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CHAPTER 1 
AIMS, SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY OF THE RESEARCH 
 
 
1.1. Object and purpose of the research 
The necessity to develop an external dimension of European migration policies 
through partnerships with countries of origin and transit has firmly been included in the 
official agenda of the European Union (EU) since the end of the last century, following 
the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999 and the Tampere European 
Council the same year, which opened the way to the Europeanisation of migration and 
asylum policies. 
Cooperation with third countries on the management of migration flows is a key 
component of the external dimension of the European migration policy and it includes 
cooperation on readmission. Readmission agreements may be generally defined as legal 
instruments that facilitate the removal of unauthorised migrants by establishing 
reciprocal obligations and procedures between the contracting parties in a treaty of 
international law. Readmission agreements have been concluded at a bilateral level 
between European States and third countries since the early 1990s. 
Since the end of the 1990s, when (with the Amsterdam Treaty) the EU gained 
competence in the area of readmission, not only have the Member States continued to 
conclude bilateral readmission agreements, but also the EU has started to negotiate 
European readmission agreements as part of the common European readmission policy. 
EU readmission agreements (EURAs) are international treaties of a reciprocal nature, 
negotiated by the European Commission on the mandate of the Council, setting out 
detailed administrative and operational procedures to facilitate the return or transit of 
persons (including own nationals, third country nationals and stateless persons) who do 
not, or no longer fulfil the conditions of entry to, presence in or residence on the 
territory of the third country or one of the EU Member States. 
Between the late 1990s and the early 2000s the development of cooperation on 
readmission in the Mediterranean area became more and more important, in light of the 
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intensification of migration flows across the Mediterranean Sea and into Europe, and 
the increasingly crucial role played by the North African countries and Turkey as 
countries of origin and/or transit. This trend has continued throughout the first decade of 
the years 2000s (although with significant evolutions and shifts in migration routes) and 
has recorded a further boost since 2011, when the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt and 
the civil wars in Libya and in Syria caused a major geopolitical fracture in the whole 
area, whose consequences, inter alia on the management of migration flows, are still 
felt loud and clear by the EU and its Member States. Against this background, 
researching cooperation on readmission with a specific focus on the Mediterranean area 
and on Euro-Mediterranean relations appears to be of particular relevance. 
Given this object (cooperation on readmission at the European and bilateral level) 
and this geographical scope (the Mediterranean area), the crucial development analysed 
by this research is the emergence during the years 2000s of what Cassarino calls 
‘informal patterns of bilateral cooperation on readmission’ (2007, 185). This expression 
refers to the increasing use of informal bilateral agreements linked to readmission (such 
as memoranda of understanding, exchanges of letters, ‘oral processes’, operational 
protocols, administrative arrangements, etc.) rather than formal readmission agreements. 
I argue that this very process can be identified also at the European level, where 
cooperation tends to be increasingly based on policy instruments such as Mobility 
Partnerships, and on informal agreements and concrete practices aimed at ensuring the 
effectiveness and rapid implementation of readmission, rather than on legal instruments 
such as EURAs. 
Mobility Partnerships (MPs) are political declarations signed at the ministerial 
level by the EU, the partner country and the interested Member States. They were 
introduced in 2007 (European Commission 2007a) as the primary instrument for the 
implementation of the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) – the new 
overarching framework for the EU external migration and asylum policy launched by 
the EU in 2005 (European Commission 2005b; European Council 2005) and renewed in 
2011 (European Commission 2011e). MPs establish a number of cooperation initiatives 
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in four policy areas, including readmission
1
; they are usually accompanied in annex by 
a list of projects which the EU, its agencies and its Member States commit to implement 
as part of the cooperation established with the partner country. 
The further step of this research consists of analysing whether and how the 
increasing use of informal instruments of cooperation on readmission both at the 
bilateral and European level impacts on the human rights of (to be) readmitted migrants, 
determining a restriction or a violation in particular of their asylum-related rights. 
To sum up, the object of this research is cooperation on readmission in the 
Mediterranean area and its purpose is to critically analyse readmission policies both at 
European and bilateral level by investigating the increasing use of informal legal, quasi-
legal and policy instruments of cooperation as well as the effects that the use of such 
instruments may have in terms of limiting or violating migrants’ human rights. 
Considering the added value of this research compared to the existing literature on 
this topic, the following can be noted. This research is the first to analyse the use of 
informal cooperation on readmission not only at the bilateral level, but also at the 
European level, emphasising the interdependence between the two levels. This is also 
the first work to compare the use of EURAs and MPs in light of a process of 
informalisation. In addition, this study is the first to compare specifically the use of 
formal and informal instruments of bilateral cooperation on readmission in three case 
studies (cooperation between Italy and Libya, Spain and Morocco, and Greece and 
Turkey), thus providing a comprehensive picture of cooperation on readmission in the 
Mediterranean and its increasingly informal nature. Finally, this research originally 
undertakes to prove, based on the evidence provided by the case studies at both the 
bilateral and European level, the existence of a relation between the effects of the use of 
informal cooperation in the field of readmission and the protection of the human rights 
of (to be) readmitted migrants. 
 
  
                                                 
1
 The policy areas included in MPs were originally three: legal migration, mobility and integration; illegal 
migration, trafficking, border control and readmission; and migration and development. The fourth policy 
area, international protection, was added in 2011 (European Commission 2011e). 
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1.2. Research questions and hypotheses 
The scope of this research is determined by two leading questions, which may be 
phrased as follows: 
1. Has there been a shift towards ‘informalisation’ in cooperation on readmission 
in the Mediterranean area, both at European and bilateral level? 
2. If so, what are the features of this ‘informalisation’ process and its implications 
on migrants’ human rights? 
For each question I have formulated a set of hypotheses that I aim to prove 
throughout the following chapters. 
 
Research question 1: Has there been a shift towards ‘informalisation’ in 
cooperation on readmission in the Mediterranean area, both at European and bilateral 
level? 
Hypothesis 1 
My first hypothesis is that in the last decade in the Mediterranean area there has 
been a gradual shift from formalisation to informalisation of readmission policies. 
While throughout the 1990s and early 2000s cooperation on readmission was 
established mainly (although with significant exceptions) by means of formal legal 
instruments (typically, international law treaties), more recently the use of informal 
quasi-legal or policy instruments has significantly increased. 
Hypothesis 2 
My second hypothesis is that this informalisation process is ‘multi-level’ because 
it occurred both at European and bilateral level. At the bilateral level, over the last 
decade (i.e. indicatively since the mid-2000s) countries on the northern and southern 
shores of the Mediterranean have increasingly grounded their migration cooperation 
policies and practices on a set of informal instruments, whose legal status is of an 
uncertain nature
2
. Examples of such informal quasi-legal instruments are: memoranda 
of understanding, exchanges of letters, ‘oral processes’, operational protocols and other 
                                                 
2
 The distinction between formal and informal instruments of cooperation will be discussed in Chapter 6, 
section 6.1. 
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kinds of (written or unwritten) agreements or arrangements between governments, 
ministries or other officials (e.g. heads of police forces). These instruments have been 
increasingly used to regulate (or re-regulate) and operationalise bilateral cooperation in 
the field of readmission.  
At the European level, despite the attempts to implement a common readmission 
policy through the negotiation of EU readmission agreements (EURAs), the limited 
results achieved in the Mediterranean area led the EU to gradually downscale the role of 
EURAs in multilateral cooperation on migration
3
. Following the launch in 2005 of the 
Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM – the second M was added in 
2011), readmission was included into a more comprehensive policy framework for 
migration cooperation with third countries. In particular, this research focuses on the 
use of Mobility Partnerships (MPs), the policy instrument introduced to implement the 
GAMM through cooperation initiatives in different areas, including readmission. The 
fact that in the aftermath of the 2011 Arab Spring, the EU resorted to MPs as an 
instrument to establish cooperation on migration (and especially on irregular migration 
and readmission) with Maghreb countries rather than pushing forward with EURAs is 
seen as an instance of informalisation at the European level
4
. Besides MPs, in the latest 
years the EU has been increasingly prioritising the effectiveness of concrete 
readmission practices, while neglecting whether such cooperation practices are based on 
formal or informal, bilateral or European, agreements
5
. 
Hypothesis 3 
My third hypothesis is that, however, informalisation at the European level may 
                                                 
3
 As it will be discussed in details in Chapter 3, the only existing EURA in the Mediterranean area is the 
EURA with Turkey, which was recently signed (on 16 December 2013; and entered into force on 1
st
 
October 2014) following a long and troubled negotiation process. Conversely, negotiations with Morocco 
(which started in 2000) are officially still ongoing (but are not progressing) and negotiations with Algeria 
(for which the Commission received the mandate in 2002) never actually took off. 
4
 As analysed in Chapter 4, following the 2011 uprisings, the EU – faced with the instability of its 
southern neighbourhood and increased migration flows –  reacted with the launch of negotiations for MPs 
with Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt. While the latter refused, Morocco and Tunisia signed MPs with the EU 
in June 2013 and March 2014, respectively. 
5
 This may be inferred from several recent documents from the European institutions, e.g. the 
Commission Communication on a EU Action Plan on Return (European Commission 2015b) and the 
Council Conclusions on the expulsion of illegally staying third country nationals (Council of the EU 
2016). 
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not produce the expected results if it is not adequately supported and pursued at the 
Member States level. Indeed, the effectiveness of a European instrument of informal 
cooperation depends on how it is implemented by Member States at the bilateral level
6
. 
European policy instruments, like MPs, provide only a very general framework for 
cooperation and need to be implemented by individual Member States through bilateral 
arrangements with the third country concerned. The same is true for informal 
readmission agreements, which may be encouraged, facilitated and supported at the 
European level, but are ultimately put in practice by Member States. 
Hypothesis 4 
My fourth hypothesis is that informalisation at the European level should not be 
regarded as a linear irreversible process and the occurrence of dynamics of ‘re-
formalisation’ should not be excluded. As a matter of fact, EURAs have never 
disappeared from the Commission’s and the Council’s official documents and the 
opening of new negotiations is from time to time suggested, rarely with a follow up. A 
significant exception, relevant to this research, is the recent opening of negotiations for 
an EURA with Tunisia, for which the Commission received mandate in December 2014 
and which formally began on 12 October 2016. Interestingly, this was one of the 
initiatives suggested in the MP signed with Tunisia in March 2014; this shows how 
European informalisation and re-formalisation processes may be fluid and intertwined. 
Research question 2: If so, what are the features of this ‘informalisation’ process 
and its implications on migrants’ human rights? 
Hypothesis 5 
My fifth hypothesis concerns the features that I consider to characterise multi-
level informalisation of cooperation on readmission. I identify three main sets of 
features, as follows. 
a. The prioritisation of the informality, flexibility and operability of cooperation, 
                                                 
6
 With ‘effectiveness of cooperation’ I refer to the capacity of cooperation policies and practices (both 
formal and informal, both at European and bilateral level) to facilitate the actual removal of the third 
country nationals concerned, accordingly with the explicit aim they have been established for. This 
definition corresponds to the institutional view of the EU and its Member States. However, I agree with 
critical views promoting a broader concept of ‘effectiveness’, which includes not only the capacity of an 
instrument to actually ‘produce’ returns, but also its ability to ensure the respect for the fundamental 
rights of (would be) readmitted migrants (see Cassarino 2010c, 43-46; 2010b, 25). 
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ensured by the possibility to rapidly adopt, immediately implement and easily modify 
an agreement. 
b. The lack of accountability and transparency of cooperation, due to the fact that 
informal agreements are negotiated at the executive/administrative level (by 
governments and ministries), are not discussed and voted by national parliaments, are 
not published on official journals and may often remain secret. 
c. The role played by non-state actors and international organisations (e.g. IOM 
and UNHCR) who are actively involved not only in the implementation but also in the 
adoption of readmission policies. As part of a process of governance expansion, these 
actors are not mere executors but rather contribute to and influence national and 
European policy-making in the field of migration cooperation (and readmission). 
Hypothesis 6 
My sixth hypothesis is that this process of multi-level informalisation has negative 
implications for the protection of migrants’ human rights. In particular, I consider how 
the use of informal cooperation instruments or initiatives by the EU and its Member 
States limits the scope of the human rights of (to be) readmitted migrants. I choose to 
focus on the legal status and rights of (to be) readmitted migrants as potential asylum 
seekers. Thus, when considering the human rights which may be subject to limitation 
(or violation) due to informalisation, I limit my analysis to four asylum-related human 
rights, namely: the right to seek asylum, the non-refoulement principle, the prohibition 
of collective expulsion and the right to an effective remedy
7
. 
As concerns the content of these rights, I mainly consider them as they are 
established in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the EU (CFR) and interpreted by the European Court of Human 
                                                 
7
 Whilst one may consider the implications of cooperation on readmission on a variety of human rights 
(including the right to life, the right to liberty and security, the right to respect for private and family life, 
etc.) or on the human rights of migrants in general, I focus precisely on its implications on the asylum-
related human rights of (to be) readmitted migrants, i.e. migrants who are directly affected by cooperation 
on readmission. This allows me to highlight the direct effect of the use of informal cooperation 
instruments and initiatives on the ability of these migrants to access and benefit from international 
protection. Moreover, I limit my analysis to readmission policies strictu sensu and do not cover issues 
related to the protection of migrants’ human rights after readmission is carried out, i.e. in the post-
deportation phase (e.g. detention in the country of transit, reintegration measures in the country of origin, 
etc.). For an analysis of post-deportation risks, see: Alpes et al. 2015; Alpes 2016; Alpes and Nyberg 
Sorensen 2016. 
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Rights (ECtHR), the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU), and some national courts. In 
my analysis, these human rights, i.e. the human rights of migrants and asylum-seekers, 
are not taken as absolute, but they are problematized and considered in their limits (also 
in light of certain critical views of human rights, such as Dembour 2006; 2010; 2015; 
Dembour and Kelly 2011; Perugini and Gordon 2015). Due consideration is given also 
to the corresponding asylum-related human rights obligations of the EU and its Member 
States (Spijkerboer 2007; 2013). 
Parallel to the process of informalisation of cooperation, I identify a process of 
restriction of migrants’ human rights and I investigate how these two processes relates 
to each other, leading to a situation where the use of informal cooperation on 
readmission leads to de facto limiting migrants’ access to human rights. The 
effectiveness of cooperation policies is prioritised over the existence of laws 
legitimising or limiting them, and in particular over existing international and European 
human rights standards. This is also due to the lack of accountability and transparency 
which characterises informalisation of cooperation. 
 
1.3. Scope of the research and case studies 
In order to prove my hypotheses, I analyse cooperation on readmission in the 
Mediterranean area both at the supranational European level and at the national bilateral 
level. For both levels, I consider two different kinds of cooperation instruments: (1) 
formal legal instruments and (2) informal quasi-legal or policy instruments
8
. 
At the European level, I examine (1) EU readmission agreements (EURAs) and 
(2) Mobility Partnerships (MPs). For both instruments I focus on: their origins and 
evolution; their content and purpose; their negotiation process and incentives offered to 
third countries; and their limits and problems. In terms of their limits, I question in 
                                                 
8
 At the European level, EURAs can be defined as legal instruments and MPs as policy instruments. At 
the national level, formal bilateral readmission agreements can be considered as legal instruments; 
conversely, informal cooperation between States is grounded on a broad variety of instruments whose 
legal status is uncertain and whose boundaries are blurred (as analysed in sections 5.1 and 6.3). Therefore, 
throughout this work I generally refer to informal bilateral cooperation agreements on readmission as 
quasi-legal instruments. Recently, similar kinds of quasi-legal instruments of cooperation on readmission 
have emerged also at the European level, in the form of political dialogues, joint statements and informal 
agreements (as analysed in section 6.2). 
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particular their European scope, their relevance and effectiveness as tools for 
cooperation on readmission, the role non-state actors and international organisations 
may play in their negotiation and implementation, as well as their human rights content. 
Given the geographical scope of my research, I analyse the relevant 
Mediterranean case studies. As concerns readmission agreements, I consider the 
pending EURA with Morocco (whose negotiations were opened in 2000 and are still 
ongoing), the pending EURA with Algeria (for which the Commission received 
mandate in 2002, but negotiations never started) and the EURA signed with Turkey in 
December 2013 and entered into force on 1
st
 October 2014. The recent opening of 
negotiations for a new EURA with Tunisia is also considered, as a possible instance of 
re-formalisation. As regards Mobility Partnerships, I analyse the MPs signed with 
Morocco and Tunisia in June 2013 and March 2014, respectively. 
The ongoing dialogue between the EU and Turkey on migration cooperation, 
which has been enhanced to face the so-called ‘refugee crisis’, is also considered as a 
further case of informalisation of cooperation. A Joint Action Plan ‘stepping up EU-
Turkey cooperation on support of refugees and migration management in view of the 
situation in Syria and Iraq’ (European Commission 2015c) agreed by the EU and 
Turkey between October and November 2015 (European Commission 2015d; European 
Council 2015c) exemplifies how a policy instrument covering inter alia cooperation on 
readmission can be used with the aim to rapidly upgrade and operationalise the 
provisions of a legal instrument (the EURA with Turkey). The EU-Turkey Statement of 
18 March 2016 (European Council 2016c) represents the peak of this recent phase of 
EU-Turkey cooperation: it is one of the most interesting borderline cases of an informal 
cooperation instrument with uncertain legal status (apparently, a political declaration 
playing the functions of a legally binding international agreement). Additional 
instruments of informal cooperation on readmission, such as high-level political 
dialogues or informal readmission arrangements, recently introduced by the EU in its 
relations with third countries also beyond the Mediterranean area (e.g. Sub-Saharan 
African and Asian countries, like Ghana and Afghanistan) are also considered, as 
examples of an increasing informalisation trend at the European level. 
At the national level, I scrutinise (1) formal bilateral readmission agreements and 
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(2) informal written or unwritten quasi-legal agreements or arrangements between 
national executives linked to readmission. My analysis of these instruments covers three 
case studies of cooperation on readmission in the Mediterranean area: (i) cooperation 
between Italy and Libya; (ii) cooperation between Spain and Morocco; and (iii) 
cooperation between Greece and Turkey. The choice of these case studies is related to a 
number of reasons. First of all, they allow my research to ideally cover the whole 
Mediterranean, i.e. the three geographical macro-areas of the Central, Western and 
Eastern Mediterranean, which correspond to the main migration routes crossing it. 
Secondly, these three case studies are very different from one another and each of them 
presents specific peculiarities which make it an interesting case on its own
9
. However, 
while analysing different uses of formal and informal cooperation instruments, I will 
also assess the existence of common patterns and similar implications, in order to draw 
a broader picture of bilateral cooperation on readmission in the Mediterranean. 
For each case study I investigate: the origins and evolution, the content and 
purpose, the incentives offered to third countries, and the problems and limits of formal 
and informal modalities of cooperation on readmission. With regards to the problems 
and limits of both formal readmission agreements and informal arrangements linked to 
readmission, I focus in particular on: their effectiveness as tools for cooperation on 
readmission; the transparency of their negotiation and adoption procedures (including 
issues of secrecy, democratic decision-making and accountability); and their impact on 
migrants’ human rights. 
Finally, as concerns the temporal scope of this study, in order to analyse in 
particular the recent phenomenon of the informalisation of cooperation on readmission 
at the European level, I had to consider also the latest developments in this policy area, 
including those taking place in the year 2016. Researching a ‘moving target’ proved to 
be an extremely interesting but challenging task; for reasons of convenience, I decided 
to cover developments until the ‘cut-off date’ of 1st December 2016. 
 
  
                                                 
9
 Features and peculiarities of each case study are discussed in the relevant sections of Chapter 5. 
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1.4. Methodology and sources 
The following sources have been used for this research. In terms of secondary 
sources, I used: academic literature and journal articles; policy papers; reports by 
international governmental and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and European 
agencies; grey literature; and media information, such as newspaper articles, blogs and 
other online sources. 
In terms of primary sources, I used: primary and secondary EU legislation; 
official documents by the European Commission, the Council of the EU, the European 
Council and the European Parliament and other relevant policy documentation by other 
EU institutions and agencies; international conventions, in particular the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR); various documents by UN bodies and by the 
Council of Europe bodies (Parliamentary Assembly, Committee for the Prevention of 
Torture, Commissioner for Human Rights); case law, primarily of the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECtHR) and to a lesser extent of the Court of Justice of the EU 
(CJEU) and some national courts; transcriptions of Italian parliamentary debates and 
works; EU readmission agreements (EURAs); Mobility Partnerships (MPs); European 
informal agreements, joint statements and political declarations linked to readmission; 
bilateral readmission agreements; bilateral migration cooperation agreements which 
include readmission clauses; and bilateral informal agreements linked to readmission
10
. 
In addition to these documentary sources, I used also information from interviews 
with: current or former EU officials working at the European Commission
11
; national 
experts and academics who have researched the topic of cooperation on readmission at 
the European or bilateral level; and lawyers and NGOs representatives who have 
investigated the issue at length. 
                                                 
10
 Informal bilateral agreements may be rather difficult to detect and access because they often remain 
unpublished, unwritten or secret. However, in some cases information about their content is made 
available either officially through parliamentary debates, or unofficially through journalistic enquires, 
leaked documents or NGOs investigations. Sometimes the existence of an informal agreement linked to 
readmission may also be deducted from the fact that it is embedded into a more general framework of 
bilateral cooperation on migration. 
11
 The Commission officials which I interviewed are (or were) mainly working at the Directorate General 
for Migration and Home Affairs (DG HOME), Dir. C: Migration and Protection Unit – Irregular 
Migration and Return Policy, and Dir. A: Strategy and General Affairs Unit – International Coordination. 
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Unfortunately, this study could not benefit from a systematic interview-based 
empirical research, because I would not be able to conduct interviews with national 
authorities and migrants in Italy, Libya, Spain, Morocco, Greece and Turkey, due to 
language, time, resources and factual constraints. Nonetheless, I deemed it worth to 
carry out interviews with some EU officials in order to gather a deeper understanding of 
the viewpoint of the Commission (and more generally of the EU institutions) on 
European readmission policies and migration cooperation with third countries in the 
Mediterranean
12
. 
In order to cover also the bilateral dimension of cooperation on readmission, I 
interviewed national experts, lawyers and NGOs representatives with a deep knowledge 
of the topic or a proved long-standing in-the-field experience in one of the three case 
studies analysed in this research. This allowed me to collect detailed first-hand 
information on bilateral cooperation on readmission in the Mediterranean. Interviews 
with national experts were also useful to supplement information gaps concerning in 
particular the Spain-Morocco and Greece-Turkey case studies, where I encountered 
some difficulties in accessing primary sources (e.g. informal agreements, policy 
documentation, parliamentary debates). 
This research is based on a qualitative methodological approach, therefore I will 
not rely on statistical and numerical analysis and I will privilege a constructivist 
perspective (Della Porta, and Keating 2008; Moses and Knutsen 2012; Alvesson and 
Sköldberg 2010). My analysis draws upon different disciplines and combines different 
approaches. Cooperation on readmission at the European and bilateral level is analysed 
mainly from a legal-political perspective (also based on the theoretical frameworks and 
conceptual tools of EU migration and asylum law, European studies, international law, 
international relations theory and critical studies on migration control), while its human 
rights implications are analysed from a legal perspective, based on relevant case law. 
Considering the literature of main importance for this research, the following can 
be noted. The study of cooperation on readmission at the European level draws upon the 
                                                 
12
 In preparing my interviews with EU officials I have drawn upon literature on interviewing elites 
(Aberbach and Rockman 2002; Berry 2002; Desmond 2004; Goldstein 2002; Harvey 2011; Mikecz 2012; 
Rice 2010). 
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literature on the process of Europeanisation of asylum and migration policies (Peers 
1998; 2011; Peers et al. 2012; Hailbronner 2000; Guiraudon 2000; Lavenex 2001; De 
Bruycker 2003; Geddes 2003; Vink 2005; Faist and Ette 2007) and on the external 
dimension of the European migration policy (Boswell 2003; Lavenex and Uçarer 2002; 
Lavenex 2004; 2006; De Bruycker et al. 2011; Cremona et al. 2011). The analysis of 
EU readmission agreements owes much to the seminal work of Coleman (2009), while 
the analysis of Mobility Partnerships is inspired by the works of Kunz, Lavenex and 
Panizzon (Kunz et al. 2011; Kunz 2013; Kunz and Maisenbacher 2013) and Carrera and 
Hernández i Sagrera (2009; 2011). 
The analysis of cooperation on readmission at the bilateral level largely draws 
upon the works of Cassarino (2007; 2010a; 2010c; 2014), which inspired this research 
since the very beginning, being the first scholar to study the use of informal agreements 
in the field of migration cooperation in the Mediterranean area. From an international 
law perspective, also the works of Pastore (1998), Hailbronner (1997) and Favilli 
(2005) proved very useful. Paoletti’s (2011a) research on the relations between Italy and 
Libya in the field of migration has been of utmost relevance to my analysis of the 
Italian-Libyan case study. 
My reflection on the process of informalisation and its features draws upon the 
early work of Lipson (1991) and the outcomes of a more recent research project on 
‘informal international law-making’ (Pauwelyn, Wessel and Wouters 2012a; 2012b; 
Berman et al. 2012), to which I refer for a definition of ‘informality’. My analysis of the 
relation between cooperation on readmission and human rights draws upon the 
contrasting opinions of Coleman (2009) on the one hand, and Giuffré (2013a; 2013b) 
and Noll (2005) on the other hand. My investigation into the human rights implications 
of informal cooperation on readmission has been hugely inspired also by the works of 
Gammeltoft-Hansen on the relation between the externalisation of European migration 
control policies and international refugee law (2011; 2012; 2014) and by Hathaway’s 
and Gammeltoft-Hansen’s conceptualisation of ‘non-entrée policies’ and ‘cooperative 
deterrence policies’ (Hathaway 1992; Gammeltoft-Hansen and Hathaway 2015). 
My analysis of the nature, content and limits of migrants’ human rights in the 
European context owes much also to the reading of the works of certain critical 
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scholars, such as Douzinas (2000), Dembour (2006; 2011; 2015), Spijkerboer (2007; 
2013) and Perugini and Gordon (2015), whose perspective on human rights helped me 
to problematize the issue. Finally, Gammeltoft-Hansen and Adler-Nissen’s (2008) 
concept of ‘sovereignty games’ inspired my research into how national governments 
mould and strategically use informal quasi-legal instruments to reaffirm their 
sovereignty and autonomy, while limiting the scope of migrants’ human rights. 
This wide and diverse literature was fundamental to the shaping of my own ideas 
and, together with information gathered from primary sources and interviews, to my 
analysis of cooperation on readmission in the Mediterranean and its human rights 
implications. 
 
1.5. Structure 
The next chapter (Chapter 2) focuses on cooperation on readmission at the 
European level. The European readmission policy is contextualised within its broader 
policy framework: an introductory overview of the origins and evolution of the external 
dimension of the EU migration and asylum policy is followed by an analysis of 
common migration cooperation initiatives developed in the Euro-Mediterranean area. 
Chapter 3 is dedicated to European readmission agreements (EURAs). An account of 
the origins and evolution of EURAs within the framework of the EU return and 
readmission policy is followed by an analysis of their content and purpose, their 
negotiation process and incentives offered to third countries, and their limits. As 
mentioned above, EURAs are assessed in terms of: their European scope; their 
relevance and effectiveness as tools for cooperation on readmission; the role non-state 
actors and international organisations may play in their negotiation and implementation; 
and their human rights content. Two case studies are discussed in this chapter: the 
EURA with Turkey and the pending EURAs with Morocco and Algeria. 
Chapter 4 focuses on Mobility Partnerships (MPs). It moves from a description of 
the policy context of MPs, including their origins and evolution within the framework 
of the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM). Parallel to the previous 
section on EURAs, this introduction is followed by an analysis of the content and 
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purpose of MPs, their negotiation process and incentives offered to third countries, and 
their limits. MPs are also assessed in terms of: their European scope; their relevance and 
effectiveness as tools for cooperation on readmission; the role non-state actors and 
international organisations may play in their negotiation and implementation; and their 
human rights content. The case studies scrutinised in this chapter are the MP with 
Morocco and the MP with Tunisia. 
Chapter 5 analyses cooperation on readmission at the bilateral level. The first 
section introduces bilateral cooperation on readmission as part of a broader framework 
of bilateral cooperation on migration management and describes its origins and 
evolution in the Mediterranean area. This introductory section is followed by an 
analysis of three case studies of bilateral cooperation on readmission, concerning Italy 
and Libya, Spain and Morocco, and Greece and Turkey. This study focuses on patterns 
of both formal and informal cooperation on readmission, investigating on: their origins 
and evolution; their content and purpose; the incentives offered to third countries; and 
their problems and limits, with particular regard to their effectiveness as tools for 
cooperation on readmission, the transparency of their negotiation and adoption 
procedures, and their impact on migrants’ human rights. 
Chapter 6 discusses the process of multi-level informalisation and describes its 
fundamental features. The first section elaborates on the concept of informalisation 
drawing upon studies on informality in international law-making and global 
governance. The second section discusses informalisation at the European level. On the 
one hand, it shows how MPs are an example of a broader trend, which privileges the use 
of policy instruments and concrete practices rather than legal instruments to establish 
cooperation on migration in general, and on readmission in particular. The EU-Turkey 
Action Plan for cooperation on migration management and the subsequent EU-Turkey 
Agreement are analysed (in their relation with the existing EURA with Turkey) as an 
example of this trend. 
On the other hand, this section argues that: (i) the effectiveness of European 
instruments of informal cooperation depends on their implementation at the level of 
Member States, as proved by the case of the Greek implementation of the EU-Turkey 
Agreement of 18 March 2016; and (ii) informalisation of cooperation on readmission at 
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the European level is not a linear irreversible process, as proved by the opening of 
negotiations for new EURAs with Tunisia and Nigeria, which may be interpreted as 
instances of ‘re-formalisation’. 
The third section of Chapter 6 focuses on informalisation at the bilateral level. It 
discusses the peculiar features of informal agreements linked to readmission and the 
reasons why States make an extensive use of them rather than (or in addition to already 
established) formal readmission agreements. Based on the empirical evidence provided 
by the three case studies analysed in Chapter 5, three common fundamental features are 
identified and discussed: (a) their flexibility, immediate operability, rapidity in the 
adoption; (b) the lack of visibility, transparency and accountability; (c) the role of non-
state actors and international organisations. The last section of Chapter 6 describes how 
these features of informal cooperation apply also at the European level. 
Chapter 7 addresses the implications of informal cooperation on readmission on 
the human rights of migrants. As anticipated in my sixth hypothesis mentioned above, I 
consider how the use of informal cooperation instruments or initiatives by the EU and 
its Member States limits the scope of the human rights of (to be) readmitted migrants. 
My analysis is focused in particular on asylum-related human rights, namely: the non-
refoulement principle; the right to seek asylum; the prohibition of collective expulsion; 
and the right to an effective remedy, mainly (but not exclusively) as set in the ECHR 
and interpreted by the ECtHR. 
The first section introduces the four asylum-related human rights that are the 
object of my analysis, and reflects on their nature, content and limits. Based on the three 
case studies of bilateral cooperation discussed under Chapter 5, the second section 
analyses how informal modalities of bilateral cooperation on readmission affect those 
rights. The third section is dedicated to the human rights implications of informal 
cooperation at the European level; it focuses in particular on the EU-Turkey Statement 
of 18 March 2016 to examine how this informal agreement infringes upon the four 
above-mentioned asylum-related human rights. Based on this investigation, in the 
conclusion of this work, I argue that, parallel to a process of informalisation of 
cooperation on readmission, one can identify a process of restriction of the fundamental 
rights of migrants and asylum seekers. 
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CHAPTER 2 
COOPERATION ON READMISSION AT EUROPEAN LEVEL. 
POLICY FRAMEWORK 
 
 
2.1. Origins and evolution of the external dimension of the EU migration 
and asylum policy 
The EU readmission policy is part of a broader policy framework which integrates 
migration and asylum into the EU’s external policy. This broader policy framework is 
known as the ‘external dimension’ of the EU migration and asylum policy; this term 
identifies a whole set of policies aimed at addressing migration and asylum issues 
through the cooperation with third countries of origin and transit. 
At the European level, migration cooperation with third countries has been 
explicitly endorsed as part of a more integrated approach to migration management at 
the meeting of the European Council in Tampere in October 1999. The Tampere 
Conclusions outlined a five-year programme for the creation of a so-called ‘area of 
freedom, security and justice’ in the European Union. This programme provided for the 
development of a common immigration and asylum policy; the management of 
migration in partnership with third countries was considered a key element of this 
policy. 
The ground-breaking Tampere Conclusions called for ‘a comprehensive approach 
to migration addressing political, human rights and development issues in countries and 
regions of origin and transit’ and for ‘a greater coherence of internal and external 
policies of the Union’ (European Council 1999, para 11). This represented a clear and 
explicit acknowledgement of the need to integrate migration and asylum objectives into 
the EU’s external relations in view of creating an external policy in the area of Justice 
and Home Affairs (JHA) based on cooperation with third countries
1
. 
                                                 
1
 ‘The European Council underlines that all competences and instruments at the disposal of the Union, 
and in particular, in external relations must be used in an integrated and consistent way to build the area 
of freedom, security and justice. Justice and Home Affairs concerns must be integrated in the definition 
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2.1.1. Origins of the EU external migration policy in the early 1990s: control-
oriented approach vs prevention-oriented approach 
However, already in the early 1990s discussions and proposals had emerged from 
both the Commission and the European Council about the need for a more 
comprehensive approach to asylum and migration policies and for their coordination 
with the EU’s foreign relations. 
As early as 1991, a Commission Communication on Immigration pointed to ‘a 
more extensive incorporation of migration into the Community’s external policy’ in 
order to ‘counter external migration pressure’ (European Commission 1991, para 47). 
This communication included a first reflection on how to address the so-called ‘root 
causes’ of migration and suggested the inclusion of a number of provisions into future 
cooperation agreements with third countries
2
. It contained also a first proposal to 
develop ‘common principles and procedures for the repatriation of immigrants in an 
irregular situation’ from one of the (at that time twelve) Member States to a third 
country (European Commission 1991, para 54). 
In December 1992 the Edinburgh European Council adopted a ‘Declaration on 
principles governing external aspects of migration policy’ (European Council 1992, Part 
A, Annex 5). The Declaration affirmed that ‘coordination of action in the fields of 
foreign policy, economic cooperation and immigration and asylum policy by the 
Community and its Member States could […] contribute substantially to addressing the 
question of migratory movements’ (European Council 1992, Part A, Annex 5, para ix). 
The statement recognised a detailed list of factors that would reduce migratory 
movements into Europe, including both forced migration and migration based on 
economic reasons
3
; the Community and its Member States committed to address such 
factors, with the purpose of improving the political and socio-economic conditions in 
                                                                                                                                               
and implementation of other Union policies and activities’ (European Council 1999, para 59). 
2
 Such provisions concerned: the fair treatment of migrants in the EU; measures to enable migrants’ 
contribution to the development of their country of origin; but also measures to keep potential migrants in 
their area of origin (European Commission 1991, para 49). 
3
 Factors listed were: ‘preservation of peace and the termination of armed conflicts; full respect for 
human rights; the creation of democratic societies and adequate social conditions; a bilateral trade policy, 
which should improve economic conditions in the country of emigration’ (European Council 1992, Part 
A, Annex 5, para ix). 
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countries of origin, contributing in the long term to reducing migration pressure 
(European Council 1992, Part A, Annex 5, paras 1, 3 and 4). As concerns readmission, 
the Community and its Member States committed to work for bilateral or multilateral 
agreements with third countries of origin and transit and they proposed to link their 
general foreign relations with third countries to the latter’s degree of cooperation on 
readmission (European Council 1992, Part A, Annex 5, paras 6-7). 
During its first meeting in November 1993, the Justice and Home Affairs Council 
further explored the idea of linking migration and asylum policy objectives to other 
policy fields. In particular, the JHA Council suggested the use of ‘beneficial’ 
cooperation agreements with third countries in the economic and development fields to 
obtain their cooperation in the areas of migration control and readmission (Coleman 
2009, 20). 
In these early documents of the EU external migration policy one can already 
recognise the co-existence of two distinct approaches to cooperation with third 
countries, which Boswell defined as the ‘control-oriented approach’ and the 
‘prevention-oriented approach’ (2003, 619-620). The former is focused on externalising 
migration control, combating irregular migration, facilitating readmission and keeping 
asylum seekers in their region of origin, whereas the latter addresses the factors which 
influence migration in the countries of origin, taking into consideration how political, 
economic, development, trade and other foreign relations issues affect migration. As 
explored in this section, the whole development of the EU external migration and 
asylum policy is characterised by a tension between these two approaches. In different 
phases efforts were made to combine them in a balanced way (especially on the 
initiative of the Commission), but looking at the entire 25-year evolution of this policy 
field, it can be noted that the control-oriented approach has prevailed over the 
prevention-oriented one. 
 
2.1.2. Reasons for developing an ‘external dimension’ of the EU migration 
policy 
But what were the reasons that pushed the Member States and the EU to adopt an 
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external approach to migration and asylum issues? At the origins of the development of 
the external dimension of EU migration and asylum policy was, firstly, a (partly real 
and partly perceived) increase in migration and refugee flows in the late 1980s-early 
1990s
4
, combined with the perceived inadequacy of traditional domestic migration 
control instruments (Boswell 2003, 621; Billet 2010, 45-46). 
Secondly, and in connection with the previous factor, starting from the 1980s, 
migration has been increasingly perceived as a problem, framed in terms of a ‘security 
threat’, linked to other internal security issues, and it has gradually reached the top of 
national political agendas. The increasing politicisation of migration and asylum led 
political parties in most European countries to seek electoral consensus through 
promises to restrict migration flows. This climate fuelled a fierce anti-migrant populist 
discourse, which legitimised increasingly restrictive policies, including the 
externalisation of migration control (Kruse 2007, 115-117; Boswell 2003, 623-624). 
Thirdly, the Europeanisation process itself played a role in determining the 
expansion of the EU migration and asylum policy beyond the borders of the EU. In 
particular, the abolition of internal border controls (introduced by the 1990 Schengen 
Convention
5
) required not only a strengthened intra-EU cooperation between Member 
States but also an enhanced cooperation with countries of origin and transit in order to 
strengthen controls at the EU external borders and limit migration into the EU. The 
development of the external dimension was to some extent the ‘natural continuation’ of 
the process of Europeanisation of migration and asylum policies (Boswell 2003, 622). 
Similarly, Lavenex highlights the interrelation between internal communitarisation and 
external widening of migration policies: according to the author, this process ‘reflects 
the continuity of a policy frame that emphasises the control, and, therewith, security 
                                                 
4
 In the late 1980s-early 1990s Western Europe experienced the fear of a mass influx of people coming 
from Central and Eastern Europe following the collapse of communism; these fears proved to be largely 
unfounded, as they did not materialise in the expected massive migration pressure. However, 
approximately the same period, i.e. the first half of the 1990s, was characterised also by a (this time real) 
significant increase in the number of refugees fleeing the civil war in the former Yugoslavia. (Boswell 
2003, 621; Van Selm 2002, 146). 
5
 Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the Governments of the 
States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic, on the 
Gradual Abolition of Checks at their Common Borders, 19 June 1990. 
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aspect of migration’ (Lavenex 2006, 330)6. 
Finally, a number of scholars have emphasised also the role played by national 
bureaucracies both in the process of Europeanisation and in the process of 
externalisation of migration and asylum policies (Guiraudon 2000, 2003; Lavenex 
2006). Communitarisation and internationalisation may be interpreted as a strategy by 
interior ministers and immigration officials to increase their autonomy against political, 
normative and institutional constraints on their restrictive control-oriented migration 
policy-making. Originally these constraints were to be found at the national level, but 
communitarisation of migration and asylum policies (which involved, inter alia, the co-
decision of the European Parliament and the extension of the CJEU jurisdiction in this 
area) moved them up to the European level. Therefore, the external action in the JHA 
field may have also represented ‘an “escape” road for national executives resisting a 
communitarisation of their domain’ (Lavenex 2006, 346). 
 
2.1.3. Development of the EU external migration policy throughout the 1990s 
The lack of follow-up to the above-mentioned statements and policy papers led 
the Commission to re-launch the initiative for a common migration policy in February 
1994, through an elaborate Communication on Immigration and Asylum Policies. While 
explicitly drawing upon the Edinburgh Conclusions, it represented ‘the first deep 
discussion of a comprehensive approach toward asylum and immigration policies in the 
EU’ (Van Selm 2002, 146), combining prevention-oriented and control-oriented 
measures. This document emphasised the need for a holistic approach to migration, 
which would include: action on the causes of migration pressure; action on controlling 
migration flows; and action to strengthen integration of legal migrants (European 
Commission 1994a, Foreword). This Communication contained more detailed 
references to the root causes of migration (European Commission 1994a, 13-19) but it 
also identified the repatriation of irregular migrants as a key instrument in the fight 
against illegal immigration (European Commission 1994a, 30-31). Among the 
‘measures to facilitate the repatriation of illegal immigrants’, the Commission 
                                                 
6
 On the same line, see also: Kruse 2007, 117. 
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mentioned the relevance of readmission agreements and reiterated the JHA Council 
suggestion to establish a link between RAs and other external agreements (European 
Commission 1994a, paras 114-115). In addition, the Commission admitted the 
‘important consequences’ and ‘considerable burdens’ that RAs may cause to countries 
of origins and transits, and thus proposed an active policy of assistance and support 
towards those countries (European Commission 1994a, para 116). 
Following the 1994 Commission Communication, the Council adopted a series of 
measures focused on readmission, aimed on the one hand at harmonising national 
readmission policies and on the other hand at incorporating readmission objectives into 
the EU external relations
7
. But the prevention-oriented approach focused on the 
situation in countries of origin was left aside
8
. For some time the idea of a 
comprehensive EU migration policy was ‘only implemented in a piecemeal fashion’ 
(Peers, 2011, 590). Towards the end of the century, between 1998 and 1999, the 
initiative for a more integrated and outward-looking approach to migration was 
resumed, culminating, as mentioned above, in the Tampere Conclusions
9
. But the way 
leading to Tampere included two significant steps. 
The first one was the controversial Strategy Paper on Immigration and Asylum 
submitted by the Austrian Presidency to the Council in July 1998, which analysed what 
was considered as the failure to effectively implement the EU migration and asylum 
policy following the 1992 Edinburgh Conclusions and the 1994 Commission 
Communication. Although the paper was strongly criticised (mainly due to its proposal 
to radically review the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the status of refugees) and 
actually never adopted by the Council, parts of this document influenced the following 
development of the external dimension of the EU migration policy (Van Selm 2002, 
147; Boswell 2003, 628; Coleman 2009, 23). 
                                                 
7
 These measures contributed significantly to the development of a common readmission policy; they will 
be described more in details under section 3.1 below. 
8
 According to Van Selm, at that point ‘the momentum to investigate the causes of migration [had] 
diminished’ (2002, 146) because the refugee flow from former Yugoslavia had reduced and fears for an 
‘invasion’ from former communist countries had not materialised. 
9
 Among the factors which influenced this renewed interest in an external approach to migration and 
asylum there was a significant rise in the numbers of asylum seekers from Iraq in the period 1995-1997 
(Boswell 2003, 629). 
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In particular, the Austrian paper suggested the EU migration policy includes 
actions aimed to the ‘reduction of migratory pressure in the main countries of origin’, 
such as: ‘intervention in conflict regions; extension of development aid and economic 
cooperation; political cooperation between host States and States of origin; raising of 
human rights standards’ (Council of the EU 1998, para 41). As concerns readmission, 
the paper evaluated ‘the steps taken to establish the widest possible network of 
readmission agreements’ as ‘strikingly unsuccessful’ (Council of the EU 1998, para 19) 
and it committed the EU to establish a ‘complete system of deportation agreements’ and 
to link bilateral agreements beneficial to a third country (e.g. concerning visa 
requirements, economic cooperation, etc.) to ‘repatriation agreements and migration 
control obligations’ (Council of the EU 1998, section 5.4) 
The second step was the establishment in December 1998 of the High Level 
Working Group on Asylum and Immigration (HLWG), on a proposal from the Dutch 
government. This new body, created within the Council, had the task to ‘establish a 
common, integrated, cross-pillar approach targeted at the situation in the most important 
countries of origin of asylum seekers and migrants’ (Council of the EU 1999a, para 1). 
The Group was, thus, supposed to focus on the alleviation of root causes of migration in 
countries of origin, but it was soon criticised for concentrating more on the 
externalisation of migration control and on readmission obligations (Coleman 2009, 23-
24). Not only its approach, but also its composition was meant to be ‘cross-pillar’, as 
the HLWG’s members were officials and ministers from different policy areas, i.e. 
home affairs, trade, development and foreign affairs (despite the prevalence of home 
affairs officials)
10
. 
The HLWG had to identify a list of third countries to be the object of its analysis 
and prepare a cross-pillar Action Plan for each of them
11
. The countries identified were: 
Afghanistan/Pakistan, Albania/Kosovo, Iraq, Morocco, Somalia, and Sri Lanka 
                                                 
10
 This ‘cross-pillar setting’ was a new, and not unproblematic, institutional development, given in 
particular the reluctant attitude of development and external policy officials, who feared the risk of 
subordinating development and external relations goals (and budget) to migration control objectives (Van 
Selm 2002, 151; Boswell 2003, 631). 
11
 For details on the tasks of the HLWG and the elements Action Plans should contain, see Council of the 
EU 1999a. 
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(Council of the EU 1999a, para 3). The first five Action Plans were submitted to the 
Tampere summit in October 1999 and they were welcomed by the European Council. 
However, when the implementation of the Action Plans had to start, their major 
shortcomings emerged clearly. 
Their implementation required a dialogue with the countries concerned, but the 
same countries had not been involved at all in their drafting. Some countries did not 
appreciate being excluded, or even felt insulted, as in the case of Morocco, which asked 
a joint redrafting of its Action Plan. With other countries (Afghanistan/Pakistan and 
Iraq) it was impossible to enter into dialogue, due to the geopolitical situation or the 
breaking of diplomatic relations. If one considers the chances to implement in practice 
the projects indicated in the Action Plans, it seems that the countries selected by the 
HLWG were not the most appropriate; in addition, their lack of involvement in the 
drafting of the reports and plans had a negative impact on their willingness to cooperate 
in the implementation phase (Van Selm 2002, 152-158; Peers 2004, 207)
12
. These 
elements reduced the potential real impact of the first Action Plans as instruments of the 
EU external migration policy
13
. 
The Tampere Conclusions drew upon, and somehow overtook, the HLWG 
initiative; the European Council made it clear that the comprehensive outward-looking 
approach to migration developed until that moment would be upheld and further 
developed, through the integration of different (internal and external) policy areas and 
through an increased cooperation with third countries. Compared to previous years, this 
was the beginning of a more structured attempt to integrate migration and asylum issues 
into the EU’s external relations. 
 
                                                 
12
 Boswell considers a number of additional shortcomings of the HLWG and its work, namely: the lack 
of know-how and experience of HLWG officials; ‘a superficial understanding of the root causes of 
migration and refugee flows, and of possible external relations tools appropriate for addressing them’; 
tensions between officials from different policy areas which hampered cooperation; primary focus on 
externalisation of migration control, readmission, containment of asylum seekers in the region of origin 
(Boswell 2003, 630-631). 
13
 Nonetheless, the HLWG experience was not put aside; on the contrary, its functioning was improved in 
order to overcome the above-mentioned shortcomings and its mandate was expanded to encompass a 
broader set of tasks in the development of the EU external migration policy (Council of the EU 2002b). 
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2.1.4. Implementation of the EU external migration policy in the early 2000s 
The years 2001-2002 were crucial for the operationalisation of the EU external 
migration and asylum policy (Peers 2011, 590). The European Council meetings in 
Santa Maria de Feira (June 2000) and in Laeken (December 2001) confirmed the 
intention to develop a common migration policy with a strong external dimension. 
In June 2002 the European Council in Seville established new relevant rules 
concerning the external dimension of migration control. In Seville it was decided: to 
include in all future EU Association and Cooperation Agreements with third countries a 
standard clause on joint migration management and compulsory readmission; to offer 
financial and technical assistance to third countries in order to ensure their cooperation 
in migration management, border control and readmission; and to introduce a ‘sanction 
policy’ in case third countries do not provide adequate cooperation (European Council 
2002, paras 33-36). The latter provision marked a significant change in strategy, as it 
introduced for the first time, along with a policy of assistance and support to third 
countries based on ‘positive incentives’, the possible use of punitive measures (so-
called ‘negative incentives’) against third countries which are considered unjustifiably 
unwilling to cooperate on migration control and readmission. 
In November 2002 the General Affairs and External Relations (GAER) Council 
agreed to implement the Seville Conclusions in practice. It established the criteria for 
deciding which third countries to address for intensifying cooperation in the field of 
migration
14
, and based on these criteria, it identified nine countries to target: Albania, 
China, Yugoslavia, Libya, Morocco, Russia, Tunisia, Turkey and Ukraine
15
 (Council of 
the EU 2002d, paras 4-5). The Council decided also on the content of the standard 
‘migration management clause’ to be included in all future Association and Cooperation 
Agreements (Council of the EU 2002d, para 8). 
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 The criteria are: nature and size of migratory flows towards the EU; geographical position in relation to 
the EU; need for capacity building concerning migration management; existing framework for 
cooperation; attitude towards cooperation on migration issues (Council of the EU 2002d, para 4). 
15
 Except for China, the selected countries are Eastern or Southern neighbours of the EU. Comparing this 
list with the list of countries for which the HLWG had drafted its Action Plans in 1999, it emerges that the 
focus of the EU external migration policy has shifted from countries of origin to countries of transit in the 
neighbourhood of the EU, and from the root causes of migration to joint migration- and border control 
(Coleman 2009, 115). 
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If we consider, along with these developments, also the Commission Green Paper 
and the Commission Communication on a Community Return Policy on Illegal 
Residents, issued in April and October 2002 respectively, it clearly appears that in the 
post-Tampere era the EU institutions adopted a control-oriented approach to the EU 
external migration policy (as discussed also under section 3.1 below). Efforts to 
enhance cooperation with third countries were focused mainly on combating irregular 
migration and human trafficking and strengthening cooperation on readmission, joint 
migration management and border control. 
However, towards the end of the year 2002, the Commission seemed to endorse a 
more balanced approach. The Communication on Integrating Migration Issues in the 
EU Relations with Third Countries issued in December 2002 represented the first 
detailed examination of the external relations aspects of migration policy, with a strong 
focus on third countries (Boswell 2003, 634-635; Peers 2011, 592). It analysed factors 
determining migration (including its root causes), as well as the impact of migration on 
developing countries (remittances, brain drain, etc.), and it suggested policies which 
would reduce migration demand in countries of origin (i.e. poverty reduction, 
liberalisation of trade, more liberal rules on short-term movements of people, conflict 
prevention, good governance, rural development). 
The communication urged the EU to be more sensitive in its relations with 
countries of origin and transit, and to acknowledge the costs and problems related to 
migration in general, and to readmission in particular, that those countries experience. 
According to the Commission, these elements should be taken into due account when it 
comes to the negotiation of EURAs, because a better knowledge of the situation and 
perspective of the partner country would be useful in order to offer the most appropriate 
incentives (e.g. a more generous visa policy or increased quotas for migrant workers), as 
financial and technical assistance may not always be sufficiently attractive (European 
Commission 2002c, 25-26). 
However, the Commission itself realistically admitted the difficulties in 
implementing such policies, especially due to the limited margin of manoeuvre at its 
disposal in policy areas falling under the competence of Member States or under the 
influence of international organisations like the World Trade Organisation (European 
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Commission 2002c, 26). Another obstacle to the proper implementation of the EU 
external migration policies was the lack of independent financial backing and 
consequent budgetary constraints, a problem which dates back to the 1998 HLWG 
initiative. But in the second part of the Communication, the Commission announced its 
intention to expand the EU funding dedicated to the external migration policy. Indeed, 
in 2004 the EU launched the AENEAS programme, a funding programme dedicated to 
technical and financial assistance to third countries in the areas of migration and 
asylum
16
. 
In her 2003 work, Boswell admitted that, at the time of writing, external migration 
policies were ‘still in their infancy’ and the EU was still in the process of defining 
which forms of cooperation would be more appropriate to achieve the multiple goals of 
EU external migration polices. Boswell considered that until that moment cooperation 
had comprised a (oscillating) combination of both approaches, but she wondered which 
one would predominate in the future. Conversely, Bouteillet-Paquet argued that until 
that moment (always the year 2003) the EU external migration policy had not 
incorporated the so-called ‘integrated approach’ and had predominantly been control-
oriented, with very limited progress in terms of root causes, migration prevention and 
political, economic and development cooperation with third countries (Bouteillet-Paquet 
2003, 373). According to the author, Member States’ priorities had driven the overall 
EU migration policy towards the fight against illegal immigration, while the prevention-
oriented approach developed by the Commission had been largely overlooked. 
 
2.1.5. The EU external migration policy within the framework of the Global 
Approach to Migration and Mobility 
In September 2005 the Commission issued a Communication on Migration and 
Development, which reaffirmed the approach of the December 2002 Communication. 
The document addressed the question of how to improve the impact of migration on 
                                                 
16
 Regulation (EC) No 491/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2004 
establishing a programme for financial and technical assistance to third countries in the areas of migration 
and asylum (AENEAS). For an analysis of the Aeneas Regulation, see: Coleman 2009, 125-128. 
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development focusing in detail on the issues of remittances, diasporas, circular 
migration and brain drain (European Commission 2005a). Apparently, starting from the 
end of 2002, the Commission had embraced and supported a more balanced and 
comprehensive approach to the EU external action in the area of migration, prioritising 
prevention-oriented policies. This orientation seems to be confirmed and expanded in 
the following years, with the launch of the Global Approach to Migration (GAM). 
In November 2005 the Commission proposed a new action plan on the external 
aspects of migration, called ‘Priority actions for responding to the challenges of 
migration’, in response to a call by the informal European Council held at Hampton 
Court one month before (European Commission 2005b); in December that year the 
European Council endorsed the plan, in the form of a ‘Global Approach to Migration’ 
(European Council 2005, paras 8-10 and Annex I). Starting from that moment, the 
GAM became the overarching framework of the EU external migration policy. In the 
following years it was further developed, at first, to include the principle of ‘circular 
migration’ and the new policy tool of ‘Mobility Partnerships’ (European Commission 
2007a). Later on, it was further expanded to incorporate more explicitly the concept of 
‘mobility’ - thus becoming the ‘Global Approach to Migration and Mobility’ (GAMM) 
- and a fourth pillar dedicated to international protection and the external dimension of 
the EU asylum policy (European Commission 2011e)
17
. 
The analysis which follows will show that, even if on the paper the GAMM 
represents a balanced and comprehensive approach to cooperation with third countries, 
in practice its control- and security-oriented component is the prevailing one. Indeed, its 
second pillar, dedicated to irregular migration, human trafficking, border control and 
readmission, has long been an underpinning priority in the framework of the GAMM, 
but lately it has markedly come to the forefront, as it clearly emerges from the most 
recent documents issued both by the Commission and the Council on the EU return and 
readmission policy (such as the Commission’s EU Action Plan on Return of September 
2015 and the Council Conclusions on the future of the return policy of October 2015)
18
. 
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 The GAMM and Mobility Partnerships will be analysed in details under Chapter 4. 
18
 These and other recent documents concerning the EU return and readmission policy are analysed under 
section 3.1. 
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2.1.6. The EU external migration policy as a bargaining process 
One final remark concerns the nature of the EU external migration policy from the 
point of view of international relations. This section has analysed the development of 
the EU external migration policy from a European perspective, but this should not 
mislead the reader. As argued by several international relations scholars, far from being 
solely a unilateral process whereby the EU and its Member States export migration 
control instruments outside their territory, the external dimension of migration consists 
of a network of complex and ever-changing bilateral and multilateral relations, whereby 
both the EU and its Member States, and third countries exercise power or pressure on 
the counterpart across different policy fields. 
From this perspective, the external dimension of migration can be seen not only in 
terms of externalisation of migration control at the expenses of countries of origin and 
transit (as it has traditionally been) but rather as a bargaining process, where both 
parties involved are able to affect the behaviour of their counterpart using all 
instruments at their disposal, including in the areas of migration, foreign affairs, trade, 
development, energy, and security (Paoletti 2010; 2011a; 2011b; Cassarino 2005; 2007; 
2010b). Examples of such bidirectional bargaining process may be found both at the 
European level (see section 3.5, which analyses the negotiation of EU readmission 
agreements with Morocco, Algeria and Turkey) and at the bilateral level (see the case 
studies analysed under Chapter 5 and section 6.3). 
 
2.2. European migration cooperation initiatives in the Euro-Mediterranean 
area 
Before analysing a specific component of the EU external migration policy, i.e. 
the EU readmission policy, it may be useful to briefly recall the main European 
migration cooperation initiatives in the geographical area of interest to this study, i.e. 
the Mediterranean area. This section aims to provide a broad picture of migration 
cooperation between the EU and Mediterranean third countries, as this represents the 
general framework where to situate cooperation on readmission. 
The EU policy towards the Mediterranean countries encompasses two types of 
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cooperation initiatives: multilateral initiatives, involving the EU, its Member States and 
the partner countries gathered all together in one forum; and bilateral initiatives 
individually targeted to the third countries concerned. 
 
2.2.1. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
Multilateral dialogue in the Mediterranean area has largely taken place within the 
framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), also known as the ‘Barcelona 
Process’, launched at the Euro-Mediterranean ministerial Conference held in Barcelona 
in November 1995, on the basis of the October 1994 Commission Communication on 
Strengthening the Mediterranean Policy of the EU: Establishing a Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership. The EMP was created as a comprehensive multilateral forum for dialogue 
and cooperation at regional level, between the EU, its (at that time fifteen) Member 
States and (originally twelve) Mediterranean third countries. Nowadays the partnership, 
renamed ‘Union for the Mediterranean’ (UfM) counts, along with the European 
institutions, 43 members: 28 EU Member States and 15 third countries across the 
Southern and Eastern Mediterranean (i.e. Albania, Algeria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Mauritania, Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, Palestine, 
Syria [suspended], Tunisia and Turkey; plus Libya as an observer)
19
. 
The Barcelona Declaration set three broad objectives for the EMP: to establish ‘a 
common area of peace and stability’; to create ‘an area of shared prosperity’ through the 
establishment of a free market zone; and to develop ‘human resources’ and promote 
‘understanding between cultures and exchanges between civil societies’ (Barcelona 
Declaration 1995). These three goals correspond to three areas of dialogue and 
                                                 
19
 Another relevant multilateral sub-regional cooperation initiative focused on migration is the 5+5 
Dialogue on Migration in the Western Mediterranean, established in 2002. Contrary to the EMP, it does 
not involve the EU institutions, but five European countries (France, Italy, Malta, Portugal and Spain) and 
five Mediterranean third countries (Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia), with the 
participation of the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) and the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) as 
observers. The 5+5 Dialogue focuses mainly on the fight against irregular migration and human 
trafficking, joint border management and information exchange, but (to a lesser extent) it also deals with 
labour migration, migrant integration, co-development and protection of migrant rights. It offers a 
comprehensive framework which aims also to foster the development of bilateral initiatives between 
individual Member States and North African countries. https://www.iom.int/55-dialogue-migration-
western-mediterranean. Accessed on 10 August 2016. 
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cooperation: on political and security issues; on economic and financial issues; and on 
social and cultural issues. Although migration cut across the three areas, it was placed 
under the third one; according to Pastore this was for the EU and its Member States ‘to 
avoid choosing between whether migration was a security or an economic issue’ (2002, 
111). Under its ‘third pillar’, the Barcelona Declaration contains two statements on 
migration: 
 
[the participants] acknowledge the importance of the role played by migration in 
their relationships. They agree to strengthen their cooperation to reduce migratory 
pressures, among other things through vocational training programmes and 
programmes of assistance for job creation. They undertake to guarantee protection 
of all the rights recognised under existing legislation of migrants legally resident in 
their respective territories; 
 
in the area of illegal immigration they decide to establish closer cooperation. In this 
context, the partners, aware of their responsibility for readmission, agree to adopt 
the relevant provisions and measures, by means of bilateral agreements or 
arrangements, in order to readmit their nationals who are in an illegal situation 
(Barcelona Declaration 1995). 
 
The Declaration apparently combined a prevention-oriented approach in the first 
statement, with a control-oriented approach in the second statement. However, as noted 
by Pastore, the two propositions represent, respectively, the interests of the 
Mediterranean third countries, and the interests of the EU Member States. Significantly, 
the partners’ interests were enunciated separately, and whilst cooperation to reduce 
migratory pressure was framed in rather generic terms, cooperation on readmission 
entailed a more precise commitment (Pastore 2002, 110). 
Actually, this combination did not prove very fruitful, as in the following years 
cooperation in the area of migration under the EMP made no relevant progress. The 
Euro-Mediterranean ministerial meetings which followed simply reiterated the 
participants’ commitment to enhance migration cooperation, but did not produce any 
concrete outcome. This was partly due to the high sensitivity and complexity of the 
issue, as well as to the difficulty in combining the interests and priorities of EU Member 
States and partner countries. However, the stalemate of the Barcelona Process in the 
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area of migration was also due to the fact that the partnership had focused mainly on its 
second objective, i.e. the strengthening of economic cooperation and creation of a free 
trade area in the Mediterranean, along with the issue of security. Conversely, the third 
pillar of socio-cultural dialogue, which included migration cooperation, was neglected 
(Pastore 2002, 111-112). 
At the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean in July 2008 the Euro-Mediterranean 
Heads of State and Government decided the creation of the Union for the Mediterranean 
(UfM), as a continuation of the EMP. The evolution of the EMP into the UfM was 
aimed to re-launch multilateral Euro-Mediterranean cooperation and make it more 
operational, through the initiation of new regional and sub-regional projects. UfM 
projects address the areas of economy, environment, energy, transport, education, 
health, migration and social affairs, but cooperation initiatives in the field of migration 
continue to be the least developed ones, even in recent years
20
. 
Parallel to the development of a multilateral dialogue, the EU launched also 
bilateral cooperation initiatives in the Mediterranean area. We will first analyse a 
bilateral cooperation initiative based on legally binding international treaties, and 
secondly a policy initiative launched ten years later, based on bilateral action plans. The 
two initiatives are interlinked, as the latter builds upon the institutional framework of 
the former. 
 
2.2.2. The Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements 
Starting from the early 1990s, the European Commission has negotiated and 
concluded a number of Association Agreements with Mediterranean countries, called 
the ‘Euro-Med Agreements’. The first Euro-Med Agreements were signed with Tunisia 
in 1995 and Morocco in 1996, and entered into force in March 1998 and March 2000 
respectively. 
These agreements established conditions for cooperation between the EU, its 
Member States and each partner country on a variety of fields, including: political 
dialogue; economic cooperation, trade, competition and financial cooperation; and 
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 http://eeas.europa.eu/euromed/index_en.htm. Accessed on 10 August 2016. 
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social and cultural issues. Similarly to the EMP, the largest part of these agreements 
was devoted to economic cooperation and trade, while political dialogue and socio-
cultural cooperation appear to be ancillary issues. In both treaties, migration cooperation 
was considered as a social issue and was only dealt with in a couple of sub-sections 
under the chapters on ‘Dialogue in social matters’ (Euro-Med Agreements with Tunisia 
and with Morocco, Art. 69.2 and 69.3) and ‘Cooperation in the social field’ (Art. 71.1).  
Under Article 69, the parties committed to undertake ‘regular dialogue’ on 
different migration-related issues, once again combining a more comprehensive 
approach to migration (dialogue on equal treatment, social rights and integration of 
legally resident migrants) with a security- and control-oriented approach (dialogue on 
irregular migration and readmission). Article 71 set out a priority list of projects to 
consolidate cooperation on, and prioritised two migration-related initiatives: once again, 
whilst the first one is clearly prevention-oriented (‘reducing migratory pressure, in 
particular by improving living conditions, creating jobs and developing training in areas 
from which emigrants come’, Art. 71.1.a), the second one focuses on readmission of 
irregular migrants (‘resettling those repatriated because of their illegal status under the 
legislation of the state in question’, Art. 71.1.b). 
However, according to Lavenex, this combination of approaches was not 
balanced; rather, the Euro-Med Agreements had a clear ‘defensive focus’ (Lavenex 
2002, 168). This is proved by the fact that both priority measures listed under Article 71 
were in fact aimed at reducing migration flows to Europe. Moreover, in both the 
Tunisian and Moroccan treaties Article 66 excluded illegally resident migrants from the 
enjoyment of social rights in their host country. As concerns cooperation on 
readmission, as mentioned above, both agreements contained a commitment to dialogue 
on ‘illegal immigration and the conditions governing the return of individuals who are 
in breach of the legislation dealing with the right to stay and the right of establishment 
in their host countries’ (Art. 69.3.c). In addition, the agreement with Morocco included 
also a ‘Joint Declaration relating to readmission’, in which the parties agreed to adopt 
bilaterally the appropriate provisions and measures to cover readmission of their 
nationals. 
Through the inclusion in the Euro-Med Association Agreements of readmission 
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clauses committing the parties to adopt provisions on readmission at a bilateral level, 
the EU actually supported the negotiation and conclusion of bilateral readmission 
agreements between Member States and Mediterranean third countries, which 
proliferated throughout the 1990s. Indeed, the Euro-Med Agreements which followed 
(with Jordan in 1997; with Egypt in 2001; with Lebanon and Algeria in 2002) contained 
a specific readmission clause in their text (Peers 2004, 199-200). The clause was 
slightly different in each agreement, but it was generally based on the ‘standard 
readmission clause’ agreed by the Council in 1996 (Council of the EU 1996) and 
modified following the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999, when the EU 
became competent to conclude readmission agreements (Council of the EU 1999c)
21
. 
Readmission clauses in Euro-Med Agreements generally included: a confirmation of the 
international customary law obligation to readmit own nationals; a commitment to 
conclude future readmission agreements with the Member States which so request (or 
with the EU after 1999) in order to facilitate the implementation of this obligation; and a 
commitment to agree readmission obligations also with regard to third country 
nationals
22
. 
 
2.2.3. The European Neighbourhood Policy and its Action Plans 
A further bilateral cooperation initiative is the European Neighbourhood Policy 
(ENP), launched by the European Commission in May 2004, with the ‘ENP Strategy 
Plan’, which followed the 2003 Communication ‘Wider Europe - Neighbourhood: A 
New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours’ (European 
Commission 2004a; 2003). The ENP represents a new policy framework for the EU’s 
relations with its neighbouring countries to the East and to the South, and it is 
implemented through bilateral Action Plans setting out the guidelines for cooperation to 
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 The texts of both the 1996 and the 1999 standard clauses can be found in Coleman 2009, 347-350 
(Annex 3 and Annex 4 respectively). Standard readmission clauses are further discussed under section 
3.1. 
22
 In the context of readmission, the term ‘third country national’ refers to a person who does not possess 
the nationality of any of the contracting parties to a readmission agreement. 
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be pursued with each third country
23
. For this reason, even if it also provides an overall 
general framework, the ENP is chiefly considered a bilateral policy between the EU and 
each partner country
24
. Differently from the Euro-Med Association Agreements, the 
ENP and its Action Plans are not legal instruments: they do not include any legal 
obligations, but only political commitments (Lavenex et al 2009, 819-820; Coleman 
2009, 129). 
The ENP is based on the idea that ‘the EU should aim to develop a zone of 
prosperity and a friendly neighbourhood – a “ring of friends” – with whom the EU 
enjoys close, peaceful and co-operative relations’ (European Commission 2003, 4). It 
offers to neighbouring countries a privileged political relationship and the greatest 
possible economic integration with the EU, based on common values (e.g. democracy, 
rule of law, respect for human rights); in Lavenex’s words, ‘it opens the perspective for 
the furthest possible association below the threshold of membership’ (Lavenex 2006, 
344). 
In the area of migration and with regard to the Southern neighbourhood, 
compared to the EMP (which, as discussed above, has proven rather ineffective), the 
ENP aims to promote a more partnership-oriented approach, built on a deeper 
understanding and consideration of the interests and priorities of partner countries, and 
on credible incentives in exchange for migration cooperation. The ENP embraces a 
more comprehensive strategy, embedding migration control into a much broader 
integration policy towards the EU neighbourhood (European Commission 2003; 2004a; 
2004b). 
However, the implementation of the ENP has shown a number of commonalities 
with previous strategies, being still based on conditionality and policy transfer (Lavenex 
2006, 345). Indeed, in order to ‘benefit from the prospect of a closer economic 
integration’, the EU expects neighbouring countries to ‘demonstrate shared values and 
effective implementation of political, economic and institutional reforms, including 
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 The ENP Action Plans are policy documents laying out the partner country’s agenda for political and 
economic reforms and the strategic objectives of cooperation between the EU and the partner country, in 
different policy areas. 
24
 http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/about-us/index_en.htm. Accessed on 12 August 2016. 
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aligning legislation with the acquis’ (European Commission 2003, 10). Approximation 
to EU standards is actually one of the main objectives promoted by the ENP (Lavenex 
et al. 2009, 820). 
In the area of migration the ENP reflects the EU cross-pillar approach, as it links 
financial assistance, economic integration and visa facilitation to joint migration 
management and border control (Cassarino 2005, 227). Since JHA issues continue to be 
central in this new policy framework, cooperation in the field of migration remains 
foremost security-oriented. This is unequivocally stated in the Commission’s ENP 
Strategy Paper of May 2004: 
 
Border management is likely to be a priority in most Action Plans […]. The Action 
Plans should thus include measures to improve the efficiency of border 
management, such as support for the creation and training of corps of professional 
non-military border guards and measures to make travel documents more secure. 
The goal should be to facilitate movement of persons, whilst maintaining or 
improving a high level of security (European Commission 2004a, 16-17). 
 
With regards to the Southern neighbourhood, the ENP seems to be especially 
focused on the fight against illegal immigration, border control and management of 
legal migration. This emerges clearly from the Action Plans with Morocco and Tunisia, 
adopted in July 2005: in both documents, a large part of the section dedicated to 
‘Cooperation on Justice and Home Affairs’ is focused on strengthening cooperation on 
legal and illegal migration management (coupled with readmission of unauthorised 
migrants), border control and combating human trafficking and smuggling (EU-
Morocco ENP Action Plan 2005, paras 46-53; EU-Tunisia ENP Action Plan 2005, paras 
43-49)
25
. 
These provisions clearly mirror the EU’s primary concerns (i.e. limiting migration 
flows into Europe) and the EU’s understanding of changes to be undertaken by 
neighbouring countries in the field of migration and asylum, but they overlook the 
general policies and interests of those countries. Rather, as noted by Coleman, the ENP 
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 The texts of the Action Plans with Morocco and Tunisia are available at the following links: 
http://www.enpi-info.eu/library/content/eu-morocco-enp-action-plan; http://www.enpi-
info.eu/library/content/eu-tunisia-enp-action-plan. Accessed on 12 August 2016. 
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reflects the EU’s objective ‘of creating a “buffer zone” of third countries surrounding 
the EU, which assume responsibility for transit migration’ (2009, 130). In fact, as of 
today, nine out of twelve currently existing Action Plans contain a provision on the 
negotiation and conclusion of a readmission agreement with the EU, and two more 
Action Plans include a more general commitment to initiate a dialogue on readmission 
(Billet 2010, 57). 
Differently from the HLWG Action Plans described in the previous section, ENP 
Action Plans are supposed to be jointly agreed by the EU and the partner countries 
concerned; they have a duration of three to five years, subject to renewal by mutual 
consent. Along with joint ownership, a crucial intended feature of ENP Action Plans is 
differentiation: even if based on common principles, each Action Plan should be tailor-
made for each partner country (European Commission 2004a; 2004b). But in most 
cases, e.g. in the cases of Morocco and Tunisia, ENP Action Plans reveal a Euro-centric 
security-oriented approach, which does not take into due consideration the partner 
country’s specificities, i.e. its national reform processes, relations with the EU, needs, 
capacities and interests. 
ENP Action Plans have as a legal basis the existing bilateral agreements between 
the EU and its neighbouring countries, namely Partnership and Cooperation Agreements 
with Eastern neighbours and Association Agreements with Southern neighbours 
(presented above in this section). Indeed, the first Action Plans have been developed 
with countries with which the EU had already one of these agreements in force
26
. ENP 
Action Plans are built upon the institutional framework of Association or Cooperation 
Agreements, especially with regard to their respective Councils (European Commission 
2004b, 3-4). 
Differently from the HLWG Action Plans, it is the Commission (and not the 
Council) to be responsible for proposing the ENP Action Plans. This may lead us to 
think that a more comprehensive approach to migration management would prevail. 
However, JHA ministers retain significant control over the process, due to the very fact 
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 Nowadays, twelve third countries participate in the ENP, having agreed Action Plans with the EU. 
These are: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Moldova, Morocco, Palestine, 
Tunisia and Ukraine. Algeria is currently negotiating an Action Plan, while Libya, Syria and Belarus are 
still outside the ENP. http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/about-us/index_en.htm. Accessed on 12 August 2016. 
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that the ENP draws upon the institutional framework of Association and Cooperation 
Agreements. Their respective Councils, whose members are officials and ministers of 
the Member States and the partner countries, are responsible for approving the Action 
Plans and for monitoring their implementation. According to Lavenex, ‘the ENP can 
thus be seen as a laboratory in which the control agenda of JHA ministers competes 
with the more comprehensive approach of the Commission’ (2006, 345). 
Being a bilateral policy, the ENP is complemented by multilateral initiatives such 
as the EMP in the Southern neighbourhood; at the same time, the ENP aims to 
overcome the limits of the EMP, producing more visible and effective outcomes in the 
implementation of cooperation projects with Mediterranean countries in a variety of 
policy areas, including migration control and readmission of irregular migrants. 
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CHAPTER 3 
EUROPEAN UNION READMISSION AGREEMENTS 
 
 
3.1. Origins and evolution of EU readmission agreements within the 
framework of the EU return and readmission policy 
The analysis of the development of the external dimension of the EU migration 
policy (section 2.1 above) showed that the issue of expulsion of irregular migrants and 
their readmission to a third country outside the EU has always been considered an 
element of crucial importance and it has been integrated into the common European 
migration policy since its origins in the early 1990s. The more the EU and its Member 
States emphasised the need to combat irregular migration, the more cooperation with 
third countries became essential and the conclusion of European readmission 
agreements rose to the top of the EU’s external relations priorities. Readmission 
agreements came to represent the main instrument of a common return policy that 
needed the cooperation of third countries of origin and transit in order to be 
implemented effectively. 
Under the Maastricht Treaty, and until the entry into force of the Amsterdam 
Treaty on 1
st
 May 1999, the EU did not have competence in the area of return and 
readmission. Therefore, the early common readmission policy developed throughout the 
1990s focused on: incentivising third countries to accept and implement readmission 
obligations prescribed by international law (also through the inclusion of readmission 
clauses into broader cooperation agreements); stimulating the conclusion of bilateral 
readmission agreements between Member States and third countries; and harmonising 
the content of these bilateral readmission agreements. 
Firstly, the Council adopted two (non-binding) recommendations aimed to limit 
the disparities between bilateral RAs concluded by different Member States with a third 
country: in November 1994 it adopted a Recommendation on a specimen bilateral 
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readmission agreement between a Member State and a third country
1
, covering both 
nationals and non-nationals of the State parties, and in July 1995 a Recommendation on 
guiding principles to be followed in drawing up protocols on the implementation of 
readmission agreements
2
 (Bouteillet-Paquet 2003, 363-364; Cassarino 2010c, 15). 
Member States retained the exclusive competence to negotiate and conclude RAs 
individually with third countries, but they could use a common instrument and follow 
common guidelines
3
. 
Secondly, in 1996 the Council adopted a ‘standard readmission clause’ which the 
Commission had to try and include in the so-called ‘global agreements’ (i.e. Association 
Agreements or Partnership and Cooperation Agreements) with third countries
4
. The 
1996 readmission clause committed the State parties in the agreement to the 
readmission of own nationals; in addition, the clause included a commitment for the 
third country concerned to conclude future bilateral readmission agreements with the 
Member States that so request, covering also the readmission of third country nationals 
and stateless persons (Council of the EU 1996). 
Following the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999, in light of the 
new competences acquired by the EU in the area of readmission, the Council modified 
the text of the standard readmission clause, in order to include the possibility for the 
third country to conclude future readmission agreements with the European Community 
itself (Council of the EU 1999c). On that occasion the Council changed another relevant 
aspect of the readmission clause: whilst the 1996 clause could be included in association 
or cooperation agreements on a case-by-case basis, the 1999 clause had to be included 
                                                 
1
 Council Recommendation of 30 November 1994 concerning a specimen bilateral readmission 
agreement between a Member State and a third country, OJ C 274, 19.9.1996. 
2
 Council Recommendation of 24 July 1995 on the guiding principles to be followed in drawing up 
protocols on the implementation of readmission agreements, OJ C 274, 19.9.1996. 
3
 As noted by Coleman (2009, 21-22), the impact of these instruments has been assessed differently by 
different scholars. Noll (2005, 497) highlighted a lack of harmonising effect, whereas Bouteillet-Paquet 
affirmed that they had a great influence over national policies: ‘Largely followed in practice, the 
provisions of these two recommendations made it possible to approximate national practice’ (Bouteillet-
Paquet 2003, 363-364). 
4
 The inclusion of readmission clauses in global agreements represented a way to incorporate migration 
policy objectives into the EU’s general external relations, implementing the approach described under 
section 2.1 above. On the inclusion of readmission clauses in Euro-Med Association Agreements, see also 
section 2.2.2 above. 
 43 
in all future agreements with third countries
5
. 
Finally, under the Austrian Presidency in 1998, the Council started negotiations 
on a draft standard readmission agreement between the whole group of the Member 
States and a third country (Coleman 2009, 24). This initiative was a clear signal of the 
Member States’ willingness to pursue collectively their common interest in the 
readmission of irregular migrants. These negotiations were soon overtaken by the entry 
into force of the Amsterdam Treaty, which conferred to the European Community the 
competence to conclude readmission agreements with third countries. At that point the 
development of a proper common European return and readmission policy could stArt. 
Article 63(3)(b) of the Amsterdam Treaty enabled the Council to adopt measures 
in the area of ‘illegal immigration and illegal residence, including repatriation of illegal 
residents’. Does this include the power to conclude readmission agreements? According 
to the case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), on the basis of the principle of 
parallelism between internal and external competence
6
, in cases where no explicit 
external competence is mentioned in the Treaty, competence on external matters 
(including power to conclude international agreements) can be implied from explicit 
internal competence in that field (Billet 2010, 59-60). Therefore, under this article, the 
EU acquired the power to conclude external agreements aimed to facilitate the return of 
irregular migrants to a country of origin or transit. The October 1999 Tampere European 
Council tried to make this external competence explicit, by expressly inviting the 
Council to conclude readmission agreements with third countries (European Council 
1999, para 27). 
The main reason for attributing these new powers to the European Community 
was that Member States were confronted with increasing difficulties in obtaining 
cooperation from third countries, which proved rather reluctant to collaborate in 
readmission procedures; without the necessary cooperation of third countries, the 
expulsion of irregular residents from a Member State’s territory was not feasible 
(Schieffer 2003, 343-344). Hence, Member States agreed that if they were not able to 
                                                 
5
 The texts of both the 1996 and the 1999 standard readmission clauses can be found in Coleman 2009, 
347-350 (Annex 3 and Annex 4 respectively). 
6
 ECJ, Commission v. Council (ERTA), Case 22/70, Judgement of the Court, 31 March 1971, para 16. 
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obtain sufficient cooperation on a bilateral level, they could probably be more 
successful by trying to act collectively: Member States expected that ‘the political and 
economic weight of the Community would increase the readiness of third countries to 
enter into readmission agreements’ (Coleman 2009, 56). According to Coleman, the 
perceived greater negotiating weight of the EU compared to individual Member States 
represented the added value of concluding readmission agreements at a European level, 
rather than at the national level. 
The EU started to exercise immediately its new competence: in the years 2000-
2002 the Commission received by the Council the mandate to initiate negotiations on 
readmission agreements with several countries: Morocco, Sri Lanka, Russia and 
Pakistan in September 2000; Hong Kong and Macao in April 2001; Ukraine in June 
2002; Turkey, Albania, Algeria and China in November 2002. During the same period, 
the Member States progressively identified a set of criteria to select the target countries. 
In April 2002 the following list of selection criteria was agreed by the JHA Council: 1) 
the migration pressure exerted by the third country; 2) the fact that the country has 
signed an Association or Cooperation Agreement (but it must not be a candidate for 
accession to the EU); 3) the country’s geographical position, in particular its proximity 
to a Member State; 4) the fact that a European RA with that third country represents an 
added value for Member States’ bilateral negotiations; 5) geographical balance between 
various regions of origin and transit
7
 (Council of the EU 2002a, para 2). 
During the year 2002, the EU institutions produced a series of action plans and 
policy papers which contributed in a decisive way to the development of the general 
guidelines for a common return and readmission policy. In this regard, a first relevant 
document was the Comprehensive Plan to combat illegal immigration and trafficking of 
human beings in the European Union, adopted by the JHA Council in February 2002, 
on the basis of the Commission Communication on a Common Policy on Illegal 
Immigration of November 2001. These documents stressed the significant role EURAs 
play in the fight against illegal immigration and encouraged the conclusion of further 
                                                 
7
 In 2004 the GAER Council affirmed that, among these criteria, the most important ones were the 
migration pressure exercised by a third country, and its geographical position relative to the EU, including 
considerations of neighbourhood and regional coherence (Council of the EU 2004b). 
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EURAs with relevant third countries. At the same time the 2001 Communication noted 
that ‘before the negotiation of any readmission agreement, the political and human 
rights situation in the country of origin or transit should also be taken into account’ 
(European Commission 2001, 25). 
As mentioned above under section 2.1.4, the Seville European Council held in 
June 2002 produced strongly control-oriented policy conclusions. Inter alia, it called for 
the speeding up of the conclusion of the EURAs which were already under negotiation 
and for the approval of new negotiating mandates (European Council 2002, para 30). In 
April 2002 the Commission produced a crucial Green Paper on a Community Return 
Policy on Illegal Residents, followed in October 2002 by a Communication on the same 
topic (European Commission 2002a; 2002b). With respect to European readmission 
agreements, while committing to push forward ongoing negotiations in order to 
complete them in due time as requested by the Seville European Council, the 
Commission explained in a very straightforward way the difficulties it was encountering 
with ongoing negotiations: 
 
As readmission agreements work mainly in the interest of the Community, third-
countries are naturally very reluctant to accept such agreements. Their successful 
conclusion, therefore, depends very much on the positive incentives (“leverage”) at 
the Commission’s disposal. In that context it is important to note that, in the field 
of JHA, there is little that can be offered in return. […] It is, therefore, essential to 
give more thought to the crucial question of what other incentives, not only from 
the JHA area but from all Community areas (e.g. trade expansion, 
technical/financial assistance, additional development aid etc.) could be offered to 
the relevant countries in return (European Commission 2002b, 24). 
 
The Seville Council also requested the development of a Return Action 
Programme based on the Commission Green Paper (European Council 2002, para 30), 
which was adopted by the JHA Council in November 2002. The Return Action 
Programme consisted of five elements: 1) improved operational cooperation among 
Member States, including exchange of information and best practices, common training, 
mutual assistance and joint return operations; 2) common minimum standards for 
return; 3) country specific programmes, the first one involving Afghanistan; 4) financial 
 46 
assistance; and 5) intensified cooperation with third countries (Council of the EU 
2002e). The first part concerning intra-EU cooperation was the most developed one; as 
regards the progress of EURAs, this document reiterated the importance for the EU ‘to 
consider the use of all appropriate instruments available in the context of the Union’s 
external relations to further negotiations with third countries’ (Council of the EU 2002e, 
para 64). Annex II to the Return Action Programme specified also a list of measures and 
actions to be adopted and carried out in each of the five areas identified above
8
. 
In the following years, progress in the field of readmission has been rather 
discontinuous (Giuffré 2011, 10); most of the EU policy debate in this area has focused 
on the issue of incentives, and how to ensure the progress of negotiations with those 
countries which proved unwilling to conclude (or even to start negotiations for) EURAs. 
This was in particular the case of many of the first countries for which the Commission 
had received a mandate in 2000 and 2002: Morocco, Algeria and China, which as of 
today have not signed an agreement yet (Morocco) or have not even started negotiations 
(Algeria and China); and Pakistan and Turkey, which reached an agreement only after a 
long and complex negotiation (the EURA with Pakistan entered into force in December 
2010, the one with Turkey in October 2014)
9
. 
In 2006, the EU decided to start negotiations for RAs with the Western Balkan 
countries (Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia) and Moldova, in 
conjunction with the negotiation of visa facilitation agreements
10
 (VFAs). In 2008 and 
2009 the Commission was granted two mandates to negotiate RAs with Georgia and 
Cape Verde respectively, and in 2011 three more mandates allowed the launch of 
negotiations with Belarus, Armenia and Azerbaijan. In December 2014 and September 
2016 the Commission received the latest mandate for an EURA with Tunisia and 
Nigeria, respectively. While the RAs with the Western Balkan countries, Moldova, 
                                                 
8
 Annex I to the Return Action Programme presented definitions for the terminology used in the return 
and readmission policy field. 
9
 The cases of Morocco, Algeria and Turkey will be analysed in details under section 3.5. 
10
 Visa facilitation agreements (VFAs) are international agreements between the EU and a third country 
providing for measures to make procedures for the issuing of short-stay visas easier and faster. They 
generally offer faster decision processes, simplified documents and reduced visa fees for short-stay visas, 
and simplified criteria for multiple-entry visas for certain category of persons. The coupling of VFAs with 
EURAs is further discussed under section 3.3. 
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Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan were concluded quite rapidly, the negotiation with 
Cape Verde was slower but was finally concluded. Negotiations with Belarus started in 
January 2014 and are reported to be close to conclusion, while the beginning of 
negotiations with Tunisia was announced by the Commission only very recently, on 12 
October 2016 (European Commission 2016j). In addition, on 26 October 2016, the 
Commission announced in its daily press release the beginning of negotiations for a 
readmission agreement with Nigeria, for which it had received the Council’s negotiating 
mandate only one month before
11
. 
Overall, since the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty, the Commission has 
received 23 negotiating mandates; 17 EURAs have been signed and are currently in 
force, while six EURAs are under negotiation. Table 1 below lists the EURAs 
concluded and the EURAs whose negotiations are ongoing or have not formally started 
yet. 
 
Table 1. European Readmission Agreements 
Country Mandate 
received 
Status of 
negotiations 
Agreement 
signed 
Entry into force 
Morocco September 2000 Started 
April 2003 
- - 
Sri Lanka September 2000 Completed 4 June 2004 1 May 2005 
 
Pakistan September 2000 Completed 26 October 2009 1 December 
2010 
Russia September 2000 Completed 25 May 2006 1 June 2007 
 
Hong Kong April 2001 Completed 27 November 
2002 
1 March 2004 
Macao April 2001 Completed 13 October 2003 1 June 2004 
 
Ukraine June 2002 Completed 18 June 2007 1 January 2008 
 
Turkey November 2002 Completed 16 December 
2013 
1 October 2014 
                                                 
11
 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEX-16-3547_en.htm. Accessed on 27 October 2016. 
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Albania November 2002 Completed 14 April 2005 1 May 2006 
 
China November 2002 Not started yet - - 
 
Algeria November 2002 Not started yet - - 
 
Macedonia November 2006 Completed 18 September 
2007 
1 January 2008 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
November 2006 Completed 18 September 
2007 
1 January 2008 
Montenegro November 2006 Completed 18 September 
2007 
1 January 2008 
Serbia November 2006 Completed 18 September 
2007 
1 January 2008 
Moldova November 2006 Completed 10 October 2007 1 January 2008 
 
Georgia November 2008 Completed 22 November 
2010 
1 March 2011 
Cape Verde June 2009 Completed 18 April 2013 1 December 
2014 
Belarus February 2011 Started 
January 2014 
- - 
Armenia December 2011 Completed 19 April 2013 1 January 2014 
 
Azerbaijan December 2011 Completed 28 February 2014 1 September 
2014 
Tunisia December 2014 Started 
12 October 2016 
- - 
Nigeria September 2016 Started 
28 October 2016 
- - 
Source: Compiled by the author based on information from the European Commisssion 
 
The Tampere Programme (1999-2004) was followed by another five-year 
programme establishing policy guidelines in the area of freedom, security and justice. 
The Hague Programme, adopted by the European Council in November 2004, for the 
period 2004-2009, combined the purpose of efficiently countering irregular immigration 
to the EU with the purpose of consolidating and harmonising EU legislation in the area 
of migration and asylum. In the field of return and readmission, the European Council 
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proposed a range of initiatives in line with the Tampere Programme, including: the 
adoption of common minimum standards for return procedures (what will become the 
so-called ‘Return Directive’12, adopted in December 2008); the creation of a European 
Return Fund by 2007; the development of common country and region specific return 
programmes; the timely conclusion of European readmission agreements; and the 
appointment of a Special Representative for a common readmission policy (Council of 
the EU 2004c, para 1.6.4). 
A relevant change in the legal framework of the EU readmission policy occurred 
with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1
st
 December 2009, which modified 
the legal basis for the conclusion of European readmission agreements. Article 79(3) of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) states that: 
 
The Union may conclude agreements with third countries for the readmission to 
their countries of origin or provenance of third-country nationals who do not or 
who no longer fulfil the conditions for entry, presence or residence in the territory 
of one of the Member States. 
 
Although the substance of this article is not new (in fact, when the Lisbon Treaty 
entered into force the EU had already concluded eleven readmission agreements with 
third countries worldwide), the relevance of this additional provision consists of the 
explicit recognition of the EU competence to conclude international agreements with 
third countries for the purpose of readmission. As mentioned above in this section, 
under Article 63(3)(b) of the Amsterdam Treaty such competence was not explicit, and 
could only be implied by interpreting the expression ‘measures […] in the area of […] 
repatriation of illegal residents’ as including the negotiation of readmission agreements, 
based on the principle of parallelism between internal and external competence
13
. 
The Lisbon Treaty introduced also a significant change in the procedure for the 
adoption of EURAs, which (as for other types of international agreements between the 
                                                 
12
 Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on 
common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country 
nationals. 
13
 First established by the ECJ jurisprudence, the principle of parallelism was codified by the Treaty of 
Lisbon in art. 3(2) TFEU. See also: Panizzon 2012, 112-113. 
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EU and a third country) now foresees an increased role for the European Parliament 
(Art. 218 TFEU). Indeed, the European Parliament (EP) has to be ‘immediately and 
fully informed at all stages of the procedure’ (Art. 218(10) TFEU) and the Council can 
adopt a decision concluding the agreement only ‘after obtaining the consent of the 
European Parliament’ (Art. 218(6)(a) TFEU), whereas under the Amsterdam Treaty the 
EP was only consulted (Art. 300(3) TEC) and delivered a non-binding opinion
14
. 
Following the Hague Programme, the development of the EU return and 
readmission policy continued under the Stockholm Programme, adopted by the 
European Council in December 2009, for the period 2010-2014. This new programme 
was much more detailed than the previous ones, but in the substance its indications were 
in line with documents preceding it. Once again, ‘the conclusion of effective and 
operational readmission agreements’ was mentioned among the measures to be taken to 
combat illegal immigration (Council of the EU 2009, para 6.1.6). 
 
3.2. Content and purpose of EU readmission agreements 
As mentioned in section 1.1 above, EU readmission agreements are international 
treaties of a reciprocal nature between the EU and a third country, setting out detailed 
administrative and operational procedures to facilitate the return or transit of persons 
who do not, or no longer fulfil the conditions of entry to or residence in the requesting 
State (i.e. the State that request the readmission of a person). Despite minor differences, 
the structure and content of the EURAs concluded so far are almost identical. This is 
due to the fact that the Commission has pursued a ‘standardised approach’, basing 
negotiations on a specimen draft agreement and trying to achieve final texts that have as 
many common features as possible (Schieffer 2003, 353). 
Section I and II set out readmission obligations for the contracting parties, i.e. the 
third country concerned and the EU, or rather its Member States
15
. They have reciprocal 
                                                 
14
 Roig and Huddleston noted that in practice under the old procedure the role of the European 
Parliament was minimal: ‘in most cases the Parliament was neither consulted nor kept informed during 
negotiations and found itself delivering a post-facto opinion’ (2007, 369). On the same line, see Billet 
2010, 64-65. 
15
 Although formally the contracting party of an EURA is the EU, readmission obligations in practice 
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obligations to take back their own nationals who have entered or stayed illegally in the 
territory of the other party; they also have an obligation to readmit third county 
nationals (i.e. nationals of non-contracting parties) or stateless persons who have 
illegally entered the territory of the other party after having transited through or stayed 
on their territory, sometimes subject to certain conditions
16
. 
Section III details the rules of the readmission procedure, including precise 
indication of: the content of the readmission application; the types of documents which 
constitute proof or prima facie evidence that a person is a national of the other party, or 
that a third country national has entered the territory of the requesting State after having 
transited through or stayed on the territory of the requested State; time limits for 
submitting a readmission application, for replying to it and for its implementation; and 
transfer modalities. EURAs usually provide also for a special accelerated procedure. 
Section IV and Section V concern, respectively, transit operations and transport 
costs (which are borne by the requesting State). Section VI contains detailed provisions 
on data protection and a ‘non-affection clause’ regulating the relations between the 
readmission agreement and other international law instruments. More precisely, the 
clause states that EURAs apply ‘without prejudice to the rights, obligations and 
responsibilities […] arising from international law’, including from international human 
rights and refugee law conventions. 
However, it must be noted that the first EURAs (with Hong Kong, Macao and Sri 
Lanka) contain a generic non-affection clause, which makes no explicit reference to 
human rights or refugee law instruments. The European Parliament criticised this fact in 
its report on the EURA with Hong Kong, and suggested the Commission reconsider the 
wording of the clause in order to make international human rights obligations more 
explicit (European Parliament 2002, 8). Since the EURA with Albania, almost all 
                                                                                                                                               
apply to its Member States, because it is Member State authorities who are responsible for requesting 
readmissions and replying to readmission requests. Readmission procedures are usually carried out at 
national level. 
16
 In particular, certain treaties provide for delayed application of readmission obligations concerning 
third country nationals (e.g. a two-year delay for Albania and Ukraine; a three-year delay for Russia and 
Turkey). These transitional periods are usually justified as capacity-building phases. 
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agreements (with the exception of the EURAs with Ukraine
17
 and Pakistan) mention 
explicitly several international human rights and refugee law conventions – in 
particular, the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the status of refugees and its 1967 
Protocol, the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights, and the 1984 Convention 
against torture and other cruel, unhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (Billet 
2010, 72). The EURA with Turkey specifies also the relation of ‘non-affection’ between 
the readmission agreement and the rights and procedural guarantees provided for by the 
EU directives in the area of migration and asylum
18
. 
Furthermore, all EURAs regulate their relations to other formal and informal 
readmission agreements in two different provisions. Firstly, the non-affection clause 
always contains a paragraph stating that ‘nothing in this Agreement shall prevent the 
return of a person under other formal or informal arrangements’, allowing for the 
readmission of a person to be carried out in application of a different instrument. This 
provision ensures the possibility for Member States to continue applying bilateral 
readmission agreements as well as informal readmission practices (Coleman 2009, 106). 
Secondly, all EURAs include an article concerning more specifically Member 
States’ bilateral readmission agreements or arrangements; the so-called ‘safeguard 
clause’ establishes that the EURA takes precedence over any readmission agreement (or 
implementation protocol) concluded between an individual Member State and the third 
country concerned, in cases of incompatibilities or overlapping. Therefore, in case of 
conflict between the provisions of an EURA and the provisions of a bilateral agreement, 
the former prevail. 
Section VII deals with the implementation and application of the agreement. All 
EURAs provide for the creation of a Joint Readmission Committee (JRC) comprising 
representatives of the Commission, representatives of the partner third country and 
experts from the Member States, with specific tasks related in particular to monitoring 
                                                 
17
 However the non-affection clause of the EURA with Ukraine contains a cross reference to the 
international human rights and refugee law conventions referred to in the Preamble of the agreement. 
18
 Article 18, paragraphs 3 to 6 of the EURA with Turkey make explicit reference to the need for the 
readmission agreement to comply with the rights and procedural guarantees set out by the Return 
Directive, the Reception Conditions Directive, the Asylum Procedures Directive, the Long-term 
Residents Directive, and the Family Reunification Directive. 
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the application of the agreement. All EURAs also entail the possibility for individual 
Member States to draw up bilateral implementing protocols with the third country 
concerned, which may include more precise information on procedural and other 
practical issues. The last section lists final provisions, usually clarifying the territorial 
scope of the agreement
19
 and rules on its entry into force, duration and termination. 
Having analysed the content of European readmission agreements, it is useful to 
reflect on their direct and indirect purposes. The EU common readmission policy 
pursues, indeed, different objectives (Coleman 2009, 57-70; Giuffré 2011, 11). First of 
all, its most intuitive aim is to fight unauthorised immigration by facilitating the return 
of irregular migrants and residents to their country of origin or transit. As mentioned 
above, EURAs have been considered by European institutions and Member States as a 
crucial tool for the actual implementation of returns and as the main instrument of a 
common return policy. The relevance of an effective return policy is also linked to the 
deterrent effect it may have on potential migrants, as emphasised by the Commission in 
several policy papers. 
The second purpose of EURAs is the establishment of a greater responsibility for 
migration control on the part of third countries of transit in the neighbourhood of the 
EU. The inclusion of a ‘third country national clause’ in EURAs is actually linked to the 
aim of creating a ‘buffer zone’ of countries responsible for readmitting migrants who 
entered the EU transiting through their territory, but also for intercepting migrants en 
route to the EU. The idea behind this argument is that a readmission agreement which 
includes an obligation to readmit third country nationals would lead a State to 
strengthen its border- and migration control polices in order to prevent transit migrants 
from entering into and crossing its territory towards the EU (Coleman 2009, 61-62). 
A third objective of the EU readmission policy is the promotion of readmission 
agreements also among third countries themselves, in particular between countries of 
transit at the borders of the EU and countries of origin. The 2004 Council Conclusions 
on the Priorities for the Successful Development of a Common Readmission Policy, 
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 EURAs do not apply to Denmark, as it ‘opted out’ from the entire area of freedom, security and justice 
and hence is not bound by EU law and policy in the area of migration and asylum. Nonetheless, EURAs 
generally include a Joint Declaration suggesting that Denmark and the third country concerned conclude a 
bilateral RA in the same terms as in the EURA. 
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besides underlining the importance of concluding EURAs that include also the 
obligation to readmit third country nationals, explicitly encouraged ‘third countries to 
conclude readmission agreements with each other and with other countries in their 
respective regions’ (Council of the EU 2004a, para 1). This would lead to the creation 
of a large network of readmission agreements allowing for chains of consecutive 
expulsions - or ‘readmission chains’ (Noll 2006, 496) - from an EU Member State to a 
transit country, to another transit country or/and to the country of origin. From the point 
of view of European institutions, such an expansion of readmission agreements would 
be of benefit both to the Member States and to third countries of transit. Coleman notes 
that the negotiation of EURAs actually had a ‘ripple-effect’, triggering EU neighbouring 
countries to initiate or intensify their own readmission policies (Coleman 2009, 65-66; 
187). The EU stimulated these developments through both direct and indirect assistance 
(European Commission 2002c, 25-26). 
A further purpose for concluding EURAs with third countries is building 
reception capacity in transit countries, including policies and facilities for the reception 
of both readmitted irregular migrants and rejected asylum seekers. This objective, 
similarly to the second and third ones, is considered to be beneficial to both the EU and 
the third country concerned and its achievement is supported by the EU through 
financial and technical assistance (Coleman 2009, 68-70). 
This analysis of the multiple purposes of EURAs shows that the relevance of 
these instruments for the EU goes well beyond their direct objective of facilitating the 
return of irregular migrants, as they are usually combined with the promotion of (and 
assistance in) improving border and migration control, negotiating further readmission 
agreements, and developing reception capacity in third countries. 
 
3.3. Negotiation process and incentives offered to third countries 
Despite their theoretically reciprocal nature, it is evident that in practice EURAs 
work in the interest of the EU and its Member States, as admitted by the Commission 
itself (European Commission 2002b, 24) and argued by numerous scholars. Rodier 
defined the EU readmission policy as ‘eurocentrée’ (Rodier 2006, 21) and Roig and 
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Huddleston compared readmission negotiations to ‘EU monologues where little interest 
exists on the other side’ (Roig and Huddleston 2007, 373-374). In light of the 
unbalanced terms of EURAs, their successful conclusion depends very much on the 
‘leverage’ at the Commission’s disposal, i.e. on the possibility for the Commission to 
offer strong incentives to a third country in order to obtain its cooperation on 
readmission. 
The need for strong incentives is often linked to one particular element of the 
EURAs: the third country national clause. Member States have so far insisted to include 
in all EURAs the obligation to readmit non-nationals; third countries, instead, have 
usually opposed the inclusion of such obligation. The Commission acknowledged that 
this provision generally represents the greatest blocking point in readmission 
negotiations
20
. Even in the relatively straightforward negotiations with Hong Kong, 
Macao and Sri Lanka, most of the time was spent discussing issues related to the 
readmission of non-nationals (Schieffer 2003, 355). But the main problems have been 
understandably experienced with third countries of transit in the neighbourhood of the 
EU which face a significant migratory pressure, like Morocco and Turkey; the inclusion 
of the obligation to readmit non-nationals is among the factors which hampered and 
lengthened most the negotiations with both countries (Roig and Huddleston 2007, 374; 
Coleman 2009, 187-189). 
For this reason, and also in light of the limited practical use of the clause by 
Member States, in its 2011 Evaluation of EU Readmission Agreements, the 
Commission suggested to include the third country national clause only in cases where 
it really represents an added value, due to the geographical position of the third country 
compared to the EU and to the potential risk of irregular transit migration to the EU. In 
addition, according to the Commission, readmission of non-nationals should only be 
included when appropriate incentives can be offered to the third country concerned 
(European Commission 2011a, 9). However, the Council Conclusions which followed 
the Commission Evaluation, ruled out the Commission recommendation to exclude the 
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 Other technical aspects which have often required lengthy negotiations are: time limits, use of the EU 
standard travel document, means of proof or prima facie evidence, use of charter flights, and relation to 
existing bilateral RAs (Schieffer 2003, 355). 
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third country national clause from future negotiating directives, and decided to continue 
incorporating it as a general rule (Council of the EU 2011, para 9). This orientation was 
confirmed in the following years and maintained until the present day
21
. 
Over the years, the Commission has identified different kinds of positive 
incentives to bring to the negotiating table. Probably one of the most effective 
incentives is the coupling of EURAs with visa facilitation agreements (VFAs): in 
exchange for the readmission of non-nationals to a transit country, the EU offers 
facilitated procedures and simplified criteria for the nationals of that country to obtain 
short-stay visas and/or multiple-entry visas (for certain categories of persons). For 
instance, in the cases of Russia and Ukraine readmission negotiations (which were at a 
standstill) broke through when the EU decided to open parallel visa facilitation 
negotiations. 
However, the Commission itself acknowledged that ‘visa concessions or the 
lifting of visa requirements can be a realistic option in exceptional cases only (e.g. Hong 
Kong, Macao); in most cases it is not’ (European Commission 2002b, 24); in particular, 
VFAs have never been (and probably will never be) offered to ‘certain African 
countries’, which are considered to ‘pose a migratory risk’ (Council of the EU 2015a, 
6). This is because ‘Member State hesitate to close a door on irregular immigration only 
to open a window on new potential irregular flows of visa overstayers, already the 
largest category of irregular migrants in the EU’ (Roig and Huddleston 2007, 377). 
Therefore, visa facilitation appears to be a limited policy tool, that Member States have 
allowed the Commission to employ only with negligible countries of origin and transit, 
or with potential candidates to accession in the Eastern neighbourhood, but not with 
countries which exercise a large migratory pressure on the EU (and for whom the 
conclusion of an EURA would be most urgent and useful). 
However, it must be noted that the 2009 Commission Evaluation of the 
Implementation of VFAs with third countries
22
 demonstrated that ‘the implementation 
                                                 
21
 In the JHA Council Conclusions on EU Return Policy of June 2014, the Council explicitly recognised 
the important role of countries of transit and encouraged the setting up of efficient readmission 
procedures with these countries (Council of the EU 2014, para 3). 
22
 The 2009 evaluation of VFAs concerned the VFAs entered into force until that moment, i.e. the VFAs 
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of VFAs has not increased security risks or risks of irregular migration towards the EU, 
as the conditions for issuing visas and the conditions for crossing the external borders 
remain unaffected’ (European Commission 2009b, 20). In light of this conclusion, in its 
2011 Evaluation of EURAs, the Commission suggested that VFAs ‘can provide the 
necessary incentive for readmission negotiations without increasing irregular migration’ 
(European Commission 2011a, 7). But the 2011 Commission’s suggestion remained 
largely unheard, and in its 2015 EU Action Plan on Return, the Commission itself 
admitted that ‘the possibility to use this instrument [VFAs] is limited, as the EU is 
unlikely to offer visa facilitation to certain third countries which generate many 
irregular migrants and thus pose a migratory risk’ (European Commission 2015b, 14). 
A second incentive third countries are extremely interested in (and often request) 
is the opening of facilitated channels for the legal migration of their nationals to the EU. 
However, this incentive touches upon one of the most sensitive migration policy issues, 
i.e. the determination of the volume of admitted migrant workers, which lies within the 
exclusive competence of Member States, as affirmed by Art. 79(5) of the Lisbon 
Treaty
23
. On the one hand, Member States are generally extremely reluctant to offer 
legal and labour migration opportunities, as in their perspective this option carries even 
more controversial costs than VFAs (Roig and Huddleston 2007, 378); on the other 
hand, the Commission lacks the competence to take its own initiative in this field, and 
therefore cannot exert sufficient leverage (Coleman 2009, 198-199). Nonetheless, the 
Commission has repeatedly called on Member States to identify incentives in the areas 
that fall under their national competence (in particular access to their labour markets for 
migrant workers) and to coordinate national initiatives in this field at EU level in order 
for the Commission to exert a more significant leverage (European Commission 2015b, 
14). 
Financial and technical assistance represents another significant incentive for third 
countries to accept readmission obligations. In the Commission’s perspective, such 
assistance should include support to measures for the reintegration of own nationals, as 
                                                                                                                                               
with Russia, Ukraine, the Western Balkan countries (including Albania) and Moldova. 
23
 ‘This Article shall not affect the right of Member States to determine volumes of admission of third-
country nationals coming from third countries to their territory in order to seek work, whether employed 
or self-employed’. 
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well as support to the creation of adequate reception facilities for non-nationals awaiting 
onward readmission to their country of origin (European Commission 2011a, 7). In the 
past, third countries demonstrated little interest in this kind of incentive, mainly due to 
the limited budget available under the Aeneas programme first, and the EU geographic 
and thematic programmes later on (Roig and Huddleston 2007, 378; European 
Commission 2011a, 7). The Commission noted that ‘it could be quite efficient as 
leverage, provided the money offered is substantial and comes on top of what has been 
already programmed or promised’ (European Commission 2011a, 7). 
Finally, in light of the integrated and comprehensive approach to migration 
promoted by the Commission between the end of the 1990s and the early 2000s 
(analysed under section 2.1. above), the Commission suggested to offer in readmission 
negotiations not only financial and technical assistance or incentives from the JHA area 
(visa facilitation and legal migration), but also incentives from other policy areas, such 
as economic cooperation, WTO-compatible trade concession (e.g. better market access 
or tariff preferences) and development aid (Schieffer 2003, 356; Roig and Huddleston 
2007, 375). This led the Commission to develop a so-called ‘package approach’, 
whereby the EU brings to the negotiating table (possibly right at the outset of 
negotiations) a coherent and tailor-made ‘package’ of incentives to be offered to the 
third country concerned in exchange for its cooperation on readmission (Coleman 2009, 
192). 
In its 2011 Evaluation of EURAs, the Commission recommended to pursue a 
‘package approach’ and, where possible, to embed readmission obligations into 
framework agreements with third countries (European Commission 2011a, 7-8). In its 
2014 Report on the implementation of the GAMM, the Commission reiterated that 
return and readmission should always be part of a balanced EU offer to a third country 
and should be linked not only to enhanced mobility, but also to other policy areas such 
as trade, enterprise and industry (European Commission 2014a, 19). Also in its EU 
Action Plan on Return, the Commission reaffirmed the need to develop ‘tailor-made 
support packages […] to help certain partner countries to fulfil their readmission 
obligations in practice and support negotiations’ (European Commission 2015b, 13). 
The ‘package approach’ has been reconfirmed in the recent Commission 
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Communication on Establishing a New Partnership Framework with Third Countries, 
issued in June 2016. Packages here take the form of so-called ‘compacts’, which ‘will 
be the key components of the overall relationships between the EU and third countries 
of origin or transit’. Each compact combines in a coherent and tailor-made way different 
policy elements leveraged towards the same objective, i.e. cooperation on migration 
management, including effective prevention of irregular migration and readmission. In 
order to maximise the leverage, ‘all EU policies including education, research, climate 
change, energy, environment, agriculture, should in principle be part of a package’ 
(European Commission 2016f, 5-9). 
However, a package-based approach to readmission negotiations entails a number 
of difficulties. On 9 June 2015, Dimitris Avramopulous, Commissioner for Migration, 
Home Affairs and Citizenship sent a letter to the JHA Ministers on the subject of 
increasing the effectiveness of the EU return and readmission policy. The paper in 
annex reaffirmed that ‘trade policy and development aid should be used to gain leverage 
in the area of readmission’; however it simultaneously admitted that ‘leverage at EU 
level outside Justice and Home Affairs is very difficult to activate due to political 
reluctance and legal constraints’ (Council of the EU 2015a, 6). In addition, if we 
consider that measures which would represent a real incentive to third countries, namely 
visa facilitation or exemption and legal migration opportunities, are generally ruled out 
by Member States in cases of third countries of significant migration salience, it appears 
that the Commission’s task to successfully conclude EURAs with those countries 
remains particularly difficult. As noted by Roig and Huddleston, ‘it is highly doubtful 
that the Commission can devise a package of carrots that satisfies the palates of third 
countries and whose costs Member States are also willing to swallow’ (2007, 378-379). 
Along with positive incentives, the Commission has considered also the 
possibility to resort to negative incentives, i.e. to adopt sanctions for non-cooperation. 
The idea of a ‘sanction policy’ was first introduced by the Seville European Council in 
2002, as mentioned above under section 2.1.4. The Seville Conclusions established that 
‘insufficient cooperation by a country could hamper the establishment of closer 
relations between that country and the Union’ (European Council 2002, para 35); 
moreover, if the Council ‘unanimously find that a third country has shown an 
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unjustified lack of cooperation in the joint management of migration flows’, the Council 
may ‘adopt measures or positions under the Common Foreign and Security Policy and 
other European Union policies’ (European Council 2002, para 36). 
In practice, however, this policy was never pursued in this terms, being 
considered as potentially harmful not only to third countries, but also to the EU. 
Diminished assistance in the areas of development, trade, human rights and democracy-
strengthening would only exacerbate the root causes of migration and reduce a third 
country’s capacity to control it; moreover, such policy would risk to hamper the broader 
EU’s external relations as well as its economic and strategic position (Coleman 2009, 
135; Roig and Huddleston 2007, 379). Despite that, an approach including negative 
incentives has never been totally abandoned or excluded by the Commission. In its 2011 
evaluation, indeed, the Commission reiterated that ‘non respect of the readmission 
obligation should lead to adopting sanctions’ and that negotiating directives should 
‘indicate possible retaliation measures by the EU in cases of persistent and unjustified 
denial of cooperation by the partner country’ (European Commission 2011a, 8). The 
Council confirmed this approach in the following Conclusions Defining the EU Strategy 
on Readmission, where the possibility was mentioned for ‘the withdrawal of incentives 
when a third country does not cooperate in the effective implementation of its 
readmission obligations’ (Council of the EU 2011, para 8). 
Most importantly, this approach introduced a ‘conditionality concept’ in the EU 
readmission policy; as a consequence, the relations between the EU and a third country 
in different policy areas (development aid, neighbourhood policy, trade, legal migration, 
mobility, security, energy, etc.) became conditional to that country’s level of 
cooperation on migration management, border control and readmission. Conditionality 
has increasingly become a fundamental underlying principle in EU cooperation with 
third countries, also in the form of the ‘more-for-more principle’, which links improved 
cooperation on return and readmission on the part of third countries to benefits and 
support in all policy areas on the part of the EU (i.e. more readmission for more EU 
funding and incentives)
24
. The conditionality approach, or more-for-more principle, can 
                                                 
24
 Interestingly enough, the ‘more-for-more principle’ was first introduced in 2011, in the aftermath of 
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be found in all the most relevant and recent EU policy papers and statements concerning 
the EU return and readmission policy
25
. 
 
3.4. Problems and limits of EU readmission agreements 
This section analyses the problems and limits of European readmission 
agreements, questioning four elements: their European scope; their relevance and 
effectiveness as instruments of cooperation on readmission; the role non-state actors and 
international organisations may play in their negotiation and implementation; and their 
human rights content. 
 
3.4.1. How much are they ‘European’? 
European readmission agreements are ‘European’ in the sense that they are 
negotiated by the Commission on the mandate of the Council and on behalf of all EU 
Member States (Denmark excluded, having ‘opted-out’ from the entire area of freedom, 
security and justice; United Kingdom and Ireland are included only if they decide to 
‘opt-in’ on a case-by-case basis to individual EURAs). Therefore, EURAs actually have 
a European scope, if we consider that they formally establish uniform obligations and 
harmonised procedures relating to readmission which apply to (almost) all EU Member 
                                                                                                                                               
the Arab Spring, with a completely different meaning and purpose. In short, it meant more democratic 
reforms for more EU support, and it was part and parcel of a new policy towards Southern Mediterranean 
countries based on a ‘Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity’ (European Commission and 
High Representative 2011b; see also Chapter 4, section 4.1). The idea was that the EU would develop 
stronger partnerships and offer greater assistance and incentives to countries that would make more 
progress towards democratic reform (European Commission and High Representative 2011b, 5). The 
more-for-more principle in its original meaning was also incorporated in the last review of the ENP, in 
2011. The Joint Communication of the European Commission and the High Representative of the Union 
for Foreign Affairs ‘A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood: A Review of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy’ affirmed that: ‘Increased EU support to its neighbours is conditional. It will 
depend on progress in building and consolidating democracy and respect for the rule of law. The more 
and the faster a country progresses in its internal reforms, the more support it will get from the EU. This 
enhanced support will come in various forms, including increased funding for social and economic 
development, larger programmes for comprehensive institution-building (CIB), greater market access, 
increased EIB financing in support of investments; and greater facilitation of mobility’ (European 
Commission and High Representative 2011d, 3). 
25
 E.g. the European Council Conclusions of 25-26 June 2015 (European Council 2015a, para 5(c)); the 
EU Action Plan on Return (European Commission 2015b, 14); the Council Conclusions on the Future of 
the Return Policy (Council of the EU 2015, para 12); and the Communication on Establishing a New 
Partnership Framework with Third Countries (European Commission 2016f, 6-9). 
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States. However, we should also consider that EURAs insert themselves into a broader 
and consolidated framework of bilateral cooperation on readmission between Member 
States and third countries. 
Readmission policies at the European and at the national level coexist and are 
closely interconnected, but the relations between the two policy levels are complex and 
have not always developed smoothly. In particular, the division of competences relating 
to the negotiation and conclusion of readmission agreements with third countries has 
been (and to some extent still is) object of dispute between the Commission, the Council 
and the Member States. Tensions and ambiguity in the determination of the respective 
powers of the EU and its Member States, the sometimes unfair behaviour of Member 
States with regards to the limits of their own competence, the weight and impact of 
Member States’ national priorities in the field of readmission on the EU’s overall 
interest, and the prominent role Member States play in the implementation of EURAs, 
all these elements lead us to question the ‘European’ character of EURAs. 
A primary controversial issue to be considered concerns the nature of the EU 
competence to conclude readmission agreements. As mentioned above under section 
3.1, the Amsterdam Treaty (implicitly) conferred on the EU the competence to conclude 
RAs with third countries (Art. 63(3)(b) TEC), however it did not clarify the nature of 
such power: did the EU acquire an exclusive competence to conclude RAs at a 
supranational level, or were the Member States still competent to conclude bilateral 
RAs at the national level? At the time of the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty, 
the Commission claimed the exclusive power to negotiate and conclude EURAs on 
behalf of the Member States, whereas the Member States contested this interpretation 
and refused to renounce their power to enter into bilateral RAs with third countries 
(Schieffer 2003, 350-351; Coleman 2009, 75-80; Panizzon 2012, 111-113). 
In order to settle the controversy, the JHA Council of 27-28 May 1999 defined the 
rules regulating the division of powers between the EU and the Member States. First of 
all, it affirmed that the EU competence is not exclusive but shared, and therefore 
Member States can continue to conclude RAs with third countries, ‘provided that the 
Community has not concluded an agreement with the third State concerned or has not 
concluded a mandate for negotiating such an agreement’. The Council Conclusions also 
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foresaw an exception to this rule: Member States may conclude a bilateral RA after the 
conclusion or the opening of negotiations for an EURA with the same third country 
only in individual cases where the EURA contains only general statements on 
readmission, while the Member States require more detailed arrangements
26
. Finally, 
the Council maintained that Member States can no longer conclude bilateral RAs if they 
might be detrimental to existing EURAs (Council of the EU 1999b, ‘Readmission 
Agreements - Consequences of the Entry into Force of the Amsterdam Treaty’). 
Coleman has usefully elaborated the content of the JHA Council Conclusions of 
May 1999 and of a confidential opinion issued by the Council Legal Service in March 
1999, into a list of five rules that the Member States have to abide by, in order to 
continue pursuing their national readmission policies, while respecting the principle of 
sincere cooperation. The rules identified by Coleman are the following: 
 
1) The Member States collectively may not conclude readmission agreements with 
third countries; 
2) A Member State must notify the Council of its intention to negotiate a 
readmission agreement with a third country; 
3) A Member State may negotiate or conclude a readmission agreement with a 
third country only insofar as the Council has not (yet) adopted a negotiating 
directive for a Community agreement concerning that country; 
4) Regarding third countries for which the Council has adopted a negotiating 
directive for a Community readmission agreement, a Member State may 
exceptionally conclude an agreement containing more detailed arrangements, if 
required; 
5) A Member State may not negotiate or conclude a readmission agreement in case 
this might be detrimental to the implementation of a Community agreement, or to 
readmission negotiations conducted at the EC level (Coleman 2009, 84). 
 
Coleman, however, notes that neither the Commission nor the Member States 
appeared to be satisfied with such division: whilst the Commission had always aspired 
to exclusive competence in the area of readmission, the Member States considered the 
                                                 
26
 This provision has been actually incorporated in the text of all EURAs, which foresees the possibility 
for Member States to conclude bilateral implementing protocols with the third country concerned. 
However, it should also be noted that EURAs never contain only ‘general statements on readmission’; 
instead, they are usually as detailed as bilateral RAs. 
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power they retained insufficient compared to their needs, and in fact individual Member 
States have challenged and even infringed the abovementioned rules on different 
occasions (Coleman 2009, 202-208; Panizzon 2012, 127-128). 
The Lisbon Treaty represented a good opportunity to clarify the issue of division 
of competences and mitigate inter-institutional tensions. It actually offered not only the 
first explicit legal basis for the Commission to conclude EURAs (Art. 79(3) TFEU), but 
also the first unequivocal categorisation of policy areas falling under either exclusive or 
shared competence; and the area of freedom, security and justice was included into the 
fields of shared competence (Art. 4(2)(j) TFEU). Therefore, the Treaties confirmed that 
the EU and the Member States share the competence to conclude readmission 
agreements with third countries. Moreover, they should balance their respective 
competence as described by Article 2(2) TFUE: 
 
When the Treaties confer on the Union a competence shared with the Member 
States in a specific area, the Union and the Member States may legislate and adopt 
legally binding acts in that area. The Member States shall exercise their 
competence to the extent that the Union has not exercised its competence. The 
Member States shall again exercise their competence to the extent that the Union 
has decided to cease exercising its competence. 
 
This provision incorporates the rules established by the JHA Council in May 1999 
(see also Coleman’s rules number 3 and 4). Furthermore, the relationship between the 
EU and the Member States in this policy area continues to be grounded on the principle 
of sincere cooperation, as established by Article 4(3) TUE, which requires both the EU 
and the Member States to ‘assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow from the 
Treaties’. In particular, the last sentence of the article says: ‘the Member States shall 
facilitate the achievement of the Union’s tasks and refrain from any measure which 
could jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s objectives’. This provision recalls the 
last paragraph of the JHA Council Conclusions of May 1999 (and Coleman’s rule 
number 5) establishing that Member States cannot undertake the negotiation of bilateral 
RAs that may be detrimental to the conclusion or implementation of an EURA. 
A second relevant issue is the implementation of European readmission 
agreements. The whole debate on the nature of the EU competence concerns, in fact, 
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only the negotiation and conclusion of EURAs; the competence over their 
implementation has always been with the Member States. There is actually no 
‘European implementation mechanism’: EURAs are implemented at a bilateral level 
between each Member State and the third country concerned. This means that the whole 
implementation phase, including the decision to return an irregular migrant, the issuance 
of a removal order, the corresponding readmission request and the actual enforcement 
of such order through the required procedure, all this falls entirely under the 
responsibility of each individual Member State (Cassarino 2010c, 17-18; Giuffré 2011, 
13). 
As noted by Cassarino, it is often mistakenly understood that once the 
Commission and the Council decide to open negotiations with a given third country, the 
Member States cannot exercise their competence on readmission as a whole; on the 
contrary, they will be responsible for the crucial phase of implementation. In 2006 Karel 
Kovanda, Special Representative for Readmission Policies at the Commission 
Directorate General for External Relations (DG Relex), clarified this point as follows: 
 
EC readmission policies and agreements fall under the external dimension. They 
set out reciprocal obligations binding the Community on the one hand and the 
partner country on the other hand. But once an agreement is negotiated, the 
Community responsibility is over. Its day-to-day implementation, the actual 
decision about sending a person back and the actual operation it involves – all this 
is entirely within the competence of our Member States (as cited by Cassarino 
2010c, 18). 
 
Therefore, in their practical implementation, EURAs appear to be much more a 
Member States’ issue. As a matter of fact, when they need to send a third country 
national back to a given country, Member States generally tend to apply pre-existing 
consolidated bilateral level arrangements and practices, even when an EURA is in place. 
This is also one of the reasons for the limited use of implementing protocols: Member 
States that are potentially more interested in having a well-functioning cooperation on 
readmission with a certain third country usually do not need to draft an implementing 
protocol in the framework of the EURA, because most probably they have already 
regulated readmission procedures with that country through formal or informal bilateral 
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arrangements. The 2011 Evaluation of EURAs acknowledged the existence of this 
practice and criticised it, stating that ‘the inconsistent application of EURAs undermines 
greatly the credibility of the EU Readmission Policy towards the third countries, which 
are expected to apply the EURA correctly’; the Commission, thus, urged Member States 
to apply EURAs for all their returns (European Commission 2011a, 4). 
In sum, one may raise doubts on the truly ‘European’ nature and scope of EURAs 
in light of a number of factors: 
1. the Member States’ reluctance to transfer to the Commission their power to 
conclude RAs and their insistence for the competence in this field to remain 
shared; 
2. the Member States’ continued pursuit of their national readmission policies (and 
national interests in this field), even when this meant neglecting the principle of 
sincere cooperation and infringing the well-established rules on the sharing of 
competence, with the risk of jeopardising the Commission’s negotiating strategy 
and/or compromise the conclusion of EURAs
27
; 
3. the fact that the implementation of EURAs rests with the Member States, which 
tend to resort to bilateral arrangements and practices rather than the procedures 
and instruments provided for by the EURA. 
The second of these elements (i.e. the Member States’ ambiguous behaviour when 
it comes to respecting the rules on the sharing of competences) is probably the most 
worrying one for the actual accomplishment of an EU readmission policy. As 
summarised by Coleman, 
 
parallel invitations by Member States to enter into a readmission agreement send 
ambiguous signals to third countries, and can interfere with negotiations at the 
Community level. It raises questions concerning the internal division of power 
regarding immigration in the EC, and raises doubts concerning the degree to which 
the Community truly has a common readmission policy (Coleman 2009, 204). 
 
                                                 
27
 Coleman reports different cases where this happened, in particular with regards to the EURA with 
Albania and the EURA with Russia (2009, 202-208); Panizzon discusses the examples of Morocco and 
Cape Verde (2012, 127-128); García Andrade et al. report about the cases of Russia and Algeria (2015, 
89). 
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3.4.2. How much are they relevant and effective? 
This section focuses on the effectiveness and relevance of European readmission 
agreements. From the standpoint of the EU institutions and Member States, EURAs are 
considered to be effective if they produce an increase in the number of returns of 
unauthorised migrants from a Member State to a third country. Similarly, EURAs are 
considered to be relevant when they actually contribute to successfully achieve their 
purpose, that is to fight irregular immigration by facilitating the removal of irregular 
migrants to a third country of origin or transit
28
. 
 
Measuring effectiveness 
The main instrument used by the Commission and Member States to measure the 
effectiveness of EURAs is the comparison between the total number of removal orders 
issued and the total number of returns actually carried out, i.e. return rates
29
. Eurostat 
data (the only available data on return covering all EU Member States) show the 
existence of a significant gap between the two values in the period from 2008 to 2014: 
every year, less than half of the third country nationals who received a removal order in 
a Member State were actually returned to a third country. In the year 2014, over 
470,000 migrants were issued an order to leave, but the order was actually enforced 
only for 36% of them (168,925)
30
. Eurostat data also prove that in the period 2008-2014 
the absolute number of removal orders and enforced returns has remained substantially 
                                                 
28
 Cassarino suggests an alternative interpretation of the concept of effectiveness. The effectiveness of 
readmission agreements depends on the extent to which the contracting parties respect their reciprocal 
obligations as enshrined in the agreement; such obligations are not limited to the enforcement of returns, 
but include also the respect of the fundamental rights of returnees. (Cassarino 2010c, 43-46; 2010b, 25). 
Therefore, quantitative data on returns under EURAs may only in part be indicators of the effectiveness 
of these instruments, but a comprehensive evaluation of EURAs should include an analysis of how they 
affect migrants’ human rights. 
29
 Carrera criticised the ‘EU’s current obsession with return rates’ (2016, 52). He argues that return rates 
may not be very reliable as an indicator of effectiveness, because many removal orders are issued to 
people who turn out to be non-expellable; in addition, he points at national authorities’ sometimes 
superficial expulsion decisions, which are taken without carefully looking at information available in 
individual cases (2016, 58-59). 
30
 Source: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Statistics_on_enforcement_of_immigration_legislation#Number_of_non-
EU_citizens_ordered_to_leave_has_decreased_between_2008_and_2014. Accessed on 6 September 
2016. See also Table 5.1 in Carrera 2016, 38. 
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stable and in decreasing trend, while the average return rate has been 36,7% (ranging 
between 34% and 43%)
31
. 
Such a low rate of successful expulsions has been a main source of concern for 
the EU institutions throughout the last decade. The ‘insufficient effectiveness’ of the EU 
return system has been explicitly acknowledged in several policy papers, such as the 
European Agenda on Migration (European Commission 2015a, 9), the letter drafted by 
Commissioner Avramopulous in June 2015 (Council of the EU 2015a, 2-3) and the EU 
Action Plan on Return (European Commission 2015b, 2), and the need to improve the 
rate of effective returns has been repeatedly and consistently urged both by the JHA 
Council (Council of the EU 2011, para 3; 2015b, para 5) and by the Commission in its 
EU Action Plan on Return (European Commission 2015b, 10) and again in its recent 
Communication on establishing a new Partnership Framework with third countries 
(European Commission 2016f, 7). 
But in reality, the quantitative picture provided by Eurostat does not help to 
precisely understand what the impact of EURAs on the EU return system really is. This 
is due to the fact that Eurostat data do not include any indication of the legal framework 
in which expulsion practices take place; therefore it is impossible to trace which returns 
are carried out within the scope of an EURA and which are carried out in application of 
other bilateral formal or informal cooperation arrangements
32
 (European Commission 
2011a, 3; PACE 2010b, para 5; 2010a, paras 8, 77-78; Cassarino 2010c, 43-45; Carrera 
2016, 39-41). This lack of statistical information make it difficult to precisely assess the 
effectiveness of EURAs in quantitative terms. 
The first study which tried to fill in this gap was carried out by the European 
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 As noted by Carrera, this is true also for countries with which the EU has concluded a readmission 
agreement: therefore, no relevant increase in returns towards those counties has been recorded since the 
entry into force of their EURA (Carrera 2016, 38). 
32
 In addition, Eurostat statistics do not specify whether a returnee is sent to the country of origin or 
transit, do not differentiate between voluntary and forced returns, and do not record whether those who 
received a removal order are irregular migrants or rejected asylum seekers. Data may also deviate from 
reality because not every third country national who is returned is always served an order to leave, in 
particular in the case of voluntary returns. Moreover, concerning the implementation of EURAs, Eurostat 
does not collect figures concerning the number of readmission requests issued by Member States and the 
number of those approved and refused by third countries; the number of travel documents issued by each 
third country; the number of readmission applications submitted under the normal and accelerated 
procedures; and other more specific information on the way in which EURAs are used. 
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Migration Network (EMN) in 2014. The synthesis report ‘Good Practices in the Return 
and Reintegration of Irregular Migrants’ was drafted on the basis of national 
contributions from 24 EMN National Contact Points
33
, who completed a common 
template answering questions on the Member States’ use of entry bans and readmission 
agreements, including both EURAs and bilateral RAs (EMN 2014b). As concerns 
EURAs, the study’s aims were ambitious: its first purpose was to collect statistics from 
Member States’ authorities on the total number of readmission applications made based 
on EURAs for the period 2010-2013 (distinguishing if they concerned own nationals or 
third country nationals, and if they involved voluntary returns). Secondly, the study 
aimed to gather figures on indicators measuring the effectiveness of EURAs
34
. And 
finally, it aimed to investigate also the practical obstacles experienced by Member 
States when implementing EURAs, either of a general nature or in relation to a given 
third country (EMN 2014a). 
Unfortunately, only twelve Member States
35
 provided statistics on the total 
number of readmission applications submitted on the basis of EURAs; some Member 
States (like France) do not collect separate data on readmission applications made under 
EURAs, while many others have offered only incomplete data (EMN 2014b, 40, Table 
A2.2). That said, the figures which emerge appear to be barely significant: in 2013 the 
total number of readmission applications submitted under EURAs in twelve Member 
States was 3,798 (EMN 2014b, 40, Table A2.2); in the same year, based on Eurostat 
data, third country nationals ordered to leave in the whole EU were 430,450 and those 
who were effectively returned were 184,765 (Carrera 2016, 38, Table 5.1). 
In light of the limited data collected, the EMN study could not identify common 
trends for the use of EURAs, which in different Member States increased, decreased or 
                                                 
33
 The countries involved in the study were: 23 EU Member States (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United 
Kingdom) and Norway. 
34
 Such indicators were: the number of readmission applications sent by Member States and the number 
of those which received a positive reply; the number of travel document requests sent by Member States 
and the number of travel documents issued by third countries; the number of persons actually returned 
under EURAs. 
35
 Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, 
Spain, Sweden. 
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remained stable (EMN 2014b, 40, Table A2.2). Collected data show that the vast 
majority of readmission applications concerned own nationals of the third countries 
with whom EURAs have been signed (almost 100%) and that even if some Member 
States use EURAs also to carry out voluntary returns, their share is generally limited 
(EMN 2014b, 21-22). However, these findings need to be carefully used: since they 
come from less than half of the EU Member States, no general conclusion should be 
drawn from them. 
Data concerning the indicators of effectiveness mentioned above are scarce as 
well. Statistics provided by eleven Member States
36
 show that the share of readmission 
applications receiving a positive reply ranges between 60% and 100% of the overall 
applications sent (EMN 2014b, 44, Table A2.6), but again these figures need to be put 
into perspective given the small number of States involved. For other indicators, data 
provided by Member States were too limited to be analysed. 
Nonetheless, the information collected was presumably considered sufficient for 
the EMN study to conclude that ‘EURAs are generally effective return tools’ and that 
‘overall, no systematic problems in cooperating with third countries have been 
identified’ (EMN 2014b, 7). These conclusions are largely debatable, as they are not 
based on sufficiently representative data. It is worth noting that the 2011 Commission 
Evaluation of EURAs confronted a similar problem (data collected from Member States 
were scarce and were not harmonised; return rates were too different, i.e. extremely 
high in some countries, very low in others) and came to the opposite conclusion, that 
‘data do not allow reliable conclusions about actual returns’ (European Commission 
2011a, 5)
37
. 
Finally, the EMN study reported a number of practical obstacles which, based on 
Member States’ experience, have a negative impact on the effective implementation of 
EURAs. These include: third countries’ failure to respect deadlines, insufficient 
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 Belgium, Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Latvia, Netherlands, Poland, 
Sweden. 
37
 Even though the 2011 Commission Evaluation of EURAs did not succeed in evaluating the 
effectiveness of EURAs in quantitative terms due to the lack of data in Eurostat and from Member States, 
it nonetheless carried out a useful qualitative assessment, in particular with respect to the human rights 
safeguards under EURAs. 
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cooperation on readmission of non-nationals, failure to issue the required travel 
documents, etc. (EMN 2014b, 22-23)
38
. Despite the limited statistical relevance of 
figures collected, the EMN study correctly observed that, on the basis of Member 
States’ experience, the extent to which EURAs can be considered effective largely 
depends on ‘the agreement and the cooperation with a given third country’ (EMN 
2014b, 7)
39
. 
 
Factors limiting the effectiveness and relevance of EURAs 
As a matter of fact, the degree of actual cooperation offered by a third country is 
one of the main factors which impact on the effectiveness of EURAs (PACE 2010a, 
para 86). The conclusion of an EURA, indeed, is not per se a guarantee of a third 
country’s cooperation in the implementation of the agreement. Countries of origin may 
prove unwilling to readmit own nationals (EMN 2012, 62; Carrera 2016, 14) and 
countries of transit to readmit non-nationals (Council of the EU 2015a, 5); in addition, 
as reported by some Member States in the 2012 EMN study on ‘Practical Measures to 
Reduce Irregular Migration’, returns to some States are not enforceable because of the 
general situation in the country, e.g. the lack of a functioning central government to 
issue travel documents or verify the identity of the person (EMN 2012, 62-63). 
The implementation of EURAs (which occurs at a bilateral level, as mentioned 
under section 3.4.1 above) is usually linked to the broader (bilateral) relations between a 
Member State and the third country concerned; the effective implementation of the 
readmission obligations established by an EURA may, thus, be the object of further 
bilateral negotiations and induce the development of informal procedural arrangements 
between national authorities (Coleman 2009, 58-60; Cassarino 2007). Carrera properly 
argued that ‘EURAs present a high level of dependency on the state of diplomatic 
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 Member States identified further critical aspects of EURAs in another EMN study on ‘Practical 
Measures to Reduce Irregular Migration’ carried out in 2012. On that occasion, several Member States 
emphasised the limited relevance of EURAs: Finland and Germany noted that cooperation on readmission 
with third countries had not improved following the conclusion of EURAs, while Malta stated that the 
EURAs concluded until that moment did not involve any of the third countries form which irregular 
migrants to Malta originate (EMN 2012, 72-73). 
39
 The same conclusion was actually drawn with respect to bilateral RAs, which the EMN study proved 
are in practice used by Member States in parallel to EURAs (EMN 2014b, 8). 
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relations between the states concerned’ and emphasised the importance of the role of 
(and relations with) third countries’ consular authorities in the concrete implementation 
of EURAs (Carrera 2016, 13). 
A further element which limits the effectiveness of EURAs is represented by the 
technical and practical aspects of the readmission procedure, as highlighted also by 
Member States in the framework of the 2014 EMN study (see above in this section). 
There may be different practical obstacles to the effective implementation of EURAs, 
but the most relevant one concerns the determination of the identity and nationality of 
undocumented third country nationals who may refuse to cooperate to their own 
removal (Carrera 2016, 13-16). Along with the lack of cooperation of third countries, 
indeed, the lack of cooperation of returnees (who may conceal their true identity or 
abscond) is often highlighted as one of the main obstacles to the implementation of 
returns (EMN 2012, 62; Council of the EU 2015a, 3). 
Since third country nationals cannot be returned anywhere, firstly, if their identity, 
nationality and/or migration route are not adequately established and proved, and 
secondly, if they are not issued new travel documents or laissez-passer
40
, cooperation 
between Member States and third countries on the issues of identification and 
documentation is crucial (Council of the EU 2014, para 4.1) - and has often developed 
through informal bilateral practices (Cassarino 2007, 187; Carrera 2016, 14). Improved 
‘operational and political cooperation on readmission’ has been urged also by 
Commissioner Avramopulous as a measure to increase the effectiveness of EURAs 
(Council of the EU 2015a, 5). 
An additional element which impacts on the overall effectiveness of EURAs (and 
on the effectiveness of the EU readmission policy as a whole) is their geographical 
distribution. As clearly stated in the policy paper in annex to Commissioner 
Avramopulous’ June 2015 letter: 
 
While the EU’s eastern flank is now well covered – through readmission 
                                                 
40
 The laissez-passer is a standard travel document used to the purpose of expulsion, in cases when a 
third country national does not held any valid travel document; the laissez-passer need to be accepted by 
the third country of destination as a valid travel document. 
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agreements with Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Turkey, the Western Balkan countries – its southern flank, which is subject to 
strong migratory pressure, is not. The EU has no readmission agreements in force 
with the North African countries (Council of the EU 2015a, 5). 
 
The lack of EURAs with countries of origin in Sub-Saharan Africa and countries 
of origin and transit in Northern Africa is another symptom of the limited effectiveness 
and relevance of EURAs as an instrument to fight irregular immigration. In light of the 
EU enlargement, in the recent past major EU’s efforts and investments have gone to 
securing the EU’s Eastern external border and establishing fruitful cooperation with 
Eastern neighbours. But EURAs have been signed also with several countries whose 
importance in terms of migratory pressure on the EU is minimal; conversely, with the 
main countries of origin and transit of migration flows into Europe, the EU has so far 
failed to conclude readmission agreements. 
The Commission recognised this flaw and affirmed the need to take action: the 
EU Action Plan on Return clearly stated that ‘African countries […] are a priority’, also 
because ‘the return rates to African countries are under 30% - well below the general 
rate of return from the EU, which […] is already insufficient’ (European Commission 
2015b, 10). In order to tackle this problem, the Commission suggested the opening of 
negotiations for EURAs with the main countries of origin in Sub-Saharan Africa; the 
recent announcement of the beginning of readmission negotiations with Nigeria 
apparently falls within this policy. In the Commission’s view, the prospect of the 
readmission of own nationals by Sub-Saharan countries would reassure North African 
countries that their position as transit countries would not pose a massive burden on 
them with regards to non-nationals. This should in turn facilitate the conclusion of 
EURAs also with North African countries - especially where readmission negotiations 
or mandates are pending, i.e. with Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia (European 
Commission 2015b, 11; Council of the EU 2015a, 5). But this strategy may not lead to 
the expected results, because, as admitted by the Commission itself, ‘these countries are 
sometimes reluctant to even cooperate in taking back their own nationals’ (European 
Commission 2015b, 11). As confirmed by a DG HOME official in a confidential 
interview, this is for example the case of Morocco. 
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Finally, Panizzon highlighted the fact that EURAs are far less effective and 
relevant compared to bilateral RAs because the latter are generally much wider in scope, 
encompassing issues such as legal migration and police cooperation, which fall outside 
the EU competences. In particular, bilateral RAs are usually linked (and are in any case 
able to offer) labour migration quotas, while EURAs cannot, due to the EU’s lack of 
competence in this policy area (Panizzon 2012, 131-132). The impossibility to resort to 
such a crucial incentive does not only hamper the negotiation of EURAs (as discussed 
above under section 3.3) but jeopardises also their effective implementation once they 
have been concluded, and limits their relevance as an instrument to combat irregular 
migration, especially if compared to more comprehensive bilateral RAs. 
 
3.4.3. What role do non-state actors and international organisations play in 
their negotiation and implementation? 
Since the early 2000s, private actors and international organisations have been 
increasingly involved in the implementation of European migration and asylum policies. 
In particular, in the fields of migration control, border surveillance, migration detention 
and forced return, the outsourcing of crucial tasks to private corporations in the security 
and surveillance sectors has become more and more widespread and is now the rule. As 
summarised by Gammeltoft-Hansen: 
 
The involvement of private actors in migration control is a growing phenomenon. 
[…] Today, however, the privatisation of migration control is far from limited to 
airlines or other transport companies. From the use of private contractors to run 
immigration detention facilities and enforce returns to the use of private search 
officers both at the border and at offshore control zones, private involvement in 
migration management is both expanding and taking new forms (Gammeltoft-
Hansen 2011, 204-205). 
 
Moreover, international organisations specialised in migration and asylum, such 
as the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), have been increasingly involved in assisting EU 
Member States in the return and reintegration of irregular migrants and rejected asylum 
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seekers, through Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration programmes (Redpath 
2004, 292-294). States have, thus, gradually delegated private actors and international 
organisations to carry out typical State duties, in order to maximise the effectiveness 
and minimise the costs and visibility of a wide range of measures and operations in the 
area of migration control, including return and readmission. In addition, the more non-
state actors and international organisations are involved in the implementation of 
migration and asylum policies, the more they acquire the power to influence (and to 
some extent participate in) decision-making in this field. 
Migration management has become a lucrative business for private actors – and 
has been analysed by various scholars as an ‘industry’ producing profits and ‘products’ 
(Andersson 2014; Gammeltoft-Hansen and Nyberg Sorensen 2013). In addition, 
migration management has become a way for international organisations like the IOM 
and the UNHCR to legitimise and expand their role and activities, to affirm their own 
logic, and to partly emancipate themselves from their own funders, i.e. the States 
(Triandafyllidou 2014, 5-6; Geiger and Pécoud 2014; Korneev 2014). At the same time, 
by taking part in the removal of unauthorised migrants and rejected asylum seekers, 
international organisations legitimise and support the overarching return objectives and 
security agenda of the EU and its Member States (Koch 2014; Scheel and Ratfisch 
2014). 
As concerns, more precisely, the role of non-state actors and international 
organisations in the negotiation and implementation of EURAs, information publicly 
available is scarce and in-depth research in this field is limited. Therefore, we 
acknowledge, together with Cassarino, that ‘the actual magnitude of outsourcing in the 
field of readmission is still unknown’ (2010c, 47). The interviews I conducted with 
current and former DG HOME officials and other experts in the field of readmission 
(like Jean-Pierre Cassarino, Institut de Recherche sur le Maghreb Contemporain 
(IRMC), Tunis) contributed to provide useful information on this issue, although 
leaving many questions unanswered. The general attitude of EU officials to my 
questions on the role of non-state actors was rather sceptical, but their answers were 
nonetheless interesting. 
It emerged that private actors and international organisations have no official role 
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during the negotiations of EURAs; these are a confidential inter-state affair and they are 
quite strictly policed in this sense. International organisations may nonetheless be 
involved before negotiations formally begin: they are usually consulted when the 
Commission wants to recommend to the Council the adoption of a negotiating directive 
and needs to provide a detailed description of the migration scenario in the third country 
concerned. For instance, in the case of Jordan - a country with a large refugee 
population - the UNHCR was consulted and provided information on the potential 
impact of an EURA with Jordan
41
. 
As concerns the implementation of EURAs, international organisations like the 
IOM are often involved in projects in third countries, which are indirectly linked to the 
implementation of an EURA. Of course, the IOM does not deal with readmission 
procedures per se (which are under the responsibility of national authorities), but it is 
usually responsible for the implementation of Assisted Voluntary Return (AVR) 
projects, reintegration programmes and/or capacity building on return management and 
training of national authorities (e.g. in the areas of identification and re-documentation). 
When the IOM is involved in the implementation of an EURA through these 
kinds of projects, it is quite common that the organisation is invited to participate in the 
Joint Readmission Committee (JRC) meetings as a third party. JRC meetings are inter-
state gatherings which usually take place behind closed doors, and whose main purpose 
is to monitor the practical implementation of the EURA. JRC regulations generally 
foresee the possibility for both the EU and the third country to invite third parties to 
participate in meetings. However, given the ‘high degree of secrecy’ of JRC meetings 
(Carrera 2016, 41), the IOM is usually only invited to attend the part of the meeting 
where its projects are discussed. The IOM representative would give a presentation of 
the state of play of the readmission capacity-building initiative or the return and 
reintegration projects the organisation is implementing and would then leave the 
meeting. Therefore, it appears that international organisations like the IOM do not 
participate directly in decision-making processes, but can nonetheless potentially 
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 As mentioned in Chapter 4, the EU signed a Mobility Partnership with Jordan in October 2014; the MP 
entails a commitment to negotiate and conclude a readmission agreement between the EU and Jordan 
(MP with Jordan, para 9). 
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influence them, being among the actors responsible for the implementation of EURAs. 
As concerns private actors, based on my interviewees’ experience, it seems that 
their role in the negotiation and implementation of EURAs is even more limited. 
Nevertheless, EU officials affirmed that non-state actors may participate in the EURA 
implementation phase as service providers, sometimes along with the IOM. For 
instance, as part of a new strategy aimed at increasing the effectiveness of EURAs 
through the automatisation of readmission procedures, a pilot project was launched in 
the framework of the EURA with Georgia, introducing the ‘Electronic Readmission 
Management System’, i.e. a web-based portal for the uploading and processing of 
individual readmission requests that allows for the automatic online exchange of 
readmission applications between Member States authorities and national authorities in 
Georgia – thus, bypassing the third country’s consulates in EU Member States and 
avoiding the exchange of hard paper copies (IOM 2014). In this case, the project 
implementation is coordinated by the IOM, but the development and management of the 
portal was outsourced to a private IT company. 
Similarly to the practice followed with the IOM, a representative from the service 
provider may be invited to attend JRC meetings in order to explain and periodically 
report on the functioning of the system. Besides this, EU officials consistently stated 
that, in their experience, they have not witnessed any other form of private actors’ 
involvement in the EURAs decision-making process; this is especially true for formal 
inter-governmental fora, such as the JRCs or the negotiation context. However, as 
mentioned by a former EU official, nothing excludes any lobbyists to contact either side 
during negotiations or in the implementation phase. 
In sum, non-state actors and international organisation have so far played only a 
marginal and somehow indirect role in the implementation of EURAs. Nevertheless, 
this has already allowed them to have a voice in inter-state decision-making settings, 
although in an apparently limited way. However, this does not prevent them from 
exercising a certain influence on decision-makers; as highlighted by Cassarino, the mere 
consultation and provision of information to policy-makers may contribute to 
consolidate and strengthen a given hierarchy of priorities and a security-oriented 
paradigm (2010c, 47). Moreover, in the future the involvement of these actors in the 
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area of readmission may well develop, as part of a broader phenomenon where 
migration management is increasingly devolved to private actors and international 
organisations who have a specialised knowledge and expertise in the field. The 
increasing involvement of specialised technocratic private or international actors proves 
that privatisation and de-statualisation of migration and refugee management may open 
the way for its de-politicisation (Lahav 2014, 4; Scheel and Ratfisch 2014). 
Even though ‘further evidence is needed to understand the actual impact of these 
interconnections [between different actors] on policy options and priorities’, Cassarino 
argues that: 
 
a readmission system is emerging whereby the interests of the private remain 
intertwined with those of the public to respond and legitimise operable means of 
implementation. Incidentally, private security companies do not only deliver a service 
which, being private, often remains beyond public purview, they are also proactive in 
developing ‘extremely close ties’ (Flynn and Cannon 2009, 16) with decision-makers 
and government officials and in expanding strategic alliances with other key private 
actors or subcontractors (Cassarino 2010c, 47). 
 
3.4.4. What is their human rights content? 
The human rights content of European readmission agreements is rather limited. 
EURAs only provide for the inclusion of a ‘non-affection clause’ (see above section 
3.2), establishing a duty for the contracting parties to apply the agreement in a way that 
is consistent with (i.e. does not affect) international obligations arising from 
international law, including human rights obligations. Starting from the EURA with 
Albania, most EURAs have included a list of human rights and refugee law conventions 
the agreement shall comply with. In addition, EURAs usually include references to 
international human rights and refugee law instruments in their Preamble. Besides this 
generic commitment to respect well-established international human rights law, EURAs 
do not contain more precise or stringent provision protecting the rights of migrants and 
asylum seekers. 
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Advocates of EURAs (including the Commission, Member States and some 
scholars, among which Nils Coleman) do not question whether these agreements are 
consistent with human rights: in their view EURAs are simply a tool facilitating the 
removal of irregular migrants and are neutral in terms of human rights. Human rights 
concerns may arise at a previous stage, when the return decision is taken, and not when 
that decision is enforced by means of an EURA. It is at that previous stage that national 
authorities should take into account human rights issues and should apply human rights 
and refugee protection obligations. Since its adoption in 2008, this occurs on the basis 
of the Return Directive, which established the rights and procedural guarantees that 
Member States have to ensure to third country nationals in a return procedure (PACE 
2010a, para 29; 2010b, para 2)
42
. This interpretation of the relationship between EURAs 
and human rights has been consistently confirmed by the current and former DG HOME 
officials which I interviewed. 
On the contrary, critics of EURAs (the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe, NGOs and some scholars, among which Gregor Noll and Maria Giulia Giuffré) 
affirm that there is a risk that readmission agreements pose a threat, directly or 
indirectly, to the human rights of irregular migrants and asylum seekers, in particular 
with regards to the principle of non-refoulement, as both the requesting and the 
requested country may fail to abide by their obligations under the 1951 Geneva 
Convention or the European Convention on Human Rights. EURAs may then be used to 
implement a flawed return decision. 
According to critics, the existence of an EURA may actually encourage the taking 
of such faulty return decisions; as noted by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council 
of Europe (PACE), in some cases EURAs may become the catalysts for the 
enforcement of questionable removal orders, which breach the human rights or neglect 
possible protection needs of the third country nationals concerned (PACE 2010a, paras 
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 According to this standpoint, not only EURAs do not raise human rights issues, but also they do have a 
number of advantages. For instance, they provide transparency because readmission procedures are 
clearly established prior to the enforcement of a removal decision, and if correctly implemented they may 
contribute to reduce the migrants’ period of detention and uncertainty by accelerating their removal 
(PACE 2010a, para 29; 2010b, para 2). Panizzon highlighted in particular that EURAs have higher 
standards of transparency and democratic legitimacy in comparison with bilateral RAs, which often are 
not publicly accessible (2012, 115-116). 
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39-43). Therefore, there would be a certain causality link between the application of 
readmission agreements and the likelihood of human rights violations for returnees 
(Giuffré 2011, 14; 2013a). 
This interpretation is based on the idea that the return process should be 
considered as a whole, in which readmission agreements are one important element; one 
phase of the process cannot be isolated from the others and respect for human rights 
must be guaranteed at every stage, from the issuance of the expulsion order to its 
enforcement (PACE 2010a, para 30; 2010b, para 3).  
In its 2011 Evaluation of EURAs, the Commission clarified its position in this 
regard. It explained that the legal construction of these agreements is based on the fact 
that they apply only to persons who are considered to be ‘illegally staying’ in the 
territory of a Member State, as determined by a return decision issued by the competent 
national authorities in application of the relevant national and European legislation and 
in compliance with international standards. If a person claims international protection, 
the EU asylum legislation applies, and a return decision can only be issued after his or 
her application has been refused. Therefore, from the Commission perspective, on 
paper, readmission can only be carried out as a result of a return decision, which may 
only be issued if the procedural guarantees and human rights safeguards foreseen by 
international and European law are observed. Formally, EURAs do not apply neither to 
asylum seekers whose application is still pending, nor to persons who face a risk of 
persecution or torture in the country of origin or return (European Commission 2011a, 
10-11). However, in the same document the Commission importantly acknowledged 
that ‘the actual administrative and judicial practice applied in the field is important’ and 
that ‘practical deficiencies […] could lead to violations of fundamental rights in the 
implementation of a readmission procedure’. Therefore, the Commission suggested 
relevant measures ‘to ensure that the human rights of returnees are fully respected at all 
times’ (European Commission 2011a, 11). 
Coleman shares a very similar position. In the conclusions to his 2009 book, he 
argued that EURAs are not detrimental to refugee protection and do not increase the risk 
of refoulement, because they do not affect in any way Member States’ international 
legal obligations in the area of refugee protection. However, he acknowledged that ‘this 
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is relevant to the formal application of a readmission agreement’, while ‘the compliance 
in practice with international obligations during the informal application of readmission 
agreements could be a cause of concern’ (Coleman 2009, 325). He recognised the 
possibility of diverging practices, especially in relation to border procedures. Therefore, 
even the advocates of EURAs, and among them also the DG HOME officials which I 
interviewed in Brussels, acknowledge that a faulty implementation of EURAs in daily 
practice entails a risk that the rights and procedural safeguards of irregular migrants and 
asylum seekers are disregarded. 
The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, NGOs, scholars and the 
European Commission in its 2011 Evaluation of EURAs, identified a number of 
shortcomings in terms of human rights guarantees in EURAs, which typically emerge in 
the practice of readmission. Firstly, all EURAs foresee an accelerated procedure for 
migrants apprehended in border regions, allowing for readmission to be carried out 
within shorter deadlines. This procedure is recognised as a source of potential 
deficiencies in practice, with particular regard to the right to access an asylum procedure 
and to have one’s application examined in substance, the respect of the non-refoulement 
principle and the right to an effective remedy with suspensive effect. The Commission 
recognised that this is also due to the fact that Member States may choose not to apply 
some of the safeguards of the Return Directive to persons apprehended in the border 
region (European Commission 2011a, 12; PACE 2010b, paras 6.3-6.5; AEDH 2013a, 
3). 
Secondly, criticism is often raised by the conclusion of EURAs with countries 
having a weak human rights and refugee protection record. This represents a serious risk 
for returnees both in the case of countries of origin (like Pakistan, which has not signed 
the 1951 Geneva Convention) and in the case of countries of transit (like Morocco, 
Algeria and Tunisia, with which the EU is trying to conclude EURAs and which 
allegedly do not offer adequate protection standards and living conditions to refugees 
and migrants) (AEDH 2013a, 3-4). The PACE and NGOs suggested EURAs should 
only be concluded with countries that comply with international human rights standards 
and the 1951 Geneva Convention, have a functioning asylum system and do not 
criminalise unauthorised immigration and emigration (PACE 2010a, para 6.1; AEDH 
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2013a, 3-4). In addition, in its 2011 evaluation, the Commission recommended the 
inclusion in EURAs of a ‘suspension clause’, providing for the temporary suspension of 
the agreement in case of a persistent and serious risk of human rights violations for 
returnees in the country concerned (European Commission 2011a, recommendation 12). 
A third critical factor, which the PACE considers to be ‘the most sensitive issue’ 
(2010a, para 44), relates to the readmission of third country nationals to transit 
countries. The PACE, the Commission, NGOs and several scholars emphasised the fact 
that persons who are not returned to their country of origin but to a country of transit 
‘may find themselves in a particularly precarious situation’ (European Commission 
2011a, 13). They risk becoming subject to so-called ‘chain refoulement’, i.e. being 
denied the possibility to apply for asylum or to have their application examined on the 
merits, and being deported to their country of origin (or to another transit country) 
without an assessment of possible risks of persecution or torture. Moreover, they risk 
being subject to an indefinite detention period pending the removal to their country of 
origin. Or if they are not detained, they may face difficulties in integrating in the host 
society, in accessing the labour market, in providing for their basic needs; they may end 
up stranded in the transit country, deprived of any means of subsistence and unable to 
leave the country, not even to return to their country of origin (European Commission 
2011a, 13; PACE 2010a, paras 44-58; 65-66). 
Roig and Huddleston affirmed that this ‘burden-shifting policy’ which transfers 
responsibility for irregular migrants to transit countries with fragile capacities, weak 
asylum systems and controversial human rights records could result in the EU becoming 
an accomplice of serious human rights violations (Roig and Huddleston 2007, 379-383). 
Both the PACE 2010 resolution and the Commission 2011 evaluation actually 
recommended that readmission to a person’s country of origin is prioritised over 
readmission to a transit country. The PACE suggested this become a legal obligation 
explicitly included in the text of EURAs (PACE 2010b, para 6.7); the Commission (as 
mentioned above under section 3.3) even recommended to exclude the readmission of 
non-nationals (i.e. the third country national clause) from future negotiating directives 
except in cases where this is deemed to be of crucial importance (European Commission 
2011a, recommendation 8). 
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More in general, conditions upon return either to a country of origin or to a 
country of transit represent an extremely concerning issue. As reported by NGOs and 
the PACE, in some third countries readmitted migrants may be fined, arrested, detained, 
deported, subject to violence or deprived of any means of subsistence (PACE 2010a, 
paras 59-64). The PACE suggested Member States verify before readmission takes 
place that the readmitting country will grant the returnees access to minimum social 
rights (2010b, para 6.8). Both the PACE resolution and the Commission evaluation 
noted the lack of a mechanism to monitor what happens to returnees after their 
readmission is carried out; therefore, they both suggested the establishment of a post-
return monitoring mechanism in third countries in order to gather information on the 
situation of persons who are readmitted under EURAs, and verify their human rights are 
respected upon and following their readmission
43
 (European Commission 2011a, 13-14; 
PACE 2010a, para 73; 2010b, paras 6.13 and 7.5). 
Scholars and NGOs have argued for the inclusion of explicit human rights clauses 
in EURAs (as well as in bilateral readmission agreements), which would provide for 
more specific and stringent obligations on the contracting parties towards returned 
migrants and asylum seekers compared to the already existing non-affection clause 
(Giuffré 2013a). A counter-argument to this proposal is that this would represent a 
superfluous reiteration, because States are already bound by human rights and refugee 
protection obligations deriving from international law (and from European law for EU 
Member States). However, as noted by Giuffré (2013a, 104), on the one hand EU and 
non-EU countries are not necessarily bound by the same legal instruments, and on the 
other hand the jurisdiction of European supranational courts would be limited in case of 
human rights violations committed by readmitting third countries. The inclusion of 
legally binding procedural human rights clauses in EURAs would thus create more 
onerous obligations than those deriving from general international law for both Member 
States and third countries (Giuffré 2011, 16-17; PACE 2010b, paras 6.11 and 7.2). 
Finally, the analysis conducted in this section showed that the European 
                                                 
43
 In its 2011 Evaluation, the Commission suggested to launch a pilot project to monitor the situation of 
persons readmitted under an EURA (European Commission 2011a, recommendation 15). A post-return 
monitoring pilot project was launched in 2014 in Ukraine and Pakistan and is implemented by the IOM in 
partnership with the UNHCR (García Andrade et al. 2015, 38). 
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Commission, in its 2011 Evaluation of EURAs, significantly acknowledged the gaps 
and flaws in terms of human rights guarantees characterising the EURAs, and proposed 
a number of relevant measures to enhance such guarantees (e.g. the introduction of a 
suspension clause, the exclusion of the third country national clause from most EURAs, 
the launch of a post-monitoring mechanism). However, most of the 2011 Commission 
recommendations were largely disregarded by the Council Conclusions defining the EU 
Strategy on Readmission, adopted only a few months later (Council of the EU 2011). 
Moreover, the EU Action Plan on Return, adopted by the Commission in 
September 2015, marks a substantial overturning in the Commission approach to the 
issue of human rights protection within EURAs. The recent Action Plan on Return, 
indeed, does not make any reference to the need to improve the implementation of 
EURAs from the perspective of its compliance with human rights obligations (European 
Commission 2015b, 10-14). It is remarkable that the whole Communication actually 
lacks any reference to human rights, except for a general commitment in the 
introduction, saying that the implementation of all actions under the Communication 
will have to comply with international human rights standards (European Commission 
2015b, 2). 
An EU source I interviewed confirmed this change of approach and explained it 
partly with the fact that in Europe ‘the situation has changed, the mood has changed’44 
and partly with the political turn brought about by the Juncker Commission (in office 
since 1 November 2014) – and more precisely with the shift from a liberal left-wing to a 
conservative right-wing Migration and Home Affairs Commissioner
45
. A DG HOME 
official confirmed that in the last two years readmission has been clearly prioritised in 
EU cooperation with third countries, the current focus being on making readmission 
                                                 
44
 The reference was to increased mixed migration flows from the Southern and South-Eastern 
neighbourhood of the EU, which became increasingly tragic and increasingly mediatised, starting with the 
Lampedusa shipwrecks in October 2013 and then exploding with the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ in the fall-
winter 2015-2016. 
45
 The position of Migration and Home Affairs Commissioner, which was held by Cecilia Malmström 
(former Swedish Minister for EU Affairs and member of the liberal party) for the period 2010-2014, is 
currently held by Dimitris Avramopulous (former Greek Minister of Defense and member of the 
conservative New Democracy Party) for the period 2014-2019. According to this interviewee, the 2011 
Communication was influenced by the then Commissioner Malmström, who ‘was allergic to any kind of 
return and readmission’. 
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more effective and conducting as many returns as possible. 
 
3.5. The case studies of Morocco, Algeria and Turkey 
This section focuses on the case studies of three European readmission 
agreements geographically located in the Mediterranean area. While the EURA with 
Turkey was signed in December 2013 following long and complex negotiations and is 
now in force, the conclusion of EURAs with Morocco and Algeria is still far away. The 
Commission received the mandate to start negotiations with the two Maghreb countries 
in 2000 and 2002 respectively; negotiations with Morocco are formally still ongoing, 
but are currently stuck, whereas negotiations with Algeria never actually began. This 
section elaborates further on the critical aspects of the negotiation process analysed 
above under section 3.3; it also demonstrates the contradictions (also discussed above 
under section 3.4.2) of an EU return policy that has so far failed to conclude EURAs 
with any countries in the Southern Mediterranean and in Sub-Saharan Africa, which are 
among the main countries of origin and transit of migration flows into Europe. 
 
3.5.1. The pending readmission agreements with Morocco and Algeria 
Due to their relevance as countries of origin and transit, Morocco and Algeria 
were actually among the first countries to be targeted for the negotiation of a European 
readmission agreement. 
 
Morocco 
The Commission received the negotiating mandate for Morocco in September 
2000 and sent the draft text of the agreement to Moroccan authorities in April 2001. 
However, a series of informal preparatory meetings and discussions within the EU-
Morocco Association Council
46
 were necessary to convince Morocco to formally start 
negotiations, finally, in April 2003 (Coleman 2009, 150-151). This first reluctant 
reaction to the EU’s invitation to enter into an EURA was followed by a 15-year long 
                                                 
46
 The EU-Morocco Association Council was established under the EU-Morocco Euro-Med Association 
Agreement, signed in February 1996 (see above section 2.2.2). 
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(and still ongoing) negotiation process, counting 18 rounds so far. Besides being very 
long, the whole negotiation has also been particularly difficult (and according to an EU 
official I interviewed, less dynamic compared to the one with Turkey), as it got stuck 
every now and then on a number of sticking points; and once blocked, negotiations were 
hard to resume. 
Throughout the entire negotiation process, there have been four main concerns on 
the part of Morocco. The first one relates to the inclusion in the EURA of a third 
country national clause imposing on Morocco a readmission obligation with regards to 
non-nationals who transited through (or resided in) its territory before entering the EU. 
Since Morocco is not only a main country of transit, but has also become a main 
country of destination for Sub-Saharan migrants, it fears becoming a ‘gathering ground’ 
for unwanted migrants (Coleman 2009, 151)
47
. Therefore, it has complained about the 
practical difficulties related to the actual implementation of this obligation (e.g. how to 
identify third country nationals, how to prove which countries they transited through, 
etc.) as well as the huge financial, organisational and technical efforts it would require. 
Morocco’s aversion to the readmission of non-nationals is linked to a second more 
general issue, concerning its foreign policy in the region. Morocco is an important 
player in the Maghreb and wants to maintain this image among regional partners (Wolff 
2014, 84). It is thus keen to maintain good relationships with neighbouring countries in 
Northern Africa, as well as to revive its ties with Sub-Saharan countries, in particular in 
West Africa, both for political and economic reasons
48. Therefore, ‘Morocco cannot 
afford to cooperate on the deportation of citizens of African countries on Europe’s 
behalf’, as it would be ‘a public relations nightmare for Morocco’ and it would harm its 
economic and political interests in the region (Carrera et al. 2016, 6)
49
. 
                                                 
47
 This change in its status from country of origin to country of destination is a source of domestic 
concern, which led Morocco to develop restrictive migration polices during the first decade of the years 
2000s (Coleman 2009, 151-152). 
48
 Morocco has political and economic interests in West Africa, related in particular to the contentious 
issue of Western Sahara, a territory which Morocco has for a large part occupied since 1976 and over 
which it claims sovereignty. Algeria has always contrasted the Moroccan occupation and supported the 
Sahrawi people’s right to self-determination and fight for independence. 
49
 Charles (2007, 25-26) emphasised the possible destabilising impact of EURAs on relations between 
partner third countries and neighbouring countries in the region. 
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Thirdly, Morocco proved to be also extremely reluctant to readmit its own 
nationals, as confirmed by the EU officials I interviewed. Morocco considers the 
readmission of own nationals to be too costly and disadvantageous, also in light of the 
fact that socio-economic reintegration may be difficult for Moroccans who typically 
have been living abroad for a long time (Carrera et al. 2016, 6). Moreover, remittances 
are a major source of income for Morocco that it may not want to see reduced by 
limiting the presence of its citizens abroad (Coleman 2009, 152). 
Morocco’s aversion to the readmission of own nationals is also linked to a fourth 
concern relating to domestic public opinion. In the view of Moroccan authorities, a 
readmission agreement with the EU ‘would be difficult to sell to the public’ (Coleman 
2009, 153) and might have relevant negative implications in terms of political 
consensus, being largely perceived as unbalanced by nature and largely unfavourable 
for Moroccan nationals. Therefore, Morocco has asked the EU for compensation ‘that 
would not only be substantive but also clearly visible’ (Coleman 2009, 153), so that the 
conclusion of the agreement could be presented to its domestic audience as overall 
beneficial to the Moroccan people.  
First of all, Morocco has required technical and financial assistance for border 
control and the reception, processing and onward removal of readmitted persons; the 
Commission and Member States have responded positively to this request, by providing 
dedicated funding and technical support throughout the last decade (Coleman 2009, 
154). However, according to Moroccan authorities, the readmission of unauthorised 
Moroccan nationals could only be sold to the public if counter-balanced by increased 
mobility and labour market access opportunities in the EU for Moroccan nationals. As 
mentioned above under section 3.3, the Commission lacks the competence to offer 
incentives in the area of legal migration and almost all Member States (with the 
exception of Italy) have proved extremely reluctant in offering preferential labour 
migration channels in exchange for cooperation on readmission (Coleman 2009, 154-
155). 
Moreover, Member States have always resisted the idea of offering visa 
facilitation to Morocco, because of the supposedly high migratory risk posed by the 
country (see section 3.3). They finally agreed on this, under the Commission’s pressure, 
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only in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, when in the framework of the GAMM, the EU 
decided to offer Mobility Partnerships to Southern Mediterranean countries
50
 (Wolff 
2014, 78). As described in section 4.1 below, since 2011 Mobility Partnerships include 
a political commitment to negotiate in parallel VFAs and EURAs with the partner 
country (European Commission 2011e, 11). Therefore, the MP signed by the EU and 
Morocco in June 2013 provides for the opening of negotiations on a visa facilitation 
agreement, as well as the revitalisation of negotiations for the European readmission 
agreement. 
The MP offered an actual opportunity for the re-launch of the EURA negotiations, 
which were stalled since May 2010. However, no agreement has been reached so far, 
despite additional offers of financial and technical assistance through EU- and Member 
State-funded projects and despite the visa facilitation incentive
51
. Core differences of 
opinion remain and new incentives do not seem to be particularly helpful, as many of 
the MP projects were actually in place already before, and the VFA in practice would 
offer only limited mobility opportunities due to its limited scope (it only applies to 
short-term Schengen visa). A new round of negotiations on the EURA (and the VFA) 
was held in January 2015 (EU Delegation to Morocco 2015); I learned from a DG 
HOME official interviewed in March 2016 that a further round of negotiations was 
scheduled in June 2015, but was cancelled by Morocco at short notice and no new date 
was proposed ever since. 
Interestingly, if on the one hand Morocco has shown reluctance, when not 
aversion, towards cooperation on readmission at the European level, at the bilateral 
level it did quite the contrary. Since the early 2000s Morocco has cooperated closely 
with Spain to control irregular migration through the Gibraltar strait, to the Canary 
Islands and to the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, by applying the 1992 bilateral 
readmission agreement between the two countries, as well as informal readmission 
arrangements and practices (especially in the case of Ceuta and Melilla)
52
. Along with 
                                                 
50
 As maintained by one of the DG HOME officials interviewed by Wolff, before the Arab Spring ‘visa 
facilitation was absolutely out of question for Member States’ (2014, 78). 
51
 The content of the MP with Morocco will be analysed in details under section 4.5.1 below. 
52
 Bilateral cooperation on readmission between Spain and Morocco is analysed in detail in Chapter 5, 
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Spain, Morocco has signed bilateral readmission agreements with Italy, France, 
Portugal, Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands (García Andrade et al. 2015, 127; 
Wolff 2014, 79-80). 
However, it is worth noting that cooperation on migration control and on 
readmission at the bilateral level proved to be effective and well-functioning with 
respect to third country nationals; conversely, readmission agreements (both of a formal 
and informal nature) are not necessarily implemented in a strict manner in the case of 
Moroccan nationals. At the consular level, in particular, Morocco has proved extremely 
hesitant in the practical application of bilateral RAs with respect to its own citizens, and 
established a practice of ‘case-by-case cooperation’ (Carrera et al. 2016, 6). The attitude 
of Moroccan consulates was described by an EU source that I interviewed as an issue of 
primary concern both for the Member States and the Commission. In their view, 
readmission should amount to an automatic procedure and it should not involve any 
decision on the merits of individual cases by the consulates of the readmitting country. 
A further development which has not only blocked the EURA negotiations but has 
jeopardised EU-Morocco cooperation relations in general, is the December 2015 ruling 
of the CJEU annulling a 2012 Council Decision regarding a trade liberalisation 
agreement in agricultural and fishery products between Morocco and the EU
53
. Morocco 
reacted harshly to this ruling and suspended its diplomatic relations with the EU. The 
EU and Member States, on their part, showed sympathy towards Morocco and hoped 
for the rapid restoration of normal relations; the Council appealed the Court decision 
and a final judgement is expected for December 2016
54
. This episode proves how 
                                                                                                                                               
section 5.3. 
53
 CJEU, Front Polisario v. Council, Case T-512/12, Judgment of the General Court, 10.12.2015. The 
case was brought to the CJEU by the ‘Front Polisario’ (a Western Saharan national liberation movement 
supporting the right of self-determination of the Sahrawi people) because the 2012 Council Decision, and 
the trade liberalisation agreement it established, would unfairly apply also to the contended territory of 
Western Sahara, which Morocco occupied in the 1970s but over which it does not have officially 
recognised jurisdiction. 
54
 Even if it goes beyond the temporal scope of this study (which analyses developments until the 1
st
 of 
December 2016), it is worth mentioning that the final CJEU judgement on the case was issued on 21 
December 2016. The Court established that the agreement in question does not apply to the territory of 
Western Sahara because it does not mention it explicitly, and is therefore valid. Thus, the Court dismissed 
the action for annulment brought by the Front Polisario against the 
Council’s decision to conclude the trade liberalisation agreement, but it also explicitly reaffirmed that that 
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cooperation on readmission is intertwined with a broader cooperation framework, which 
includes other strategic (and perhaps more crucial) policy areas (Carrera et al. 2016, 6). 
To conclude, all the EU officials I interviewed consider the chances for reaching 
an agreement with Morocco in the next future to be very low, one of them even stating 
that ‘one thing is for sure: Morocco will never sign the European readmission 
agreement’. Similarly, Carrera et al. affirm that ‘the continuous pressure to conclude an 
EURA has alienated rather than brought Morocco closer’ (2016, 12). The authors argue 
that the EU’s strong focus on readmission as a main goal, and the use of the whole EU 
cooperation with Morocco as a leverage to obtain the conclusion of the EURA, have 
been counter-productive and have put the EU’s broader interests at risk. This was 
confirmed also by Jean-Pierre Cassarino in an interview I conducted in July 2016, 
during which he highlighted the Commission was wrong in focusing too much on 
readmission and making initiatives in all other areas conditional to it. According to 
Cassarino, this is doubly dangerous for the EU, because Morocco (like other Southern 
Mediterranean countries) have become strategic partners for the EU and its Member 
States in other, even more relevant, policy areas besides migration control (i.e. energy 
security, international terrorism, etc.). 
 
Algeria 
The case of Algeria is strongly linked with that of Morocco. Both countries were 
selected for the conclusion of EURAs for similar reasons and in light of the EU’s 
regional approach to cooperation on readmission. As mentioned above, the Commission 
received the mandate to open negotiations with Algeria in November 2002, but 
negotiations have not started so far, because Algeria posed firm conditions for agreeing 
to negotiate the EURA (Coleman 2009, 175). 
At first, Algeria refused to enter into negotiations because it wanted its Euro-Med 
Association Agreement to enter into force first. The Euro-Med Agreement with Algeria 
was initialled in December 2001, and it entered into force in December 2005. To some 
extent, Algeria forced the EU to accelerate the procedures necessary for its entry into 
                                                                                                                                               
for the EU the territory of Western Sahara is not part of the Kingdom of Morocco. CJEU, Council v. 
Front Polisario, Case C-104/16 P, Judgment of the Grand Chamber, 21.12.2016. 
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force, because it perceived the agreement as favourable; at the same time, thanks to this 
strategy, Algeria managed to postpone the negotiations of the readmission agreement, 
that it perceived as disadvantageous (Coleman 2009, 184). 
Secondly, Algeria linked the start of readmission negotiations to the outcome of 
the EURA negotiations between the EU and Morocco. The reasons for this choice was 
that Algeria wanted to achieve a readmission agreement with the EU on the same terms 
as Morocco, and possibly obtain the same degree of compensation. Besides the 
traditional rivalry between the two countries, this request was mainly due to the fact 
that, as neighbours, they share the responsibility for transit migration in the region and 
in such situations a certain level of harmonisation in readmission procedures is highly 
desirable, if one wants EURAs to work properly (Coleman 2009, 176).  
Evidently, Algeria’s position is strategically very unfavourable to the Commission 
(Coleman 2009, 185-186) and it has so far resulted in the total impossibility for the EU 
to open readmission negotiations with Algeria, due to the difficulties in concluding the 
negotiations with Morocco first. Algeria has continued to refuse starting negotiations 
also in recent years, i.e. throughout 2012 and 2013 (European Commission 2014a, 6, 
footnote 11). 
 
3.5.2. The readmission agreement with Turkey 
The case of Turkey is interesting for several reasons. Turkey is among the key 
countries in the neighbourhood of the EU with which the Commission engaged early on 
in readmission negotiations. The latter revealed to be a long and difficult process, but 
differently from the cases of Morocco and Algeria, they ended with the actual 
conclusion of a European readmission agreement. The EURA with Turkey is 
particularly relevant to this study because it relates to readmission arrangements and 
practices established at bilateral level between Turkey and Greece (analysed in Chapter 
5, section 5.4) as well as to recent migration cooperation and readmission arrangements 
adopted by the EU and Turkey starting from October 2015 with the purpose of 
stemming the increased migrant and refugee flow transiting through Turkey into the EU 
(see Chapter 6, section 6.2.1.1). 
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Already in the early 2000s, the establishment of readmission relations with 
Turkey was considered of utmost importance by the EU, in light of its objectives of 
securing the EU’s external borders and creating a ‘buffer zone’ of third countries 
assuming responsibility for transit migration (both in terms of preventing the entry of 
and readmitting irregular migrants). Irregular transit migration through Turkey was 
already a critical issue, due to Turkey’s geopolitical location at the crossroads of Asia, 
Africa and Europe, which made it a crucial hub of smuggling routes and networks 
(İçduygu and Aksel 2014, 338-339). In addition, in the early 2000s Turkey was still also 
a country of origin of unauthorised migrants and asylum seekers (Coleman 2009, 178). 
A further peculiar element of the readmission negotiation with Turkey is that it is 
closely intertwined with the country’s accession process. The case of Turkey, indeed, is 
peculiar also due to the country’s long and troubled history of prospective EU 
membership (İçduygu and Aksel 2014, 338)55. Therefore, readmission negotiations 
were inevitably affected by membership negotiations, negatively or positively at 
different stages of the process. For instance, the Europeanisation triggered by the 
accession process brought about national reforms in the area of migration and asylum 
and the gradual adoption and implementation of the EU acquis; this rapprochement of 
Turkish legal and policy framework to the European one fostered cooperation in the 
management of migration, including readmission (İçduygu and Aksel 2014, 357-359; 
Wolff 2014, 91-92). 
In November 2002 the Commission was given mandate to open negotiations for a 
readmission agreement with Turkey; after receiving a draft text of the agreement in 
March 2003, Turkey did not acknowledge the invitation to start negotiations until 
March 2004 (Coleman 2009, 178). Even before negotiations started, Turkey had 
manifested a reluctant attitude, when not open resistance, to the conclusion of an 
EURA. The most critical issue was, also in the case of Turkey, the readmission of non-
nationals (Coleman 2009, 179; İçduygu and Aksel 2014, 352-353). Such obligation 
entails a responsibility for transit migration, which Turkey was not keen to take, fearing 
to become ‘a buffer zone and a dumping ground for unwanted migration to the EU’ 
                                                 
55
 Turkey had become a candidate Member State in 1999, after having applied ten years before (Coleman 
2009, 178). 
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(Kirisçi 2014, 2). As a solution to this problem, Turkey adopted a ‘delaying tactic’ 
(Coleman 2009, 180): it postponed the conclusion of the EURA and meanwhile 
engaged in a ‘regional readmission policy’ (Wolff 2014, 90), by proactively seeking to 
conclude bilateral readmission agreements with an impressive number of countries
56
. 
Presumably, before agreeing to the readmission of non-nationals from the EU Member 
States, Turkey tried to secure more readmission obligations from the main countries of 
origin. 
Turkey’s second objection against the conclusion of an EURA is grounded on a 
manifest contradiction between the fact that since 1999 Turkey is a candidate Member 
State and the criteria for the selection of readmission target countries, as set by the April 
2002 Council Conclusions on this topic. As mentioned above under section 3.1, in this 
document the JHA Council identified the criteria for the identification of third countries 
with which new EURAs should be negotiated; as a second criteria, the Council affirmed 
that: ‘given the European Union’s forthcoming enlargement, countries with which it is 
negotiating accession agreements should not be included’ (Council of the EU 2004, para 
2). As noted by Coleman, ‘including this criterion was a strategic mistake, considering 
Turkey’ (2009, 180); a mistake which left the Commission without much space for 
successful counter-arguments. Consequently, the Commission resorted to political 
pressure in order to convince Turkey to start readmission negotiations, e.g. by 
announcing Turkey’s protracted lack of response on the EURA would impact negatively 
on the country’s accession process (Coleman 2009, 181). 
This strategy was finally successful, as in March 2004 Turkey accepted to start 
readmission negotiations. However, Turkey’s reluctance was definitely not overcome, 
considering that in practice negotiations only began in May 2005 and were interrupted 
in December 2006, to remain stalled until 2010. This was partly due to the EU’s 
decision to suspend negotiations on a number of chapters in the accession process 
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 In October 2004 Turkey already had agreements in place with Syria, Greece, Kyrgyzstan, and 
Romania; negotiations were underway with Belarus, Bulgaria, Egypt, Kazakhstan, Libya, Lebanon, 
Macedonia, Sri Lanka, Russia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan; in addition, Turkey was awaiting responses to 
invitations to negotiate from Algeria, Bangladesh, China, Ethiopia, Georgia, India, Iran, Israel, Jordan, 
Mongolia, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sudan, and Tunisia (Kirisçi 2004, Appendix, 14). 
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(Kirisçi 2014, 2)
57
. Turkey, on its part, reacted by advancing a new request: visa 
exemption for Turkish citizens travelling to the EU on equal terms as the Western 
Balkan countries, which were about to obtain visa liberalisation
58
 (Wolff 2014, 86; 
Kirisçi 2014, 2). From that moment on, the opening of a parallel dialogue on visa 
liberalisation became the main quid pro quo required by Turkey in exchange for the 
conclusion of a readmission agreement with the EU
59
. 
The EURA negotiations were resumed in 2010, when the EU prepared a new draft 
text including the possibility of visa facilitation; but the Turkish government kept 
demanding visa exemption instead. Turkey’s requests encountered the resistance of the 
JHA Council, and of some Member States in particular
60
. This worsened the climate of 
deep mistrust already characterising EU-Turkey relations. Nevertheless, three 
negotiation rounds took place in 2010, followed by a meeting of the Chief negotiators in 
January 2011 (Wolff 2014, 87). By February 2011 readmission negotiations were 
completed and the agreement on a draft text of the EURA was reached, but the issue of 
visa liberalisation was still pending. From February 2011 to June 2012 the debate 
focused entirely on this issue, with Turkish authorities making the conclusion of the 
EURA explicitly conditional to the attainment of a visa-free regime for Turkish citizens 
travelling to Europe (İçduygu and Aksel 2014, 335). 
The EURA was finally initialled in June 2012, when the Member States finally 
accepted under the Commission’s pressure, to initiate a dialogue on visa liberalisation 
                                                 
57
 This decision was taken by the EU in response to Turkey’s refusal to open its ports and airports to 
ships and planes from the Republic of Cyprus (İçduygu and Aksel 2014, 353). 
58
 Western Balkan countries (i.e. Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia) 
signed EURAs in 2006 and 2008; in the meanwhile they were given a roadmap to follow in order to get 
visa liberalisation, which they obtained in 2009 and 2010. 
59
 So-called visa exemption (or visa liberalisation, visa-free regime, etc.) allows citizens of a third 
country holding a biometric passport in line with EU standards, to travel for short stays (i.e. 90 days 
within any 180-day period) in the Schengen area without a visa. As part of its common visa policy, the 
EU has a common list of third countries whose nationals must be in possession of a visa in order to enter 
the EU, and a common list of countries whose nationals are exempt from that requirement. These lists are 
set out in EC Regulation 539/2001 of 15 March 2001 and its successive amendments. 
60
 Member States had different opinions on the opening of a visa liberalisation dialogue with Turkey. 
Among the opponents, there were Germany, France, Austria and Greece, which highlighted the 
possibility of increased migration from Turkey and expressed hesitancy also with regards to Turkey’s EU 
membership. Among the supporters, there were Italy, Britain, Sweden, Finland, Poland and Spain, which 
argued that a visa-free regime would not necessarily result in increased irregular migration (İçduygu and 
Aksel 2014, 354). 
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with Turkey. Nonetheless, this commitment was still rather vague and framed in a long-
term perspective (European Commission 2012). The EU tried to make the actual launch 
of the visa liberalisation dialogue conditional to the formal signature of the EURA; 
conversely, Turkey refused to formally sign the EURA without a concrete and credible 
commitment on the part of the EU to move towards a visa-free regime for Turkey 
(Wolff 2014, 87). 
But why had visa liberalisation become so crucial for Turkey? During the first 
decade of the years 2000s the country’s economy grew considerably and economic 
relations with the EU expanded and intensified, in particular thanks to the EU-Turkey 
Customs Union established in 1995. Thus, ‘it became increasingly awkward that 
Turkish goods enjoyed free movement while business people faced exacerbating if not 
humiliating visa applications while their European counterparts could enter Turkey 
freely often with just their identity cards’ (Kirisçi 2014, 2). While business people 
argued that visa had become a form of ‘non-tariff barrier’, similar complaints were 
increasingly raised by university students and academics participating in EU 
programmes, as well as journalists and civil society in general. A recurrent argument on 
the part of Turkish authorities was that of ‘equal treatment’ for Turkey in comparison 
with other candidate Member States (Western Balkan countries in particular) which 
were granted visa liberalisation despite less favourable economic indicators and higher 
numbers of migrants and asylum seekers to the EU (Kirisçi 2014, 3). 
The ‘credible commitment’ required by Turkey to the EU as a pre-condition for 
the formal signature of the EURA took the form of a ‘Roadmap towards a visa free 
regime with Turkey’, or Visa Liberalisation Roadmap (VLR) - a document setting out 
the requirements that Turkey needs to meet in order to be included in the EU list of 
visa-free countries. Although the Visa Liberalisation Roadmap is a Commission 
document, it was subject to an unusually long political negotiation within the Council. 
The Roadmap was finalised in November 2012 and transmitted to Turkey; but Turkish 
authorities were still hesitant in signing the EURA. The manifestly divergent Member 
States’ positions, the fact that visa liberalisation was not directly incorporated in the 
readmission agreement, and the lack of clarity and deadlines to the visa liberalisation 
process fuelled Turkish distrust that EU Member States would ever grant Turkey a visa-
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free regime, and thus weakened the power of the VLR as an incentive (Wolff 2014, 89). 
In addition, not all the VLR requirements were welcomed by the Turkish authorities; 
hence, Turkey refused to accept some of them and replied with an ‘annotated version’ 
of the Roadmap (Elitok 2015, 1; İçduygu and Aksel 2014, 356-357). 
Finally, on 16 December 2013 the EU and Turkey signed the EURA and 
simultaneously launched the visa liberalisation dialogue, based on the Roadmap 
(European Commission 2013). The VLR contains 72 specific requirements that Turkey 
needs to meet in order to qualify for visa-free regime. Requirements are organised in 
five thematic ‘blocks’: readmission of irregular migrants (directly linked to the 
conclusion and effective implementation of the EURA); document security; migration 
management; public order and security; and fundamental rights
61
. On the one hand, 
Turkey is required to embark in substantial legislative and administrative reforms in all 
these areas with the aim to establish ‘a secure environment for visa free travel’. But on 
the other hand, both the EURA and the VLR include provisions that are symptomatic of 
a troubled negotiation process where Turkey actually succeeded in pushing its main 
concerns forward. 
The EURA contains a provision (Art. 24, para 3) that delays the application of the 
obligation to readmit third country nationals to three years after the entry into force of 
the agreement; during that three-year period the EURA applies to Turkish nationals, 
stateless persons and nationals of third countries with which Turkey has already 
concluded bilateral RAs
62. This seems to be a compromise originating from Turkey’s 
reluctance to take responsibility for the readmission of non-nationals. 
Moreover, looking at the VLR, if on the one hand the EU requires that Turkey 
‘fully and effectively implement[s] the EU-Turkey readmission agreement in all its 
provisions’ for visa liberalisation to occur, on the other hand Turkey has the right to 
suspend the application of the EURA if the terms of the Roadmap are not met by the EU 
                                                 
61
 The text of the Roadmap is available at the following link: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-
is-new/news/news/docs/20131216-roadmap_towards_the_visa-free_regime_with_turkey_en.pdf.  
62
 The three-year deadline for the full application of the EURA with Turkey was modified following the 
EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan activated in November 2015; it was brought forward from 1
st
 October 2017 
to 1
st
 June 2016. However, at the moment of writing, the EURA provisions relating to third country 
nationals are still not applicable, lacking the formal authorization from the Turkish Council of Ministers. 
For details, see section 6.2.1.1 below. 
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- i.e. if the EU does not offer visa liberalisation to Turkey by April 2018
63
 (Kirisci 2014, 
3). This represents a way to address Turkey’s long-standing mistrust towards the EU’s 
real intentions with regards to visa exemption. Ultimately, the EU-Turkey readmission 
agreement was ratified by the Turkish Parliament on 26 June 2014 and entered into 
force on 1
st
 October 2014 (European Commission 2014e; 2014f). 
Criticism has been raised by Turkish scholars and NGOs against the fact that the 
Turkish government presented the EU readmission agreement merely ‘as a technical 
formality related to the visa exemption negotiations going on with the EU’ (Refugee 
Rights Coordination 2014, 2) and ‘a historical turning point that will remove the visa 
obligation for Turkish citizens to Europe’ (Elitok 2015, 1). The whole public discussion 
in Turkey was in fact dominated by the issue of visa exemption, while the issue of 
readmission was downgraded to a procedural step required by the visa liberalisation 
process. According to Turkish scholars, the presentation at domestic level of the whole 
process as a success story that would bring as an outcome ‘visa-free Europe’ for 
Turkish people amounted to a ‘public relations strategy’ pursued by the Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) with electoral purposes (Elitok 2015, 3; İçduygu and Aksel 
2014, 360). But according to several commentators, in reality the EURA represented a 
step back for Turkey, in particular with regards to its position as prospective candidate 
to EU membership. 
Elitok highlights that, as a candidate Member State, Turkey had already acquired 
rights with regards to the free movement of its citizens in the EU, but the Turkish 
government decided to overlook this and accepted instead the supposedly shorter-term 
and more visible option of linking visa liberalisation to the conclusion of the 
readmission agreement. But Elitok criticises also the EU for applying double standards 
when awarding visa exemption to other candidate (or even non-candidate) countries in 
the Western Balkans before Turkey. Moreover, the author underlines that the visa 
liberalisation notion is ambiguous and the process leading to it open-ended, which 
might lead to extra duties and responsibilities on Turkey. Finally, Elitok emphasises that 
                                                 
63
 Also this deadline for the achievement of visa liberalisation was brought forward firstly by the 
November 2015 Joint Action Plan and then by the March 2016 EU-Turkey Agreement, to be later 
postponed again, at the moment of writing, to the end of 2016-beginning of 2017 (see section 6.2.1.1 
below). 
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the EURA merely serves the EU’s migration control objectives, as it shifts on Turkey 
the ‘burden’ of all irregular migration transiting through the country into Europe (Elitok 
2015, 3-4). 
Along with criticism related to the fact that the EU-Turkey readmission agreement 
would go to the detriment of Turkey and Turkish people, NGOs strongly criticised its 
human rights implications for migrants and refugees, especially in light of the 
significant presence of forced migrants, asylum seekers and refugees among those who 
transit through Turkey towards the EU (Refugee Rights Coordination 2014)
64
. 
As concerns the implementation of the EURA, from the interviews I conducted 
with DG HOME officials in March 2016
65
 it emerged that it is ongoing: interviewees 
mentioned the fact that the Joint Readmission Committee has already met twice and that 
negotiations for an implementing protocol with Germany have been concluded
66
. 
However, none could provide figures concerning the practical implementation of the 
agreement, in particular the number of Turkish nationals and non-nationals who had 
been readmitted under the EURA since its entry into force. The reasons advanced by 
interviewees are related to the well-known lack of statistics distinguishing returns 
carried out under EURAs from other kinds of returns (see above section 3.4.2). 
Nevertheless, EU officials admitted that the implementation of the agreement is not 
progressing in the best way, mainly due to faulty practices on the part of Turkish 
authorities (e.g. with respect to time limits, identification of own nationals, issuance of 
travel documents, etc.) in particular at the consular level and in Member States like 
Germany or France (where the return of unauthorised Turkish nationals represents a 
relevant issue). 
The relevance of the EURA with Turkey within the broader framework of the EU 
migration and asylum policy increased substantially starting from autumn 2015 when, 
                                                 
64
 The human rights concerns raised with respect to the EURA with Turkey are not discussed in details 
here, because they are very similar to those characterising EURAs in general (which have already been 
analysed above under section 3.4.4). 
65
 In March 2016 the EURA with Turkey was applicable only to Turkish nationals and nationals of third 
countries with which Turkey had already bilateral RAs in place 
66
 In April 2016 the Commission reported Turkey had agreed a bilateral implementing protocol with 
Germany and was negotiating similar implementing protocols with Greece and Bulgaria (European 
Commission 2016d, 5). 
 99 
due to a huge increase in arrivals of migrants and refugees coming from Turkey to 
Europe crossing the Aegean Sea and the Western Balkans (the so-called ‘refugee 
crisis’), the EU established with Turkey enhanced cooperation in the area of migration 
management, with the twofold purpose of stemming this migration flow and supporting 
Syrian refugees in Turkey. This new EU-Turkey migration cooperation framework will 
be analysed in details under section 6.2.1.1. Here it is worth mentioning one of its most 
interesting outcomes: the anticipation of the deadline for the full application of the EU-
Turkey RA to all third country nationals from the 1
st
 of October 2017 to the 1
st
 of June 
2016. Therefore, since June 2016 Turkey has the obligation to readmit all irregular third 
country nationals who entered one of the EU Member States coming directly from 
Turkey. 
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CHAPTER 4 
MOBILITY PARTNERSHIPS 
 
 
4.1. Origins and evolution of Mobility Partnerships within the framework of 
the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility 
As anticipated above under section 2.1.5, the Global Approach to Migration 
(GAM) was launched in 2005. Following the informal European Council held at 
Hampton Court in October that year, the Commission produced a plan of ‘priority 
actions for responding to the challenges of migration’ (European Commission 2005b). 
This Communication proposed a set of concrete measures that constituted a 
comprehensive approach to migration and formed the basis for further discussion by the 
European Council. In December 2005, the European Council upheld the Commission 
plan and adopted the ‘Global Approach to Migration: Priority actions focusing on 
Africa and the Mediterranean’ (European Council 2005, Annex I). Mobility 
Partnerships (MPs) were introduced soon after, in May 2007, as the main policy 
instrument to operationalise the GAM (European Commission 2007a). 
However, both the GAM and the concept of MPs did not turn up out of the blue: 
their origins can be traced back to the early days of the Europeanisation of migration 
and asylum policy. As extensively discussed under section 2.1, the development of the 
external dimension of the EU migration and asylum policy underwent different phases, 
where policies (or the policy discourse) were informed by either a control-oriented 
approach or a more comprehensive prevention-oriented approach (or a mix of both). 
The Global Approach to Migration stems precisely from the ideas brought forward by 
the EU documents (especially Commission communications) that already in the 1990s 
had proposed a comprehensive approach to migration based on partnerships with third 
countries. 
In particular, in its 1991 and 1994 communications on immigration and asylum 
policies, the Commission recommended the adoption of a ‘global approach to the 
problem’ (also referred to as ‘comprehensive multi-disciplinary approach’ or ‘balanced 
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and integrated approach’) combining ‘three separate but interrelated elements: taking 
action on migration pressure; controlling migration flows; strengthening integration 
policies for the benefit of legal immigrants’ (European Commission 1991, 2-3; 1994, 
11). The first element (i.e. taking action on migration pressure) was meant to be 
implemented in close cooperation with the main countries of origin, as it should 
specifically address the root causes of migration. Lavenex and Stucky (2011, 118) 
noticed two main differences between the 2005 Global Approach to Migration and this 
early notion of ‘global approach’: the latter did not include initiatives in the field of 
legal and labour migration, and did not make EU cooperation with third countries 
conditional to the third countries’ commitment in the areas of migration control and 
readmission. 
As mentioned under section 2.1 above, the 1999 Tampere European Council 
represented a turning point for the breakthrough of ‘a comprehensive approach to 
migration addressing political, human rights and development issues in countries and 
regions of origin and transit’ and for the strengthening of an idea of ‘partnership with 
third countries’ as ‘a key element for the success of such a policy’ (European Council 
1999, para 11). The issue of ‘possibilities for legal immigration’ was included in 
Tampere’s idea of a comprehensive approach to migration as an issue to be dealt with in 
cooperation with third countries (European Council 1999, para 22). But it was a 
Commission Communication issued one year later, in November 2000, that focused 
specifically on legal migration and on the admission of labour migrants in the EU.  
In this forward-looking document, the Commission explicitly stated that ‘channels 
for legal immigration to the Union should now be made available for labour migrants’, 
because ‘it is clear from an analysis of the economic and demographic context of the 
Union and of the countries of origin, […] that the «zero» immigration policies of the 
past 30 years are no longer appropriate’ (European Commission 2000, 3). The 2000 
Communication promoted a ‘partnership approach’ whereby the EU should ‘take a 
responsible attitude towards the effects of emigration on the countries of origin’, in 
particular as concerns brain drain, remittances and the link between migration and 
development (European Commission 2000, 7). In light of these considerations, the 
Commission further suggested that: 
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The partnership approach should provide a framework for dealing flexibly with 
new trends in migration which are now developing in the world, with the concept 
of migration as a pattern of mobility which encourages migrants to maintain and 
develop their links with their countries of origin. This includes ensuring that the 
legal framework does not cut migrants off from their country of origin e.g. that 
they have possibilities to visit without losing their status in their host country, and 
of moving on or going back as the situation develops in the country of origin and 
elsewhere in the world (European Commission 2000, 8). 
 
In this paragraph, the Commission clearly anticipated the concepts of mobility and 
circular migration (although without naming the latter), which will be formally 
introduced as part of the GAM in May 2007, by the Commission Communication on 
Circular Migration and Mobility Partnerships between the EU and Third Countries. 
However, as analysed under section 2.1.4, in the following years (the early 2000s) 
the focus of the EU migration policy shifted to irregular migration and to a security-
oriented approach to migration control, both at the level of the European Council, the 
JHA Council and the Commission. As highlighted by Lavenex and Stucky (2011, 119-
120), in this context, the ‘rhetoric of partnership’ was to some extent maintained but the 
purpose of ‘partnering’ was no more to tackle the root causes of migration and support 
socio-economic development in partner countries, or to offer legal migration 
opportunities to migrant workers; rather, the aim of ‘partnering’ became to integrate 
countries of origin and transit into the EU migration control system. Cooperation on the 
part of third countries was required primarily in the areas of return and readmission, as 
well as on migration- and border control. Cooperation in these areas was incentivised 
through the promise of rewards, such as visa facilitation, financial and technical 
assistance, and benefits in other policy areas. Therefore, in the early 2000s, the notion of 
partnership was embedded in a conditionality, or quid pro quo, framework. 
In light of this analysis, the Global Approach to Migration appears to be closely 
connected with the overall evolution of the EU migration policy. Indeed, as further 
discussed below in this section, the GAM has incorporated and merged elements from 
both the comprehensive prevention-oriented partnership approach and the control-
oriented approach. But notwithstanding this close relation with its broader policy 
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context, the breakthrough of the GAM in 2005 has to be attributed to a number of 
contingent factors, both external and internal to the European framework, as follows. 
The first (and most crucial) factor leading to the launch of the GAM is represented 
by the tragic events which occurred in Ceuta and Melilla in September 2005, when 
Spanish and Moroccan authorities brutally deterred hundreds of migrants from climbing 
over the fences of the Spanish enclaves, causing the death of at least eleven people, and 
deported many of them in unhuman conditions to the Moroccan-Algerian desert border. 
These events and their mediatisation acted as ‘external shocks’ causing what has been 
considered as a ‘crisis’ in the then prevailing EU repressive approach to migration 
cooperation with third countries. The EU institutions and Member States were thus 
pushed towards a major rethinking of their external migration policy (Lavenex and 
Stucky 2011, 122; Cassarino and Lavenex 2012, 284). 
A second factor, identified by Cassarino (2009), is a change in power relations 
between the EU and Southern Mediterranean and African countries, following the 
proactive involvement of the latter in the reinforced control of the EU external borders. 
The flourishing of bilateral and multilateral joint operations led to a significant 
interdependence between sending, receiving and transit countries and to the 
‘empowerment’ of Mediterranean and African countries vis-à-vis the EU and its 
Member States. Having become strategic partners in the implementation of migration 
control, neighbouring countries could ‘act as key and equal players in migration talks’, 
advancing their own requests and conditions. Consequently, the EU had to adapt its 
policy approach and make it more comprehensive and ‘partnership-oriented’. 
A third element that, according to Cassarino, was conducive to this change in the 
EU approach consists of the Member States’ growing concerns about the EU 
institutions’ capacity to effectively fight unauthorised immigration and negotiate 
EURAs (2010c, 33; 2009). These concerns pushed the Commission to explore new 
avenues to improve third countries’ cooperation in the area of migration control and 
readmission, by means of a new approach, which needed to be less restrictive, less 
Eurocentric and more sensitive to the partner countries’ perspectives and interests1. 
                                                 
1
 Lavenex and Stucky highlighted two further elements which may have contributed to and supported a 
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The Global Approach to Migration was, thus, presented as ‘a balanced, global and 
coherent approach, covering policies to combat illegal immigration and, in cooperation 
with third countries, harnessing the benefits of legal migration’ (European Council 
2005, para 8). When it was first launched by the European Council in December 2005 it 
consisted of a broad array of actions aimed at strengthening operational cooperation 
between Member States, as well as increasing dialogue and cooperation with African 
countries and with neighbouring Mediterranean countries – with a special focus on 
Morocco, Algeria and Libya (European Commission 2005, Annex I). 
In November 2006 the Commission reported back on the progress made during 
the first year of implementation of the GAM and discussed ways to make it more 
comprehensive. In its Communication on the Global Approach to Migration One Year 
On, the Commission suggested in particular to promote the ‘migration and development 
agenda’ and to include measures in two policy areas, i.e. legal migration and 
integration, that had been given only marginal consideration in the 2005 list of priority 
actions (European Commission 2006, 5-8)
2
. 
The European Council Conclusions of December 2006 confirmed this orientation 
and required the Commission to take steps, in particular with regards to the expansion 
of the geographical scope of the GAM and to the issue of legal migration (European 
Council 2006, para 24(a)). The European Council established that the Global Approach 
should be applied not only to the EU Southern neighbourhood, but also to its Eastern 
and South-eastern neighbouring regions. Moreover, it invited the Commission to 
elaborate proposals on how to effectively incorporate legal migration opportunities into 
the EU external migration policy ‘in order to develop a balanced partnership with third 
countries adapted to specific EU Member States’ labour market needs’ and to explore 
‘ways and means to facilitate circular and temporary migration’. In response to this 
request, in May 2007 the Commission issued a Communication on Circular Migration 
                                                                                                                                               
change in the EU external migration policy: ‘the intensifying international discourse on the issue of 
migration and development within the UN system’ and ‘a general move towards “partnership” in EU 
external relations’ (2011, 122). 
2
 Interestingly, this 2006 Communication explicitly mentioned that, along with reinforcing the fight 
against illegal immigration and human trafficking, the GAM should also ensure access to asylum 
procedures, in particular in the context of mixed migration flows (European Commission 2006, 9-10). 
 106 
and Mobility Partnerships Between the EU and Third Countries, where it elaborated the 
new policy instrument of MPs and the concept of circular migration (European 
Commission 2007a). 
Actually, the idea of ‘mobility partnerships’ was first introduced in the above-
mentioned 2006 Communication on the Global Approach to Migration One Year On, 
where the Commission stated: 
 
Once certain conditions have been met, such as cooperation on illegal migration 
and effective mechanisms for readmission, the objective could be to agree Mobility 
Packages with a number of interested third countries which would enable their 
citizens to have better access to the EU. There is a clear need to better organise the 
various forms of legal movement between the EU and third countries. Mobility 
packages would provide the overall framework for managing such movements and 
would bring together the possibilities offered by the Member States and the 
European Community, while fully respecting the division of competences as 
provided by the Treaty (European Commission 2006, 7). 
 
Therefore, the first notion set forth by the Commission was that of ‘Mobility 
Package’, a term that ‘highlight[s] more explicitly the bargaining character of this 
policy initiative’ (Lavenex and Stucky 2011, 126). It was the Commission itself to 
suggest in its 2007 Communication the renaming of the instrument as ‘Mobility 
Partnership’ (European Commission 2007a, 3), ‘probably to stress the joint 
management and ownership of the initiative and the sharing of mutual commitments 
between the European Union and selected third countries’ (Cassarino 2009). 
This quote from the 2006 Communication is particularly relevant because it 
contains explicit indication of one of the fundamental features of the MPs, and of the 
GAM as a whole, i.e. their conditionality. As affirmed in the first lines, the adoption of 
MPs is conditional to the degree of cooperation on irregular migration and readmission 
demonstrated by the third countries concerned. The conditional approach adopted in the 
framework of the MPs is clear: cooperation in the fight against irregular immigration 
and effective implementation of readmission obligations represent mandatory 
preconditions for partner countries to possibly (but not certainly) benefit from legal 
migration opportunities and increased mobility towards the EU. As highlighted by 
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Lavenex and Stucky (2011, 125-126), the more the GAM policy discourse moves 
towards practical cooperation, the more the ‘partnership approach’ leaves space to a 
‘conditionality approach’. This statement from the 2006 Communication reveals also 
the selective nature of MPs: indeed, MPs are addressed only to third countries that 
cooperate in the fight against irregular migration and have effective mechanisms for 
readmission in place (Cassarino 2010c, 33-34). 
This analysis of the evolution of the GAM in the two-year period 2005-2007 
shows that the Global Approach to Migration has been gradually developed to comprise 
three thematic areas, or ‘pillars’, as reflected also in the structure of MPs. These areas 
are: 1) the management of legal migration and mobility, including visa issues; 2) the 
prevention of and fight against irregular immigration, including combating human 
trafficking and smuggling, border control and readmission; and 3) the relationship 
between migration and development, i.e. the development impact of migration. 
However, as further discussed in the following sections, in practice the second 
component (i.e. migration control and readmission) continued to prevail and to be 
prioritised over the other dimensions of the GAM. 
A Commission Communication issued in October 2008 affirmed that the GAM 
reflected a major change in the external dimension of the European migration policy, 
‘namely the shift from a primarily security-centred approach focused on reducing 
migratory pressures, to a more transparent and balanced approach guided by a better 
understanding of all aspects relevant to migration’ (European Commission 2008, 3). 
However, it emerges from the analysis above that, although heralded as a 
comprehensive partnership-oriented approach, the GAM did not mark a radical shift 
from previous restrictive security-oriented policies; instead, the GAM discourse 
combines comprehensive and restrictive elements by making legal migration 
perspectives conditional on readmission and joint migration management. 
In 2011, a second ‘external shock’ or ‘crisis’ (after the 2005 deadly events in 
Ceuta and Melilla) seemed to be potentially able to bring about a real change in the 
EU’s approach to migration cooperation with third countries. This second ‘crisis’ was 
represented by the Arab Spring, i.e. the uprisings involving large parts of civil society in 
several Southern Mediterranean countries aimed to the deposition of former 
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dictatorships and democratisation of the countries. Shortly after the revolutions in 
Tunisia and Egypt, the EU was quick to promise major innovations in its relations with 
Northern African countries, including in the area of migration cooperation; such 
innovations were meant to mark a (this time) real shift from a repressive to a 
comprehensive partnership-oriented approach (European Commission and High 
Representative 2011b). 
In fact, even though the GAM was born with a focus on the Mediterranean and 
African countries (European Council 2005, Annex I), when in 2007 the moment arrived 
for its concrete implementation through the MPs, the attention of the EU seemed to shift 
towards its Eastern neighbourhood, as proved by the Commission Communication on 
Applying the GAM to the Eastern and South-eastern Regions Neighbouring the EU 
(European Commission 2007b). This trend is clear if we look at the MPs signed or 
under negotiations in 2011: at the time of the Arab Spring, the EU had concluded the 
first pilot MPs with Moldova and Cape Verde in June 2008 and with Georgia in 
November 2009, and it was negotiating a MP with Armenia. Three out of four MPs 
involved countries in the Eastern and South-eastern neighbourhood, while the only MP 
in the Southern neighbourhood targeted an island whose migratory impact on the EU 
was rather limited, compared to other countries in West Africa (Lavenex and Stucky 
2011, 129-130). 
But the Arab Spring did not only bring the attention of the EU back to the 
Mediterranean; it also questioned the willingness of the EU to support the process of 
democratisation in the Southern Mediterranean and to re-found its relations towards 
Northern African countries on new, more equal and fair bases. In this respect, the Joint 
Communication issued by the European Commission and the High Representative of 
the Union for Foreign Affairs already in March 2011 ‘A Partnership for Democracy and 
Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean’ was a very inspired and forward-
looking document
3
 (European Commission and High Representative 2011b). 
                                                 
3
 The historic message contained in the first paragraph of this Communication is worth quoting: ‘The 
events unfolding in our southern neighbourhood are of historic proportions. They reflect a profound 
transformation process and will have lasting consequences not only for the people and countries of the 
region but also for the rest of the world and the EU in particular. The changes now underway carry the 
hope of a better life for the people of the region and for greater respect of human rights, pluralism, rule of 
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Moving from the awareness that ‘a radically changing political landscape in the 
Southern Mediterranean requires a change in the EU’s approach to the region’ 
(European Commission and High Representative 2011b, 3), the EU offered its support 
in the form of a ‘Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity’ to Southern 
Mediterranean countries willing and able to embark in a process of democratisation and 
reforms. This Communication introduced for the first time the ‘more-for-more’ 
principle, which in its original meaning entailed a commitment on the part of the EU to 
offer greater support and a stronger partnership to the countries that ‘go further and 
faster with reforms’ (European Commission and High Representative 2011b, 5)4. In the 
area of migration, the Commission emphasised the need to enhance ‘well-managed 
mobility’ from Mediterranean countries to the EU; to this purpose, it suggested the 
launch of Mobility Partnerships with these countries and committed to work together 
with Member States on legal migration legislation and visa facilitation options 
(European Commission and High Representative 2011b, 6-7). 
The following Communication on ‘A Dialogue for Migration, Mobility and 
Security with the Southern Mediterranean Countries’ issued by the Commission in May 
2011 partly followed the orientation of the previous joint communication (in particular 
the proposal to offer MPs to Northern African countries), but the very open and 
proactive partnership-oriented approach characterising the first European reaction to the 
Arab Spring was distinctly downsized. The May 2011 Communication moved from the 
verification that the historic events that occurred in the Southern neighbourhood of the 
EU ‘have also induced significant movements of people’; it thus proposed to address the 
existing challenges in the area of migration through the establishment of a ‘Dialogue for 
Migration, Mobility and Security’ with Southern Mediterranean countries (European 
Commission 2011c, 2). 
                                                                                                                                               
law and social justice – universal values that we all share. Movement towards full democracy is never an 
easy path - there are risks and uncertainties associated with these transitions. While acknowledging the 
difficulties the EU has to take the clear and strategic option of supporting the quest for the principles and 
values that it cherishes. For these reasons the EU must not be a passive spectator. It needs to support 
wholeheartedly the wish of the people in our neighbourhood to enjoy the same freedoms that we take as 
our right’ (European Commission 2011b, 2). 
4
 For an analysis of how the meaning of the more-for-more principle has been changed to become a 
synonym of conditionality, see the last paragraph (and footnotes) of section 3.3 above. 
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Although this initiative was intended to reflect the three pillars of the GAM, the 
terms used to define the Dialogue reveal a renewed focus on security aspects and a 
conditionality-based approach. The declared aim of the Dialogue is to support and 
encourage reforms in the partner countries ‘aimed at improving security’, as a 
precondition to offer their citizens ‘a possibility of enhanced mobility towards the EU 
Member States, whilst addressing the root causes of migratory flows’ (European 
Commission 2011c, 7-8). MPs are considered to be the most suitable tool to achieve this 
goal; but if on the one hand their declared primary function is ‘to ensure that the 
movement of persons between the EU and the partner country concerned is well-
managed’, on the other hand this movement must ‘take place in a secure environment’ 
(European Commission 2011c, 8). 
As a matter of fact, the Communication lists (in a non-exhaustive way) a number 
of specific measures that each prospective partner country has to implement as a 
precondition for increased mobility. These measures are ‘aimed at contributing to the 
creation of a secure environment’ for the circulation of persons, and include: setting up 
voluntary return arrangements; concluding readmission agreements with the EU and 
working arrangements with Frontex; cooperating in joint surveillance operations in the 
Mediterranean Sea; and strengthening capacities in integrated border management 
(European Commission 2011c, 10-11)
5
. 
This overhaul in the order of priorities from the ‘Partnership Communication’ to 
the ‘Dialogue Communication’ may be explained by the institutional shift in the 
responsibility for drafting the documents, from the High Representative and the 
External Action Service to DG HOME. Moreover, the elaboration of the Dialogue was 
carried out in spring 2011, against the background of growing European concerns for an 
alleged ‘invasion’ of migrants from Northern Africa and amidst the Franco-Italian 
dispute over the influx of Tunisian migrants (Carrera et al. 2012, 9). The approach to be 
                                                 
5
 Interestingly, the May 2011 Communication mentions a specific feature of future MPs with Northern 
African countries that seems to indicate a less restrictive approach on the part of the EU: at least on paper, 
indeed, the legal migration and mobility opportunities included in MPs should apply not only to the 
citizens of the partner countries but also to the nationals of other countries, ‘in particular those of Sub-
Saharan Africa and of the Middle East, who increasingly reside on or transit through the territory of the 
Southern Mediterranean countries’ (European Commission 2011c, 7). 
 111 
pursued through the Dialogue was clearly pointed out already in the JHA Council 
Conclusions of 11-12 April 2011, stating that: 
 
The Dialogue should in first instance focus on the identification and promotion of 
measures which can contribute in a concrete and effective way to the prevention of 
illegal migration, to the effective management and control of their external borders, 
to the facilitation of the return and readmission of irregular migrants, and to the 
development of protection in the region for those in need, including through 
regional protection programmes. Subsequently, this dialogue could explore the 
possibilities for facilitating people-to-people contacts using instruments such as 
mobility partnerships (Council of the EU 2011a, para 10). 
 
Therefore, the renewed promise originating from the Arab Spring for a more 
comprehensive and balanced GAM was largely betrayed. The second pillar (i.e. 
irregular migration and readmission) continued to be prioritised, while the possibility of 
increased mobility was made conditional to the prior fulfilment of an array of security- 
and control-oriented conditions
6
. 
Following the May 2011 Communication, the Commission proposed to start 
Dialogues for Migration, Mobility and Security with Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt. The 
launch of these Dialogues represented a preliminary step towards the negotiation and 
adoption of MPs
7
. Dialogues with Morocco and Tunisia started in October 2011 and led 
to the adoption of MPs in June 2013 and March 2014, respectively; conversely, Egypt 
declined the EU’s proposal and has thus far refused to enter into negotiations for a MP. 
In December 2012 the EU started a Dialogue also with Jordan, which led to the 
signature of a MP with the country in October 2014. 
However, towards the end of 2011 a further relevant development marked the 
evolution of the GAM. Building upon the approach and proposals set out by the 
previous 2011 communications, in November 2011 the Commission issued a new 
                                                 
6
 ‘During the preparatory phase, the Southern Mediterranean countries would be requested to make 
progress towards building capacity for the efficient management of migration and to contribute towards 
establishing a secure environment for mobility, as conditions for the fair and sustainable implementation 
of the Mobility Partnership’ (European Commission 2011c, 11). 
7
 ‘The dialogues allow the EU and the partner countries to discuss in a comprehensive manner all aspects 
of their possible cooperation in managing migration flows and circulation of persons with a view to 
establishing Mobility Partnerships’ (European Commission 2011e, 2). 
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Communication on ‘The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility’, which represents 
the most relevant ‘reform’ of the GAM after its launch in 20058 (European Commission 
2011e). This Communication, like the previous ones, originates from the Arab Spring 
and from the impact those events had on the EU, as stated in the press release which 
accompanied its publication
9
. In this document the Commission presents a renewed 
Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM, with double ‘M’), which at least 
on paper should place mobility of third country nationals at its centre and make 
partnerships with third countries more sustainable and forward-looking. The main 
innovations introduced by the November 2011 GAMM reform are the following. 
A stronger focus is placed on ‘mobility’, which is considered ‘a much broader 
concept than migration’, ‘of strategic importance’ for the EU. Due to the close 
interconnections existing between the EU visa policy for short stays, Member States’ 
national policies on long stays and the GAM, the Commission proposed ‘to expand the 
scope of this policy framework to include mobility, making it the Global Approach to 
Migration and Mobility (GAMM)’ (European Commission 2011e, 3). 
However, the concept of mobility, portrayed in a positive way in all EU 
documents, is in fact rather controversial, because it implies a short-term temporary 
movement. According to scholars, the renewed GAMM entails an explicit shift of 
emphasis away from more permanent or semi-permanent forms of legal migration to 
encourage short-term temporary movements, which may even become ‘recurrent’ under 
circular migration schemes (Carrera and Hernández i Sagrera 2011, 100 and 109; 
Carrera et al. 2012, 13). Such forms of mobility are promoted by the EU as especially 
beneficial to third countries, since they contribute to avoid brain drain and support 
development. However, critics emphasise that the actual purpose of this new (but in fact 
old) approach is to regulate labour migration as a seasonal temporary phenomenon 
targeting certain categories of workers, while avoiding their permanent residence, 
                                                 
8
 The above-mentioned MPs with Mediterranean countries signed after 2011 reflect in their content and 
structure the developments introduced by the new GAMM. 
9
 ‘The Arab Spring and events in the Southern Mediterranean in 2011 further highlighted the need for a 
coherent and comprehensive migration policy for the EU. That is why today the European Commission 
proposes to strengthen dialogue and operational cooperation with non-EU partner countries in the area of 
migration and mobility’ (European Commission 2011f). 
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family reunification and social integration in the EU (Carrera and Hernández i Sagrera 
2011, 109). 
As concerns the thematic areas, the new GAMM complements the traditional 
three pillars of the old GAM (legal migration, irregular migration and migration and 
development) with a fourth pillar on international protection and the external dimension 
of asylum policy. In addition, in the renewed GAMM the human rights of migrants 
should be considered a cross-cutting issue relevant to all four pillars and more in 
general ‘the GAMM should […] be migrant-centred’ (European Commission 2011e, 5-
7). 
Therefore, the revised GAMM appears to be much more focused on the interests 
of third country nationals and partner countries, given the emphasis that is given for the 
first time to mobility, international protection and migrants’ human rights. But this is on 
paper; the implementation of the Global Approach through MPs demonstrates that even 
after 2011 the focus of the EU external migration policy has continued to be on 
combating irregular migration and making readmission more effective. 
Also the instrument of MPs is partly modified and strengthened under the new 
GAMM. The Commission stresses that, since it is no more in its pilot phase, the MP 
‘should be upgraded and promoted as the principal framework for cooperation in the 
area of migration and mobility between the EU and its partners’; as concerns its 
geographical focus, MPs should be primarily offered to countries in the EU’s immediate 
neighbourhood (European Commission 2011e, 10-11). However, the most relevant 
change in the renewed MP is that it includes a commitment for the parties to negotiate a 
visa facilitation agreement in parallel with a European readmission agreement; it thus 
reinforces the connection between VFAs and EURAs and confirms the conditionality 
link between cooperation on readmission and increased mobility (European 
Commission 2011e, 11). 
Table 2 below lists the Mobility Partnerships signed and indicates which Member 
States participate in each of them; Table 2 lists also the third countries that refused the 
EU’s offer to negotiate a MP (Egypt), whose negotiations are ongoing (Ghana) or 
whose negotiations have been suspended due to lack of progress (Senegal). 
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Table 2. Mobility Partnerships 
Country Status of 
negotiations 
Mobility Partnership 
signed 
Participating Member 
States 
Moldova Completed 5 June 2008 BG, CY, CZ, FR, EL, 
DE, HU, IT, LT, PL, PT, 
RO, SI, SK, SE (15) 
Cape Verde Completed 5 June 2008 ES, FR, LU, PT, + NL (5) 
 
Georgia Completed 30 November 2009 BE, BG, CZ, DK, DE, 
EE, EL, FR, IT, LT, LV, 
NL, PL, RO, SE, UK (16) 
Senegal Suspended - - 
 
Armenia Completed 27 October 2011 BE, BG, CZ, DE, FR, IT, 
NL, PL, RO, SE (10) 
Ghana Ongoing
10
 - - 
 
Azerbaijan Completed 27 October 2013 BE, FR, DE, IT, NL, PT, 
ES, SE, UK (9) 
Egypt Refused - - 
 
Morocco Completed 7 June 2013 BE, FR, DE, IT, NL, PT, 
ES, SE, UK (9) 
Tunisia Completed 3 March 2014 BE, DK, DE, FR, IT, PL, 
PT, ES, SE, UK (10) 
Jordan Completed 9 October 2014 CY, DE, DK, EL, ES, 
FR, IT, HU, PL, PT, RO, 
SE (12) 
Belarus Completed 13 October 2016 BG, LT, LV, HU, PL, 
RO, FI (7) 
Source: Compiled by the author based on information from the European Commisssion 
                                                 
10
 Negotiations for a MP with Ghana have been ongoing since 2010 (Maroukis and Triandafyllidou 2013, 
2) but until very recently they have not progressed in any significant way. Following the La Valletta 
Summit of November 2015, negotiations have been revitalised in the form of a High Level Dialogue on 
migration. So far, this has led to the signature of a ‘Joint Declaration on Ghana-EU Cooperation on 
Migration’ on 16 April 2016. Compared to MPs, this is a more informal and less structured kind of 
political declaration, covering the four thematic areas of the GAMM but in a rather general way (EEAS 
2016a). The text of the Declaration is available at the following link: 
https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/5249_en. The ongoing EU-Ghana Dialogue 
is meant to lead to the adoption of a Common Agenda on Migration and Mobility (CAMM), which may 
prelude to the subsequent adoption of a MP. 
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4.2. Content and purpose of Mobility Partnerships 
Mobility Partnerships are conceived as the main comprehensive and long-term 
framework for facilitating policy dialogue and operational cooperation in the field of 
migration between the EU, a given third country and interested Member States 
(European Commission 2011e, 10). More precisely, as affirmed by the Council in June 
2007, MPs should include on the one hand an ‘offer of legal migration opportunities, 
adapted to the specific Member States’ labour market needs’ and on the other hand ‘a 
genuine cooperation on preventing and combating illegal immigration, trafficking in 
and smuggling of human beings as well as effective readmission and return policy’ 
(Council of the EU 2007, para 10). These two elements represent precisely the dual 
purpose of MPs. 
As described in the previous section 4.1, MPs were launched by the Commission 
in May 2007 as a response to a request raised by the European Council in December 
2006 to explore ways for incorporating legal migration and mobility into the EU 
cooperation with third countries (European Council 2006, para 24(a)). Therefore, the 
first explicit objective of MPs is to create a framework for the EU and Member States to 
offer in a coordinated way legal migration opportunities (with a special focus on labour 
migration), increased mobility, a less restrictive visa policy and circular migration 
projects to the citizens of selected third countries. 
However, as analysed above, legal migration and mobility are offered only in 
return for the partner countries’ cooperation on combating irregular migration and 
implementing effectively their readmission obligations. This conditionality link reveals 
what the more implicit objectives of MPs are, i.e. to reinforce migration control and to 
improve readmission. Going beyond the official purpose of MPs as declared in most of 
the EU documents, their introduction seems in fact to be closely related to the EU 
readmission policy (Carrera and Hernández i Sagrera 2011, 100). Given the difficulties 
encountered by the Commission in the negotiation of EURAs and obstacles in their 
effective implementation (attributed in primis to lacking cooperation on the part of third 
countries), MPs appeared to be a new potentially powerful vehicle to promote 
readmission. This view is confirmed by the 2008 Commission Communication on 
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Strengthening the Global Approach to Migration, which called for an intensification of 
readmission efforts by ‘placing the readmission policy more firmly within the Global 
Approach and its priorities and using the potential of mobility partnerships’ (European 
Commission 2008, 6). 
From a European perspective, MPs could represent a tool for offering third 
countries a broad package of incentives in different JHA areas (legal migration, visa 
policy, development, integration, etc.); they could thus help speeding up readmission 
negotiations and reaching a quid pro quo which could satisfy both parties. Moreover, 
being a long-term and ever-changing cooperation framework, MPs could be useful to 
ensure from partner countries the effective implementation of their readmission 
obligations (because, as explained below in this section, the content of MPs is open and 
it is always possible to add or withdraw incentives). 
The interviews I conducted both with experts and DG HOME officials confirmed 
that the introduction of MPs was directly linked to the need to improve readmission, i.e. 
to make negotiations easier and faster and to create a framework that would encourage 
actual cooperation and effective returns. A top official declared that this was not ‘one of 
the reasons’, but ‘the main reason’ why MPs were introduced. However, we will 
analyse under section 4.4.2 below whether this attempt to foster readmission through 
MPs has produced the desired outcomes. 
As concerns the content of MPs, they all share an almost identical structure, as in 
the case of EURAs. Their Preamble makes reference to the existing relationships 
between the EU and the third country concerned, i.e. the GAMM, the regional and 
bilateral dialogues and the agreements that represent the broader framework for 
migration cooperation with the partner country. Following a presentation of its general 
objectives, which correspond to the four thematic areas of the GAMM, each MP lists 
the specific objectives of the partnership and commitments of the parties. These are 
usually divided under the following four sections (i.e. the GAMM pillars), with slight 
variations in some cases: 1) mobility, legal migration and integration; 2) fight against 
irregular immigration and trafficking in human beings, readmission, border 
management; 3) migration and development; 4) asylum and international protection. 
The first MPs with Moldova, Cape Verde and Georgia (signed before the 2011 renewal 
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of the GAMM) do not include a dedicated section on international protection, but a few 
provisions on this topic are nonetheless incorporated under other sections (usually the 
first one). The MPs with Southern Mediterranean countries (Morocco, Tunisia and 
Jordan) as well as the latest MP with Belarus entail a further section on horizontal 
initiatives, dealing with broader cross-cutting issues concerning the governance of 
migration. All MPs are closed by a set of provisions on their implementation. 
Most MPs are accompanied in Annex by a list of concrete projects and initiatives 
which the EU, its agencies and participating Member States commit to implement in 
order to achieve the objectives set out in the text of the MP. Each proposed project is 
listed under one of the four thematic areas mentioned above. The Annex details also 
which party (or parties) is (or are) responsible for the implementation of each initiative, 
i.e. the EU (sometimes with indication of which EU institution or agency) or one or 
more Member States
11
. Annexes may be more or less rich and detailed in terms of the 
quantity and quality of initiatives listed; the Annex to the MP with Morocco is the most 
detailed one, due to a specific request from Moroccan authorities, as reported by an EU 
official I interviewed. 
However, ‘policies proposed in the Annex usually do not break new ground’ 
(Lavenex and Stucky 2011, 132) and are often very much in line with the national 
migration policies of participating Member States; in some cases Member States have 
included also initiatives that were already planned or that were already in their 
implementation phase under different bilateral cooperation frameworks (Weinar 2012). 
As concerns the thematic area of reference of the projects listed, there is a 
predominance of initiatives relating to migration control and readmission, while 
measures promoting mobility are scarce, weak and of poor value; most of the projects 
under the first pillar deal with information sharing and capacity building, while real 
offers of legal migration opportunities, especially for working purposes, are almost 
absent from all MPs. Also projects intended to foster synergies between migration and 
development are very limited in number and hardly significant in value (Lavenex and 
Stucky 2011, 132-133). 
                                                 
11
 Only in the case of the MP with Azerbaijan, the Annex does not contain any indication of the party 
responsible for the implementation of the proposed projects. 
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Annexes are included in all MPs, except for the most recent ones with Tunisia, 
Jordan and Belarus. A DG HOME official interviewed in Brussels confirmed that with 
regards to MP Annexes, after the MP with Morocco there has been a change in the EU 
negotiation strategy: they are no more discussed together with the text of the MP (the 
Joint Declaration), but at a later stage, after the MP has been agreed upon and signed. 
According to the interviewee, this change was linked to the experience with Morocco: 
the MP negotiation process was slowed down by the Moroccan request for a very 
detailed Annex, the elaboration of which required more time. Therefore, with the 
following MPs the Commission decided it was not worth to delay the signature of the 
entire MP due to a detailed negotiation on its Annex
12
. The list of practical projects and 
initiatives to be implemented is now produced by an appropriate body (called ‘Mixed 
Committee’ in the MP with Tunisia and ‘Joint Working Group on Migration and 
Mobility’ in the MP with Belarus) created in the framework of the MP itself and 
composed of representatives from the signatory parties, which meets once or twice per 
year, in the first place to agree on a list of projects and then to update it and monitor its 
implementation (MP with Tunisia, para 37; MP with Belarus, para 39)
13
. 
With regards to their legal nature, MPs are established by a Joint Declaration 
signed by the EU, interested Member States (at the ministerial level) and the partner 
country. Being based on a political declaration, they do entail mutual commitments for 
the parties, which however are not legally binding
14
 (European Commission 2009a, 4). 
Indeed, all MPs include a final clause indicating explicitly that their provisions ‘are not 
designed to create legal rights or obligations under international law’; the inclusion of 
                                                 
12
 In the 2015 study on EU migration cooperation with third countries conducted by García Andrade et al. 
for the European Parliament, the authors affirm that ‘the Annex of the EU-Tunisia MP was not published 
[together with the Joint Declaration] at the request of the Tunisian authorities’ (García Andrade et al. 
2015, 132). Maybe both statements are to some extent true: on the one hand the EU was interested in 
signing the MP as soon as possible, on the other hand Tunisia was keen on taking more time to discuss 
the specific content of the Annex before adopting it formally. 
13
 Under previous MPs the monitoring of projects’ implementation was carried out by Local Cooperation 
Platforms, as discussed under section 4.4.2 below. Most probably the composition, function and tasks of 
Mixed Committee, Joint Working Group on Migration and Mobility and Coordination Platforms are the 
same. 
14
 The fact that MPs lack legally-binding force does not mean they lack legal value; their signatories may 
be bound by the good faith principle not to act against their commitments and expectations they have 
created in their partners (García Andrade et al. 2015, 32). 
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such clause helps to clarify their legal nature, because ‘in the absence of the will of the 
parties, other signs such as formal elements, the structure or the drafting could have led 
to an interpretation in favour of an international agreement’ (García Andrade et al. 
2015, 32). On the contrary, MPs are not international law sources but rather fall within 
the category of ‘soft law’, or even ‘soft policy’ (Carrera and Hernández i Sagrera 2011, 
105-106). According to García Andrade et al., MPs may be qualified as ‘non-
conventional concerted acts’ or ‘non-normative agreements’ (2015, 32). In this study 
MPs are considered policy instruments, in contrast to EURAs, which are legal 
instruments. 
MPs are characterised by a number of relevant features relating to their content. 
Firstly, they are meant to be country-specific, meaning that their content should be 
tailor-made to the shared interests of the EU participants and the partner country; it 
should also take into account ‘the current state of the EU’s relations with the third 
country’ and ‘the level of commitments which the third country is ready to take on’ 
(European Commission 2007a, 3). This element reveals the importance of the Annexes, 
given the scarce differentiation of the texts of Joint Declarations. 
Secondly, as mentioned above, MPs are conceived as long-term open and flexible 
instruments. Flexibility means that their content may change over time, as new projects 
and initiatives may be added to the Annex, while others may be abandoned; hence, 
flexibility allows the participating actors to adjust the partnership according to evolving 
circumstances, interests and priorities (Brocza and Paulhart 2015, 2). Openness and 
flexibility also mean that Member States take part in MPs on a voluntary basis; Member 
States may even decide to join MPs after their signature, because MPs remain always 
open to the participation of additional EU countries
15
 (European Commission 2009a, 4). 
Thirdly, the MPs’ content has been critically defined as ‘a package of fragmented 
cooperation measures’ and ‘a shopping list of different proposals’ (Carrera and 
Hernández i Sagrera 2011, 106) informed by ‘distinct and hugely divergent domestic 
priorities’ (Carrera and Hernández i Sagrera 2011, 108). This fragmentation and lack of 
internal coherence has been identified as a weakness of the instrument by the 
                                                 
15
 In practice this happened only in the case of the Netherlands, which joined the MP with Cape Verde 
after its adoption. 
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Commission itself, which observed that ‘the partnerships risk being a collation of new 
and already planned activities’ and suggested that ‘additional effort should be made so 
that the package offered to a partner is an effective and coordinated offer’ (European 
Commission 2009a, 5). 
Fourthly, the content of MPs has been largely criticised for being ‘unbalanced’, 
i.e. disproportionately focused on the second thematic area of the GAMM (i.e. on 
measures in the area of irregular migration, border control and readmission) compared 
to the others. In particular, MPs appear to lack concrete and significant initiatives aimed 
to facilitate legal migration and increase mobility to the EU (Lavenex and Stucky 2011; 
Carrera and Hernández i Sagrera 2011; Carrera, den Hertog and Parkin 2012, 11-14; 
Cassarino and Lavenex 2012; Maroukis and Triandafyllidou 2013; Brocza and Paulhart 
2015). As further discussed under section 4.4.1, this flaw is generally attributed to the 
division of competences between the EU and its Member States in the area of legal 
migration. However, the insufficient offer of projects in this policy field is highly 
paradoxical if we consider that facilitating legal migration to the EU was precisely the 
major explicit purpose of MPs (see also section 4.4.2). 
 
4.3. Negotiation process and incentives offered to third countries 
Mobility Partnerships are not international agreements, therefore the procedure for 
their adoption is not subject to the rules established by Article 218 TFEU (which instead 
apply to EURAs). MPs are negotiated mainly by the Commission, under political 
guidelines of the Council (similar to mandates for international agreements) together 
with the Presidency of the Council, Member States’ representatives and the third 
country. EU agencies like Frontex, the European Training Foundation (ETF), the 
European Asylum Support Office (EASO) or Europol may participate in negotiations, 
especially when involved in the implementation of some initiatives under the MP 
(European Commission 2009a, 4; García Andrade et al. 2015, 32). 
The Commission plays a leading role in the negotiation process. In fact, there is 
no direct meeting between Member States and third countries: it is the Commission that 
holds discussions with both parties and is responsible for bringing together their 
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respective interests. As described by Lavenex and Stucky (2011, 131-132), during a first 
phase of preliminary talks the Commission shares with the third country concerned an 
EU ‘list of priorities’ and explores the third country’s interest and willingness to engage 
in the partnership. The third country is then expected to submit its proposals to the 
Commission; moving from these proposals, the Commission elaborates together with 
Member States an ‘EU offer’. At this stage Member States may decide to join the MP 
and add projects to the offer. Based on the output of these discussions the Commission 
drafts the text of the Joint Declaration and the Annex, to which third countries may add 
final amendments. In this process the Commission’s task is to encourage Member 
States’ collaboration and verify whether the concerns expressed by third countries 
match with the Member States’ offer. 
The Commission considers that ‘this division of roles, while respecting 
competences, ensured smooth negotiations and increased trust between all actors, thus 
having a positive impact on the integrity of the process’ (European Commission 2009a, 
4). However, Lavenex and Stucky (2011, 132) argue that the negotiation of MPs is more 
a ‘consultation process’, where the leverage lies on the side of Member States. Third 
countries, instead, can only express their wishes and proposals, but have no leverage to 
push Member States to change their offers; they can merely accept what the EU and 
Member States are available to give (or rather promise), or alternatively refuse it. With 
regards to Southern Mediterranean countries, Carrera, den Hertog and Parkin agree and 
affirm that:  
 
there is little indication that the Dialogue was developed in close consultation with 
the third countries it intends to target. Rather it appears to have been presented as a 
fait accompli to the authorities of Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco with the expectation 
that those states would be ready to undertake the strict security requirements 
demanded in return for limited mobility possibilities (Carrera et al. 2012, 14). 
 
According to García Andrade et al. (2015, 31), a further symptom of the limited 
role of third countries in the elaboration of MPs consists of the high similarities in the 
structure and content of their text; this element suggests that MPs are drafted by the EU 
following a standard model and proposed to the partner country for adherence without 
leaving much space for discussions. 
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As a matter of fact, the whole period of negotiation (or consultation) is usually 
rather short (in particular if compared with the length of EURA negotiations) and 
includes few talking rounds at the expert level before the MPs are signed at political 
level (Lavenex and Stucky 2011, 132). For instance, the first MPs with Moldova and 
Cape Verde were concluded in five months only; the MP with Georgia in seven 
months
16
. Negotiations with Southern Mediterranean countries took longer - one year 
and a half to two years from the launch of Dialogues on Migration, Mobility and 
Security to the signature of the MPs, which is still a short time considering the 
traditional reluctance on the part of those countries to establish migration cooperation 
with the EU, especially with regards to return and readmission (Carrera et al. 2012). 
A final relevant feature of the MPs’ negotiation process, which also represents a 
crucial difference with EURAs, is the complete absence of involvement of the European 
Parliament, which is neither consulted nor informed before the signature of MPs. 
Moreover, since MPs are political instruments and are not international agreement, once 
adopted they do not need to be ratified neither by the European Parliament, nor by 
national parliaments of the participating Member States. As noted by Carrera and 
Hernández i Sagrera, this democratic deficit raises concern over the MPs’ compatibility 
with the rule of law: ‘it is striking that the negotiations and implementation of MPs have 
marginalised any sort of democratic accountability at the EU and the national levels’ 
(2011, 106)
17
. 
But what are the incentives offered to third countries to encourage them to 
conclude a Mobility Partnership with the EU? On paper, MPs are supposed to offer the 
same incentives mentioned under section 3.3 above with regards to EURAs, namely: 
visa facilitation (combined with readmission), legal migration opportunities, 
cooperation in the management of migration, financial and technical assistance 
(including capacity-building) in particular in the area of migration control, and projects 
                                                 
16
 Exploratory talks with Moldova and Cape Verde started in January 2008 and MPs were signed in June 
the same year. Negotiations with Georgia started in Spring 2009 and were conducted in parallel with 
negotiations for the EURA and the VFA; the MP was signed in November 2009. 
17
 In addition, the authors observe that: ‘the extent to which MPs can be subject to any judicial control 
exercised by the Court of Justice or Member States’ jurisdictions remains equally doubtful’ (Carrera and 
Hernández i Sagrera 2011, 106). 
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aimed at supporting the positive impact of migration on the development of the partner 
country. These incentives are all put together within the framework of the MP and are 
offered as a whole ‘package’; in MPs, incentives take the form of concrete projects that 
the EU and participating Member States commit to implement. The ‘package approach’ 
and the alleged pragmatism of MPs are meant to represent an added value, especially 
compared to EURAs taken alone. This should make MPs more appealing to third 
countries and should make third countries more keen to cooperate on readmission and 
more ready to negotiate an EURA (in parallel with a VFA). 
However, the problem with the MP incentives is that the most relevant ones from 
the point of view of third countries are neglected by Member States (similarly to what 
occurred with EURAs) - in primis the opening of legal migration opportunities for 
citizens of the partner country. As mentioned in the previous section 4.2, MPs are only 
in theory balanced in their offer of measures under the four pillars of the GAMM. 
Indeed, almost all Annexes reveal a large prevalence of projects relating to migration 
control and readmission, while the offer of significant initiatives in the areas of legal 
migration and mobility, and migration and development is quantitatively scarce and 
qualitatively poor; in particular, concrete labour migration opportunities are almost 
completely lacking. 
In addition, sometimes Member States include in their offer to the partner country 
also initiatives which were already planned or which were already in the process of 
being implemented. The inclusion of pre-existing projects, which would be carried out 
anyway, certainly cannot represent an incentive for third countries. A further element 
limiting the power as incentives of the actions listed in the Annex is the gap between 
what is put down on paper and what is implemented in practice. Indeed, given the non-
legally binding nature of MPs, third countries have no guarantees that Member States 
will abide by their commitments; even once the EU incentives are set out in the Annex, 
uncertainty remains as to their concrete implementation (Carrera et al. 2012, 14). 
On the other hand, the long-term open and flexible nature of MPs suggests that 
more incentives could be added over time by the EU participating parties and possibly 
by additional Member States that may join the MP later on. This could represent an 
added value; however, in light of the strong conditionality basis of MPs, additional 
 124 
incentives in the form of new projects (possibly in the areas of legal migration and 
development) would most probably be offered to third countries only in exchange for 
increased efforts on their part, always in the area of irregular migration and readmission. 
 
4.4. Problems and limits of Mobility Partnerships 
This section analyses the problems and limits of Mobility Partnerships, 
questioning four elements: their European scope; their relevance and effectiveness; the 
role non-state actors and international organisations may play in their negotiation and/or 
implementation; and their human rights content. 
 
4.4.1. How much are they ‘European’? 
Mobility Partnerships are ‘European’ in the sense that, similarly to EURAs, they 
are negotiated by the Commission under political guidelines of the Council and on 
behalf of all EU Member States. However, differently from EURAs, MPs are explicitly 
also very much ‘national’, because Member States’ national policies are clearly 
integrated within this EU policy instrument and do play a relevant role in it. Indeed, as 
described above, the Annexes to MPs consist of a list of concrete actions, proposed both 
by the EU and by participating Member States, implementing the objectives set out in 
the main text of the MP. 
Therefore, MPs present themselves as a way to merge under a single umbrella a 
broad array of migration cooperation initiatives to be developed at different levels: the 
supranational level (projects proposed and implemented by the Commission and/or 
other EU agencies); the national level (actions proposed and carried out by individual 
Member States); and the multinational level (initiatives involving groups of Member 
States). It seems thus interesting to consider whether this coexistence of different policy 
levels is balanced and works well or, on the contrary, whether tensions may arise, in 
particular between the European and national scope of MPs. 
As analysed in the previous sections, Mobility Partnerships were launched with a 
dual purpose: to facilitate legal migration from selected third countries to the EU and to 
enhance third countries’ cooperation on migration control and readmission. The 
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Commission heralded MPs as the tool of a radical shift from a security-oriented 
approach to a more balanced and equal framework for cooperation, based on the idea of 
contracting partnerships with third countries to reduce irregular migration, while 
simultaneously offering possibilities for their nationals to enter legally in the EU for 
working purposes. 
However, the Treaties establish that whilst the EU has the competence to 
elaborate common policies relating to the management of migration flows and the fight 
against irregular migration and human trafficking (Art. 79(1) TFEU), it is up to the 
Member States ‘to determine volumes of admission of third-country nationals coming 
from third countries to their territory in order to seek work’ (Art. 79(5) TFEU)18. Since 
Member States retain the exclusive competence to decide on migrant workers’ 
admission quotas, in the framework of MPs it is necessarily their responsibility to 
propose concrete measures in this policy area. 
When MPs were introduced, Member States were thus supposed to contribute 
with national initiatives aimed at opening labour migration channels (e.g. for certain 
categories of workers), introducing circular migration schemes, etc.. Therefore, their 
role was crucial to ensure a significant content to the first MPs’ pillar, and consequently 
to guarantee a balance between the four pillars. However, this happened only in a very 
limited way. In fact, MPs initiatives aimed at concretely offering opportunities for 
migrant workers to enter the EU are mere exceptions; when they are present, they are 
usually formulated in vague terms or they re-propose already existing bilateral schemes. 
Therefore their relevance and potential impact are extremely reduced
19
. 
                                                 
18
 However, it is worth recalling that the Commission has some competences in the area of legal 
migration and mobility. As mentioned when discussing visa facilitation, it has competence over short-
term visas, but also over the temporary admission of students, researchers, highly-qualified people, intra-
corporate transferees and seasonal workers. The Commission has adopted legislation harmonising the 
conditions for admission and rights of these categories of migrants; however, Member States retain the 
right to decide on the numbers of migrant workers to be admitted in their territory. 
19
 For instance, the MP with Cape Verde includes, along with the continuation of a pre-existing 
temporary migration scheme with Portugal for the admission of certain categories of workers, three new 
national initiatives proposed by Spain, France and Luxembourg aimed at creating labour migration or 
circular migration opportunities; however, these commitments are formulated in rather abstract and vague 
terms (MP with Cape Verde, Annex, paras 2(iv), 2(v), 2(viii)). The MP with Moldova is another case in 
point; the Annex includes the continuation of a pre-existing project promoted by Italy to support the entry 
of certain categories of Moldovan workers, but also a new (potentially valuable) initiative proposed by 
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Scholars consider the division of competences between the EU and its Member 
States mentioned above as one of the main reasons for the unbalanced content of MPs 
(Cassarino and Lavenex 2012, 285; Pastore 2015; Maroukis and Triandafyllidou 2013, 
2-3). Measures in the area of legal migration and mobility are still largely insufficient 
because in most cases Member States have proved reluctant to offer labour migration 
opportunities to citizens of the partner countries, and have rather focused on actions 
addressing irregular migration (Carrera et al. 2012, 12-13; Carrera and Hernández i 
Sagrera 2011; Weinar 2012). The Commission, on its part, lacks the competence to take 
its own initiative in this field and has no power to force Member States in this direction, 
due to the legally non-binding nature of MPs. 
This division of competences represents a problem not only for third countries 
that might not get from Member States the counterpart of what they are asked to give to 
the EU, but also for the Commission that, as in the case of EURAs, except for visa 
facilitation, cannot offer to third countries the necessary elements to achieve a balanced 
partnership and to ensure their effective cooperation. This may actually represent an 
element of tension between the European and national policy levels. 
All the Commission can do (and all it actually does, although with limited results) 
is encourage national governments to take action in the area of labour migration. In 
doing so, the Commission often emphasises that opening legal migration channels for 
certain categories of migrant workers, also through circular migration schemes, could be 
beneficial in primis for Member States, which may use this opportunity to fulfil their 
own labour markets’ needs and address specific labour and skill shortages (European 
Commission 2006, 2, 6-7; 2011c, 10; 2011e, 12-13; 2014a, 15 and 19). Still, in most 
cases Member States have resisted this possibility. 
The analysis conducted so far shows that there is a risk that within the framework 
of MPs Member States’ national policies and interests prevail over more general EU-
wide objectives, and MPs end up being a mere sum of national initiatives. As a matter 
of fact, it is the very structure and functioning of MPs that offer the possibility for this 
                                                                                                                                               
Poland to offer admission for temporary work without the need to obtain a work permit (MP with 
Moldova, Annex, para 4(iv)). Also the Czech Republic and Cyprus offered circular migration projects, 
which however concerned support for migrants’ return and reintegration in Moldova, rather than 
employment opportunities in the EU Member States (MP with Moldova, Annex, para 4(ii)). 
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to happen, due to a number of reasons. Firstly, Member States decide voluntarily to 
participate in MPs precisely on the basis of their national interests; secondly, Member 
States are free to contribute to MPs with projects that they choose, again on the basis of 
their own preferences and needs, and are not obliged to cover all four thematic areas; 
thirdly, also the implementation of proposed projects is left to the discretion of Member 
States, as there is no enforcement mechanism and no independent monitoring agency. 
The Commission has been criticised, indeed, for its reduced role in MPs as mere 
coordinator of national initiatives (García Andrade et al. 2015, 33). 
The actual European scope of MPs may be questioned also on the basis of two 
more considerations. First, all 28 Member States have never signed up for one Mobility 
Partnership; the most ‘participated’ ones are the MPs with Moldova and Georgia (with 
15 and 16 signatory States respectively), while the least ‘participated’ ones are the MP 
with Cape Verde (five signatory States) and the MP with Belarus (seven signatory 
States, all concentrated in Eastern Europe). Member States’ choice ranges from 
participating in almost all MPs (only France, except for the MP with Belarus) and 
participating in none (Austria, Ireland, Malta and Croatia); all other Member States 
participate only in some partnerships. 
This is usually highlighted as a symptom of the limited European value of MPs; 
however, Weinar (2012) is of a different opinion. The author argues that this does not 
represent a weakness of the instrument, because third countries in primis are not 
interested in developing migration cooperation initiatives with all Member States, but 
typically only with those Member States with which they have already established (or 
have an interest in establishing) cooperation in this (and other) area(s)
20
. The same is of 
course true also for Member States, which usually decide to participate in MPs on the 
basis of their needs and interests, without considering the potential European added 
value of MPs; this kind of attitude, however, risks to reduce the innovative and 
potentially valuable elements of the instrument. 
Secondly, only a small number of initiatives listed in Annex to MPs are 
multilateral; these projects are proposed and implemented jointly by several Member 
                                                 
20
 For instance, Tunisia would presumably be more interested in legal migration opportunities offered by 
Italy or France rather than by Bulgaria or Latvia (Weinar 2012). 
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States, in some cases also with the involvement (or on the initiative) of EU agencies. 
Even though they are usually focused on migration management, border control, 
readmission, return and reintegration, and are often described in rather vague terms, 
multilateral projects have a larger scope than national ones
21
. It is often argued that this 
kind of projects brings ‘a real EU dividend’ (Weinar 2012) and could represent an 
added value for MPs. The Commission, in fact, encourages the adoption of such 
multilateral initiatives; for instance, the funding allocated to MPs under the Thematic 
Programme for Cooperation with non-EU countries in the areas of migration and 
asylum was partly conditional on a partnership between Member States (Reslow 2015, 
124). But probably this incentive has not been sufficient, as so far the majority of 
projects has been offered and implemented by individual Member States, as a 
continuation of their own national policies (Reslow 2015, 118). 
To conclude, the prevalence of national policies and the prioritisation of national 
interests, together with a division of competences that allows only Member States to 
offer real labour migration opportunities, risk to jeopardise not only the European scope 
of MPs, but the very idea of MPs as a balanced and comprehensive instrument of 
migration cooperation with third countries. 
 
  
                                                 
21
 Examples of multilateral initiatives come from the MPs with Moldova, Georgia and Armenia, as well 
as from the MPs with Morocco and Tunisia. MPs with Moldova and Georgia include the same initiative, 
proposed and implemented by eleven and ten Member States respectively, whose purpose is ‘to cooperate 
in providing information on routes for legal migration to the EU, legal employment in the EU Member 
States, dangers and negative effects of illegal migration as well as return and reintegration’ (MP with 
Moldova, Annex, para 3(i); MP with Georgia, Annex, para 1(a)). This description is rather generic, but 
according to the Commission the initiative includes in particular ‘an important component for return 
migration and reintegration’ (European Commission 2009a, 5). The MP with Georgia contains also two 
more specific multilateral projects: one in the area of border management proposed by Frontex and 
involving eight Member States; the other one in the area of readmission with the participation of four 
Member States (MP with Georgia, Annex, paras 3(a) and 4(a)). The MP with Armenia includes: a 
capacity-building initiative in the area of migration management proposed by five Member States; a 
reintegration project involving seven Member States and the EU with the support of ETF; an information- 
and good practice-sharing initiative on return and readmission proposed by six Member States and the 
EU; and a project to improve border control implemented by three Member States and the EU (MP with 
Armenia, Annex, paras I(b), II(b), III(a) and III(c)). Also the ‘Sharaka Project’ and the ‘Lemma Project’ 
implemented in the framework of the MPs with Morocco and Tunisia (analysed under sections 4.5.1 and 
4.5.2 respectively) are examples of multilateral initiatives. 
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4.4.2. How much are they relevant and effective? 
This section focuses on the effectiveness and relevance of Mobility Partnerships. 
From the standpoint of the EU institutions and Member States, MPs may be considered 
effective and relevant if they actually contribute to successfully achieve their implicit 
and explicit purposes (analysed under section 4.2 above). From this perspective, MPs 
may thus be considered a relevant and effective policy tool when: 1) they succeed in 
offering legal migration opportunities and increased mobility; 2) they contribute to 
reinforce cooperation on combating and preventing irregular migration, human 
trafficking and smuggling; 3) they help improving cooperation on readmission and lead 
to the conclusion of EURAs and to more effective returns. Let us now consider if and 
how the achievement of these purposes can be assessed. 
 
Assessing the relevance and effectiveness of MPs 
According to Reslow, the MPs’ implementation process is still at an early stage, 
therefore ‘a definitive assessment of policy success/failure, in terms of goal realisation, 
is premature’ (2015, 118). The author argues that an ideal assessment of the 
implementation of MPs would be based on ‘scoreboards’. These are documents tracking 
the progress of projects listed in the Annex to MPs, including details on the initiatives’ 
funding, implementing period, state of play, responsible partners, etc. (European 
Commission 2009a, 5-6). Each MP has its own scoreboard, which is regularly updated 
by the Commission, based on information provided by participating Member States, EU 
agencies and other actors involved in its implementation. Unfortunately, except in the 
case of Moldova
22
, scoreboards are not made publicly available, therefore it is not 
possible to assess the progress in the implementation of MPs for the purpose of 
evaluating their effectiveness in a comprehensive way
23
. 
Alternatively, the effectiveness of MPs may be determined based on their actual 
                                                 
22
 Moldova’s scoreboard is available online at the following link: http://scoreboard.mfa.gov.md/. 
23
 Although scoreboards are usually not published online and not made available to the broad public, one 
of the EU officials I interviewed in Brussels told me that the Commission has produced two versions of 
scoreboards: whilst one is for internal use only, the other one can be shared with the public. Therefore, I 
asked him for the updated scoreboards of MPs with Morocco and Tunisia and I was kindly given access 
to the non-restricted version of both documents. I am very grateful to this EU official for his courtesy. 
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contribution to legal migration and mobility, since this was heralded as their primary 
purpose and the reason for their creation (European Commission 2007a). This may be 
assessed on the basis of two indicators: the number of first residence permits and the 
number of short-stay visas issued to citizens of MP countries. Both Reslow (2015, 119) 
and García Andrade et al. (2015, 74-75) considered these two indicators, coming to the 
same conclusions. 
As concerns the first indicator, it clearly emerged that MPs had no impact on the 
number of residence permits issued. In most cases MPs actually seemed to have a 
negative impact; but other completely separate factors (e.g. the economic crisis) have 
certainly played a relevant role in causing a decrease in the number of residence permits 
issued to citizens of MP countries. As concerns the second indicator, there seemed to be 
an increase in the number of short-stay visas issued (e.g. in the case of Georgian and 
Armenian nationals) but most VFAs have entered into force too recently and are still at 
an early stage of implementation to allow for a truthful assessment of their actual 
impact. 
Therefore, from a quantitative perspective, it seems that so far MPs have not 
created new dynamics of legal migration and mobility from partner countries to the EU; 
but since migration and mobility are affected by a variety of factors, more time is 
needed for a more reliable evaluation. What is evident simply looking at the text of MPs 
(their Annexes in particular) is that legal migration and mobility are not given the same 
attention as irregular migration and readmission (as already discussed in previous 
sections). This shortcoming jeopardises the achievement of the first above-mentioned 
purpose of MPs (to increase mobility and legal migration) as well as the very 
functioning of MPs, which is based on the offer of legal migration opportunities in 
exchange for enhanced cooperation on migration control and readmission. 
The 2007 Communication which launched the MPs as the main instrument of the 
GAMM clarified, indeed, that MPs were based on a set of reciprocal commitments on 
the part of the third country concerned on the one hand, and the EU and participating 
Member States on the other hand. The list of commitments expected from third 
countries put in first place the effective implementation of readmission obligations and 
the signature of EURAs, followed by a list of actions exclusively pertaining to the fight 
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against irregular immigration and human trafficking, border control and security of 
travel and identity documents. The commitments to be taken on by the EU and Member 
States were instead entirely focused on legal migration: offering labour migration 
opportunities and assistance in the management of legal migration flows; addressing the 
risk of brain drain and promoting circular migration; and facilitating procedures for 
issuing short-stay visas (European Commission 2007a, 4-8). 
However, the reciprocity of these commitments did not imply that the parties 
would benefit equally from MPs, due to at least two reasons: 1) the fulfilment of the 
first set of commitments by third countries is a precondition for the EU and its Member 
States to implement their set of commitments; 2) Member States participate in MPs on a 
purely voluntary basis, they are free to decide the level of their engagement, and once 
they take on a set of commitments, the implementation of the latter is relegated to their 
discretion, determining a potential gap between initiatives proposed on paper and 
initiatives materialised in practice. 
The combination of these two elements – conditionality and voluntary non-
binding nature of MPs – produced an unbalanced instrument of cooperation, largely 
focused on irregular migration and readmission, which does not correspond to the 
comprehensive tool that it was meant to be. This is the main criticism raised by scholars 
with regards to MPs (Lavenex and Stucky 2011; Carrera and Hernández i Sagrera 2011; 
Carrera et al. 2012, 11-14; Cassarino and Lavenex 2012; Maroukis and Triandafyllidou 
2013; Brocza and Paulhart 2015). But the problem has been highlighted also by the 
Commission itself. In its 2009 evaluation of MPs, the Commission stated that ‘the focus 
of mobility partnerships should go beyond issues regarding illegal migration’ (European 
Commission 2009a, 3). Also in its 2014 report on the implementation of the GAMM, it 
stressed that ‘more work needs to be done to make sure that the MPs are being 
implemented in a balanced manner, i.e. better reflecting all four thematic priorities of 
the GAMM, including more actions with regard to legal migration, human rights and 
refugee protection’ (European Commission 2014a, 9). Weinar (2012) emphasised that 
MPs have raised very high expectations for increased mobility, which have not been 
fulfilled yet; she claims that in order to be effective, MPs should ‘fulfil their main 
promise: more mobility to the ordinary people’, including more visa facilitation, visa 
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liberalisation and concrete labour migration opportunities. 
A further element which proves the ineffectiveness of MPs in increasing legal 
migration and mobility, is the lack of concrete follow-up measures relating to the 
concept of circular migration, launched by the 2007 Commission Communication 
together with mobility partnerships (Papagianni 2013, 294, García Andrade et al. 2015, 
76). According to Maroukis and Triandafyllidou (2013, 4), the type of circular 
migration envisaged by the 2007 Communication ‘is largely non-existent’: very few 
highly-skilled migrants engage in circular mobility and take back to their country of 
origin the skills acquired in the EU. According to the authors, the only kind of circular 
migration taking place in some Member States concerns seasonal workers in the 
agricultural sector and usually occurs through informal channels, rather than through 
national or European schemes. 
As concerns the other objectives of MPs, i.e. increasing the partner countries’ 
involvement in migration control, enhancing their cooperation on readmission and 
concluding readmission agreements with them, MPs could potentially be more effective 
in achieving these purposes, as most of the MPs’ initiatives are in these policy areas. 
For instance, with regards to EURAs, in most cases the adoption of MPs has so far 
actually led to the signature of EURAs with partner countries: this happened in the 
cases of Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Cape Verde, and will probably soon happen 
also for Belarus since negotiations are finalised
24
. However, it remains to be seen 
whether such a ‘successful’ outcome will be replicated for the Southern Mediterranean 
countries (Morocco, Tunisia and Jordan), given the traditional resistance demonstrated 
by these countries towards EURAs. 
As in the case of initiatives proposed in the area of legal migration, also 
commitments undertaken in the area of readmission may suffer from the consequences 
of the voluntary and non-binding nature of MPs. Political commitments to revitalise or 
initiate readmission negotiations may not lead to the actual conclusion of EURAs, as 
affirmed also by one of the DG HOME officials I interviewed. The same interviewee 
admitted that, with regards to readmission, until that moment (the interview took place 
                                                 
24
 In the case of Moldova, the country had already signed an EURA when it started to negotiate a MP. 
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in March 2016) the MPs with Morocco and Tunisia had not produced the results the 
Commission has hoped for
25
. 
 
Factors limiting the effectiveness and relevance of MPs 
There are a number of factors that may impact on the effectiveness and relevance 
of MPs, i.e. on the possibility that they achieve their purposes as described above. 
The first of these factors is the lack of a transparent monitoring mechanism to 
ensure the actual implementation of proposed projects listed in the Annex to MPs 
(which is made uncertain by the non-legally binding nature of the instrument). The 
projects’ implementation should be monitored at the EU level through a Mobility 
Partnership Taskforce and in the partner country through a Local Cooperation 
Platform
26
. In addition, partner countries may have their own internal structure for 
monitoring and coordinating the MP’s implementation (European Commission 2009a, 
5-6; Reslow 2015, 118; Lavenex and Stucky 2011, 134-136). This multilevel 
monitoring mechanism seems to be in place, with slight variations, for all MPs. 
However, this is not a public and open monitoring process, as it usually takes 
place behind closed doors. As mentioned above, generally scoreboards (the MPs 
fundamental monitoring tool) are not publicly available, making it extremely difficult 
for any external independent subject to get information about the implementation of 
MPs, monitor the progress of projects in different areas and evaluate the overall 
effectiveness of the instrument. 
In addition, the Commission has not produced any specific evaluation of existing 
MPs after the early Communication on Mobility Partnerships as a tool of the GAM of 
                                                 
25
 The interviewee specified that in the case of Morocco the MP for sure had not facilitated the progress 
of the EURA negotiations, while in the case of Tunisia it remained to be seen, as the MP could indeed 
encourage the formal starting of readmission negotiations (which actually happened very recently, on 12 
October 2016). But in the opinion of the official, this can hardly be considered as a success in itself, 
because beginning negotiations does not necessarily mean being able to conclude the readmission 
agreement, as proved by the experience with Morocco. 
26
 The MP Taskforce gathers representatives of the Commission and participating Member States with 
the aim to ensure internal EU coordination; the Commission plays a key role in organising the Taskforce 
meetings and updating the MPs’ scoreboards. MP Local Cooperation Platforms involve Member States’ 
embassies, EU Delegations and the partner countries’ authorities with the aim to ensure coordination 
between third countries and participating actors and agencies on the ground; Cooperation Platforms are 
responsible for checking that the implementation of projects follows the scoreboard. 
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September 2009, whose scope was rather limited, given that the only MPs in force at 
that moment were with Moldova and Cape Verde. The Commission Report on the 
Implementation of the GAMM 2012-2013 issued in February 2014 presents a general 
evaluation of the whole GAMM and its various instruments, including but not limited to 
MPs (European Commission 2014a). Even though this report includes interesting 
considerations on the progress and state of implementation of existing MPs, the 
information provided is not sufficiently specific and detailed, in particular if compared 
to the 2009 Commission Staff Working Document on MPs or to the 2011 Evaluation of 
EURAs
27
. A follow-up in-depth quantitative and qualitative evaluation of MPs, almost 
ten years after the launch of this instrument, would be most useful. 
That said, it seems that the actual implementation of MPs depends in the first 
place on the willingness of Member States to follow up on projects once they have been 
agreed upon
28
. Indeed, a second factor limiting the MPs effectiveness is the Member 
States’ reluctance to participate in MPs and actively contribute to them. Member States’ 
engagement in developing and implementing significant initiatives appears scarce, as 
proved by the fact that they often re-propose projects which were already planned or 
were already in the process of being implemented under other bilateral cooperation 
frameworks (García Andrade et al. 2015, 33 and 90). Moreover, Member States are also 
reticent in contributing financially to the implementation of MPs’ initiatives; as reported 
by the Commission in 2014, the majority of Member States participating in MPs has not 
made any financial contribution to their implementation, while most of the funding 
comes from the EU budget (European Commission 2014a, 20). 
The reduced involvement of Member States is partly a consequence of the non-
binding and flexible nature of MPs, which allows Member States to participate on a 
voluntary basis. However, from an EU perspective, voluntary participation could, on the 
                                                 
27
 The only exception is the MP with Moldova, the sole MP to be subject to a detailed evaluation by an 
expert contracted by the IOM (European Commission 2014a, 4). The result of this evaluation is the report 
‘The European Union ­ Republic of Moldova Mobility Partnership 2008­2011: Evaluation Report’ issued 
on 1
st
 October 2012 and available online at: http://www.mfa.gov.md/img/docs/eu-moldova-mobility-
partnership-evaluation.pdf.  
28
 However, some scholars emphasise that the effective implementation of MPs depends also on the 
partner countries’ degree of ‘ownership’ of the instrument, on their active participation in the monitoring 
process and on their ability to actively use Local Cooperation Platforms to advance their own priorities 
(Lavenex and Stucky 2011, 136). 
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contrary, have represented a potential advantage, because it allows Member States to 
cooperate to various degrees in countries where they have particular expertise and 
interests, while Member States whose national policies and priorities did not match well 
with the MP approach could simply choose not to participate (European Commission 
2014a, 20; García Andrade et al. 2015, 85; Reslow 2015, 122 and 126). This could have 
a positive impact on the effectiveness of MPs, because in theory Member States that 
decide to participate in a given MP are more committed to implement it properly. The 
‘normative softness’ of the MP structure was thus expected to decrease national 
reluctance to offer concrete initiatives, especially in the area of legal migration; but 
Member States have so far failed to demonstrate their full commitment and to secure a 
balanced offer of projects spread across the four thematic areas (García Andrade et al. 
2015, 33). 
A third factor affecting the effectiveness of MPs is represented by the limited 
financial, human and organisational resources available on all sides: at the Commission 
level, in EU Delegations on the ground, with regards to Member States’ national 
authorities and diplomatic missions, and on the part of third countries. Given the 
complexity of coordination tasks required for the implementation and monitoring of a 
multilevel policy instrument like MPs, insufficient staff and inadequate institutional 
structures are a serious problem for both the Commission and Member States (Lavenex 
and Stucky 2011, 136; Reslow 2015, 123-124). 
As pointed out by the Commission, ‘EU representatives on the ground are not 
necessarily initially well-informed and equipped to follow-up on intensified and 
increased activities on migration in the partner country or to ensure their articulation 
with already existing activities in that field’ (European Commission 2009a, 6). 
Moreover, not all Member States participating in MPs are represented locally in the 
partner countries, while others cannot provide adequate human resources at home. This 
is considered to be also one of the causes for the Member States’ incapacity to ensure a 
continuous active involvement in the implementation of MPs (García Andrade et al. 
2015, 90). In addition, third countries may face specific difficulties concerning 
institution building, organisational capacity and staff expertise (Lavenex and Stucky 
2011, 136; Reslow 2015, 124). These practical deficiencies cannot but impact 
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negatively on the effective implementation of MPs. 
A fourth problematic aspect is the overlapping of projects offered by more 
individual Member States and/or the EU and its agencies in the same policy area and 
with the same (or very similar) purpose (García Andrade et al. 2015, 89-90). Although 
each project may bring added value to migration cooperation between the partner 
country and individual Member States, it has been argued that, in order to ensure greater 
effectiveness and relevance to MPs, there should be more coordination efforts, more 
information sharing, more joint planning between the Commission, Member States and 
the EU agencies involved (European Commission 2009a, 7-8). According to Lavenex 
and Stucky (2011, 137), this possibility for enhanced coordination and dialogue 
between participating actors at different levels represents a potential strength of MPs. 
However, in order to be effective and relevant, MPs should be considered as a European 
instrument and not simply as a collection of bilateral initiatives, as emphasised by the 
Commission itself in its 2009 evaluation of MPs (European Commission 2009a, 5). 
An additional element which impacts on the effectiveness and relevance of MPs 
within the broader framework of the GAMM is their geographical distribution. Until the 
Arab Spring, the GAM has been more successful towards the East than towards the 
South of the EU. The only MP signed with a country in the Southern neighbourhood 
was the MP with Cape Verde, a small country whose migratory salience was rather 
limited compared to other countries in West Africa. The following attempts to open 
negotiations with Senegal (in 2008) and Ghana (in 2010) in view of the signature of 
MPs have either failed or produced negligible progress
29
 (see Table 2 at the end of 
section 4.1 above). 
As in the case of European readmission agreements, the main reason explaining 
why it has been easier for the EU to establish migration cooperation with Eastern 
neighbouring countries seems to be linked to the EU prospective enlargement. 
However, it is hard to consider the progress of the GAM to the East as a significant 
result for the EU external migration policy, because in many cases MPs have been 
signed with countries whose migratory impact on the EU is minimal (e.g. Georgia, 
                                                 
29
 For an analysis of the negotiations for a MP with Senegal and the reasons that led to their suspension 
and failure, see: Chou and Gibert 2012. 
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Armenia and Azerbaijan). The fact that no MPs had been signed with key countries of 
origin or transit, in particular in the African continent, represented a clear deficit of the 
instrument, which undermined its effectiveness and relevance as the main tool for the 
operationalisation of the GAMM. 
For this reason the launch of negotiations for MPs with a number of North African 
countries following the Arab Spring, and the actual conclusion of MPs with Morocco, 
Tunisia and Jordan in the years 2013-2014, represented a crucial development. From an 
EU perspective, this was a significant evolution not only because finally MPs were 
signed with key countries for the EU migration policy, but also for a revival of the 
GAMM, and most importantly, because the signature of MPs could offer the possibility 
to reach an agreement also on the conclusion of EURAs with countries which have 
always proved reluctant (especially Morocco, as discussed in section 3.5.1 above). 
However, so far the adoption of MPs with Southern Mediterranean countries has 
not brought radical changes or substantial improvements in the cooperation between 
these countries and the EU or its Member States, and no real progress has been done 
with regards to the negotiation of EURAs, except for the recently announced opening of 
negotiations with Tunisia. Therefore, even after the formal expansion of their 
geographical scope to relevant countries of origin and transit, Mobility Partnerships 
have not yet proved to be a relevant and effective instrument of the EU external 
migration policy. 
 
4.4.3. What role do non-state actors and international organisations play in 
their negotiation and implementation? 
As discussed in the corresponding section of the previous chapter dedicated to 
EURAs, since the early 2000s private actors and international organisations have been 
playing an increasingly relevant role in the elaboration and implementation of the EU 
external migration and asylum policy (see section 3.4.3 above). With particular regard 
to Mobility Partnerships, information publicly available on the role of non-state actors 
in their negotiation and implementation is scarce; as in the case of EURAs, also in-
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depth research and critical analysis of this phenomenon are still limited
30
. The 
interviews I conducted with DG HOME officials contributed to provide useful 
information on this topic, although the attitude of EU interviewees to my questions on 
the role of non-state actors in MPs was generally prone to understating the issue. 
Nonetheless, what emerges quite clearly from official documents is the crucial 
role played by international organisations - e.g. the International Organisation for 
Migration (IOM), the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), 
etc. - in the implementation of MPs’ projects and initiatives, often in cooperation with 
Member States, EU Delegations, EU agencies and other non-state actors and NGOs. 
Among intergovernmental organisations, a special consideration should be given to the 
IOM, which has been largely involved not only in the implementation of all MPs, but 
also at different stages of their preparation, negotiation and monitoring. First of all, 
since 2005 the IOM has contributed substantially to developing the concept of circular 
migration (IOM 2005) and it has actively promoted the link between circular migration 
and MPs by the EU, framing the partnerships as a tool for the implementation of 
circular migration schemes and proposing a direct role for the organisation itself in 
putting this idea in practice - e.g. during preliminary dialogues on the MP with Moldova 
(Carrera and Hernández i Sagrera 2009, 24-25; Carrera and Hernández i Sagrera 2011, 
100). 
Moreover, given its large expertise in the field of migration, its highly 
decentralised structure and its worldwide capillary presence on the ground
31
, the IOM 
emerged as an essential partner for the EU to gather and analyse information, identify 
counterparts in third countries and initiate an informal dialogue with them (Potaux 
2011, 184). The IOM has thus come to play a crucial role in supporting the preparation 
of each MP: by providing information on the third countries’ migration trends (and 
drafting country- or region-specific migration profiles); through consultations with third 
                                                 
30
 However, as we will see, the role and activities of the IOM within the framework of MPs have been the 
subject of some specific academic interest (Potaux 2011; Carrera and Hernández i Sagrera 2009; Carrera 
and Hernández i Sagrera 2011). 
31
 In 2016 the IOM consists of 165 member states and has offices in 150 countries; in 2014 it had more 
than 2,400 ongoing projects in more than 400 field locations. Data as of October 2016, available online 
at: http://www.iom.int/organizational-structure. Accessed on 10 October 2016.  
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countries’ governments to explore their interests and expectations; and by 
recommending possible activities to be included in MPs (Potaux 2011, 186). 
Furthermore, the IOM is involved in the development and implementation of 
many concrete projects under all MPs, especially in the areas of legal migration and 
migration and development, but also concerning return and reintegration, visas, security 
of identity and travel documents, etc. Notably, Assisted Voluntary Return and 
Reintegration (AVRR) programmes are among the main services offered by the IOM to 
EU Member States (Redpath 2004, 292-294). Potaux (2011, 186-198) describes 
extensively the role of the IOM in preparing, drafting and implementing the MPs with 
Cape Verde, Moldova, Georgia and in preparing the MP with Senegal (in the end not 
concluded); her account provides a detailed picture of the IOM’s involvement and, more 
in general, clarifies the extent of the IOM’s penetration in the EU policy-making in the 
area of migration and asylum. 
The Commission, on its part, has affirmed on various occasions that it is keen to 
see IOM taking a role in the development and implementation of MPs (Potaux 2011, 
185). In Annex II to the 2007 Communication on circular migration and mobility 
partnerships, the Commission included four IOM initiatives as examples of EU-funded 
projects facilitating the orderly management of legal migration flows to Europe 
(European Commission 2007a, 18-25). This proves that the Commission acknowledges 
the IOM’s expertise and operational capacities in this field and its potential usefulness 
in the practical implementation of circular migration and MPs. In the 2009 Working 
Document on MPs, the Commission suggested an increased involvement of 
international organisations (like the IOM) and NGOs that are ‘active on migration in the 
third country concerned’ through their participation in Local Coordination Platforms 
(see above section 4.4.2) along with representatives of the EU, Member States and 
partner countries (European Commission 2009a, 8). 
However, as mentioned by Lavenex and Stucky, at the present moment 
‘international organisations, non-governmental organisations, diaspora or migrant 
organisations are not formally involved’ in Coordination Platforms (2011, 135). But a 
DG HOME official I interviewed affirmed that even though international organisations 
do not participate in an official and systematic way in meetings with partner countries 
 140 
(Cooperation Platforms), they may be invited to join on a case-by-case basis, usually to 
report on the progress of the projects they are implementing and to share views with the 
partners. More often, they take part in EU internal meetings between the Commission, 
EU Delegations and Member States, but always upon invitation. 
This analysis shows that Mobility Partnerships cannot be comprehensively 
understood from a purely state-centric approach. As argued by Carrera and Hernández i 
Sagrera, 
 
The picture is far more complex. The external dimensions of the EU’s immigration 
policy go beyond pure state-to-state and EC institutional interests. The early and 
continuing role played by other intergovernmental and non-governmental actors 
(such as the IOM, ICMPD and the Fundación Internacional y para Iberoamérica de 
Administración y Políticas Públicas) has been very important (Carrera and 
Hernández i Sagrera 2009, 31). 
 
It should also be noted that most of the projects implemented by international 
organisations within the framework of MPs receive funding mainly from the EU. This 
makes the IOM (and to a lesser degree other international organisations) ‘the main 
beneficiaries of EU and Member State funding for making MPs and circular migration 
schemes work on the ground’ (Carrera and Hernández i Sagrera 2011, 107). From a 
purely utilitarian perspective, in the end they seem to benefit from MPs much more than 
any other actors involved (the EU, Member States, partner countries and migrants). 
Interestingly, it seems that whilst the Commission is prone to support the 
involvement of international organisations, Member States may not always be satisfied 
with having the latter implementing MP initiatives. The report from the Expert Group 
meeting on the GAMM held on 26 February 2014 is revealing. With regards to the MP 
with Georgia, the report shows a certain discontent on the part of some Member States 
(the Czech Republic, Poland and France) for the Commission’s decision to contract out 
to the IOM and the ICMPD the implementation of new projects in the framework of 
both the MP and the Visa Liberalisation Action Plan. Member States regretted they 
have not been involved and claimed this choice could result in loss of visibility and 
leadership for Member States (European Commission 2014b, 3-4). 
With regards to private actors, it seems their role in the development and 
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implementation of MPs is rather marginal, compared to that of international 
organisations. A DG HOME official I interviewed affirmed that they do not participate 
neither in preliminary discussions nor in the negotiations of MPs; as concerns the 
implementation phase, generally they are not involved, except in the case of specific 
activities that need to be contracted out to a service provider, who may be a private 
company (as in the case of EURAs). To the knowledge of my interviewees, private 
actors do not participate in meetings to monitor the implementation of MP projects 
(neither at the EU level nor with third countries) unless they are mandated with a 
specific role. 
Finally, as concerns non-governmental organisations, an EU official I interviewed 
explained that the Commission tries to involve local NGOs and civil society 
organisations in prospective partner countries by organising meetings with them prior to 
the conclusion of a MP; this happened for instance in the cases of Tunisia and Morocco. 
However, the interviewee admitted that these meetings are not real public consultations, 
because organisations are not consulted on the content and text of the MP; the aim of 
these meetings is rather to reach out to civil society, explain the purposes of MPs and 
get a general feedback (which in the cases of Tunisia and Morocco was very negative). 
However, this EU attempt to involve civil society in partner countries looks like a mere 
‘façade strategy’, which is not intended to a truthful involvement of local non-
governmental and civil society actors in the MP decision-making and which does not 
help increasing the level of ‘shared ownership’ of MPs. 
In conclusion, if the role of private actors and NGOs in MPs appears to be still 
limited, the involvement of international organisations is deep and widespread. This 
situation may evolve in the future, leading to an even more radical penetration of non-
state actors in migration and asylum policy-making. As brilliantly summarised by 
Carrera and Hernández i Sagrera, 
 
There is a patchwork of non-state and non-EU institutional actors driving the 
circular migration agenda at the EU level and putting the mobility partnerships into 
practice. Their involvement adds to the complexity and obscurity of the Mobility 
Partnership regime in light of the multiplicity of the interests, agendas and actors 
involved in the transnational governance of migration (Carrera and Hernández i 
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Sagrera 2011, 107). 
 
4.4.4. What is their human rights content? 
The human rights content of Mobility Partnerships is as limited as that of 
European readmission agreements. First of all, an analysis of the official documents 
issued by the EU institutions on the MPs and the GAMM shows very few traces of the 
human rights discourse. In most EU documents, indeed, the respect for the fundamental 
rights of migrants, including their right to seek asylum, is mentioned only in relation to 
the objectives of fighting irregular immigration and improving return and readmission; 
usually a general reference is made to the fact that actions in this field should be 
pursued in the respect of international human rights standards and the dignity of 
migrants. An example is the 2007 Commission Communication that introduced MPs as 
the main instrument of the GAMM. After listing the commitments expected from third 
countries in order to establish a MP (all of which concerned readmission, irregular 
migration, border control, etc.), it is stated that: ‘this type of measures must be 
implemented in full compliance with the fundamental rights of the persons in question, 
including the specific rights of persons who might be in need of international 
protection’ (European Commission 2007a, 5). 
The 2011 Communication on the renewed GAMM tried, to some extent, to 
expand the human rights content of MPs. In this document the Commission affirmed 
that ‘the human rights of migrants are a cross-cutting dimension, of relevance to all four 
pillars in the GAMM’ and referred explicitly to the need to pay special attention to 
vulnerable migrants, i.e. unaccompanied minors, asylum seekers, stateless persons and 
victims of trafficking. It mentioned the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and 
the respect of its provisions as a key element in EU policies on migration; it also 
recommended a thorough assessment of the human rights impact of initiatives taken in 
the framework of the GAMM (European Commission 2011e, 6). Finally, the 
Commission emphasised that ‘the GAMM should strengthen respect for fundamental 
rights and the human rights of migrants in source, transit and destination countries 
alike’ (European Commission 2011e, 7). 
Unfortunately, it seems that this reinforced human rights framework was not 
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transposed in the MPs that followed this Communication, which (as analysed below for 
the cases of Morocco and Tunisia) do not reflect neither in their text, nor in their 
implementation a more migrant-centred and human rights-oriented approach. Notably, 
post-2011 MPs were not enriched with any concrete initiatives aimed at reinforcing the 
respect for the fundamental rights of migrants, refugees and asylum seekers, despite 
repeated Commission statements affirming that ‘the protection of the human rights of 
migrants is a cross-cutting priority in the EU’s cooperation with third countries’ 
(European Commission 2014a, 17). 
Only the MPs with Morocco and Tunisia include among their objectives the 
strengthening of the third country’s capacities to assist victims of human trafficking and 
unaccompanied minors (MP with Morocco, paras 17-18; MP with Tunisia, paras 12-
13). However, an analysis of the two scoreboards reveals that in practice the EU and 
Member States proposed mainly training and capacity-building initiatives addressed to 
Moroccan and Tunisian authorities, whose real impact on vulnerable migrants is 
doubtful. Moreover, as concerns unaccompanied minors, proposed projects are meant to 
prevent their emigration and encourage their return, rather than assisting them (see also 
section 4.5). 
The 2014 Commission report on the implementation of the GAMM highlighted 
that MPs are implemented in an unbalanced manner and recommended that they better 
reflect all four thematic areas of the GAMM, ‘including more actions with regard to 
legal migration, human rights and refugee protection’ (European Commission 2014a, 9). 
The Commission thus stressed the need to improve MPs not only as concerns their offer 
of legal migration opportunities, but also with regards to their human rights content, so 
that human rights issues can be addressed in a more systematic way (European 
Commission 2014a, 18). In addition, MPs should be improved also with regards to the 
implementation of concrete initiatives in the area of international protection (European 
Commission 2014a, 16). 
However, an analysis of the text of existing MPs uncovers the limited scope of 
their human rights and international protection provisions. In the Preamble to all MPs 
one can find only a minimal reference to the respect of the fundamental rights and 
dignity of migrants and/or of the international human rights and refugee law 
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instruments, but always in relation to the objectives of fighting irregular migration and 
improving cooperation on return and readmission (similarly to other EU documents and 
to the above-mentioned 2007 Communication)
32
. 
As concerns international protection, all MPs include at least one provision on the 
strengthening of the partner country’s institutional and administrative capacity in the 
area of asylum, to be pursued through institution-building, development of a legislative 
framework, capacity-building, technical assistance, and cooperation with specialised 
agencies (UNHCR and EASO). The first MPs with Cape Verde and Moldova contain 
only a small reference to initiatives in the area of international protection (MP with 
Cape Verde and MP with Moldova, para 3), while the following MPs usually include 
two provisions focusing more precisely on the development of national asylum systems 
in partner countries, in compliance with international and European standards. 
The section on asylum and international protection is more developed in the MPs 
which followed the 2011 GAMM renewal and in particular in the MPs with Southern 
Mediterranean countries. For instance, the MPs with Morocco and Tunisia contain a 
provision encouraging the adequate implementation of the 1951 Geneva Convention 
and its 1967 Protocol (MP with Morocco, para 28; MP with Tunisia, para 24). And the 
MP with Tunisia, which counts four provisions under the international protection pillar, 
is the only one to include a commitment to the full application of the principle of non-
refoulement (MP with Tunisia, para 25). 
Notwithstanding this gradual expansion of the international protection section in 
MPs’ texts, moving from the paper to the practice, the development and concrete 
implementation of initiatives in this area have so far been insufficient. Moreover, no 
systematic assessment has been conducted of the human rights impact of projects 
implemented under existing MPs, neither by the Commission nor by an independent 
body. The only detailed evaluation report, drafted for the MP with Moldova, makes no 
                                                 
32
 There are a few exceptions, which however do not contribute in any substantial way to increase the 
human rights content of MPs. In the MP with Azerbaijan the respect of human rights and international 
refugee law instruments is connected not only to measures in the area of migration control, but also to the 
objective of maximising the development impact of migration (MP with Azerbaijan, 3). The Preambles to 
the MPs with Morocco and Jordan include an (identical) additional recital recalling that respect for 
fundamental rights underpins the EU’s and the partner country’s migration policies, including in relations 
with third countries (MP with Morocco, 2; MP with Jordan, 1). 
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reference at all to how the respect of fundamental rights of migrants has been promoted, 
strengthened or enforced in the framework of the MP (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
the Republic of Moldova 2012). 
Scholars, NGOs and grass root organisations in Europe and in partner countries 
have identified a number of deficiencies in the structure, nature and content of MPs, 
which impact negatively on the respect of the human rights of migrants. One of the 
main points of criticism is that MPs do not have the fundamental rights of migrants and 
refugees as a priority; on the contrary, their main focus is on preventing migrants and 
asylum seekers from reaching the EU and returning them to their countries of origin or 
transit. MPs may, thus, be considered as yet another instrument of the EU’s ‘security 
policy’, aimed at the externalisation of border control and outsourcing of the processing 
and reception of asylum seekers (Brocza e Paulhart 2015; EMHRN, AEDH at al. 2014; 
EMHRN 2014; Papagianni 2013, 295). 
As already discussed in previous sections, MPs are widely criticised for offering 
only very limited opportunities for legal migration, despite being promoted as a tool for 
facilitating mobility. NGOs denounce the EU and Member States’ reluctance to open 
legal avenues for migrants to access the European territory as an extremely 
controversial policy from a human rights perspective, because it pushes thousands of 
people to risk their life crossing the Mediterranean (EMHRN, AEDH at al. 2014; 
EMHRN 2014, 13). 
According to NGOs, the most critical aspect of MPs is their connection to 
EURAs, which entails the risk of human rights violations, relating in particular to the 
prohibition of collective expulsions, the right to seek asylum, the prohibition of 
refoulement, the risk of being subject to inhuman and degrading treatment upon return 
(EMHRN 2014, 5-9; EMHRN, AEDH at al. 2014). Indeed, the same concerns raised 
with regards to the human rights content of EURAs (see section 3.4.4 above) actually 
apply also to MPs, because MPs promote the conclusion of EURAs and increased 
operational cooperation on readmission but do not introduce any additional human 
rights guarantees compared to EURAs. 
In particular, civil society organisations emphasise the risk of establishing MPs 
with countries having a weak human rights and refugee protection record and lacking 
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the institutional and legislative framework needed to guarantee adequate protection 
standards and living conditions to migrants, asylum seekers and refugees. NGOs 
focused more precisely on the overall situation and legal and institutional context in 
Tunisia and Morocco, highlighting that the combination of MPs and EURAs with such 
countries puts EU Member States at risk of committing serious human rights violations. 
As noted by civil society organisations, Tunisia has not completed its democratic 
transition and has not yet adopted national legislation implementing the 1951 Geneva 
Convention and its 1967 Protocol, and the provisions of the new Constitution on the 
right to asylum (EMHRN, AEDH at al. 2014). 
As regards Morocco, both local and international NGOs and the Moroccan 
National Council for Human Rights (CNDH) have denounced the situation of Sub-
Saharan migrants in Morocco, who are arbitrarily arrested and detained, summarily 
deported, exposed to violence and abuse by Moroccan authorities, subject to 
exploitation and criminal violence, and live in precarious conditions, deprived of any 
means of subsistence (MSF 2013; CNDH 2013; HRW 2014a; EMHRN 2014, 6-8; 
Amnesty International 2015a). Despite the adoption of a new migration and asylum 
policy in September 2013 based on the CNDH recommendations (CNDH 2013)
33
, 
migrants and asylum seekers in Morocco continue to suffer from the lack of an effective 
asylum system, the criminalisation of irregular migration (introduced by Law 02-03 of 
November 2003), institutional violence and a xenophobic environment particularly 
hostile towards Sub-Saharan migrants (EMHRN 2014). 
                                                 
33
 In September 2013 the Moroccan National Council for Human Rights (CNDH) presented a report 
entitled ‘Foreigners and Human Rights in Morocco: for a radically new asylum and migration policy’. 
The report entailed a critical assessment of the situation of migrants and refugees in Morocco and urged 
the government to substantially reform the national migration and asylum policy with a view to protecting 
the fundamental rights of migrants and asylum seekers in Morocco (CNDH 2013). Shortly after, the King 
of Morocco announced the launch of a new migration policy, whose declared aims were the regularisation 
and integration of migrants in Morocco and the establishment of a well-functioning national asylum 
system. During the year 2014, the Moroccan government took relevant measures, but their faltering 
implementation has reduced their potentially positive impact. The government carried out a regularisation 
campaign upon which 18,000 migrants obtained a one-year renewable residence permit (but 10,000 
applications were rejected due to strict and non-uniformly applied criteria); it presented three new laws on 
immigration, human trafficking and asylum (which have not yet been adopted by the Parliament, though); 
it launched a broad migrant integration programme (co-funded by the EU for 10 million euros); and it 
unsuccessfully tried to re-open the Bureau des Réfugiés et des Apatrides (BRA), the national authority 
responsible for refugee status determination which has suspended its activities since 2004 (García 
Andrade et al. 2015, 129-130; Carrera et al. 2016, 11-12; EMHRN 2014). 
 147 
NGOs, thus, suggest the EU establish cooperation in the field of migration only 
with countries that fully respect the fundamental rights of migrants and refugees and 
that have adopted and effectively implement legislation protecting these rights 
(EMHRN, AEDH at al. 2014). They should be countries that comply with the 1951 
Geneva Convention, that have a functioning asylum system and that do not criminalise 
unauthorised immigration and emigration. 
A further concern expressed by NGOs with regards to the adoption of Mobility 
Partnerships is the lack of transparency in their negotiation process. This issue has been 
raised in particular for the MPs with Morocco and Tunisia, whose negotiations did not 
involve neither civil society actors nor international NGOs, many of whom have been 
active in defending and promoting migrant and refugee rights (EMHRN 2014; 
EMHRN, AEDH at al. 2014). As mentioned above, a DG HOME official interviewed in 
Brussels actually affirmed that the Commission organised preliminary meetings with 
civil society organisations in those countries, but also admitted that such meetings were 
not public consultations aimed at discussing and negotiating the content and text of 
MPs; their purpose was rather to provide general information and receive a general 
feedback. Local and European NGOs claim a more active role also in the 
implementation of MP initiatives as well as in monitoring their compliance with 
international human rights instruments and their impact on the fundamental rights of 
people concerned (EMHRN 2014; EMHRN, AEDH at al. 2014). 
Besides the lack of transparency in their negotiation process, scholars have 
questioned MPs also for their lack of democratic accountability, due to the absence of 
any role for the European and national parliaments in their negotiation and adoption - an 
element which makes them different from EURAs (see above section 4.3). In addition, 
due to their nature of political declarations, it is unclear whether MPs can be subject to 
the jurisdiction of national courts and the Court of Justice of the EU. Therefore, it is not 
clear whether a person who is subject to abusive practices or human rights violations by 
the public authorities of a participating Member State while implementing a MP 
initiative, will have the individual right to seek an effective remedy (Carrera and 
Hernández i Sagrera 2011, 106-107; Papagianni 2013, 296). 
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4.5. The case studies of Morocco and Tunisia 
This section focuses on the case studies of Mobility Partnerships with two 
Southern Mediterranean countries, Morocco and Tunisia, signed respectively in June 
2013 and March 2014. The conclusion of MPs with Northern African countries is the 
result of developments following the Arab Spring (see above section 4.1). After the 
2011 uprisings, on the one hand the EU seemed willing to support democratic transition 
in post-revolution countries and the stabilisation of the region; on the other hand raising 
fears of unwanted migration to the EU pushed Member States to place their main efforts 
on border control and readmission agreements (Fargues and Fandrich 2012, 5-6). 
The analysis that follows shows that, if on the one hand the EU offered to 
Southern Mediterranean countries a supposedly comprehensive and balanced instrument 
of cooperation, on the other hand the main purpose of these MPs was to strengthen 
cooperation on border control, limit irregular migration and promote the signature of 
EURAs, while offering limited incentives in the areas of legal migration, mobility and 
development. The analysis of these two case studies further proves the flaws and limits 
of this policy instrument, already described throughout section 4.4 above, in particular 
with regards to their unbalanced content, limited effectiveness, lack of transparency and 
poor human rights content. 
 
4.5.1. The Mobility Partnership with Morocco 
In the aftermath of the Arab Spring, the Commission proposed to start Dialogues 
on Migration, Mobility and Security with North African countries, within the wider 
scope of the European Neighbourhood Policy, as a preliminary step to the negotiation of 
Mobility Partnerships (see above section 4.1). The Dialogue with Morocco was 
launched on 13 October 2011; after six EU missions to Morocco, carried out in the 
period from October 2011 to February 2013, on 7 June 2013 the parties adopted a Joint 
Declaration establishing a Mobility Partnership. Morocco was, thus, the first 
Mediterranean country to sign a MP with the EU and nine of its Member States 
(Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom). 
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The structure and content of the Joint Declaration reflects entirely the standard 
model used in other MPs, and described under section 4.2 above. The Preamble recalls 
the existing relationships and broader cooperation framework between the EU and 
Morocco in the area of migration, i.e. the GAMM, bilateral and regional dialogues 
(Euro-Med Association Agreement, EU-Morocco Action Plan, Euro-Med Partnership, 
5+5 Dialogue, Rabat Process, etc.) and bilateral agreements with Member States. The 
final part of the Preamble states the general objectives of the MP, which correspond to 
the four thematic priorities of the GAMM: 1) to better manage the movement of persons 
for short stays and legal and labour migration; 2) to combat irregular migration and 
human trafficking and smuggling, and to promote an effective return and readmission 
policy; 3) to strengthen cooperation on migration and development; 4) to comply with 
international refugee law instruments. 
The Joint Declaration is divided accordingly into four sections, which list the 
specific objectives and commitments that the parties intend to take on and pursue under 
each thematic area
34
. A relevant element of the Joint Declaration is that the parties 
commit to open negotiations for a visa facilitation agreement ‘in order to ensure more 
fluid mobility between the EU and Morocco’ (MP with Morocco, para 3) and to resume 
negotiations of the EU-Morocco readmission agreement (MP with Morocco, para 13), 
which were blocked since May 2010. However, as mentioned above when analysing the 
EURA with Morocco (section 3.5.1), after a first round of combined VFA and EURA 
negotiations in January 2015 (EU Delegation to Morocco 2015), the process of parallel 
negotiation got stalled and has not made any progress since. 
The most developed and specific sections are the first and the second ones. As 
concerns the first section on mobility, legal migration and integration, the main 
commitments are aimed to: 1) simplify procedures, improve consular services and 
facilitate the issuing of short-stay visas, in order to make it easier for Moroccan 
nationals to enter and stay in the EU; 2) better inform Moroccan citizens about aspects 
of legal migration to the EU (entry conditions, rights and duties), facilitate recognition 
                                                 
34
 The titles of the four sections are: 1) Mobility, legal immigration and integration; 2) Preventing and 
combating illegal immigration, people-smuggling, border management; 3) Migration and development; 4) 
International protection. 
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of diplomas, improve cooperation between employment services; 3) promote migrant 
integration and combat xenophobia with regards to both Moroccan nationals in the EU 
and third country nationals in Morocco, and ensure the portability of social security 
rights of Moroccan workers (MP with Morocco, paras 1-11). Evidently, there is no 
explicit reference to the possibility of offering to Moroccan citizens concrete legal or 
labour migration opportunities in the EU, not even in the form of temporary or circular 
migration. 
With regards to the section on preventing and combating illegal immigration, 
people smuggling and border management, the actions foreseen are aimed to: continue 
cooperation on readmission and conclude the EURA; enhance information exchange 
and operational and technical cooperation to support Morocco in combating irregular 
migration, detecting trafficking and smuggling networks and controlling borders; 
improve the security of Moroccan travel and identity documents and residence permits; 
conduct campaigns on the risks of irregular migration; develop voluntary return and 
reintegration initiatives to Morocco and from Morocco to other third countries (MP with 
Morocco, paras 12-20). Interestingly, paragraphs 17 and 18 refer to the objective of 
increasing Morocco’s capacity to assist and offer protection to two categories of 
vulnerable people: victims of trafficking and unaccompanied minors. However, in 
particular as concerns the latter, proposed actions should focus on preventing their 
emigration and encouraging their voluntary return. 
The third section, dedicated to the development impact of migration, looks shorter 
and less specific. Besides a vague commitment to support the socio-economic 
development of regions with high migration potential, the objectives set out by the EU 
are: to mobilise Moroccan skills abroad and encourage Moroccan migrants to actively 
contribute to the development of their country of origin; to facilitate their voluntary 
return and reintegration in Morocco; to reduce the cost of remittances; and to prevent 
‘brain drain’ through circular migration (MP with Morocco, paras 21-27). Evidently, the 
main focus of EU actions in this area is on the role Moroccan migrants can play in the 
development of their country: the aim is to facilitate their contribution and encourage 
their return. 
Only two paragraphs are part of the fourth section on international protection. In 
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this area the EU and Member States generally commit to support: the strengthening of 
Morocco’s legislative and institutional framework on asylum; capacity building for 
Moroccan authorities in cooperation with relevant asylum agencies; and the 
implementation of the 1951 Geneva Convention (MP with Morocco, paras 28-29). The 
MP with Morocco includes a further section that entails horizontal initiatives, i.e. cross-
cutting issues relating to the governance of migration, which are of relevance to all four 
thematic areas of the MP
35
. 
Finally, the Joint Declaration is closed by a set of provisions concerning its 
implementation. Here it is reaffirmed that the MP is ‘a long-term cooperation 
framework […] which will evolve over time’ (MP with Morocco, para 38) and that the 
various components of the MP constitute a package and should be implemented in a 
balanced way, in particular the VFA and the EURA (MP with Morocco, para 39). As 
regards the monitoring of the implementation of the partnership and its further 
development, the parties commit to ‘meet at least twice a year at an appropriate level 
decided by mutual agreement’ (MP with Morocco, para 42). 
The text of the MP is complemented by a detailed Annex of activities undertaken 
by the EU, its agencies and participating Member States in order to achieve the specific 
objectives set out in the Joint Declaration. The Annex takes the form of a table and is 
divided into two parts, listing respectively the new projects and the ongoing projects as 
of 25 March 2013. Its structure is very clear: both parts of the Annex are divided in five 
sections, corresponding to the four thematic areas of the GAMM plus the horizontal 
initiatives. The proposed projects are listed under the five sections depending on their 
specific objective (which coincides with one of the paragraphs of the Joint Declaration). 
The total number of proposed projects is 105; however, as stated in the Annex itself:  
 
the Annex is intended to be an evolving one, the listing of initiatives is purely 
indicative and their implementation will be subject of appropriate contacts between 
the Moroccan and European authorities concerned, in particular in order to take 
                                                 
35
 Examples of horizontal initiatives include: improving Morocco’s ability to manage migration flows in 
accordance with the GAMM approach; increasing consultation and dialogue between the parties on the 
respective migration policies; developing cooperation between judicial authorities on migration issues; 
increasing the capacities and role of civil society actors in Morocco; promoting scientific knowledge of 
migration (MP with Morocco, paras 30-39). 
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into account the interests of the two parties and reflect their priorities (MP with 
Morocco, Annex, 14). 
 
As a matter of fact, under paragraph 45 of the Joint Declaration the parties 
commit to update the Annex on a regular basis and to ensure coordination of their 
respective actions. The parties established that a first joint meeting was to be scheduled 
by September 2013, in order to consider if any projects were to be added, modified or 
cancelled (MP with Morocco, Annex, 14)
36
. 
Looking more carefully at the projects listed in the Annex, a number of 
problematic issues clearly emerge. Firstly, the unbalanced content of the MP is proved 
by the number of initiatives proposed under each section/thematic area. The second 
pillar on irregular migration and readmission counts 38 projects, 27 of which are new 
initiatives launched in the framework of the MP; under the first section on mobility and 
legal migration there are 35 projects, but only 15 of them have been introduced by the 
MP; the third pillar includes 20 projects, only seven of which are new; and only six 
projects are listed under the section on international protection. 
Secondly, as mentioned in previous sections, Member States (but also the EU and 
its agencies) are free to participate in MPs by proposing projects that are already 
planned or already in progress under different cooperation frameworks, and gather them 
under the label of the MP. In the case of the MP with Morocco, the 43% of initiatives 
(listed in the second part of the Annex) were already in progress at the moment of its 
adoption; these initiatives obviously do not bring any added value to the MP, as they are 
a mere re-proposition of pre-existing projects. For instance, a relevant number of 
initiatives under the first and second pillars proposed by Spain and France were already 
in place as part of the bilateral cooperation between the two EU countries and 
Morocco
37
 (García Andrade et al. 2015, 33 and 64-69). 
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 On that occasion, Moroccan authorities presented a series of counter-proposals for the Annex, which 
for the most part were not approved by European officials, causing discontent among Moroccan officials 
(García Andrade et al. 2015, 128). 
37
 These initiatives deal with: facilitating the issuance of short-stay visas; increasing mobility for certain 
categories of people; promoting legal migration for certain categories of workers and students (also on a 
temporary or circular basis); provide technical support and training to Moroccan authorities and promote 
information exchange and operational cooperation in the fight against irregular migration, people 
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Thirdly, the overlapping of new projects offered by individual Member States and 
the EU or its agencies is evident in the MP with Morocco. The overlaps occur in 
different areas. For instance, under the first pillar, they concern information campaigns 
and training courses on legal migration (three projects proposed by Italy, Belgium and 
Spain) and capacity building for employment services (three projects set forth by the 
EU, Spain and Sweden). Overlapping projects characterise also the fourth pillar: six 
projects on capacity building in the area of international protection have been offered by 
the EU, EASO and three Member States (the Netherlands, Germany and Portugal). But 
the most significant overlapping concerns training and information exchange initiatives 
on border management, prevention and fight against people smuggling and trafficking, 
and document security: 11 projects have been proposed by Frontex, the United 
Kingdom, the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, France and Portugal. Although each project 
may bring its own added value, coordination between different initiatives with the same 
objective is crucial in order to avoid duplications and waste of funding. 
Also with a view to ensuring this kind of coordination, and more in general to 
adequately monitor the implementation of the MP, the participating parties resort to a 
scoreboard. As described above under section 4.4.2, scoreboards are the main 
instrument for monitoring the implementation of MPs and are regularly updated by the 
Commission, with contributions from participating Member States and EU agencies 
involved. Normally these documents are for internal use only, but I was kindly provided 
a copy of the scoreboard of the MP with Morocco by a DG HOME official I 
interviewed in March 2016
38
. This version of the scoreboard is updated to June 2015 
and lists a total of 92 initiatives, which are either ongoing, in preparation or under 
consideration. The ongoing initiatives are a total of 59. 
For each project, the scoreboard provides the following information: objective 
pursued, Member State(s) or institution(s) that proposed and implement it, short 
description of the project, indicative implementation period, current status of the 
project, funding source and indicative budget. However, it must be noted that 
                                                                                                                                               
smuggling, trafficking and border control. 
38
 The scoreboard of the MP with Morocco (as well as the one with Tunisia analysed in the next section) 
is an Excel file and is drafted in French. 
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information is not complete for all initiatives listed: details on the implementing period, 
funding source and budget are often lacking. Besides that, the main limit of the 
scoreboard seems to be that it fails to provide a real assessment of the progress made in 
the implementation of projects over time and it does not seem to be used to evaluate on 
a regular basis if and how ongoing projects contribute to achieve the objectives set out 
in the Joint Declaration (García Andrade et al. 2015, 128). This certainly limits its 
usefulness when it comes to evaluate the effectiveness of the MP; however, according to 
an EU official I interviewed, the scoreboard has proved to be a helpful instrument to 
increase the coherence and complementarity of different projects, the coordination of 
funding and the sharing of information among actors involved. 
In the areas of legal migration, mobility and development, the majority of ongoing 
projects clearly promote: 1) a model of temporary and circular migration for low-skilled 
migrants linked to seasonal work
39
; 2) the mobilisation of skills of Moroccans living in 
the EU, in view of their contribution to the development of Morocco; 3) the return and 
reintegration of Moroccan nationals, with a strong focus on highly-skilled qualified 
migrants and entrepreneurs, whose return (even on a temporary or circular basis) may 
contribute to the development of Morocco
40
. The latter is the objective of at least 14 
ongoing projects listed in the scoreboard and implemented by individual Member 
States, groups of Member States or the EU. 
These are the main purposes also of the ‘Sharaka Project’, the flagship initiative 
funded by the EU to support the implementation of the MP with Morocco. It was 
launched in 2014 with a budget of 5 million euro over three years; the project involves a 
partnership of seven Member States (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Spain and Sweden) and the EU and is implemented by a French public agency, 
Expertise France
41
. Its focus is on supporting Moroccan policies in the area of mobility 
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 However, there is only one concrete initiative aiming to put this model in practice; it is proposed by 
Italy and consists of a circular migration programme for young Moroccan workers who wish to acquire 
competences in specific sectors, e.g. agriculture or tourism. 
40
 An interesting measure has been adopted by Germany aimed to foster mobility and circular migration: 
Moroccan nationals who are permanent residents in Germany will be able to leave Germany for a 
maximum period of 24 months without losing their permanent residence permit. 
41
 As reported in its website, Expertise France is ‘the leading public agency of French international 
technical assistance’; ‘the agency promotes French public expertise with a view to building public 
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and labour migration and on maximising the development impact of migration, through 
capacity building and reinforced cooperation between Moroccan and European 
administrations
42
. 
In the area of readmission, along with the relaunch of the EURA negotiations, 
both the Annex and the scoreboard contain two initiatives proposed by the Netherlands. 
The first one consists of an exchange of best practices on readmission between 
European and Moroccan authorities, concerning in particular the identification, 
nationality determination and re-documentation of persons to be readmitted. This 
initiative is coordinated by the Dutch Ministry of Security and Justice, with the 
participation of the EU and Belgium. According to the information provided in the 
scoreboard, the project is ongoing and has been implemented through two working 
group meetings and an EU mission to Morocco in autumn 2014, which allowed 
European authorities to share the problems they face and discuss practical solutions 
with Moroccan authorities. 
The second Dutch initiative is still in preparation, as it is linked to the previous 
signature of the EURA with Morocco. Its purpose is to support Morocco in the 
implementation of the EURA, especially ‘in implementing the return of third-country 
nationals, for the most part Sub-Saharan Africans’ (MP with Morocco, Annex, 19). This 
would include establishing standard procedures for the identification and verification of 
the nationality of returnees, as well as assisting Moroccan authorities in obtaining travel 
documents from third countries of origin. The Netherlands foresee the possibility to 
facilitate cooperation on readmission between Morocco and third countries of origin 
through the establishment of AVR programmes (i.e. a continuation of a pre-existing 
project funded by the Netherlands and implemented by the IOM). Clearly, achieving an 
                                                                                                                                               
policies meeting the institutional, economic, demographic, social and environmental challenges of partner 
countries’. http://www.expertisefrance.fr/eng. Accessed on 28 October 2016. 
42
 The Sharaka Project consists of four components, which are mentioned separately in the scoreboard, 
according to their specific objective: 1) mapping of existing ‘migration and development’ projects in 
Morocco and scaling up of the most effective ones; 2) capacity building in mobilisation of the skills of 
qualified Moroccan nationals residing in the EU; launch of pilot mechanisms to foster their return or 
circular migration, in view of their contribution to national development; 3) capacity building in labour 
migration management, concerning both the international placement of Moroccan workers in Europe and 
the integration of regular migrants in the Moroccan labour market; 4) supporting the reintegration of 
returning Moroccan migrants. 
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effective cooperation on readmission with regards to both Moroccan nationals and ‘third 
country nationals of Sub-Saharan origin’ represent a major priority for the Netherlands. 
This is an example of how Member States consider MPs as an opportunity to pursue 
their national interests and preferences (Reslow 2012a). 
As reported by García Andrade et al. in their study for the European Parliament 
on EU cooperation with third countries, in August 2015 there were 25 EU-funded 
ongoing projects in the area of migration in Morocco, for a total of more than 20 million 
euro over their implementation period
43
. They thus observe that the implementation of 
the MP has translated into a more than doubling of EU resources allocated to 
cooperation initiatives in the area of migration in Morocco (García Andrade et al. 2015, 
130). As discussed in previous sections, the various projects funded under the MPs are 
intended as a ‘financial support package’ offered, in this case, to Morocco as an 
incentive in exchange for its expected commitments in the area of readmission. 
However, the Moroccan side may continue to perceive this kind of incentive as 
insufficient compared to the efforts required by the EU side with regards to the 
readmission of nationals and non-nationals (Carrera et al. 2016, 7; Fargues and Fandrich 
2012, 8). As noted by scholars like Carrera and Cassarino, the funding of projects alone 
does not address Morocco’s concerns and interests and has not led to any progress in 
EURA negotiations so far
44
; only the opening of channels for legal entry and residence 
in the EU and the offer of real mobility (possibly through something more than visa 
facilitation) would address Moroccan priorities in a substantial way (Carrera et al. 2016, 
7). 
 
4.5.2. The Mobility Partnership with Tunisia 
After Morocco, the second Southern Mediterranean country to sign a Mobility 
                                                 
43
 Of this amount, 10 million euro correspond to a new programme launched in 2015 to promote the 
integration of regular migrants in Morocco; this funding supports directly the new national immigration 
policy adopted by the Moroccan government in 2014 (see footnote 33 in the previous section 4.4.4). 
Another 5 million euro are earmarked for the implementation of the Sharaka Project described above; 1 
million euro is allocated to a return programme from Morocco to countries of origin and 1.6 million euro 
funds a multi-country project (involving Morocco, Tunisia and Senegal) on voluntary return and 
reintegration. Remaining funds are dedicated to smaller technical assistance and development projects. 
44
 This issue has been discussed also in the previous chapter, under section 3.5.1. 
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Partnership with the EU was Tunisia in 2014. As recalled in previous sections, 
following the Arab Spring (of which Tunisia was one of the main protagonists), the 
Commission offered to launch Dialogues on Migration, Mobility and Security with 
North African countries. The EU began a Dialogue with Tunisia on 6 October 2011; 
discussions continued for two years leading to the finalisation of negotiations for a MP 
on 13 November 2013 (European Commission 2014c). The Joint Declaration 
establishing a Mobility Partnership was signed on 3 March 2014 by Tunisia, the EU and 
ten Member States (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom). 
The negotiation process with Tunisia took longer and was more complicated than 
the one for the MP with Morocco because, following the 2011 uprising, Tunisia was 
undergoing a complex phase of political transition and reforms, characterised by social 
instability and a serious economic downturn. On the Tunisian side, in fact, the MP was 
signed by an interim technical government, which had entered into force only two 
months before, to prepare the second democratic elections of the country after the 
revolution. This peculiar situation may also explain why the MP with Tunisia was 
adopted without an Annex of activities complementing the text of the Joint Declaration, 
as in the case of all the MPs concluded until that moment. Negotiations actually 
continued after the signature of the MP, in order to define the list of initiatives to be 
included in the Annex. 
Under paragraph 37 of the Joint Declaration, the parties committed to create a 
‘Mixed Committee’ to monitor the implementation of the MP. They established that the 
first task of this committee would be to meet immediately after the adoption of the MP 
to decide the set of concrete actions to be carried out in order to achieve the MP’s 
objectives (as provided for also by paragraph 36), and to draft the relative scoreboard. 
After this task would be achieved, as in the case of the MP with Morocco, the Mixed 
Committee should meet twice a year at an appropriate level decided by mutual 
agreement, in order to evaluate the progress made in the implementation of the MP, re-
examine the priorities of the parties and update the list of initiatives and the scoreboard 
(MP with Tunisia, para 37). 
A further element that complicated the negotiations of the MP with Tunisia was a 
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climate of explicit opposition on the part of the main Tunisian migrant associations, 
civil society organisations and trade unions. These organisations published several joint 
statements calling for the Tunisian government to refuse signing the MP with the EU 
and to refuse starting EURA negotiations. As mentioned above under section 4.4.4, they 
considered both instruments to be mere means for the EU to externalise migration 
control and outsource the processing and reception of asylum seekers, with the result of 
reducing the protection of migrants’ and refugees’ fundamental rights. 
They also denounced the lack of transparency in the MP’s negotiation process, 
which failed to involve civil society actors (EMHRN, AEDH at al. 2014). In their study 
for the European Parliament, García Andrade et al. report that the EU Delegation in 
Tunisia invited grass root associations to join some preparatory meetings with the 
Tunisian government, but at short notice and without sharing working documents; for 
this reason the organisations refused to participate (García Andrade et al. 2015, 132). 
The highly critical reaction of Tunisian civil society organisations and trade unions 
towards the MP was confirmed by one of the EU officials I interviewed. 
As concerns the structure and content of the Joint Declaration, it largely 
corresponds to the standard model used for other MPs and for the MP with Morocco 
(see above sections 4.2 and 4.5.1), except for the lack of the Annex. The Preamble 
recalls the broader cooperation framework between the EU and Tunisia in the area of 
migration (the Euro-Med Association Agreement, the EU-Tunisia Action Plan, the 
‘Privileged Partnership’ established in 2012, all in the context of the ENP and the 
GAMM) and bilateral cooperation agreements with Member States. It then sets out the 
general objectives of the MP, which coincide with those in the MP with Morocco: 1) to 
better manage the movement of persons for short stays and legal and labour migration; 
2) to combat irregular migration and human trafficking and smuggling, and to promote 
an effective return and readmission policy; 3) to strengthen cooperation on migration 
and development; 4) to comply with international refugee law instruments
45
. 
The Joint Declaration entails four sections, corresponding to the four GAMM 
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 In addition, the MP with Tunisia mentions explicitly a fifth objective (which nonetheless falls under 
the first GAMM pillar): to promote the integration of regular migrants through anti-discrimination 
policies and by recognising their contribution to the development of both their country of origin and 
residence (MP with Tunisia, 3). 
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pillars, which detail the specific objectives and commitments pursued by the parties
46
. A 
key element of the MP is that the EU and Tunisia commit to ‘conclude a readmission 
agreement in conformity with the EU standards in this domain’ and they establish that 
‘the negotiation of this agreement will be initiated and concluded in parallel to the 
negotiation of a visa facilitation agreement’ (MP with Tunisia, para 9; author’s 
translation). Until very recently this commitment has remained only on paper; according 
to the EU officials I interviewed, this was mainly due to the Tunisian authorities not 
being ready to take this step yet and to the Commission not being willing to force them, 
considering the still vulnerable transition situation in the country. However, on 12 
October 2016 the Commission announced the opening of the parallel negotiations for a 
EURA and a VFA with Tunisia (European Commission 2016j). 
The content of the EU-Tunisia MP is similar to that of other MPs, especially the 
one with Morocco analysed above; however, it presents some specificities, which 
presumably reflect certain priorities set forth by Tunisia in the area of legal migration, 
and certain European interests in the area of irregular migration and border 
management. For instance, the paragraphs relating to legal and labour migration are 
more articulated and specific than in the MP with Morocco; they emphasise more 
explicitly and with a more concrete approach the need to improve possibilities for 
Tunisian citizens to enter, stay and move in the EU for working, training, study or 
research purposes, even on a temporary or circular basis (MP with Tunisia, paras 3-6). 
Conversely, the section on combating irregular migration includes two additional 
paragraphs (not present in the MP with Morocco) that specifically commit the parties to 
an increased cooperation in joint search and rescue operations at sea (including capacity 
building, information exchange and Tunisia’s participation in the Seahorse 
Mediterranean Network) and to reinforced police cooperation (including capacity 
building, information exchange, operational cooperation, provision of technical 
equipment, etc.) aimed to better control borders and detect criminal organisations (MP 
with Tunisia, paras 15-16). 
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 The titles of the four sections are: 1) Mobility, legal migration and integration; 2) Fight against 
irregular migration and human trafficking, readmission, security of travel and identity documents, border 
management; 3) Migration and development; 4) Asylum and international protection. 
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Looking more in detail into the first section of the Joint Declaration, the main 
objectives are: 1) to simplify procedures, improve consular services and facilitate the 
issuance of short-stay visas; 2) to better inform Tunisian citizens about aspects of legal 
migration to the EU (entry conditions, rights and duties) and about job opportunities 
actually available; to improve cooperation between employment agencies in Tunisia and 
in the EU; to better assist Tunisian candidates to emigration in solving administrative 
issues; to strengthen capacities of Tunisian labour authorities; to facilitate temporary 
and circular migration through better information and concrete initiatives; 3) to facilitate 
recognition of diplomas; to improve possibilities for qualified young Tunisians to access 
study and job opportunities in the EU; to reform the Tunisian education system in order 
to meet the requirements of European labour markets; to make it easier for Tunisian 
students and researchers to enter the EU and move from one Member State to another; 
4) to promote migrant integration with regards to both Tunisian nationals in the EU and 
third country nationals in Tunisia; to ensure the portability of social security rights of 
Tunisian workers (MP with Tunisia, paras 1-8). 
With regards to the second section, the commitments undertaken by the parties are 
aimed to: strengthen cooperation on readmission and conclude an EURA; reinforce 
Tunisian authorities’ capacity to manage their borders, prevent irregular migration and 
detect trafficking and criminal networks, and enhance cooperation in all these areas; 
improve the security of Tunisian travel and identity documents, residence permits and 
other official documents; develop voluntary return and reintegration initiatives to 
Tunisia and from Tunisia to other third countries
47
 (MP with Tunisia, paras 9-16). 
The third section on migration and development is mainly focused on the role 
Tunisian migrants can play in the development of their country of origin, as in the case 
of the MP with Morocco. In this context, actions should be primarily aimed to: mobilise 
the skills of Tunisians abroad so that they can use them to contribute to the development 
of their country of origin; facilitate their voluntary return and socio-economic 
reintegration in Tunisia (with the same purpose); and reduce the cost of remittances. In 
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 As in the MP with Morocco, two paragraphs mention the objective of increasing the national 
authorities’ capacity to assist and offer protection to victims of trafficking and unaccompanied minors, 
with a special focus on preventing the emigration and encouraging the voluntary return of the latter (MP 
with Tunisia, paras 12-13). 
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addition, paragraph 21 highlights the importance of analysing the negative impact of 
emigration on regions of origin and suggests the development of a support programme 
(MP with Tunisia, paras 17-23). 
The section dedicated to international protection is to some extent more developed 
than in other MPs, although its fundamentals are the same. This is probably due to the 
fact that following the civil war in Libya in 2011-2012, Tunisia hosted a large refugee 
population, mainly of Sub-Saharan origin. Against this background, EU Member States 
had a clear interest in enhancing Tunisia’s capacity to offer adequate protection to 
asylum seekers and - in the long run - in fostering the development of a national asylum 
system, in order to reduce the risk of secondary movements of refugees from Tunisia to 
the EU. The MP’s initiatives in this area have the following purposes: to support 
Tunisia in the development of a national legislative and institutional framework in the 
area of asylum in compliance with the 1951 Geneva Convention and the new Tunisian 
Constitution; to ensure that the non-refoulement principle is fully applied; to strengthen 
the capacities of Tunisian asylum authorities through exchange of good practices and 
technical support; to promote cooperation between Tunisian asylum authorities and the 
UNHCR, the EASO and Member States’ asylum authorities (MP with Tunisia, paras 
24-27). 
As in the case of Morocco, the MP with Tunisia includes also a section on 
horizontal initiatives relating more broadly to the governance of migration in the 
country (MP with Tunisia, paras 28-31). The Joint Declaration is closed by a number of 
provisions concerning its implementation. The MP is here described as ‘a long-term 
cooperation framework […] based on political dialogue and cooperation, which will 
evolve over time on the basis of the existing relationships between Tunisia and the EU’ 
(MP with Tunisia, para 32; author’s translation). The parties express their intention to 
intensify the Dialogue they established in October 2011 and commit to involve civil 
society actors ‘in a spirit of partnership’ (MP with Tunisia, para 34); however, this 
commitment does not seem to have properly materialised yet. 
As mentioned above in this section, under paragraphs 36 and 37, the parties 
commit to put in practice the content of the MP through an array of concrete initiatives 
to be established by a Mixed Committee, that would start its work immediately after the 
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signature of the Joint Declaration. A DG HOME official I interviewed confirmed this 
has actually happened: the Mixed Committee met for the first time in April 2015 (one 
year after the adoption of the MP) and agreed on a list of activities, which had been 
discussed and prepared over the year. This list was then transposed into a scoreboard. 
As in the case of Morocco, I received a copy of the scoreboard of the MP with Tunisia 
from an EU official. In the absence of an Annex, this seems to be the only document 
available (not publicly though) listing the MP’s activities. 
The version in my possession dates to May 2015 and lists a total of 101 initiatives 
which are either ongoing, in preparation or under consideration; initiatives reported as 
ongoing are only 34. Unfortunately, from the information provided in the scoreboard it 
is not possible to properly distinguish new initiatives from projects which were already 
in progress. However, considering that the list of MP’s activities has been agreed upon 
only in April 2015, a large part of initiatives labelled as ‘en cours’ in the May 2015 
scoreboard were presumably already in place before. Once again, these kind of projects 
do not bring any added value to the MP, as they are a mere re-proposition of pre-
existing initiatives. 
The structure of the Tunisian scoreboard is almost identical to the Moroccan one. 
For each project, the scoreboard includes the following information: objective pursued, 
Member State(s) or institution(s) that proposed and implement it, a short description of 
the project, indicative implementation period, current status and funding source; 
differently from the Moroccan scoreboard, this one does not contain any indication of 
the projects’ budget. Moreover, for the majority of initiatives listed, details are lacking 
as regards the implementation period (mentioned only for three activities) and the 
funding source (generically mentioned for less than half of them). This version of the 
scoreboard, thus, looks more like a working document, whose content is still rather 
vague and incomplete if compared to the scoreboard of the MP with Morocco. 
Looking more in detail into its content, the first thematic area on legal migration 
and mobility seems to be the most developed one, as it counts 38 initiatives, 15 of 
which are already in progress; conversely, the second area on irregular migration 
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includes 25 projects, only six of which are reported as ongoing
48
. The still limited 
development of actions under the second GAMM pillar, combined with the 
predominance of measures under the first pillar, is unusual; it may be partly explained 
by the fact that this version of the EU-Tunisia scoreboard is an early one, produced 
when the implementation of the MP had just begun. Besides that, this may also be a 
consequence of Tunisia’s ability in advancing its own priorities during the MP 
negotiations, as mentioned above (Fargues and Fandrich 2012, 7-8; García Andrade et 
al. 2015, 132). A further confirmation would come from another peculiarity of this 
scoreboard: it does not only entail measures proposed and implemented by the EU, its 
agencies and Member States, but it also includes 12 initiatives that are explicitly 
requested by Tunisia and whose implementation requires specific actions on the part of 
the Member States and the EU
49
. 
Therefore, most of the initiatives listed in the EU-Tunisia scoreboard 
(approximately 60) are focused on: providing Tunisian nationals with the means, skills 
and opportunities to enter and stay in the EU for working, training or studying purposes; 
developing the capacities of Tunisian nationals in the EU in view of their return to 
Tunisia, possibly on a temporary and circular basis
50
; encouraging the contribution of 
Tunisian nationals to the development of their country of origin; and supporting their 
socio-economic reintegration in Tunisia. 
These are the ultimate objectives also of the flagship project proposed by the EU 
to support the implementation of the MP with Tunisia, which aims in particular to offer 
assistance, cooperation and capacity building to Tunisian authorities dealing with 
migration and mobility. This initiative is very similar to the Sharaka Project launched in 
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 In addition, the scoreboard contains 21 initiatives concerning migration and development (nine of 
which are in progress) and only seven activities on international protection (only one of which is already 
being implemented). 
49
 The majority of initiatives demanded by Tunisia (9 out of 12) fall under the first and third GAMM 
pillars and concern labour migration, vocational training, portability of social rights, circular migration, 
mobilisation of Tunisians abroad, remittances, bilateral migration and development agreements. 
50
 Germany proposed the same measure it had proposed for Moroccan nationals: with the purpose to 
facilitate mobility and circular migration dynamics, Tunisian nationals who are permanent residents in 
Germany will be able to leave Germany for a maximum period of 24 months without losing their 
permanent residence permit. This initiative is in preparation. On its part, Tunisia advanced the request 
that this measure is adopted by other Member States and ideally by the whole EU. 
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the framework of the MP with Morocco: it has a budget of 5 million euro over three 
years under the Asylum Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF); it involves a 
partnership of seven Member States (Belgium, Spain, France, Italy, Poland, Portugal 
and Sweden) and the EU; and it is implemented by the French public agency Expertise 
France. It consists of three components, which were already identified and clearly 
spelled out in the May 2015 version of the scoreboard, although at that early stage the 
project did not have a name yet
51
. 
As observed by García Andrade et al. (2015, 132) in their study published in 
October 2015, one year and a half after the signature of the MP with Tunisia, its 
flagship project had not started yet, whereas the Sharaka Project had begun within nine 
months of the adoption of the MP with Morocco. The project, called ‘Lemma - together 
for mobility’, was finally launched in July 2016 (Agence Tunis Afrique Presse, 26 July 
2016). The Lemma Project is reported as ‘under way’ in the press release issued by the 
Commission on 12 October 2016 announcing the beginning of visa facilitation and 
readmission negotiations with Tunisia (European Commission 2016j); however, no 
further detail about the project implementation has been provided by the Commission so 
far. 
As concerns readmission, along with the commitment to negotiate and conclude 
an EURA, the scoreboard lists two more initiatives, one proposed by Portugal, the other 
one by Tunisia. Portugal offered to support Tunisian authorities responsible for 
readmission through information exchange at expert level on good practices in this 
field. Tunisia asked the partners to implement a project that would allow its national 
authorities to increase their capacity in the identification of migrants to be readmitted. 
However, both initiatives are still ‘à l’étude’, i.e. they are only proposed on paper and 
possibilities for their actual implementation are still under consideration. 
A final feature characterising the scoreboard of the MP with Tunisia is a 
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 The three components of the projects, as indicated in the scoreboard, are: 1) strengthening the 
capacities of relevant Tunisian authorities to manage labour migration and trade-related mobility through 
enhanced cooperation with EU partners; 2) improving the knowledge of the features and trends of the 
main Tunisian communities in Europe and establishing a targeted diaspora mobilisation programme; 3) 
strengthening the capacities of relevant Tunisian authorities and civil society organisations to provide 
support for the reintegration of returnees. 
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significant overlapping of projects. As in the MP with Morocco, overlaps are present 
under all thematic areas. A first evident case is in the area of labour migration, where 14 
initiatives have been proposed by the EU, France, Italy, Germany, Poland, Sweden and 
Tunisia
52
; under the third pillar, France, Germany and Sweden have proposed three 
different voluntary return and reintegration programmes; also in the area of international 
protection, five capacity-building initiatives have been offered by the EASO, France, 
Denmark, Germany and Poland. But probably the most significant example concerns (as 
in the case of Morocco) training, capacity building and information exchange initiatives 
on border management, prevention and fight against irregular migration, and document 
security: 13 projects of this kind have been proposed by the EU, Frontex, France, 
Germany, Italy, Poland and the United Kingdom. It is worth recalling that, as mentioned 
in previous sections, coordination between different initiatives that share the same 
objective and target is essential in order to ensure the overall coherence and 
effectiveness of the instrument. For this reason, in the context of the MP, one 
multilateral project involving a group of Member States would be more advisable than a 
plurality of separate projects, each implemented by an individual Member State. 
To conclude, it seems from the information I could access that the MP with 
Tunisia underwent a prolonged negotiation process, also due to a delicate situation in 
the country; discussions and consultations continued after its signature, causing a delay 
also in its implementation. However, in recent months, a more general revitalisation of 
EU-Tunisia relations, marked also by the adoption of the September 2016 Joint 
Communication on Strengthening EU Support to Tunisia (European Commission and 
High Representative 2016i), led to the launch of two key elements of the MP: the 
Lemma Project and the parallel negotiation of readmission and visa facilitation 
agreements. 
Nevertheless, according to García Andrade et al. (2015, 133), Tunisian authorities 
complain about three main issues: the MP does not provide for any additional labour 
migration opportunities; the existing bilateral labour migration agreements with certain 
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 All these initiatives concern the provision of information and assistance to prospective migrant 
workers, capacity building for the relevant Tunisian authorities, the creation of connection mechanisms 
between employment agencies, and the offer of circular migration schemes and other temporary 
migration programmes targeting specific categories of workers. 
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Member States (e.g. France) are not fully exploited; and support measures offered by 
the EU and Member States are mainly limited to technical assistance. On a positive 
note, the process leading to the adoption of the MP and preparation of the scoreboard 
has allegedly already helped Tunisian authorities developing expertise in this field, 
which may turn out to be beneficial to the formulation of a national migration and 
asylum policy and to the development of a sound legal and institutional framework in 
this area. 
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CHAPTER 5 
COOPERATION ON READMISSION AT BILATERAL LEVEL. 
THREE CASE STUDIES 
 
 
5.1. Origins and evolution of formal and informal bilateral cooperation on 
readmission in the Mediterranean area 
Having analysed in detail cooperation on readmission at the European level, this 
chapter addresses cooperation policies at the bilateral level. It considers both formal and 
informal modalities of cooperation on readmission established between EU Member 
States and third countries, focusing on the Mediterranean area. Analysing bilateral 
cooperation on readmission is crucial if one considers that formal and informal 
agreements concluded by EU Member States with third countries constitute a wide 
network; compared to EURAs, they represent by far the largest share of the overall 
number of existing instruments of cooperation on readmission
1
. This section 5.1 
provides a general introduction to the topic, describing the origins, development and 
main features of bilateral cooperation on readmission in the Mediterranean area. The 
following sections 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 analyse three case studies of bilateral cooperation 
concerning, respectively, Italy and Libya, Spain and Morocco, and Greece and Turkey
2
. 
In Europe, cooperation between States aimed at facilitating the readmission of 
unauthorised foreigners to their country of origin has long-standing origins, dating back 
to the nineteenth century. Coleman (2009, 12-19) identifies three waves of bilateral 
readmission agreements in Europe. The first readmission agreements concluded 
between European countries in the nineteenth and early twentieth century were not 
linked to migration management, but rather served the purpose of enabling the 
expulsion of undesirable persons (vagabonds, criminals, etc.) to their country of 
nationality. Conversely, the second wave of bilateral (and multilateral) RAs concluded 
                                                 
1
 In his study for the European Parliament on the EU readmission policy, Cassarino talks about ‘a 
predominant bilateral dimension’ (2010c, 22ff.). 
2
 The reasons for choosing these three case studies have been mentioned in Chapter 1, section 1.3. 
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between European countries in the 1950s and 1960s were actually used to regulate the 
movements of persons from one country to the other. However, Coleman observes that 
the practical relevance of these agreements was rather limited as they were hardly 
implemented in practice; moreover, even though they already reflected the 
contemporary purpose of regulating migration flows, they were not informed by a 
securitarian perception of migration as a problem or a threat. 
The scenario changed completely in the 1990s, a period that Coleman defines as 
‘a veritable renaissance of European readmission agreement’ (2009, 16). Along with a 
proliferation of bilateral RAs
3
, this period was marked by a relevant change concerning 
the countries involved. While until the 1990s bilateral RAs were mainly concluded 
between European countries, starting from that period Member States have begun to 
negotiate bilateral RAs also with third countries of origin and transit outside the EU, 
and in particular with countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans. 
Coleman identifies three main elements that determined this development in the 1990s: 
1) the prospective EU enlargement eastward
4
; 2) the European integration process; 3) 
and a significant influx of refugees and migrants from the Western Balkans and Central 
and Eastern Europe. 
With regards in particular to the European integration process, as mentioned 
above in section 2.1, the creation of an area of free movement of persons and the lifting 
of internal border controls required the introduction of new migration control policies 
focused on the EU’s external borders. In this new context, the Member States’ 
readmission policies focused more decisively on establishing effective mechanisms for 
the expulsion of unauthorised migrants to third countries of origin or transit outside the 
EU (i.e. outside the borderless Schengen area). Therefore, in order to facilitate the 
effective implementation of removals, throughout the 1990s EU Member States have 
concluded a large number of formal bilateral readmission agreements, mainly with 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe. 
                                                 
3
 According to Noll (2000, 203) an estimated 220 bilateral readmission agreements were concluded 
during the 1990s worldwide. 
4
 The lifting of visa requirements for nationals of Central European countries in view of their future EU 
membership was combined with the conclusion of readmission agreements, which served as a 
‘compensating safeguard’ (Coleman 2009, 16-17). 
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These new wave of agreements differ from the previous ones in several ways 
(Coleman 2009, 18-19). In particular, despite their formally reciprocal nature, since they 
are concluded with major third countries of origin or transit, they imply a predominantly 
unidirectional expulsion process (from a Member State to a third country); thus, 
readmission does not take place anymore on an equal and bidirectional basis, as it was 
with RAs between EU countries. Moreover, while previous bilateral agreements 
concerned mainly the readmission of own nationals, since the 1990s RAs have usually 
included also obligations relating to third country nationals, who shall be readmitted to 
transit countries in the immediate neighbourhood of the EU. 
Between the late 1990s and the early 2000s the Member States’ attention partly 
shifted from the eastern to the southern neighbourhood of the EU. The development of 
cooperation on readmission in the Mediterranean area became increasingly important, in 
light of the intensification of migration flows across the Mediterranean Sea and into 
Europe, and the increasingly crucial role played by North African countries and Turkey 
as countries of origin and/or transit. Some EU Member States, namely those located at 
the EU’s southern borders (Italy, France, Spain and Greece), engaged proactively in 
trying to establish cooperation on migration management, border control and 
readmission with third countries in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean. However, 
bilateral negotiations on readmission between Mediterranean Member States and third 
countries turned out to be lengthier and more complex (Cassarino 2007, 179-180, 185-
188). 
Differently from countries in Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans, 
Mediterranean and African third countries proved to be reluctant towards the conclusion 
and/or the actual implementation of formal readmission agreements due to a number of 
reasons, analysed in details in section 6.3 below. Among the main reasons, there was a 
lack of incentives comparable to those offered by the EU and its Member States to the 
EU’s eastern neighbours. In fact, countries in Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans 
accepted the conclusion of bilateral readmission agreements (and EURAs as well) 
because they perceived them as the quid pro quo to obtain visa facilitation, visa 
liberalisation and prospective EU membership. On the contrary, countries in the 
Southern Mediterranean were not offered this prospect; therefore, in most cases they 
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opposed the negotiation of formal bilateral RAs with EU Member States (and EURAs, 
as discussed above in Chapter 3). Even in cases when they agreed to sign formal 
bilateral RAs, the concrete implementation of the latter was usually hindered by a 
substantial lack of cooperation on the part of the authorities of Mediterranean third 
countries. 
Faced with these difficulties in concluding (or implementing) formal readmission 
agreements with Mediterranean third countries, some Member States (i.e. mainly 
southern EU Member States, which for reasons of geographic proximity and migration 
salience are the most interested in controlling effectively migration flows across the 
Mediterranean) started to devise a broader bilateral cooperation framework based on a 
variety of informal instruments (Cassarino 2007, 179-180). The use of informal 
agreements linked to readmission
5
 rather than, or in addition to, formal readmission 
agreements was meant to foster a more effective collaboration on the part of 
Mediterranean third countries. In fact, for the reasons discussed below in section 6.3, 
Southern Mediterranean countries proved to be more keen to cooperate with EU 
Member States in the field of readmission on the basis of informal arrangements and in 
the framework of a broader bilateral cooperation encompassing different policy areas 
and issues. In sum, based on empirical data, Cassarino (2007, 185-188; 2010b, 9-14) 
demonstrates that across the 1990s and the years 2000s there has been a parallel growth 
of, on the one hand, formal bilateral readmission agreements with non-EU countries in 
Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans, and on the other hand, of informal agreements 
linked to readmission with Mediterranean and African countries
6
. 
Examples of these informal instruments of bilateral cooperation on readmission 
established between EU Member States and (mainly) third countries in the 
Mediterranean and Africa are: memoranda of understanding (MoUs); exchanges of 
letters; administrative arrangements; operational protocols; provisions on readmission 
                                                 
5
 The expression ‘agreements linked to readmission’ was coined by Cassarino (2007). 
6
 As of January 2007, EU-27 Member States had signed 87 formal bilateral RAs with countries in Eastern 
Europe and Western Balkans and only four informal agreements with the same countries. Conversely 
Member States had concluded 32 known informal agreements linked to readmission with countries in 
Southern and Eastern Mediterranean and Africa; the formal RAs concluded with the latter were 13 
(Cassarino 2007, 188, Table 1). 
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included in broader police cooperation agreements; ‘oral processes’ and other kinds of 
unwritten agreements; etc.. These informal agreements are usually negotiated and 
signed by the executives of the respective countries, i.e. by heads of governments, 
ministries (usually of interior or foreign affairs), heads of police and other officials, 
while national parliaments are usually not involved
7
. 
The general trends described so far may be confirmed through a short analysis of 
formal and informal bilateral agreements linked to readmission concluded during the 
last two decades by Italy, Spain and Greece (i.e. the Mediterranean Member States that 
are object of the case studies included in this chapter). This account is based on the 
‘Inventory of the agreements linked to readmission’ compiled by Jean-Pierre Cassarino 
and updated to December 2016
8
. 
Starting from the second half of the 1990s and (indicatively) until the first half of 
the years 2000s, Italy, Spain and Greece have signed formal readmission agreements 
with other European countries (including EU Member States) and third countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans. Throughout the years 2000s, they 
have negotiated intensely with countries in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean, to 
conclude mainly informal readmission arrangements (i.e. MoUs, exchanges of letters, 
administrative arrangements and operational protocols) or broader police cooperation 
agreements including provisions on readmission
9
. In some cases southern EU Member 
States concluded also formal RAs with Mediterranean third countries
10
; however, while 
                                                 
7
 The features of these informal instruments of bilateral cooperation on readmission are analysed in depth 
in Chapter 6, sections 6.1 and 6.3. 
8
 The inventory does not include oral agreements; moreover, as admitted by Cassarino himself, data 
concerning informal agreements should not be considered complete. For instance, the list of informal 
agreements between Italy and Libya seems to lack several instruments, inter alia the operational protocols 
signed on 4 February 2009 and 7 December 2010. In an interview I had with Cassarino in July 2016, he 
explained that tracing and accessing informal agreements is a challenging task; many of them may remain 
hidden, or even if their existence is disclosed, their content may not be published (as in the case of the 
two operational protocols mentioned above). I am grateful to Jean-Pierre Cassarino for sharing data from 
his inventory with me. 
9
 Italy concluded this kind of informal agreements linked to readmission with Algeria, Egypt, Libya, 
Tunisia and Turkey; Spain with Algeria, Morocco and Turkey; Greece with Tunisia, Egypt and Turkey. 
10
 This happened in the case of Italy with Morocco in July 1998, with Tunisia in August 1998, with 
Algeria in February 2000 (entered into force in October 2006) and with Egypt in January 2007; in the 
case of Spain with Morocco in 1992 (entered into force in 2012) and Mauritania in 2003; and in the case 
of Greece with Turkey in 2001. 
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the informal instruments identified by Cassarino are 22 (12 concluded by Italy, five by 
Spain and five by Greece), formal RAs are only seven (four signed by Italy, two by 
Spain and one by Greece). Finally, Italy and Spain have negotiated agreements linked to 
readmission also with Sub-Saharan African countries, mainly since the second half of 
the years 2000s
11
. Interestingly, with these countries they have concluded only informal 
arrangements (especially MoUs) or broader police cooperation or migration cooperation 
agreements including readmission clauses; the only exception seems to be the Italian-
Nigerian bilateral readmission agreement entered into force in June 2011
12
. 
The following sections describe the features and peculiarities of three case studies 
of bilateral cooperation between a southern EU Member State and a Mediterranean third 
country. As already anticipated in section 2.1.6, a common feature emerges from these 
case studies, concerning the nature of relations between countries on the two shores of 
the Mediterranean. These case studies prove that the establishment of cooperation on 
readmission cannot be seen as a unilateral process where EU Member States impose 
their interests and priorities on third countries. On the contrary, third countries may 
prove reluctant to acquiesce to the requests of EU Member States or unwilling to abide 
by the commitments they have undertaken. In this context, third countries have acquired 
their own negotiating power and have become capable to impose their own interests and 
priorities, affecting the behaviour and choices of their counterparts and making the 
bargaining over migration control and readmission a bidirectional and interactive 
process (Paoletti 2010; 2011a; 2011b; Cassarino 2005; 2007; 2010b; Cuttitta 2010). 
This aspect of bilateral cooperation on readmission is further discussed under 
section 6.3 below, which describes how the very choice of using informal rather than 
formal instruments of cooperation has been largely determined by the reluctance of 
Mediterranean and North African third countries to conclude formal readmission 
agreements, which they perceived as detrimental to their own interests. 
 
                                                 
11
 Italy concluded this kind of informal agreements linked to readmission with Djibouti, Gambia, Ghana, 
Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and Sudan; Spain with Cameroon, Cape Verde, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, 
Guinea Conakry, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal. 
12
 For a broader account of Member States’ bilateral cooperation policies and practices in the field of 
migration and asylum with a focus on the Mediterranean area, see: García Andrade et al. 2015, 64-69. 
 173 
5.2. The Central Mediterranean: cooperation on readmission between Italy 
and Libya 
The case of Italian-Libyan cooperation on readmission is peculiar because it is the 
only case of bilateral cooperation between an EU Member State and a Mediterranean 
third country to be entirely based on informal arrangements. Indeed, although since the 
end of the 1990s Italy and Libya have been negotiating over cooperation in the area of 
migration in a rather intense way, readmission per se has never been the subject of a 
formal agreement between the two countries. Readmission has been, instead, at the core 
of many informal administrative arrangements, operational protocols, MoUs and even 
oral agreements concluded between the Italian and Libyan executives over the last 
decades. 
In some cases the content of these informal agreements has been published, in 
other cases it has been kept secret. Nonetheless, in two distinct periods the practical 
effects of informal (and partly unknown) agreements between the two countries have 
manifested themselves in very clear and controversial ways. From October 2004 to 
March 2006 Italy has readmitted to Libya groups of third country nationals (mainly 
Egyptians) by means of charter flights; from May to November 2009 Italy has carried 
out several push-back operations at sea, intercepting migrants (mainly from Sub-
Saharan Africa and the Horn of Africa) in international waters and bringing them back 
to Libya and/or rendering them to Libyan authorities. These two readmission practices 
had no apparent legal basis in the agreements concluded by the two countries, whose 
content is known to the public. However, the periods preceding the implementation of 
these two practices were characterised by intense discussions between Italy and Libya in 
different policy areas, including: colonial compensations and resolution of other post-
colonial disputes; bilateral economic relations, trade and investments (in particular in 
the energy sector); fight against international terrorism - and migration control. As 
further argued below, readmission was most probably embedded into this broader 
cooperation framework, and it was dealt with in an informal and mainly secret way. 
Italy and Libya began to discuss on the joint management of migration in the late 
1990s. On 4 July 1998 they signed two documents, a so-called ‘Oral Process’ and a 
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‘Joint Communication’, which represented a highly significant step in Italian-Libyan 
relations. The 1998 Joint Communication formally acknowledged, for the first time, the 
suffering caused by Italy during the colonial period and set out a series of measures and 
reparations to compensate for that, while simultaneously aiming to boost economic 
relations between the two countries. This was also the first written agreement between 
Italy and Libya to mention the need to cooperate in the fight against irregular migration, 
laying the bases for the subsequent 2000 agreement (Paoletti 2011a, 116-119)
13
. 
In the period following the signing of the Joint Communication, Italian and 
Libyan authorities intensified dialogue
14
. A number of meetings on migration-related 
issues were held, leading to the conclusion of a bilateral agreement ‘on cooperation in 
the fight against terrorism, organised crime, traffic in drugs and irregular migration’, 
which was signed on 13 December 2000 and entered into force on 22 December 2002
15
. 
The agreement contains a separate section concerning the fight against irregular 
migration, suggesting three measures: 1) the exchange of information on irregular 
migration flows and on criminal organisations that favour them, their modus operandi 
and itineraries; 2) the exchange of information on organisations specialised in the 
counterfeiting of documents and passports; 3) reciprocal assistance and cooperation in 
the fight against illegal immigration (2000 Agreement, Art. 1(d)). The agreement 
foresees also the establishment of different modalities of police cooperation and 
periodic joint expert meetings (2000 Agreement, Arts. 2-5). Overall, the content of this 
document is rather general: in fact, the 2000 Agreement looks more like a framework 
                                                 
13
 Many of the questions addressed and compensations proposed by the 1998 Joint Communication will 
be recalled in the notorious Treaty of Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation, which will be signed ten 
years later, on 30 August 2008 (Ronzitti 2009, 3). 
14
 The then Italian Prime Minister Massimo D’Alema was the first head of government to visit Libya, in 
December 1999, after the imposition of UN sanctions to the country in 1992. 
15
 Considering its content, purpose and form, this may be considered a formal bilateral agreement. For 
the Italian part, it was signed by the then Minister of Foreign Affairs Lamberto Dini, it entered into force 
in December 2002 and was published on the Official Journal in May 2003 (GU n. 111, 15 May 2003, 
supplement). However, the role played by the Italian Parliament is not clear. The agreement includes a 
provision saying that it will enter into force after the parties will notify each other the fulfilment of 
internal procedures, without mentioning ratification (2000 Agreement, art. 9). While certain scholars 
affirm that the Parliament ratified the agreement (Paoletti 2011a, 120), Favilli (2005, 161-162) observes 
that the agreement entered into force without a formal exchange of ratifications between the parties; the 
Italian Parliament did not intervene with any law of ‘ratification and execution’ or ‘approval and 
execution’ of the agreement. 
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agreement with a programmatic function than a text immediately applicable in practice; 
nonetheless, it set the basis for all formal and informal bilateral agreements that 
followed. 
Between 2000 and 2007, no formal agreements on migration were signed between 
the two countries; however, under the Berlusconi government (2001-2006) discussions 
and meetings with Libyan authorities continued intensely, in view of solving the 
pending issues related to the colonial era and deepening cooperation in different areas – 
especially in the areas of economic relations and joint migration management (Paoletti 
2011a, 121-131). With regards to the latter, negotiations focused in particular on the 
actual operationalisation of the commitments undertaken in the 2000 Agreement; in this 
respect, the measures informally agreed upon by the Italian Minister of Interior and the 
Libyan Minister of Justice on 3 July 2003 were extremely relevant. 
The informal agreement signed on that occasion allegedly regulated practical 
cooperation between the security forces of the two countries and addressed the technical 
implementation of specific cooperation initiatives aimed at tackling irregular migration 
and human trafficking (Klepp 2010b, 80). The agreement involved ‘among other things, 
the exchange of information on migration flows and the provision to Libya of specific 
equipment to control sea and land borders’ (Paoletti 2010, 58). As affirmed by the 
Minister of Interior – and reported by Paoletti (2011b, 141) – the agreement included 
the construction of a number of centres for irregular migrants in Libya, funded by Italy. 
The 2003 Technical Agreement may be linked also to the Italian practice of financing 
and coordinating the repatriation of migrants from Libya to their countries of origin via 
charter flights, which reportedly started precisely in 2003
16
 (Paoletti 2011a, 151-152). 
Conversely, on that occasion Libya refused the Italian proposal to conduct joint patrols 
in Libyan territorial waters, being determined to protect its national sovereignty 
(Cuttitta 2008, 5; Tondini 2010, 4; Paoletti 2011a, 125). However, details about the 
                                                 
16
 As documented by the European Commission Report on the Technical Mission to Libya on Illegal 
Immigration 27 Nov-6 Dec 2004, between August 2003 and the end of 2004, Italy financed 50 return 
flights from Libya to Egypt, Ghana, Mali, Eritrea, Nigeria, Sudan, Niger, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Syria, 
expelling a total of 5,688 migrants (European Commission 2005c, 61-62). As reported by Paoletti, based 
on figures provided by the Libyan Ministry of Interior, between January 2003 and August 2006, 8,899 
migrants were repatriated from Libya with the financial assistance of Italy (Paoletti 2011a, 151-152). 
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content of this agreement are uncertain. Indeed, probably the most relevant 
characteristic of the 2003 Technical Agreement is its secrecy: this text has been neither 
discussed nor ratified by the Italian Parliament and its content has never been disclosed 
to the public
17
. 
The decision to maintain the terms of this deal hidden is particularly controversial 
also because, according to some scholars, this agreement may be linked to the Libyan 
decision to start accepting the readmission of irregular migrants from Italy (Cuttitta 
2008, 5; Paoletti and Pastore 2010, 12). In fact, as part of the cooperation established 
with Italy, until September 2004, Libyan authorities used to repatriate to their countries 
of origin only third country nationals apprehended within the Libyan territory, either 
while they were trying to leave for Italy from the Libyan coasts or on a more ‘random’ 
basis. It was only starting from October 2004 that Libya began to accept also the 
readmission of third country nationals from Italy, even in the absence of a formal 
readmission agreement (Cuttitta 2008, 5). 
As documented in detail by Paoletti (2010, 61-65; 2011a, 143-148), between 
October 2004 and March 2006 Italy organised and financed the removal via charter 
flights from Sicily and Calabria of approximately 3,043 migrants (mostly of Egyptian 
nationality) who had recently arrived from Libya; most of them were immediately 
repatriated to their country of origin. This practice has been widely criticised, e.g. by the 
European Parliament (2005a), international organisations (UNHCR 2005; CPT 2006a) 
and NGOs (Amnesty International 2005; HRW 2006, 106-113); criticisms concerned 
both the dubious legal basis of the return flights and their legality on human rights 
grounds, as further analysed under section 7.2. In fact, this practice gave rise also to a 
number of applications before the European Court of Human Rights; however, after 
having initially admitted them (joined in the case Hussun and Others vs Italy), the Court 
struck out of the list or rejected all applications due to different reasons, the main one 
being that the representatives had lost contact with all of the applicants (except one) and 
therefore, according to the Court, a further examination of the applications was not 
                                                 
17
 It is especially telling that this agreement was kept secret not only at the time of its signature, but also 
over the years, by all the following Italian governments, until the present day (Paoletti and Pastore 2010, 
12). 
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justified
18
. 
With regards to the legal basis of the return flights carried out in the period 2004-
2006, as mentioned above, apparently no formal readmission agreement had been 
signed by Italy and Libya. However, between the 2003 Technical Agreement (whose 
exact content remains unknown) and the beginning of return flights there was another 
probably crucial and equally obscure informal agreement between the two countries. On 
25 August 2004, during his third visit to Libya, the then Italian Prime Minister Silvio 
Berlusconi met the Libyan President Muammar Gaddafi; allegedly, it was precisely 
during this meeting that the two leaders agreed upon the actual implementation of 
readmissions from Italy to Libya (Paoletti 2011a, 125). However, the details of this oral 
agreement were never disclosed; moreover, as in the case of the 2003 Technical 
Agreement, the Italian Parliament was not involved in the procedure and the agreement 
was neither transcribed in a written form nor published in the Official Journal
19
 (Favilli 
2005, 162-164). 
Based both on public statements and confidential interviews with high-ranking 
officials at the Ministries of Interior and Foreign Affairs, Paoletti (2010, 65-67) argues 
that removals to Libya were carried out on the basis of informal agreements developed 
in the course of the bilateral discussions conducted at the executive and ministerial level 
over the years. Therefore, return flights from Italy to Libya and the subsequent 
repatriations from Libya to third countries were implemented with the consent of 
Libyan authorities, but in the absence of a formal readmission agreement; instead, 
arrangements linked to readmission were embedded into the broader Italian-Libyan 
cooperation framework. In the account of Paoletti, certain officials stressed some highly 
significant elements: e.g. the fact that oral agreements hold juridical value and therefore 
a readmission agreement may be concluded in non-written form (2010, 66), and the fact 
that for Italy it may be preferable to have an agreement, even if it is informal and the 
                                                 
18
 ECtHR, Hussun and Others v. Italy, Applications No. 10171/05, 10601/05, 11593/05 and 17165/05, 
Judgment of the Court (Struck out of the List), 19.01.2010. For details on the reasons why the 
applications were rejected and a reference to scholars’ critical views on the judgement, see: Tondini 2010, 
7. 
19
 As further discussed in section 6.3.2, Favilli (2005) argues that this practice is incompatible with the 
Italian Constitution, being in violation of art. 80 and art. 10 (2). 
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counterpart wants its content to remain secret, than to have no agreement at all (2010, 
67). 
Presumably, the regular implementation of removals in the period 2004-2006 was 
linked also to the continued pressure exercised by the Italian government on Libyan 
authorities, e.g. through repeated high-level visits to Libya and the conclusion of 
additional informal agreements, such as the two memoranda of understanding signed on 
6 February 2005 and 17 January 2006 (Cuttitta 2008, 5). These MoUs were aimed at 
further strengthening bilateral police cooperation in the areas of irregular migration, 
human trafficking and border control (Paoletti 2011a, 129-130). This gradual 
development of practical and operational cooperation with Libya culminated in the 
adoption of a Protocol and an Additional Technical-operational Protocol on cooperation 
in the fight against irregular migration, signed on 29 December 2007 by the Italian 
Minister of Interior and the Libyan Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Italian head of 
police and its Libyan counterpart, respectively. 
The two 2007 Protocols are largely considered as a watershed in Italian-Libyan 
migration cooperation because for the first time they allowed for the joint patrolling of 
Libyan territorial waters; moreover, as examined below, they indirectly paved the way 
for the implementation of push-back operations in 2009 (Klepp 2010b, 81; Paoletti 
2011a, 155-156; Giuffré 2013b, 701; Cuttitta 2010, 35-36). As in the case of previous 
informal agreements concluded at the ministerial level, the Italian Parliament was not 
involved in the negotiation and adoption of these Protocols and was not called to ratify 
them; moreover, at first their content was kept secret, to be disclosed only in 2009
20
 
(Giuffré 2013b, 701). 
Pursuant to Article 2 of the 2007 Protocol, the parties agreed to organise joint 
maritime patrols using six vessels temporarily supplied by Italy embarking a mixed 
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 However, the Italian Parliament was not unaware of the content of the 2007 Protocols. Indeed, already 
in January 2008 it approved the allocation of 6 million euro to the Guardia di Finanza (a specialised 
Italian police force) for the implementation of the agreement on joint patrolling in Libya; the following 
year it earmarked further 4.8 million euro for the same purpose (Paoletti 2011a, 155). This is an example 
(among others) of the actual standpoint of the Italian Parliament towards the government’s practice of 
concluding informal agreements with third countries in the area of migration. Even when the Parliament 
had the opportunity to raise the issue of the lack of transparency and democratic decision-making and 
object this government’s practice by vetoing the funding of implementing measures, it did not do it. On 
this point, see also the example analysed by Favilli (2005, 159 and 164). 
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crew composed of both Libyan and Italian personnel. The joint patrolling missions 
would include both control and search and rescue activities, to be conducted both in 
Libyan territorial waters and international waters. Article 1(1) of the 2007 Additional 
Protocol specified the typology and characteristics of the six Guardia di Finanza 
vessels that would be provided to Libya. With regards to their crew, Article 1(3) and 
1(4) of the 2007 Additional Protocol clarified that for the first 90 days the vessels would 
be provided with a full Italian crew, responsible for training the Libyan personnel on 
board; during this initial training period the vessels would not carry out operational 
missions. After the first 90 days, the Italian staff on board were to be progressively 
reduced and operational missions were to stArt. 
Along with training activities, the Italian personnel were tasked with technical 
assistance and maintenance of the vessels (Art. 2, 2007 Protocol). Conversely, Libyan 
authorities were totally entrusted with the command and responsibility for all initiatives 
conducted during both the training and operational missions (Art. 1(5), 2007 Additional 
protocol). In addition, a Joint Operational Command was created with the task of 
arranging the daily implementation of joint (training and operational) patrolling 
operations; the responsibility for the command of this unit was assigned to a Libyan 
representative, supported by an Italian vice-commandant with advisory function (Art. 2, 
2007 Additional Protocol). The wording of the 2007 Protocols, thus, was clearly aimed 
to avoid that any direct responsibility for actions carried out during joint patrolling 
operations could be ascribed to Italy and to its police personnel, whose tasks were 
formally limited to training, assisting and advising Libyan personnel (Art.3(5), 2007 
Additional Protocol). 
The actual implementation of the 2007 Protocols, however, did not follow suit. As 
noted by Pastore, in June 2008 the six patrol boats promised by Italy were still 
‘anchored in some Italian port waiting for the Libyans to declare themselves ready to 
accept the offering’ (2008, 2). Considering that in the same period migrant arrivals to 
Italy kept increasing
21
, Libyan reluctance to put the 2007 agreement in practice caused 
sharp disappointment and frustration in Italian authorities, who therefore engaged in 
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 Pastore reported a threefold increase in the first five months of 2008, compared to the same period in 
2007 (2008, 2). 
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trying to push Libya to comply with the commitments undertaken. 
For instance, the Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi chose Libya as the destination 
of the first official international trip of his new mandate (started in May 2008) and in 
the meeting he had with President Gaddafi on 28 June 2008 the main topic of discussion 
was precisely the implementation of the agreement on joint patrolling (Paoletti 2011a, 
134). Also, in finally signing the long-negotiated Treaty of Friendship, Partnership and 
Cooperation on 30 August 2008, Italian authorities hoped that the impasse on joint 
patrolling was eventually overcome (Paoletti 2011a, 156). But in fact, it was only when 
the Treaty of Friendship was ratified by the Italian Parliament in February 2009, that 
Libya agreed to sign an Additional Executive Protocol allowing for the actual 
operationalisation of the 2007 agreement (Cuttitta 2010, 35). 
Nonetheless, the 2008 Treaty of Friendship represented a crucial step towards the 
implementation of the 2007 Protocols. The conclusion of this agreement was in itself a 
historic turning point for Italian-Libyan relations: it marked the culmination of a ten-
year long history of complex negotiations, covering a broad variety of issues
22
. In 
particular, this comprehensive agreement was meant to conclude the long dispute over 
the compensations claimed by Libya for the damage deriving from the Italian colonial 
occupation. Therefore, a crucial element of the agreement was the Italian pledge to pay 
five billion US dollars over 20 years in reparations; these would materialise in the 
construction of several infrastructural projects to be carried out by Italian companies 
(Arts. 8(1) and 8(2), 2008 Treaty of Friendship). These projects would include the 
coastal highway connecting Tunisia to Egypt – a major work with a highly symbolic 
value, which had been insistently requested by Libya
23
. 
Italian authorities had great expectations about the impact of the 2008 Treaty on 
Libyan authorities’ collaboration in the joint management of migration: the underlying 
idea was that, having settled the historic dispute over colonial compensations, Libya 
                                                 
22
 The content, form, purpose and procedure followed suggest that this treaty can be considered a formal 
bilateral agreement. It was signed in Benghazi on 30 August 2008 by Berlusconi and Gaddafi; even 
though its text was first disclosed (and published online) in October 2008 by the Italian newspaper La 
Repubblica, it was then presented to the Italian Parliament in December 2008, ratified with Law n. 7 on 6 
February 2009 and published on the Official Journal (GU n. 40, 18 February 2009). The treaty was 
ratified also by the Libyan Parliament on 2 March 2009. 
23
 For a detailed analysis of the content of the treaty, see: Ronzitti 2009. 
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would be available to fully cooperate in controlling irregular migration towards Italy. 
As reported by Paoletti (2011a, 135), the Italian Minister of Interior explicitly affirmed 
the existence of a direct connection between the building of the highway and the 
implementation of joint patrols in Libyan territorial waters. 
In fact, Article 19(1) of the Treaty of Friendship provided for the intensification of 
the ongoing Italian-Libyan cooperation in the fight against terrorism, organised crime, 
drug trafficking and irregular migration; as a legal basis, it makes reference to the 2000 
Agreement and ‘the subsequent technical arrangements’, mentioning in particular the 
2007 Protocols on joint patrolling. Furthermore, Articles 19(2) and 19(3) foresaw, 
respectively, the creation of a satellite system for the control of Libyan land borders (to 
be jointly financed by Italy and the EU) and the development of bilateral and regional 
initiatives aimed at preventing irregular migration directly in the countries of origin. 
On 4 February 2009, Libya and Italy signed an Executive Protocol additional to 
the 2007 Protocols, which allowed for the implementation of the latter to finally stArt. 
Indeed, in March 2009 the first three Guardia di Finanza patrol boats were handed over 
to Libya (the other three followed in February 2010), while training activities and joint 
patrolling operations started shortly after, in May 2009 (Tondini 2010, 5-6). If on the 
one hand the effects of the conclusion of this agreement were immediately visible, its 
precise content was kept secret and its text has never been published. Based on the 
limited information reported by Tondini (2010) and Giuffré (2013b)
24
, the 2009 
Executive Protocol established that the six Italian vessels would be supplied on a 
permanent basis to Libya (Giuffré 2013b, 713) and joint patrolling operations would be 
carried out by an equal number of Italian and Libyan officials in both Italian, Libyan 
and international waters, under the responsibility respectively of Italy, Libya and either 
country (Tondini 2010, 6). 
Allegedly, this re-definition of the operational modalities of cooperation between 
the two countries and the actual handing over of the Italian vessels to Libya changed the 
context of Italian-Libyan collaboration, fostering a more proactive action on the part of 
Libyan authorities in patrolling and intercepting migrant boats in their territorial waters 
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 Tondini affirms that he obtained the text of the 2009 Executive Protocol during his fieldwork activities 
in the context of the INEX Project (2010, 4, footnote 8). 
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and high seas – with financial and technical resources being provided by Italy (Giuffré 
2013b). Building upon the 2007 Protocols, the 2008 Treaty and the 2009 Executive 
Protocol, a different and more collaborative form of cooperation in the fight against 
irregular migration was gradually developed and eventually put in place. This new and 
strengthened modality of cooperation, however, did not remain limited to joint 
patrolling; on the contrary, it opened the way for the first Italian push-back operations, 
which were carried out between the 6
th
 and 10
th
 of May 2016. 
Based on figures provided by the Italian Ministry of Interior, from May to 
November 2009 Italian authorities carried out nine push-back operations towards Libya 
resulting in the readmission of 834 migrants (UNHCR 2011, para 2.1.2) and two push-
back operations towards Algeria resulting in the readmission of 51 migrants (Tondini 
2010, 4)
25
. The push-back operations towards Libya were carried out by different Italian 
police and military forces and consisted of intercepting migrant boats in international 
waters, taking migrants on board of the Italian vessels, and either returning them 
directly to Libya or handing them over to Libyan patrol boats on the high seas, the latter 
vessels being operated by mixed Italian-Libyan crews, as provided for by the 2007 
Protocols (UNHCR 2011, paras 2.1.3 and 2.1.5). 
However, the Italian push-back practice does not seem to have any apparent legal 
basis in none of the above-mentioned formal and informal agreements concluded by 
Italy and Libya between 2007 and 2009. Tondini (2010) and Giuffré (2013b) argue that 
neither the 2007 Protocols nor the 2009 Executive Protocol (which regulate the 
technical aspects of Italian-Libyan cooperation) include any explicit provision 
concerning the interception of migrants in international waters and their deflection to 
Libya or their handing over to Libyan authorities. As reported by the two scholars, 
Article 2 of the 2009 Executive Protocol refers only in extremely generic terms to the 
duty for both countries to repatriate irregular migrants and to conclude agreements with 
countries of origin in order to limit irregular migration (Tondini 2010, 4; Giuffré 2013b, 
711)
26
. 
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 For a detailed account of the push-back operations carried out by Italy in 2009, see: UNHCR 2011, 1-
3; Tondini 2010, 4-5. 
26
 In addition, Article 2(1) of the 2007 Additional Protocol establishes that the above-mentioned Libyan-
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Therefore, as argued by Giuffré (2013b, 703-716), even though the 2007 and 2009 
Technical Protocols and the 2008 Friendship Treaty individually taken do not stand per 
se as the legal basis of push-backs, this series of agreements taken as a whole and 
framed within the broader context of Italian-Libyan relations, constitutes the legal 
framework within which the Italian push-backs were performed; outside of this broad 
bilateral cooperation framework, the implementation of this kind of operations would 
have been impossible
27
. In addition, Giuffré noted that the legal framework of the 2009 
push-backs most probably includes also other informal instruments, such as the notes 
exchanged by relevant authorities and other informal arrangements communicated via 
telephone or fax in the contingency of the maritime operations. Arguably, it is on the 
basis of these informal operational accords that, for each operation, Libyan authorities 
consented to the entry of Italian vessels in their territorial waters and authorised the 
readmission of third country nationals. 
Expectedly, Italian push-back operations gave rise to a national and international 
outcry. The Italian actions were widely criticised for being in violation of European and 
international human rights and refugee law; the Committee for the Prevention of 
Torture of the Council of Europe (CPT 2010a), NGOs (HRW 2009) and international 
organisations (UNHCR 2011) raised serious concerns over the fate of the persons who 
had been forcibly readmitted to Libya without having their individual case considered 
and without being granted the possibility to apply for asylum
28
. The Italian practice 
gave rise to several judicial and quasi-judicial actions; in particular, an application was 
filed before the ECtHR by a group of 24 Somali and Eritrean migrants who were 
                                                                                                                                               
led Joint Operational Command responsible for arranging and coordinating joint patrols may request the 
intervention of Italian vessels ordinarily deployed by the island of Lampedusa for conducting anti-
immigration activities. Since push-back operations could be considered as ‘anti-immigration activities’, 
the generic wording of this provision might be interpreted as allowing for push-back operations to be 
carried out by Italian vessels at the request of the Joint Operational Command. However, it does not seem 
possible to consider this highly generic provision as the actual legal basis for the implementation of push-
backs. 
27
 Paoletti (2011a, 163-164) interpreted the Libyan decision to accept both the joint patrolling of its 
territorial waters and the return of migrant boats to its shores as a relevant policy shift and explained it as 
an outcome of the deal finally reached with the 2008 Friendship Treaty, ‘consistent with the overall give-
and-take dynamics’ characterising Italian-Libyan relations. 
28
 These issues are further discussed under section 7.2. 
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readmitted to Libya during the first push-back operation carried out on 6 May 2016
29
. 
As further analysed in section 7.2, in its landmark judgement on the Hirsi case, 
the Grand Chamber of the Court found that, in forcibly returning the applicants to Libya 
without examining their case, Italy exposed them to a risk of ill-treatment in Libya and 
to a risk of further repatriation to Somalia or Eritrea, in breach of the non-refoulement 
principle (double violation of Article 3 ECHR). The Court also found that, due to the 
modalities of its implementation, their return amounted to a collective expulsion 
(violation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 ECHR). Furthermore, the applicants were 
deprived of any remedy which would have enabled them to challenge their expulsion 
before a competent authority and to have their complaint duly examined before their 
removal was enforced (violation of Article 13 in conjunction with Article 3 and Article 
4 of Protocol No.4 ECHR). 
In November 2009 Italy suddenly interrupted push-back operations, due to 
unspecified reasons (allegedly linked to the Hirsi case). However, according to some 
scholars, in reality ‘interdictions and joint push-backs of boat migrants continued even 
in 2010 in different forms’ (Giuffré 2013b, 698). While in 2009 interdiction operations 
were carried out by Italian officials using Italian vessels, in 2010 Italy delegated to 
Libyan vessels the task of intercepting migrant boats and returning them to Libyan 
ports. Still, according to Tondini (2010, 5), these operations were ‘de facto coordinated 
by, or at least conducted with the support of, Italian […] authorities, which first 
detect[ed] the boats to be intercepted and then request[ed] the assistance of their Libyan 
partners’. 
This policy shift was most probably made ‘official’ by a further Additional 
Operational Protocol signed on 7 December 2010, whose text was neither scrutinised by 
the Parliament nor made public. Information on the content of this informal agreement 
may be traced in a parliamentary hearing held on 1 March 2011 with Guardia di 
Finanza officials, who were called to report on mechanisms of border surveillance
30
. On 
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 ECtHR, Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, Application No. 27765/09, Judgement of the Grand 
Chamber, 23.02.2012. 
30
 The text of the parliamentary hearing is available at the following link: 
http://www.camera.it/_dati/leg16/lavori/stenbic/30/2011/0301/s020.htm (accessed on 10 December 
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that occasion, the speaker explained that the modalities of cooperation established by 
the 2007 and 2009 Protocols had been substantially reviewed on 7 December 2010; the 
revised terms of Italian-Libyan cooperation did not include any more joint patrolling 
operations but rather a more structural collaboration, focused on training activities and 
the provision of technical assistance and equipment (Italian Parliament 2011, 8). After 
having detailed all the initiatives foreseen by the 2010 Protocol, the speaker explained 
that due to the events that were taking place in Libya in early 2011, such activities had 
been suspended and the presence of Italian officials in the country had been radically 
reduced. 
In fact, the events that occurred in 2011 – the February uprisings against the 
Gaddafi government, the civil war that followed and the military intervention of a 
coalition of Western countries against the Gaddafi government, which ended in October 
after the death of the Colonel – caused the suspension of the agreements signed between 
the two countries (Giuffré 2013b, 695; Perrin 2012) and the interruption of the 
operational cooperation on migration management and readmission that they had 
established in the previous years. However, Italy aimed to preserve its good relations 
with Libya and to secure the re-establishment of cooperation as soon as the general 
situation in the country would have allowed for it (Paoletti 2012). 
Therefore, in April 2011 Italy recognised Libya’s National Transitional Council 
(NTC) and only two months later the two governments signed a new informal migration 
cooperation agreement. In the Memorandum of Understanding of 17 June 2011 they 
confirmed their commitment to a joint management of migration, based on the 
application of the 2000 Agreement and of the following Operational Protocols signed in 
2007, 2009 and 2010. The 2011 MoU recalled the commitments previously undertaken 
by the parties using the same wording of Article 1(d) of the 2000 Agreement
31
; in 
addition it specified that cooperation in the fight against irregular migration would 
include also the readmission of irregular migrants. 
                                                                                                                                               
2016). 
31
 The parties committed to exchange information on irregular migration flows, the criminal 
organisations that favour them, their modus operandi and itineraries, and on organisations specialised in 
the falsification of documents and passports; moreover they committed to reciprocal assistance and 
cooperation in the fight against irregular migration, including the readmission of irregular migrants. 
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A second and more detailed agreement, the ‘Oral Process of the Meeting between 
the Italian Minister of Interior and the Libyan Minister of Interior’, was signed on 3 
April 2012. This agreement was preceded by an official visit to Libya by the new Italian 
Prime Minister Mario Monti, which took place on 21 January 2012; on that occasion the 
Italian Prime Minister and the Prime Minister of the NTC signed the ‘Declaration of 
Tripoli’, which reportedly included the main provisions of the 2008 Friendship Treaty32 
(FIDH 2012, 35-36). 
The 2012 Oral Process entails specific measures aimed at re-establishing a well-
functioning bilateral cooperation in the field of migration control. The agreement counts 
six sections, which provide for, respectively: 1) the organisation of training programmes 
for Libyan police forces and the establishment of a centre for the detection of false 
documents and a centre for nautical training; 2) the reactivation of existing migrant 
reception (in fact detention) centres with the support of the EU, and the building of a 
new reception centre in Kufra; 3) the improvement of border control activities at the 
Libyan land and sea borders, in order to contrast the departure of irregular migrants 
from the Libyan territory
33; 4) the facilitation of migrants’ voluntary return to their 
countries of origin in cooperation with the IOM, and the strengthening of Italian-Libyan 
cooperation on readmission; 5) the creation of a system of data management for civil 
registration; 6) the establishment of follow-up mechanisms to ensure the proper 
implementation of the agreement, e.g. ‘Friendship offices’ jointly staffed by police 
personnel from both countries to be opened both in Libya and in Italy, and a ‘Joint 
Security Committee’. 
The text of the 2012 Oral Process was neither discussed nor ratified by the 
Parliament and remained secret until it was published by the Italian newspaper La 
Stampa in June 2012 (FIDH 2012, 36). A peculiarity of this document is that it is the 
first agreement signed by Italy and Libya to include a ‘human rights clause’. Indeed, the 
third section entails a general commitment on the part of the two countries to respect 
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 The Friendship Treaty had been reactivated in December 2011 (La Repubblica, 15 December 2011). 
33
 To this purpose Italy committed to provide technical assistance and equipment to Libya, and both 
parties agreed to exchange operational information and coordinate maritime operations in their respective 
areas of competence and in international waters, as provided for by existing bilateral agreements and in 
accordance with the international law of the sea. 
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human rights when conducting anti-immigration activities and during the permanence 
of irregular migrants in reception/detention centres in Libya. However, considering the 
general security situation in Libya at the time when this agreement was signed – a 
situation where ‘the country is wracked by chaos and violence with widespread 
xenophobia and the authorities cannot even protect their own population’ (Perrin 2012) 
– this human rights clause appears to be a mere façade provision, hardly applicable in 
practice. 
As argued by Paoletti (2012), the Italian policy towards Libya (as well as towards 
Tunisia and Egypt) following the 2011 Arab Spring has been characterised by a 
substantial continuity with the previous period, whereby domestic security-oriented 
interests linked to migration control have been prioritised over a more comprehensive 
human rights policy framework (despite a declared support to the democratisation 
process). As observed by the International Federation for Human Rights: ‘it is very 
worrying that, although the European political establishment is well aware of the 
situation of insecurity faced by migrants and asylum seekers in Libya and the serious 
violations of their human rights, the objective of controlling migration continues to 
outweigh all other considerations’ (FIDH 2012, 34). 
The actual implementation of the initiatives set out by the 2012 Oral Process and 
the re-establishment of migration cooperation between Italy and Libya were hampered 
by the outbreak of a new civil war in 2014 between two rival governments based in 
Tobruk and Tripoli. The second Libyan civil war – which is still ongoing, despite an 
attempt of pacification through the creation of a Government of National Accord in 
2016 – caused a further deterioration of the security situation in the country. In 
particular, the lack of a central authority produced a condition of deep political 
instability and substantial anarchy, with negative effects on Libya’s capacity to exert 
control over migration flows. In fact, migrant arrivals across the Central Mediterranean 
route have increased exponentially in the period 2014-2016
34
 (although this increase is 
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 Official figures from the Italian Ministry of Interior and the UNHCR show that, while during the 2011 
Arab Spring migrant arrivals to the Italian shores had increased to 62,692, in 2012 they went down to 
13,267. In 2013 the number of arrivals by sea raised again to 42,925, but it was the year 2014 that 
recorded the unprecedented amount of 170,100 arrivals, mainly from Libya. This trend remained 
substantially stable in 2015 (153,842 arrivals) and 2016 (175,244 arrivals until 11 December 2016). See: 
 188 
linked to different factors, not all of which can be ascribed to Libya’s lacking 
cooperation). 
To conclude, from this account it clearly emerges that informality and secrecy 
have characterised the development of Italian-Libyan bilateral cooperation in the area of 
migration control and readmission since the late 1990s and until the present day (Klepp 
2010b, 78-82). The widespread use of a wide array of informal agreements has allowed 
for parliamentary scrutiny to be circumvented and for certain deals to remain secret or 
to be published only years later – a practice that has resulted in a total lack of 
transparency and accountability, as well as in the faulty adherence to (if not the 
violation of) international human rights norms (as analysed in detail in Chapter 7). In 
fact, some of the most controversial practices carried out as part of Italian-Libyan 
migration cooperation, i.e. the return flights between 2004 and 2006 and the push-backs 
in 2009, were the result of informal (in some cases oral and in part even secret) 
operational agreements, embedded into a broader bilateral cooperation framework 
(Paoletti and Pastore 2010, 28). 
As concerns the effectiveness of this kind of cooperation, the Italian government 
has measured it in terms of numbers of migrant arrivals to the Italian shores. From this 
standpoint, as argued also by Paoletti and Pastore, ‘overall, bilateral and largely 
informal cooperation in the field of migration has been, at least in the short term, a 
satisfactory match’ (2010, 14). In particular, unauthorised arrivals to the Italian shores, 
which had steadily increased between 2000 and 2006, have sharply decreased in 2009-
2010 (Paoletti 2011a, 176). According to the Ministry of Interior, the year 2009 (i.e. the 
year of push-backs) witnessed a 90% drop in migrant arrivals from Libya
35
 and the 
downward trend continued in 2010 (Tondini 2010, 6; Paoletti and Pastore 2010, 4). 
Although it would be too simplistic to entirely attribute this decrease in arrivals to 
Italian-Libyan cooperation (or more specifically to Italian push-back operations), 
                                                                                                                                               
http://www.interno.gov.it/sites/default/files/dati_statistici_marzo_2015.pdf (figures for the period 2011-
2014); http://www.interno.gov.it/sites/default/files/trend_sbrachi_migranti_2013-2014-2015.pdf (figures 
for the period 2013-2015); http://data.unhcr.org/mediterranean/country.php?id=105 (figures for the year 
2016). Accessed on 12 December 2016. 
35
 Between 5 May and 31 December 2009 only 3,185 migrants arrived from Libya, compared to 31,281 
over the same period in 2008 (Tondini 2010, 6; Paoletti and Pastore 2010, 4). 
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reportedly, ‘as of March 2010, collaboration on migration seems to have achieved one 
of its primary objectives of containing the migration pressure on Italy and Libya’ 
(Paoletti 2011a, 179) – a situation that has radically changed, first in 2011 and then 
since 2014
36
. 
In 2009-2010, official figures showing a sizeable reduction in the migrant flow 
were sufficient for Italian authorities to claim the success of bilateral cooperation with 
Libya. However, this merely quantitative evaluation did not consider neither the 
constitutionality of the government practice of signing informal agreements in the area 
of migration (avoiding parliamentary scrutiny and keeping their text secret), nor the 
potential human rights issues arising from the practical implementation of this kind of 
agreements. 
 
5.3. The Western Mediterranean: cooperation on readmission between 
Spain and Morocco 
Cooperation on readmission between Spain and Morocco has been established 
both through formal and informal agreements. However, without denying the relevant 
role played by the latter (especially by an informal agreement signed in December 
2003), in a long term perspective both kinds of instruments seem to have exercised a 
relatively limited impact on the operationalisation of cooperation on readmission 
between the two countries. In fact, the actual implementation of ‘effective returns’ from 
Spain to Morocco appears to depend much more, on the one hand, on the technical and 
administrative arrangements established between the competent authorities (e.g. 
identification and re-documentation procedures carried out at the consular level) and, on 
the other hand, on daily operational practices as they are performed by police and 
security forces at the borders; in this respect, the case of Ceuta and Melilla (the two 
Spanish enclaves on the northern Moroccan coast) represents a prime example. 
Spain and Morocco took the first steps in view of establishing a bilateral 
                                                 
36
 As mentioned in footnote 34 (above in this section), the year 2011 (i.e. the year of the Arab Spring) 
and the years 2014-2016 recorded two new peaks in arrivals to the Italian shores. 
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cooperation on readmission already in the early 1990s
37
. In February 1992 the two 
countries signed a formal readmission agreement, as part of a process of reconciliation 
and rapprochement, which resulted in the conclusion of a Treaty of Friendship, Good-
neighbourliness and Cooperation on 4 July 1991
38
. This Treaty created a broad 
framework for establishing and deepening bilateral cooperation relations between the 
two countries in different fields. 
The document is opened by a Preamble, which recalls the long-standing historical 
and cultural ties connecting Morocco and Spain, and reaffirms their commitment to 
promote mutual understanding, dialogue and international cooperation as a guarantee of 
peace, stability and security in the Western Mediterranean region. After stating the 
general principles that inform the relations between the two countries, including the 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, the Treaty details the parties’ 
commitments to collaborate on economic and financial issues, in the areas of defence, 
development, culture, and in the legal and consular field. In this text, migration is not 
mentioned per se as an area for enhanced bilateral cooperation; however, as said above, 
shortly after the signature of this framework agreement, Morocco and Spain concluded 
a specific ‘Agreement concerning the Movement of People, the Transit and the 
Readmission of Foreigners who Have Entered Illegally’. 
The 1992 Readmission Agreement, signed on 13 February 1992 by the Spanish 
and Moroccan Ministers of Interior, focused in particular on the readmission of third 
country nationals who have entered illegally the territory of one of the parties coming 
from the territory of the other party, rather than on the readmission of own nationals 
(Art. 1, 1992 RA). Reportedly, Morocco accepted to sign this agreement for a number 
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 When Spain joined the Schengen Convention in 1991, it had to reinforce controls at its external 
borders. As a first step, in May 1991 it introduced visa requirements for Moroccan citizens; this had a 
remarkable impact on Spanish-Moroccan border dynamics, discouraging circular mobility and leading to 
the emergence of irregular migration from Morocco to Spain. Carrera et al. (2016, 4) argue that this and 
the following developments (in terms of securitisation of the Spanish-Moroccan border, externalisation of 
migration control to Morocco and enhanced cooperation on readmission) were partly the result of Spain’s 
participation in the EU integration process and were partly financed by the EU, thus emphasising the role 
of the EU in the development of migration cooperation between the two countries. 
38
 This Treaty is a formal international agreement. It was signed by the Prime Ministers of Morocco and 
Spain and entered into force on 28 January 1993, after the parties informed each other of the completion 
of the required internal procedures (in accordance with Article 14 of the Treaty itself). It was registered 
by Spain with the UN Secretariat on 24 March 1993. 
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of reasons. Firstly, as mentioned above, the RA was part of a more general 
rapprochement process; being embedded into a broader cooperation framework, which 
included other policy areas, there were higher and diversified interests at stake. 
Secondly, in the early 1990s the migration of Sub-Saharan nationals transiting through 
Morocco towards Spain and the EU was not yet perceived as a significant phenomenon 
by Moroccan authorities (Cassarino 2007, 183-184). Thirdly, Morocco’s acceptance to 
conclude this agreement was motivated also by the ambition to obtain a special status in 
its political and economic relations with Spain and the EU (Mrabet 2003, 380). 
The 1992 RA established procedures for the readmission of third country 
nationals (Arts. 1-5) as well as for their transit for the purpose of expulsion (Arts. 6-8). 
With regards to the former, the text specifies that the readmitted migrants shall be sent 
back to their countries of origin as soon as possible (Art. 5, 1992 RA); as concerns the 
latter, interestingly, the parties may refuse transit for the purpose of expulsion when the 
persons concerned are nationals of countries members of the Arab Maghreb Union
39
 
(Art. 8(e), 1992 RA). The text provides also for the creation of a Spanish-Moroccan 
Joint Committee responsible for monitoring the implementation of the agreement and 
resolving contentious cases that may arise from it; the Committee is also tasked with the 
organisation of ‘mutual assistance in the development of border control measures, 
especially with regards to equipment and training of border control personnel’ (Art. 11, 
1992 RA). Finally, the 1992 RA does not include neither a human rights clause, nor any 
other reference to the substantial and procedural safeguards that should be granted to 
migrants who are subject to a readmission procedure
40
. 
On 25 April 1992, shortly after its signature, the Spain-Moroccan readmission 
agreement was published on the Spanish Official Journal. The agreement has been 
provisionally applied since the day of its signature (as established by Article 16 of the 
agreement itself); however, it entered into force officially only two decades later, on 21 
October 2012 – ‘thirty days after both Parties have notified each other of the fulfilment 
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 The Arab Maghreb Union (Union du Maghreb Arabe – UMA) consists of: Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, 
Morocco and Tunisia. This provision was most probably included as a safeguard for Morocco, in order to 
protect its relations with neighbouring countries. 
40
 For instance, the exceptions to the obligation of readmission mentioned under Article 3 of the 
agreement do not include the principle of non-refoulement (Amnesty International 2015a, 21). 
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of constitutional requirements for its ratification’ (Art. 16, 1992 RA). Nonetheless, the 
fact that the agreement was immediately applicable, independently of its ratification, did 
not ensure its prompt implementation. 
On the contrary, the 1992 RA has never been fully implemented. This was partly 
due to the Moroccan authorities’ reluctance to accept the readmission of third country 
nationals from Sub-Saharan Africa, based on the argument that their transit through the 
territory of Morocco could not be incontrovertibly proven; indeed, Moroccan authorities 
have often claimed that Sub-Saharan migrants in fact transited through Algeria, not 
Morocco, before arriving in Spain (Cassarino 2007, 183). In addition, Morocco’s 
reluctance to cooperate on readmission was also due to the acute tensions that 
characterised diplomatic relations between the two countries under the governments of 
José María Aznar (1996-2004), in particular in the early 2000s
41
. It was only towards 
the end of the second Aznar government that efforts were made to resume dialogue and 
normalise bilateral relations. The succeeding government, led by José Luis Rodríguez 
Zapatero, further promoted the resumption of good relationships with Morocco, starting 
precisely from the reinforcement of bilateral cooperation on migration (Paoletti 2011a, 
46-47; Coslovi 2007, 3). 
On 4 December 2003 the two countries signed an informal agreement (or a MoU) 
where they committed to cooperate in the fight against irregular migration and migrant 
trafficking. To this purpose, the agreement provided for sea patrolling operations to be 
jointly carried out by Spanish and Moroccan authorities in the Strait of Gibraltar and in 
the area surrounding the Canary Islands. In return for its cooperation, Morocco was 
granted the considerable amount of 390 million dollars in aid (de Haas 2005); this was 
expected to stimulate Spanish foreign direct investments in Morocco and the 
delocalisation of Spanish firms in various sectors (Cassarino 2005, 229). Reportedly, as 
part of this agreement, along with financial compensation Morocco received ‘other, 
unrevealed favours’ (Briscoe 2004). 
The signature of this MoU and the more general improvement of relations 
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 The deterioration of Spanish-Moroccan relations culminated in the July 2002 ‘Perejil island crisis’, a 
dispute over a small uninhabited rocky islet close to the Spanish enclave of Ceuta (Ferrer et al. 2006; 
Paoletti 2011a, 47). 
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between the two countries led to the actual intensification of bilateral cooperation on 
migration control and readmission. Arguably, the pressures exerted by the Spanish 
government, which between 2000 and 2004 was faced with a constant increase in 
migrant arrivals from Morocco, pushed Morocco to adopt more restrictive migration 
policies (e.g. Law 02-03 of 11 November 2003 on the entry and residence of foreigners) 
and to adapt its legal and institutional framework to the EU acquis (de Haas 2005). 
Spanish pressures for increased cooperation in the area of irregular migration also led to 
the harshening of border control practices carried out by Moroccan police forces 
(Statewatch 2004; Briscoe 2004; Baldwin-Edwards 2004). As concerns readmission, 
Moroccan authorities were already cooperating with the Spanish ones in readmitting 
migrants from Ceuta and Melilla; but starting from January 2004, as a consequence of 
the signature of the MoU, Morocco began to accept also the readmission of migrants 
(both Moroccan nationals and non-nationals) who were intercepted at sea or had 
reached the Spanish shores, seemingly in application of the 1992 RA (Schuster 2005, 
13; Baldwin-Edwards 2004; de Haas 2005). 
With regards to border control, in the early 2000s Spain began to invest 
significant resources in the development of technologies and infrastructures for border 
surveillance. In particular, over the years Spain has involved Morocco in the 
implementation and gradual expansion of a sophisticated radar system for the 
surveillance of its maritime borders (called SIVE - Integrated System of External 
Surveillance). In addition, starting from February 2004 the two countries began to 
conduct joint naval patrolling operations, as provided for by the 2003 MoU (Schuster 
2005, 13; Baldwin-Edwards 2004), and they intensified joint police training courses 
focused on intelligence sharing and (maritime) border surveillance (Paoletti 2011a, 47). 
Furthermore, between 2003 and 2005 Morocco carried out numerous arrests and 
deportations of irregular migrants from its own territory, claiming it prevented the 
unauthorised migration to Spain of a significant amount of both Moroccan nationals and 
third country nationals (Briscoe 2004; Baldwin-Edwards 2004; de Haas 2005). 
Partly as a result of this intense cooperation, starting from 2005 migration flows 
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from Morocco to Spain have been gradually but significantly reduced
42
 (Coslovi 2007, 
3-7). This may suggest that the operational cooperation established between Morocco 
and Spain has proved effective, although a number of different factors have certainly 
contributed to determine a reduction in migrant arrivals along the Western 
Mediterranean route (Coslovi 2007, 3-7). However, if on the one hand Morocco has 
proved extremely collaborative and effective in pursuing tasks related to border control 
and the fight against irregular migration, on the other hand it did not prove equally keen 
to cooperate in the area of readmission (Paoletti 2011a, 48). As discussed also in section 
3.5.1 above, Moroccan cooperation in the identification and re-documentation of own 
nationals to be readmitted has been rather erratic
43
. Moreover, Morocco has proved 
reluctant to massively readmit and subsequently expel Sub-Saharan migrants, inter alia 
because this could harm its strategic political relations in the Western African region 
and with Sub-Saharan African countries (de Haas 2014). 
As argued by Paoletti (2011a, 48-50) and Cassarino (2005) and mentioned in 
other sections of this work, Morocco’s partial compliance with the Spanish and 
European agenda is linked to the ‘complex give-and-take framework’ characterising the 
overall negotiations between the parties, which aggregate a variety of issues (including 
migration, fisheries agreements, oil resources, development aid, trade, investments, the 
dispute over Western Sahara, etc.). In this context, Moroccan authorities have made 
clear both to Spain and to the EU that their active involvement in the fight against 
irregular migration and their cooperation on readmission is contingent on Spanish and 
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 In 2003 migrant arrivals to Spain were 19,176, in 2004 they were 15,671 and in 2005 11,781. In 2005, 
it was in particular the number of migrants arriving to the Canary Islands that dropped by half compared 
to 2004 (from 8,426 to 4,715), while arrivals to the rest of Spain remained stable, around 7,000 (Sources: 
Coslovi 2007, Tab. 2, 4; De Bruycker et al. 2013, Tab. A1.4, 18). Therefore, Spanish-Moroccan 
cooperation had an immediate effect in reducing the flow from the Moroccan Western coast to the Canary 
Islands. Interestingly, in 2006 Spain recorded a peak of arrivals to the Canary Islands (31,678 migrants) 
but the main point of departure was no more Morocco but Mauritania and Senegal. Indeed, while until 
2005 the majority of migrants landing on the Canary Islands were Moroccans, starting from 2006 they 
were mainly nationals of Sub-Saharan African countries (Coslovi 2007, Tab. 2, 4). Therefore, reinforced 
cooperation between Spain and Morocco produced a shift southwards of the Western African route, until 
Spain managed to strengthen cooperation on migration control and readmission also with Mauritania and 
Senegal. This contributed to diminish the number of arrivals to the Canary Islands to 12,478 in 2007, 
9,181 in 2008 and 2,246 in 2009. Since 2010 arrivals to the Canary Islands amount to less than few 
hundreds per year (De Bruycker et al. 2013, Tab. A1.4, 18). 
43
 This holds true for readmission of Moroccan nationals not only from Spain but from all EU Member 
States. 
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European support and concessions in other areas. 
Starting from 2010, migration along the Western Mediterranean route has 
radically diminished (De Bruycker et al. 2013, Tab. A1.4, 18) and has remained low 
also in recent years, especially if compared to the peaks observed along the Central and 
Eastern Mediterranean routes (Manrique Gil et al. 2014, 6-7; Frontex 2015, 19 and 24; 
Frontex 2016, 16 and 21). This outcome has been unanimously attributed (at least in 
part) to improved high-tech surveillance at the Spanish-Moroccan borders
44
 and to 
enhanced cooperation between Spain and Morocco. Indeed, cooperation between the 
two countries on border surveillance and migration management, partly funded by the 
EU, is considered to be overall ‘effective’ and is often seen as a model to be promoted 
across other European external borders (The Economist, 17 October 2015). It is thanks 
to this achievement that Morocco has acquired a significant bargaining power vis-à-vis 
its European counterparts
45
. 
In analysing Spanish-Moroccan cooperation on readmission and border control, it 
is essential to focus on the peculiar case of Ceuta and Melilla – the two Spanish 
enclaves in Moroccan territory, which represent the land borders between the two 
countries. Since the early 1990s the enclaves have been increasingly fenced off, by 
means of physical fences, high-tech surveillance and operational cooperation between 
Spanish and Moroccan police authorities. In the early 2000s, the enclaves have triggered 
significant migration flows
46
. The situation escalated in autumn 2005, when large scale 
and coordinated attempts to climb over the tall barbed-wire fences of the enclaves were 
conducted by groups of hundreds of migrants (Amnesty International 2015a, 16). The 
reaction of Spanish and Moroccan authorities resulted in the death of between eleven 
and thirteen people and several more being seriously injured, or subsequently ill-treated. 
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 Over the years, the SIVE has been integrated with other systems and networks of border surveillance 
involving the border authorities of several countries across the Mediterranean and West African coasts 
(e.g. the SEAHORSE Network) as well as the EU external border agency Frontex (e.g. EUROSUR). 
45
 As noted by Paoletti (2011a, 49) it was precisely the Spanish securitised approach to migration and the 
externalisation of migration control from Spain to Morocco that have actually strengthened Morocco’s 
leverage vis-à-vis Spain and the EU, also in the economic and political fields. 
46
 Irregular border crossings recorded in Ceuta and Melilla in the period between 2001 and 2005 ranged 
between 5,000 and 5,500. Source: Comisión Española De Ayuda Al Refugiado (CEAR), ‘Llegadas 
irregulares a Ceuta y Melilla’, https://www.cear.es/que-hacemos/cifras-y-estadisticas/ (accessed on 16 
December 2016). 
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These episodes had a wide political echo across Europe, leading to a partial rethinking 
of the EU external migration policy towards its southern neighbourhood, and the launch 
of the GAM
47
 (see section 4.1 above). 
In the following years irregular border crossings in Ceuta and Melilla kept 
decreasing, also due to the reinforcement of border fences and surveillance measures 
(Amnesty International 2015a, 16-19). But in the summer of 2012, for the first time 
since 2005, numerous groups of migrants attempted to cross the fences of Melilla (MSF 
2013, 14); starting from that moment, a new rise in collective attempts to jump the 
border fences of the enclaves has been observed
48
. During the last three years, the 
perpetration of excessively violent or unlawful practices by both Moroccan police 
forces and the Spanish Guardia Civil at the land and sea borders between Morocco and 
the territories of Ceuta and Melilla has been repeatedly documented by NGOs (MSF 
2013, 14-18; ECRE 2014b; HRW 2014a, 38-46; 2014b; 2014c; Amnesty International 
2015a, 30-36 and 40-48; Migreurop et al. 2015). 
With regards in particular to cooperation on readmission, a special practice is 
carried out in Ceuta and Melilla, reportedly since 2001 (El Diario, 19 November 2013), 
consisting of the direct expulsion of irregular migrants from Spain to Morocco 
immediately after their interception at the borders. As consistently reported by NGOs, 
on several occasions Spanish authorities have handed over intercepted migrants directly 
to Moroccan security forces, without identifying them, without considering their 
personal circumstances, and without offering them the possibility to apply for asylum or 
to challenge their removal in front of a competent authority, thus in violation of 
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 In October 2005, the European Commission carried out a Technical Mission to Morocco on Illegal 
Immigration, visiting Ceuta and Melilla. The Mission Report suggested the EU response to the mounting 
migration pressure from Africa should consist of ‘intensified cooperation with and assistance to 
Morocco’, as well as ‘the urgent development of a comprehensive migration policy for the main countries 
of origin and transit in Sub-Saharan Africa’ (European Commission 2005d, 3). 
48
 In 2013 the number of irregular border crossings in Ceuta and Melilla increased from 2,800 (in 2012) 
to 4,200 and in 2014 it almost doubled, reaching the unprecedented number of 7,485 arrivals. Source: 
Comisión Española De Ayuda Al Refugiado (CEAR), ‘Llegadas irregulares a Ceuta y Melilla’, 
https://www.cear.es/que-hacemos/cifras-y-estadisticas/ (accessed on 16 December 2016). The upward 
trend continued in 2015. This surge in arrivals is mainly due to a new phenomenon linked to the Syrian 
refugee crisis: an increasing number of Syrian refugees began to irregularly enter the Spanish enclaves 
(especially Melilla), mainly using false documents and passing through the official border crossing points 
(Amnesty International 2015a, 24-25; Frontex 2016, 21). 
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international and European human rights and refugee law (HRW 2014a, 42-46; 
Amnesty International 2015a, 30-36; Migreurop et al. 2015). This type of expulsions are 
called devoluciones en caliente and they amount to push-back operations, even if they 
usually take place at land rather than at sea. 
Starting from 2013, the practice of devoluciones en caliente has been increasingly 
criticised by the above-mentioned NGOs (Amnesty International, ECRE, HRW, 
Migreurop, GADEM, CEAR, etc.) as well as by the Council of Europe Commissioner 
for Human Rights (2015a; 2015b; 2016b) for entailing the risk of serious violations of 
the fundamental rights of migrants and asylum seekers
49
. Allegedly, these summary 
removals deprive migrants from their right to seek asylum and put them at risk of being 
subject to refoulement and to further violence and abuse by Moroccan authorities, 
potentially amounting to unhuman or degrading treatment (as proved by numerous first-
hand testimonies collected by NGOs)
50
. Devoluciones en caliente have been criticised 
also for being carried out in a selective way, as they target almost exclusively Sub-
Saharan migrants. This practice is conducted in close cooperation by Spanish and 
Moroccan authorities; however, although its implementation necessarily requires the 
consent and participation of Moroccan police forces, the responsibility for such push-
back operations is on Spain. Therefore, Spain may be considered directly responsible 
for any violence migrants face when Spanish authorities summarily remove them to 
Morocco (Amnesty International 2015a, 46). 
Having briefly highlighted the substantive criticisms raised with regards to the 
conformity of this practice with international and European law, for the purpose of this 
study it seems interesting to consider whether devoluciones en caliente have a legal 
basis in the existing framework of bilateral cooperation on readmission between Spain 
and Morocco. As mentioned above, the 1992 readmission agreement (which has long 
remained unapplied) was eventually ratified in October 2012. Since its formal entry into 
force coincided with a new surge in irregular border crossings into the Spanish enclaves 
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 This issue is further analysed under section 7.2. 
50
 When they were handed over to Moroccan authorities, intercepted migrants also faced the risk 
of being deported to the desert border with Algeria and collectively expelled in the absence of any formal 
procedure. Reportedly, this practice was stopped in September 2013, after the announcement of 
Morocco’s new migration and asylum policy (Amnesty International 2015a, 26-27). 
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and a consequent intensification of push-back operations, one could infer that the 1992 
formal RA served as a legal basis for devoluciones en caliente
51
. However, this does not 
seem to be the case: even though the 1992 RA fails to include a number of substantial 
and procedural guarantees and any reference to the fundamental rights of migrants 
involved in a readmission procedure, it nonetheless establishes the rules of a formal 
readmission procedure; such rules are not followed at all in the practice of devoluciones 
en caliente (ECRE, 22 November 2012; Migreurop et al. 2015, 20). 
In fact, based on interviews with representatives of the Spanish police forces in 
the enclaves, Amnesty International reports that, as a rule, the Moroccan government 
does not accept the readmission of non-nationals from Ceuta and Melilla under the 1992 
readmission agreement or through other formal channels, whereas it largely accept their 
summary expulsion through informal practices
52
 (Amnesty International 2015a, 37-38). 
Furthermore, with regards to the legal basis of operations carried out at the enclaves’ 
borders in cooperation with Moroccan authorities, representatives from the Spanish 
Ministry of Interior and Guardia Civil told to Amnesty International that such actions 
are generally carried out on the basis of operational protocols, which – given their 
technical and operational nature – do not need to be made public. Spanish authorities 
admitted that meetings are regularly held with their Moroccan counterparts, ‘where they 
agree on operational cooperation concerning border issues and sign documents to that 
effect’ (Amnesty International 2015a, 44-45); however, the content of these informal 
arrangements is considered confidential. 
Repeated calls by NGOs and the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human 
Rights for the Spanish government to stop devoluciones en caliente have so far 
remained unheard. In contrast, after having long denied summary removals, Spain has 
recently overturned its strategy and decided to provide this practice with a stronger legal 
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 Indeed, Spanish Guardia Civil officers operating in Ceuta and Melilla were allegedly told that the 1992 
RA provides a legal basis for their actions (El País, 18 November 2013). 
52
 The reason for accepting summary removals while rejecting readmissions under formal procedures 
from the enclaves would be allegedly linked to the historic dispute between Morocco and Spain over 
Ceuta and Melilla – which, according to Morocco, are illegitimately occupied by Spain (Amnesty 
International 2015a, 37-38). 
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basis, by fully including it into its national legislation on migration (HRW 2014b)
53
. In 
October 2014 the Spanish government proposed to amend the Spanish Immigration Law 
(Organic Law 4/2000) in order to introduce a special regime for expulsions at the 
borders in Ceuta and Melilla (ECRE 2014c); the amendment was approved by the 
Spanish Parliament in March 2015. The new provision stipulates that ‘foreigners 
detected on the boundary line of the territorial demarcation of Ceuta and Melilla, 
attempting to overcome the border containment elements in order to irregularly cross 
the border, may be rejected in order to prevent their illegal entry into Spain’ (transl. by 
Amnesty International 2015a, 38), thus codifying into law a new concept of ‘rejection at 
the border’. 
Although the amendment includes a paragraph stating that ‘the rejection will be 
carried out in compliance with international human rights and international protection 
norms’, it fails to describe how ‘rejections at the border’ would be carried out and it 
does not mention the substantive and procedural safeguards that normally apply to 
return procedures (e.g. prohibition of refoulement, right to apply for asylum, access to 
interpretation and legal aid, right to an effective remedy, etc.) (Amnesty International 
2015a, 38-40; ECRE 2015). For this reason, several NGOs and international 
organisations (inter alia, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights 
2015a; 2016b) have recommended that Spain reviews this new legislation in accordance 
with international and European human rights and refugee law. 
Finally, the practice of devoluciones en caliente gave rise to two applications 
against Spain currently pending before the ECtHR (submitted in February 2015 and 
partly communicated to the Spanish government in July 2015)
54
. The two applicants in 
the joint cases N.D. and N.T. v. Spain reported they were part of a group of Sub-Saharan 
migrants who managed to climb over the fences of Melilla on 13 August 2014 and were 
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 In its 2015 report ‘Fear and Fences’, Amnesty International denounced that the practice is nowadays 
carried out ‘in plain sight’ and argued that what distinguishes Spanish push-backs from push-backs 
carried out at other EU external borders ‘is the fact that the Spanish Government is not attempting to hide 
them, but instead tries to convince the world that they are lawful and are not in breach of Spain’s national 
law or international obligations’ (2015a, 30-31). 
54
 ECtHR, N.D. v. Spain and N.T. v. Spain, Applications No. 8675/15 and No. 8697/15, Decision, 
13.07.2015. Both the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights (2015b) and a group of NGOs 
(The AIRE Centre et al. 2015) have submitted third party interventions in November 2015. 
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immediately handed over to Moroccan authorities and summarily returned to Morocco. 
The applicants denounced the violence suffered (and witnessed) on the part of both 
Spanish and Moroccan authorities, the fact that no identification procedure and no 
assessment of their personal circumstances were carried out before their (collective) 
expulsion took place, and the impossibility to challenge their return decision before a 
competent authority
55
. 
To conclude, from this account it clearly emerges that in the Spanish-Moroccan 
case the operationalisation of cooperation on migration management, border control and 
readmission has been largely prioritised. Apparently, this has contributed to the 
effectiveness of Spanish-Moroccan migration cooperation in terms of reduction of 
migrations flows, so that nowadays bilateral cooperation between the two countries is 
often described as a model to be promoted across Europe (The Economist, 17 October 
2015). The establishment of a well-functioning operational cooperation between the 
authorities of Spain and Morocco, mainly through informal agreements (such as the 
2003 MoU) and technical-operational arrangements (as those negotiated and agreed 
upon on a regular basis by the Spanish and Moroccan police forces in Ceuta and 
Melilla) has been key to reaching the objective of effectively controlling the borders and 
implementing removals of unauthorised migrants. In this context, the formal 
readmission agreement signed in 1992 and entered into force in 2012 appears to have 
only a marginal role: it seems to provide a façade legal framework of reference, but in 
practice readmissions to Morocco rarely take place under the 1992 RA. The 
predominant informality of cooperation on readmission between Spain and Morocco 
and its focus on operational aspects, which are kept secret, result in a lack of 
transparency and accountability, and may lead to potential human rights violations. 
 
  
                                                 
55
 A similar application has been submitted to the ECtHR in April 2015; the case has been communicated 
to the Spanish government in December 2015. ECtHR, Doumbe Nnabuchi v. Spain, Application No. 
19420/15, Communicated Case, 14.12.2015. 
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5.4. The Eastern Mediterranean: cooperation on readmission between 
Greece and Turkey 
Similarly to the case of Spain and Morocco, cooperation on readmission between 
Greece and Turkey has been established both through formal and informal agreements. 
As further discussed below, the latter (especially the 2010 Joint Statements for 
Cooperation, but partly also the recent EU-Turkey Agreement of 18 March 2016) have 
been signed with the purpose of increasing the limited effectiveness of the former (the 
2001 Readmission Protocol). However, the impact of informal agreements may turn out 
to be likewise limited, lacking a real political willingness to cooperate – which has long 
been the case of Turkey in its relations with Greece (and with the EU, as analysed in 
section 3.5.2) in the area of readmission. As in the case of Spain and Morocco, the 
actual implementation of removals of irregular migrants from Greece to Turkey seems 
to depend, to a large extent, on the technical and administrative arrangements 
established between the competent authorities, as well as on daily operational practices 
carried out at the maritime and land borders by coast guards and police forces of both 
countries. 
A further similarity with the Spanish-Moroccan case concerns the context where 
cooperation on readmission between Greece and Turkey has been first established, that 
is the context of an easing of diplomatic tensions. If throughout the twentieth century 
the history of Greek-Turkish bilateral relations was characterised by conflicts, religious-
ethnic divisions and tensions over territorial and sovereignty issues
56
, in 1999 a so-
called ‘earthquake diplomacy’ took hold (Baldwin-Edwards 2006); starting from that 
moment the two countries engaged in a policy of dialogue, notwithstanding the 
persistence of tensions and occasional disputes (e.g. over the Cyprus issue and over 
Aegean borders). Moreover, in December 1999 Turkey was officially recognised as a 
candidate to the EU membership. In view of fulfilling the accession criteria, in the early 
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 Tensions between the two countries date back to the First World War, the subsequent Greek-Turkish 
War (1919-1922) and the ‘Exchange of Populations’ which followed the Treaty of Lausanne of 30 
January 1923. This exchange involved the expulsion of Anatolian Orthodox Greeks to Greece and Greek 
and Turkish Muslims to Turkey. This is considered to be one of the most relevant events in the process of 
nation-building of both countries (Baldwin-Edwards 2006; Wissink and Ulusoy 2016, 129). 
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2000s Turkey started to harmonise its legislation to the EU acquis and to reform its 
migration policy and border control measures accordingly to the Schengen standards 
(Kirişci 2003; İçduygu 2011; Paoletti 2011a, 52-53). 
Therefore, the early 2000s were characterised by two simultaneous processes: a 
rapprochement in Greek-Turkish bilateral relations, and the gradual ‘Europeanisation’ 
of Turkish legislation and policies in the JHA area, under the EU’s pressure to 
strengthen control over the increasing irregular migration flows transiting through 
Turkey towards Europe
57
. The combination of these processes resulted in Greece and 
Turkey intensifying dialogue and starting to adopt instruments of cooperation in the 
area of migration management and fight against unauthorised migration. 
On 20 January 2000 the two countries signed an ‘Agreement on Combating 
Crime, Especially Terrorism, Organised Crime, Illicit Drug Trafficking and Illegal 
Migration’58. Shortly after, on 8 November 2001, Greece and Turkey signed a specific 
Implementing Protocol on readmission (in pursuance to Article 8 of the Agreement
59
) 
with the purpose ‘to promote their cooperation in order to ensure a better application of 
provisions relevant to the transfer of persons who do not or who no longer fulfil the 
conditions in force for entry or residence’ (Preamble, 2001 Readmission Protocol)60. 
Both the police cooperation agreement and its implementing protocol on readmission 
are formal bilateral agreements; a formal procedure was followed for their adoption, 
including their signature by the Greek and Turkish Ministers of Foreign Affairs, their 
ratification by the national parliament of both countries and their publication on the 
Greek Official Journal. 
The 2001 Readmission Protocol sets out a basic obligation for the parties to 
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 As reported by İçduygu (2011, 4-5), based on data from the Turkish Bureau for Foreigners, Borders 
and Asylum at the Directorate of General Security of the Ministry of Interior, between the mid-1990s and 
the early 2000s the number of irregular migrants apprehended in Turkey increased from about 11,000 in 
1995 to 94,000 in 2000. The 58% of irregular migrants apprehended between 1995 and 2009 were 
potential transit migrants who were heading for Europe. The first five countries of origins of these 
migrants were: Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran and Palestine. 
58
 The Agreement on Combating Crime was ratified by Greek Law 2926/01 and entered into force on 27 
June 2001. 
59
 Article 8 of the Agreement concerned cooperation on combating irregular migration (Pro Asyl 2007, 
26). 
60
 The Implementing Protocol on Readmission was ratified by Greek Law 3030/2002 on 15 July 2002 
and it entered into force on 5 August 2002. 
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readmit both their own nationals and non-nationals who have irregularly entered the 
territory of one of the parties coming from the territory of the other party
61
. It 
establishes the evidences required as a proof of citizenship for the nationals of the 
parties (Arts. 2-3, 2001 Readmission Protocol) and as a proof of entry from the territory 
of the other party for nationals of third countries (Arts. 4-5). Moreover, the text provides 
for two different kinds of readmission procedures (Art. 6)
62
 and it foresees a time limit 
for readmission obligations concerning non-nationals (Art. 8)
63
. The final provisions 
regulate several details, including the designation of six border posts at land, air and sea 
borders (three in Turkey and three in Greece) to be used for the transfer of readmitted 
persons (Art. 12). 
The Protocol does not include neither an explicit clause on compliance with key 
international human rights conventions nor any other reference to the protection of 
fundamental rights and procedural safeguards during readmission procedures; it only 
contains a general non-affection clause stating that ‘this Protocol does not affect the 
rights and obligations arising from other international agreements binding upon the 
Parties’ (Art. 11). Finally, although this is not mentioned in the text of the Protocol, it 
emerges from other official documents produced by the Greek authorities that the two 
countries agreed on a compensation of 71 euro per person to be paid by Greece to 
Turkey for each third country national it accepts to readmit (Council of the EU 2012, 
16; EMN and Greek Ministry of the Interior 2014, 26). 
The implementation of the Greek-Turkish Readmission Protocol had a slow stArt. 
As reported by Baldwin-Edwards, by 2006 it was clear that although Turkey was 
accepting some readmissions, there were considerable problems and delays. Indeed, 
based on figures provided by the Greek authorities, between 2002 and 2006 only 6% of 
the readmission requests sent by Greece to Turkey resulted in the actual deportation of 
the persons concerned (Baldwin-Edwards 2006). Greek authorities have repeatedly 
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 The Protocol regulates also the transit of third country nationals for the purpose of readmission (Art. 7, 
2001 Readmission Protocol). 
62
 The simplified procedure applies ‘when a person is arrested in a frontier zone’ and is meant to produce 
a faster readmission, whilst the normal procedure is followed in all other cases (Art. 6). 
63
 Readmission requests must be submitted within 14 days from the unauthorised entry of the third 
country national concerned or, in exceptional cases, within 3 months (Art. 8). 
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attributed the limited effectiveness of cooperation on readmission with Turkey to the 
unwillingness of Turkish authorities to abide by the commitments undertaken in the 
2001 Protocol (Paoletti 2011a, 52). 
In particular, Greek authorities have often complained about the fact that their 
Turkish counterparts did not respect the time limits for replying to readmission requests 
established by Art. 6 of the Protocol
64
; they lamented that the six border posts identified 
by Art. 12 were not used, as all transfers were made at Evros (resulting in complex 
procedures and higher costs for Greece); they even claimed that the 71-euro 
compensation was on occasion increased by Turkish authorities to 400 or even 1,000 
euro (Baldwin-Edwards 2006; Pro Asyl 2007, 26; HRW 2008, 36). Occasional 
diplomatic tensions between the two countries have further hampered the effective 
implementation of the 2001 Readmission Protocol. 
Due to the persisting difficulties in actually implementing returns and to the 
increasing number of migrants crossing the Greek-Turkish border and consequent 
European pressures to stem the flow, in 2010 the two countries signed ‘Joint Statements 
for Cooperation’ – an informal agreement aimed to enhance bilateral cooperation on 
readmission, revitalise the 2001 formal Readmission Protocol and ensure its effective 
implementation (EMN and Greek Ministry of the Interior 2014, 18). Unfortunately, I 
could not access the text of the 2010 Joint Statements
65
; however, reportedly, on that 
occasion Greece and Turkey agreed that at least 1,000 irregular migrants had to be 
readmitted from Greece to Turkey each year (Wissink and Ulusoy 2016, 130). This was 
definitely an ambitious target, considering that returns carried out under the 2001 
Readmission Protocol in the entire period 2002-2010 amounted to a total of 2,425 – i.e. 
270 per year on average, as calculated by İçduygu (2011, 7)66. 
The first readmission of a group of migrants to Turkey after the 2010 reactivation 
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 One week from notification of arrest at the border, in the case of a simplified procedure; 75 days for 
replying to a readmission request and 15 days for readmitting the persons whose readmission has been 
agreed upon, in the case of a normal procedure (Art. 6, 2001 Readmission Protocol). 
65
 In fact, I was not able to find out whether the text of the 2010 Joint Statements has actually been 
published, but I strongly doubt it has. Even an experienced Turkish human rights lawyer that I 
interviewed in February 2016 was not aware of the disclosure of the exact content of this informal 
agreement. 
66
 See also: İçduygu and Aksel 2014, 351. 
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of the Readmission Protocol took place in January 2011 (Wissink and Ulusoy 2016, 
130-131). A Turkish human rights lawyer that I interviewed in February 2016 was 
directly involved in this event and could provide a detailed account of facts
67
; it seems 
interesting to briefly present this case, because it is descriptive of the readmission 
procedures and practices carried out by Greek and Turkish authorities. On 10 January 
2011 a group of 38 migrants (including 19 children) was deported by boat from the 
Greek island of Leros to the Turkish city of Dikili and then transferred to Izmir, in 
application of the 2001 bilateral Readmission Protocol
68
. Most of them claimed they 
were Palestinian, but Greek authorities registered all of them as Syrians
69
; presumably, 
this was because Turkey had a bilateral readmission agreement in place with Syria since 
2001 (İçduygu and Aksel 2014, 351), which could facilitate the subsequent 
straightforward transfer of the returnees from Turkey to Syria. 
With regards to this practice, concerns were raised in particular about possible 
violations of the non-refoulement principle and the right to seek asylum, if persons in 
need of international protection are returned to a third country like Syria (or Iraq) 
without being granted the possibility to apply for asylum in Greece or Turkey (Wissink 
and Ulusoy 2016, 131). Turkish NGOs have repeatedly criticised the Greek practice to 
deport to Turkey, in application of the Readmission Protocol, third country nationals 
who may be in need of international protection without considering their asylum 
requests; in some cases the ‘refugee’ status of these returnees has been later confirmed 
by the UNHCR, when they applied for asylum in Turkey (Refugee Rights Coordination 
2014, 5). This practice is particularly worrying if one considers that the large majority 
of third country nationals transiting through Turkey into Greece come from so-called 
‘refugee-producing countries’, i.e. Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran and Palestine 
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 At that time the interviewee was working in Izmir for the local NGO Mülteci-Der. 
68
 The group was originally composed of 40 migrants, including two women who had been separated 
from their families and children and had to be readmitted to Turkey while their families would remain in 
Leros; reportedly, in the end these two women were not deported. 
69
 Reportedly, only three of them were actually Syrians (Wissink and Ulusoy 2016, 131). Based on first-
hand testimonies of migrants, the NGOs Pro Asyl and HRW reported that during registration with Greek 
authorities Iraqi asylum seekers often claim to be Palestinian in order to reduce the likelihood of being 
returned to Turkey and then repatriated to Iraq (Pro Asyl 2007, 26; HRW 2008, 37). 
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(İçduygu 2011, 5) and nowadays Syria70. 
As concerns the 38 migrants readmitted to Turkey in January 2011, upon their 
arrival in Izmir none of them applied for asylum, but 30 claimed they were Palestinian. 
The eight persons who accepted to be Syrian were deported to Syria on the first week of 
February; conversely, the remaining 30 who claimed to be Palestinians were kept in a 
detention centre in Izmir for several weeks, while the local police was waiting for 
instructions from the Ministry of Interior about what to do with them (given the 
impossibility to deport them to Palestine). Finally, on 21 February 2011 the group of 30 
was transferred back to Greece through the Evros region. 
When the whole group first arrived in Izmir, the lawyer I interviewed had the 
chance to talk with the local head of Immigration Police, who explained that from that 
moment on (i.e. following the signature of the 2010 Joint Statements for Cooperation) 
readmissions from Greece to Turkey were to be carried out on a regular basis and would 
consist of the deportation of a group of 40 migrants every two weeks; Izmir police 
would then be in charge of the subsequent deportation of returnees to Syria, Iran and 
Iraq. However, the final outcome of the first readmission under this new ‘regime’ 
(which resulted in the actual removal of 8 out of 40 persons) clearly proves that 
obstacles arising from the practical implementation of the agreement may prevent the 
achievement of its original target. 
Indeed, notwithstanding the 2010 attempt to strengthen Greek-Turkish 
cooperation on readmission, the results have not been satisfactory for Greece, as it 
emerges from the country report for the 2014 European Migration Network (EMN) 
study on ‘Good Practices in the Return and Reintegration of Irregular Migrants’, which 
draws upon information and figures provided by the Greek Ministry of the Interior 
(EMN and Greek Ministry of the Interior 2014). This report confirms the persistence of 
the same problems observed in the years preceding the 2010 informal agreement; in 
particular, Greece claims Turkish authorities do not respect deadlines for responding to 
readmission requests and show a certain reluctance in consenting to the readmission of 
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 For instance, between 2007 and 2008 NGOs denounced an increase in deportations of Iraqi asylum 
seekers from Greece to Turkey, followed by their detention in Turkey and their subsequent repatriation to 
Iraq, in violation of the right to seek asylum and the prohibition of refoulement (Pro Asyl 2007, 26; HRW 
2008). 
 207 
third country nationals – e.g. they selectively accept to readmit mainly Iraqi and Iranian 
nationals (EMN and Greek Ministry of the Interior 2014, 25-26). The Turkish human 
rights lawyer I interviewed confirmed that the limited effectiveness of Greek-Turkish 
cooperation on readmission is to be mainly attributed to a lack of political willingness 
on the Turkish side. 
As a proof of the fact that even in recent years the 2001 Readmission Protocol has 
not been implemented correctly, the EMN country report makes reference to the 
following figures. Between 2002, when the agreement entered into force, and the end of 
2013, Greek authorities requested the readmission of 125,742 irregular migrants; out of 
these, Turkey accepted to receive 12,618 persons, but only 3,832 were eventually 
readmitted to Turkey (EMN and Greek Ministry of the Interior 2014, 26). Hence, the 
recognition rate of readmission applications to Turkey is approximately 10%, while the 
actual return rate is only 3%
71
. Greek authorities identify as a main reason for this low 
return rate Turkish delayed responses to readmission requests, which allow for the 
migrants concerned to abscond (EMN and Greek Ministry of the Interior 2014, 26); as 
noted by the European Stability Initiative, ‘by the time Turkey has agreed to readmit 
someone and paperwork is completed, the person is usually no longer in Greece’ (ESI 
2015c, 2). 
But looking more in details into the figures reported by the EMN Greece country 
report (2014, 27), a recent ESI policy paper (2015c, 2), and the Council draft paper on 
Member States’ practical experiences with readmission to Turkey (2012, 7-12), it 
emerges that immediately after the signature of the Joint Statements, i.e. in the years 
2010 and 2011, the number of readmissions approved by Turkey had raised to 1,457 
and 1,552 respectively, and the number of returns actually carried out to 501 and 730 – 
the highest level ever)
72
. However, in the following years there has been a substantive 
decrease in both numbers; with regards in particular to migrants actually readmitted to 
Turkey, their number decreased drastically to 113 in 2012, 35 in 2013, 6 in 2014, and 8 
                                                 
71
 These data are confirmed by the European Stability Initiative (ESI 2015c, 2), whose figures include 
also the year 2014: between 2002 and the end of 2014, Greece asked for the readmission of about 135,000 
irregular migrants; Turkey accepted 13,100 of these, but in the end only 3,800 were transferred to Turkey. 
72
 Please note that the figures reported by these three sources for the years 2009 and 2010 do not coincide 
with those reported by İçduygu (2011, 7). 
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in 2015
73
 (ESI 2015c, 2). 
Against this background and in the midst of the so-called ‘refugee crisis’, the EU-
Turkey Agreement of 18 March 2016 (which is analysed in details in Chapter 6, section 
6.2.1.1) had among its purposes that of increasing the number of irregular migrants and 
rejected asylum seekers readmitted from Greece to Turkey, first and foremost under the 
bilateral readmission agreement between the two countries (insofar as the EURA with 
Turkey was not yet applicable to third country nationals; see section 3.5.2 above)
74
. 
Therefore, similarly to the 2010 Joint Statements, the EU-Turkey Agreement of 18 
March 2016 may be considered as another informal agreement signed inter alia in order 
to improve the effectiveness of the 2001 Greek-Turkish Readmission Protocol and 
increase the number of third country nationals removed to Turkey
75
. 
Apparently, this objective has been at least partly achieved: as mentioned by the 
Commission in its Fourth Progress Report on the implementation of the EU-Turkey 
Agreement issued in December 2016, a total of 1,187 irregular migrants were actually 
returned from Greece to Turkey in the course of 2016 under the Greek-Turkish 
Readmission Protocol and the EU-Turkey Agreement (European Commission 2016l, 5). 
This represents the highest number of yearly removals actually carried out since the 
bilateral Readmission Protocol entered into force in 2002; moreover, for the first time 
readmissions to Turkey have reached (and exceeded) the yearly quota of 1,000 migrants 
that had been set out by the bilateral informal agreement signed by the two countries in 
2010. 
However, the formal and informal instruments of bilateral cooperation on 
readmission analysed so far do not provide for a complete picture; an analysis of 
informal readmission practices at the borders is needed in order to gain a comprehensive 
                                                 
73
 This number is confirmed by the Commission First Progress Report on the implementation of the EU-
Turkey Agreement (European Commission 2016d, 4, footnote 5). 
74
 The readmission of irregular migrants and rejected asylum seekers under the bilateral Greek-Turkish 
readmission agreement (and later the EURA with Turkey) is neither the only nor the main purpose of the 
EU-Turkey Agreement of March 2016; its broader content and aims are extensively discussed in Chapter 
6, section 6.2.1.1. 
75
 It is worth noting that the EU-Turkey Agreement of 18 March 2016 is not a bilateral informal 
agreement between Greece and Turkey, but a European instrument of informal cooperation with Turkey, 
which nonetheless had an extremely relevant impact on cooperation on readmission at the bilateral level 
between Greece and Turkey, as analysed in details in Chapter 6, section 6.2. 
 209 
understanding of the Greek-Turkish case. In particular, given the similarities with the 
cases described in previous sections, it seems useful to focus on Greek push-back 
operations carried out in the Aegean Sea
76
. Throughout the last decade several NGOs 
have accurately documented the systematic occurrence of push-backs at sea towards 
Turkey (Pro Asyl 2007; 2013; HRW 2008; Amnesty International 2013; 2015a). These 
collective expulsions are carried out as an informal practice, apparently without any 
legal basis in Greek law or in the legal framework of Greek-Turkish bilateral 
cooperation on readmission. 
Based on the first-hand testimonies of migrants and asylum seekers involved, 
different modalities of push-backs have been reported and described, as follows. Push-
backs are generally carried out by the Greek Coast Guard
77
; this may block small 
migrant boats or dinghies just before they enter Greek territorial waters and divert them 
towards Turkey, typically by means of dangerous manoeuvres. If migrant boats are 
already in Greek territorial waters, Greek authorities may tow them back into Turkish 
waters by using a rope, or they may take the people and the dinghy on board their vessel 
and when they reach Turkish waters put the dinghy with its passengers down and leave 
it at sea. Migrants may be pushed back to Turkey even when they are a few meters off a 
Greek island, or even after they have made their landfall. Reportedly, Greek officials 
usually damage or disable dinghies so that migrants can only, at best, return to the 
Turkish coast. If a dinghy is already damaged or gets damaged by migrants themselves 
(a common strategy to avoid being towed back to Turkey), Greek authorities may take 
the migrants on board their vessel and bring them back to the Turkish coast or, more 
often, deposit them on uninhabited Turkish islands without any means of subsistence
78
 
(Pro Asyl 2007, 6, 9-12 and 35; HRW 2008, 41-47; Amnesty International 2013, 9-13; 
                                                 
76
 Systematic push-backs at the Greek-Turkish land border in the Evros region have also been 
documented by NGOs (Pro Asyl 2007, 17-18; HRW 2008, 38-41; Amnesty International 2013; Pro Asyl 
2013, 29-32; Amnesty International 2014a, 20-28; Amnesty International 2015a, 57-65); however, for 
reasons of brevity I will not analyse this practice, but rather focus on push-backs at sea. 
77
 However, according to several testimonies, in some cases it was not possible to determine the identity 
and affiliation of officers involved in push-back operations, because they wore black uniforms and full 
face-covering masks (Pro Asyl 2013). 
78
 These operations are usually carried out during the night, so that Turkish authorities do not detect 
Greek Coast Guard vessels entering Turkish territorial waters (Pro Asyl 2007, 35). 
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Pro Asyl 2013, 18-28; Amnesty International 2015a, 57-65). 
All these practices evidently put migrants’ lives in serious danger. Moreover, 
episodes of violence and ill-treatment are often reported by migrants and asylum seekers 
involved in push-backs (Pro Asyl 2007, 10-11; HRW 2008, 41-47; Amnesty 
International 2013, 13-14). Greek push-backs may even result in the death of migrants, 
as exemplified by the incident that took place offshore the Greek island of Farmakonisi 
on 21 January 2014, when twelve people died during what the survivors described as an 
attempted push-back operation. The survivors reported that their boat, which was 
carrying 28 people (of Afghan and Syrian nationality) and had a mechanical breakdown, 
capsized while it was being towed at high speed and in bad weather conditions by the 
Greek Coast Guard towards the Turkish coast
79
 (ECRE 2014a; UNHCR 2014). 
From a legal point of view, all different modalities of push-backs described above 
are extremely controversial and may entail (or lead to) several violations of EU and 
international human rights and refugee law, as further analysed in section 7.2. Migrants 
and asylum seekers involved in such operations are neither identified nor granted the 
possibility to apply for asylum, they are not heard by Greek authorities, their personal 
situation is not assessed on an individual basis, and they are not given the opportunity to 
challenge their forced removal in front of the competent authorities. NGOs report that, 
in some cases, even when asylum seekers explicitly requested not to be deported 
because they were fleeing war and seeking protection, their requests remained unheard 
(Pro Asyl 2013, 18). It is worth recalling that a large majority of migrants who cross the 
Aegean Sea from Turkey to Greece come from ‘refugee-producing countries’ (like 
Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine, the Horn of Africa, etc.) and should thus be 
considered as potential asylum seekers. Therefore, the respect of the non-refoulement 
principle and the right to seek asylum appears to be of utmost importance in the Greek-
Turkish context. 
                                                 
79
 In contrast, Greek authorities affirmed that they were conducting a rescue operation by towing the 
migrant boat towards the island of Farmakonisi. They alleged that the sinking of the boat was not due to 
their supposedly risky manoeuvre, but to the movements of migrants, who gathered on one side of the 
boat, causing its overturning and sinking. The UNHCR and the Council of Europe Commissioner for 
Human Rights denounced the suspicious circumstances of the incident and called for a thorough 
investigation (ECRE 2014a; UNHCR 2014). 
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Nonetheless, alleged push-backs at sea have been performed continuously, 
although with variable frequency
80
. Still, Greek authorities have never officially 
admitted that such a practice is in place, and have usually replied to allegations by 
stressing the enormous endeavour of the Greek Coast Guard in surveilling a large part 
of the EU external maritime borders and preventing unauthorised migration, as well as 
its commitment to properly implement EU law (Pro Asyl 2013, 16-17). 
For the sake of clarity, it is worth specifying that in its daily activity the Greek 
Coast Guard does perform also search and rescue (SAR) operations in accordance with 
international standards and procedures
81
; in fact, first-hand testimonies have confirmed 
that on several occasions the Greek authorities have rescued migrants in distress at sea 
and taken them to the nearest safe port on the Greek islands
82
. However, even though 
not all migrant boats are pushed back to Turkey, the copious and consistent evidence 
collected by NGOs during the last decade appears to incontestably demonstrate the 
existence of this informal practice. Actually, based on NGOs’ reports, it seems that the 
majority of third country nationals’ removals from Greece to Turkey are carried out by 
means of informal summary expulsions, rather than based on the formal readmission 
procedures established by the 2001 Readmission Protocol (HRW 2008, 37). 
In contrast to the cases of Italian push-backs towards Libya and Spanish 
devoluciones en caliente towards Morocco, Greek push-backs towards Turkey are 
neither based on a provision of national law, nor on informal bilateral cooperation 
agreements or technical arrangements. Greek push-backs appear to be a purely informal 
practice lacking any legal basis; and it is precisely its informal nature that has always 
allowed Greece to deny its existence. 
Turkey, on its part, cannot but be aware of Greek push-backs; however, its 
standpoint towards this practice is neither clear nor unambiguous. On occasion, Turkish 
                                                 
80
 The most recent episodes documented by Amnesty International took place between November 2014 
and August 2015 (Amnesty International 2015a, 60). 
81
 For an account (based on interviews with Greek authorities) on how the Greek Coast Guard normally 
operates, see: Pastore and Roman 2014, 20-21. 
82
 The implementation of proper SAR operations increased between 2015 and 2016, during the peak of 
the ‘Syrian refugee crisis’; this may be linked not only to the large number of arrivals and to the high 
mediatisation of the phenomenon, but also to the fact that the sea crossings began to take place also in 
broad daylight. 
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authorities have complained with Greece and have even formally requested the 
readmission to Greece of migrants who had been summarily deported to Turkey
83
; but, 
most of the time, Turkish authorities simply turn a blind eye on this practice. Based on 
first-hand testimonies, NGOs report that if pushed-back migrants are rescued by the 
Turkish Coast Guard (in Turkish territorial waters or from uninhabited islands) or 
arrested by Turkish police on the coast, they are usually kept in detention centres for 
some time and then simply released; however, depending on their nationality, returnees 
may face the risk of being deported to their country of origin (Pro Asyl 2013, 19). 
To conclude, it seems that also in the Greek-Turkish case the operationalisation of 
cooperation on migration management, border control and readmission has been largely 
prioritised. In order to improve the limited effectiveness (in terms of return rates) of the 
formal Readmission Protocol signed in 2001, the two countries resorted to informal 
agreements, first in 2010 and later (at the EU level) in March 2016, with the purpose to 
revitalise bilateral cooperation and remove obstacles to the practical implementation of 
the readmission agreement. However, readmissions to Turkey are only partly carried out 
in the framework of formal or informal bilateral agreements; allegedly, they are mostly 
carried out through informal push-back operations, whose existence is largely 
documented by NGOs but has always been denied by the Greek government. The 
informality and secrecy of such readmission practices result in a lack of transparency 
and accountability, and open the way to potential human rights violations. 
 
                                                 
83
 In the 2014 country report on Greece for the EMN study on ‘Good Practices in the Return and 
Reintegration of Irregular Migrants’, Greek authorities have denounced that Turkey submits what they 
deem to be ill-founded readmission requests at the sea border for alleged illegal refoulement operations 
carried out by the Greek Coast Guard (EMN and Greek Ministry of the Interior 2014, 26). 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE PROCESS OF MULTI-LEVEL INFORMALISATION OF 
COOPERATION ON READMISSION AND ITS FUNDAMENTAL 
FEATURES 
 
 
6.1. The concept of multi-level informalisation 
Following an in-depth analysis of cooperation on readmission at the European and 
bilateral level, which focused in particular on the Mediterranean area, this chapter aims 
to discuss and provide an answer to the first research question mentioned in Chapter 1, 
section 1.2: has there been a shift towards ‘informalisation’ in cooperation on 
readmission in the Mediterranean area, both at European and bilateral level? 
At the bilateral level, the process of informalisation of cooperation on readmission 
has been first identified and studied by Cassarino (2007). In his works he analysed the 
increasingly widespread use of informal bilateral agreements or arrangements linked to 
readmission (such as memoranda of understanding, exchanges of letters, ‘oral 
processes’, administrative arrangements, operational protocols, etc.) focusing in 
particular on the Mediterranean area (Cassarino 2007; 2010b; 2010c; 2014; 2015). 
States may resort to this kind of informal instruments either as an alternative to or in 
combination with formal bilateral readmission agreements. 
What I argue is that this very process of informalisation can be identified also at 
the European level, where cooperation on readmission is increasingly based on: policy 
instruments such as Mobility Partnerships or other kinds of joint political declarations, 
like the one signed with Ghana in April 2016 (EEAS 2016a); informal arrangements 
such as the EU-Turkey Agreement of March 2016 (European Council 2016c) or the EU-
Afghanistan Agreement of October 2016 (EEAS 2016c); and concrete practices, on the 
model of the EU Member States. Also at the European level, informal arrangements 
may either represent an alternative to formal European readmission agreements (as in 
the case of the recent EU-Afghanistan Joint Way Forward Agreement), or both kinds of 
instruments may be used in a complementary way (as in the case of the simultaneous 
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and coordinated operation of the EURA with Turkey and the EU-Turkey Agreement, 
analysed under section 6.2.1.1 below). Thus, in light of the fact that similar 
informalisation dynamics in the area of readmission can be identified both at the 
national and European levels, I consider this process to be multi-level. 
The informalisation of cooperation on readmission at the bilateral level and its 
main features are analysed under section 6.3, while informalisation of readmission at the 
European level and its main characteristics are investigated under sections 6.2 and 6.4. 
This section 6.1, firstly, defines the concept of informalisation, drawing upon studies on 
the informality of international law and law-making by Lipson (1991) and Pauwelyn, 
Wessel and Wouters (2012a); secondly, focusing more precisely on international 
cooperation on readmission, it elaborates on the distinction between formal and 
informal instruments; and thirdly, it examines how the process of multi-level 
informalisation of readmission policies in the context of the EU developed over the 
years. 
In his article ‘Why are some international agreements informal?’ Lipson considers 
agreements to be informal ‘if they lack the state’s fullest and most authoritative 
imprimatur, which is given most clearly in treaty ratification’ (1991, 498); therefore, he 
links the informality of an instrument of international cooperation essentially to its 
adoption process, and in particular to the lack of ratification. According to Lipson, 
‘informality is best understood as a device for minimizing the impediments to 
cooperation, at both the domestic and international levels’ (1991, 500) and he identifies 
in particular three advantages of informal agreements compared to treaties. These are: 
1) their flexibility, which allows for their adaptation to changing conditions; 2) the 
possibility to rapidly negotiate and immediately implement them, as they do not require 
elaborate ratification; 3) their reduced publicity and prominence (when not complete 
secrecy), which allows to limit or avoid democratic oversight (due to the lack of a 
parliamentary debate and ratification process), bureaucratic control by other parts of the 
executive, and the constraints of diplomatic precedents. Hence, informality allows ‘the 
most sensitive and embarrassing implications of an agreement [to] remain nebulous or 
unstated for both domestic and international audiences, or even hidden from them’ 
(Lipson 1991, 501). 
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Lipson summarises the main reasons for choosing informal agreements, as 
follows: ‘1) the desire to avoid formal and visible pledges, 2) the desire to avoid 
ratification, 3) the ability to renegotiate or modify as circumstances change, or 4) the 
need to reach agreements quickly’ (1991, 501). With regards to the latter, Lipson 
specifies that informal arrangements may be chosen because of time pressure, e.g. in a 
situation of crisis, when there is no time for the lengthy negotiation of a formal 
agreement (1991, 538). 
Lipson’s analysis of the advantages of informal agreements and reasons for 
choosing them applies perfectly to our area of interest, i.e. international cooperation on 
readmission. However, Lipson’s definition of informality as ultimately linked to the 
lack of a ratification procedure appears too limited to cover the scope and complexity of 
informalisation, especially in the field of readmission. In their broad empirical-based 
study on ‘informal international lawmaking’, Pauwelyn, Wessel and Wouters (2012a) 
provide a wider and more complete definition of the concept of informality in the 
framework of international law. 
Similarly to Lipson, the authors consider an agreement to be informal when ‘it 
dispenses with certain formalities traditionally linked to international law’ (Pauwelyn 
2012, 15). The circumvention of these formalities is what makes informal agreements 
more desirable and effective, but at the same time it is also the reason for claiming that 
they are insufficiently accountable compared to formal agreements. According to the 
authors, these formalities may have to do with three distinct elements of international 
lawmaking
1
: the output, the process and/or the actors involved
2
. 
With regards to the output, international cooperation may be informal when it 
does not lead to a formal treaty or other international law agreement, but rather to a 
                                                 
1
 With ‘lawmaking’ the authors broadly refer to any ‘norm-setting or public policy-making by public 
authorities’, which may also involve non-state actors. The output of ‘lawmaking’ may not necessarily be 
‘law’ (Pauwelyn 2012, 21). 
2
 However, both Lipson and Pauwelyn, Wessel and Wouters agree that not all sort of informal talks 
between public authorities at international level amount to informal agreements or informal lawmaking. 
According to Lipson, ‘to be considered genuine agreements, they must entail some reciprocal promises or 
actions, implying future commitments’ (1991, 498). In Pauwelyn’s words, the output of informal 
international lawmaking ‘must be normative in that it steers behaviour or determines the freedom of 
actors’ (2012, 16); it ‘may not, strictly speaking, be part of law but merely have legal effects or fit in the 
context of a broader legal or normative process’ (2012, 21). 
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statement, guideline, declaration or an even more informal type of policy coordination. 
In the authors’ and in my own view, output informality does not necessarily imply the 
lack of legally binding character
3
: an informal agreement may, indeed, take the form of 
a statement or a press release, and yet it may be construed or considered by the parties 
as legally binding, or it may have legal and normative effects
4
 (Pauwelyn 2012, 15-16). 
As concerns the process, international cooperation may be informal when it 
occurs ‘in a loosely organised network or forum’, although this does not exclude 
informal international lawmaking may take place in the context or under the auspices of 
a more formal organisation (Pauwelyn 2012, 17). With regards to the actors involved, 
international cooperation may be informal when it does not engage traditional 
diplomatic actors (e.g. heads of State or government, foreign ministers, embassies) but 
other ministries, domestic regulators, independent or semi-independent agencies, etc.; in 
addition, private actors and international organisations may also participate in informal 
lawmaking (Pauwelyn 2012, 19). 
This three-fold definition of informality applies perfectly to international 
cooperation in the area of readmission, both at the bilateral and European level. In terms 
of output, informal cooperation on readmission has materialised, at the bilateral level, in 
instruments such as memoranda of understanding (MoUs), exchanges of letters, 
administrative arrangements, operational protocols, oral agreements, etc.; and at the 
European level, in instruments like joint political declarations, joint statements, press 
releases, high-level dialogues, etc. Even if they are not international law agreements, all 
these instruments are meant to generate reciprocal commitments on the parties and/or to 
produce legal or normative effects. 
With regards to the process, law-making in the area of cooperation on 
readmission, at both levels, may not always take place within traditional fora of 
international negotiation and may not follow codified rules and standard procedures. As 
concerns the actors involved, at the bilateral level, interior ministers and heads of police 
                                                 
3
 In this the authors’ and my view differ from Aust’s, who defines an informal instrument as ‘an 
instrument which is not a treaty because the parties to it do not intend it to be legally binding’ (1986, 
787). 
4
 For example, this is the case of the EU-Turkey Statement of 18 March 2016, also called EU-Turkey 
Agreement, analysed under section 6.2.1.1 below. 
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may, for instance, take part in informal negotiations on readmission along with foreign 
affairs ministers and heads of government. At the European level, agencies like Frontex 
and the EASO may participate in informal negotiations along with representatives from 
the EU institutions and Member States; in addition, as discussed above under section 
4.4.3, international organisations like the IOM and UNHCR may also play a relevant 
role in informal policy-making, while (based on information available) the involvement 
of private actors is less evident. 
Pauwelyn provides two examples of typical instruments of informal international 
lawmaking. The first one concerns memoranda of understanding (MoUs), an instrument 
which is largely used in particular by the United Kingdom; the UK defines MoUs as 
international commitments that do not have a legally binding character and to which the 
formalities of treaty-making (including ratification and publication) do not apply
5
 
(Pauwelyn 2012, 16). The second example concerns French administrative 
arrangements concluded by a French minister with his or her homologous minister of 
another country; the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not consider these 
agreements as proper international law agreements
6
 (Pauwelyn 2012, 19-20). Both 
MoUs and administrative arrangements are typically used by several EU Member States 
to establish informal patterns of cooperation on readmission with third countries in the 
Mediterranean area
7
. 
In line with Lipson, Pauwelyn highlights that, at the domestic level, informality 
(of output, process and actors) may lead to weaker forms of democratic oversight (e.g. 
no parliamentary ratification, no obligation of publication) and may raise accountability 
issues. Moreover, at the international level, informality raises the fundamental question 
of whether informal agreements are part of international law and whether they are 
                                                 
5
 The position of the UK is in contrast with that of the United Nations, which define MoU as ‘a less 
formal international instrument than a typical treaty or international agreement’ and consider it a legally 
binding instrument (UN Treaty Section of the Office of Legal Affairs 2012, 68). 
6
 Interestingly, a 1997 circular of the French Prime Minister concerning the elaboration and conclusion of 
international agreements, recommended French negotiators should only resort to this kind of agreements 
in exceptional circumstances, given the uncertainty of the effects they produce (Pauwelyn 2012, 20). 
7
 For instance, Italy has often used administrative arrangements involving interior ministers and heads of 
police to establish cooperation on readmission with North African countries, often within the framework 
of broader police cooperation (Cuttitta 2008; 2010). 
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subject to the consequences that normally derive from that. Indeed, it is not clear 
whether they are subject to the jurisdiction of international courts and to hierarchy and 
other systemic rules in relation to other norms of international law, including human 
rights and jus cogens (Pauwelyn 2012, 16-17). 
Having analysed the concept of informality in international law- and policy-
making, it is now useful to focus more precisely on the informality of cooperation 
instruments in the area of readmission. Both Lipson and Pauwelyn, Wessel and Wouters 
agree in saying that there may be different degrees and ways for an agreement to be 
informal. Pauwelyn (2012, 21) highlights that informality may involve only one of the 
three elements mentioned above (output, process or actors) or all of them; in any case, 
the instruments concerned may be considered informal, to a greater or lesser extent, 
depending on how many dimensions are characterised by informality. 
Lipson (1991, 498) maintains that there may be different degrees of informality 
along two main variables: the actors who concluded the agreement (heads of State and 
government or lower-level bureaucracies); and the form or means by which the 
agreement is formulated (elaborate written document, exchange of notes, joint 
statement, oral bargain, or tacit agreement). The combination of these two variables 
gives rise to different levels of informality and different types of informal agreements, 
which may be used to meet different needs (1991, 501). 
This applies also to cooperation on readmission. As a matter of fact, there seems 
to be a multiplicity of different informal quasi-legal agreements, whose degree of 
informality (and ‘legality’) varies depending on a number of variables. This is not only 
true for bilateral cooperation on readmission, but it applies also to the European level, 
where one can witness the increasing use of different modalities of informal cooperation 
in the area of migration management, asylum and readmission (see section 6.2.1 below). 
The most relevant variables of informality I have identified are: denomination of the 
instrument; form of the instrument; actors involved in its negotiation and conclusion; 
type of parliamentary scrutiny (formal authorisation or ratification, parliamentary 
debate, or none); and type of publication (official journal, unofficial publication through 
other institutional sources, leaked publication or none). A differentiated combination of 
these variables will produce different kinds of informal instruments of cooperation. 
 219 
Interestingly, on the basis of these variables, in some cases it may be difficult to 
make a clear distinction between formal readmission agreements and informal 
arrangements. As an example, the bilateral readmission agreement between Morocco 
and Spain signed in 1992, fully complies with the standards of formality relating to its 
denomination, form, actors involved and type of publication. However, as concerns 
parliamentary scrutiny, this agreement was only ratified 20 years later and entered into 
force in October 2012; meanwhile it has been applied in a provisional way. Is this a 
formal or informal kind of cooperation? Is it based on an informal arrangement or 
international law agreement? The case studies of bilateral cooperation on readmission 
analysed above under Chapter 5 provide further examples of how the distinction 
between formal and informal instruments may be blurred. 
A final remark concerns the use of the term ‘informalisation’ in this work. I have 
chosen to talk about ‘informalisation’ rather than simply ‘informality’ because I 
consider that of ‘being informal’ not only a feature of cooperation on readmission, but 
also (and most importantly) a process or a trend, which led cooperation on readmission 
to ‘becoming (more) informal’, firstly at the bilateral level and later also at the 
European level. Therefore, I am interested in analysing how the Member States and the 
EU have increasingly used informal instruments in addition to, or rather than 
(depending on the circumstances), formal readmission agreements, and have 
increasingly prioritised the operational aspects of readmission over the conclusion of 
international agreements regulating them. However, the identification of a process of 
informalisation does not imply in any way a sharp separation between two water-tightly 
distinct phases, i.e. a phase of formalisation of cooperation on readmission and a 
subsequent phase of informalisation. 
Indeed, both formal and informal modalities of cooperation on readmission have 
always co-existed. Since the late 1990s and throughout the years 2000s informal 
instruments of bilateral cooperation have been used in parallel to formal bilateral 
readmission agreements (see Cassarino 2007, 186, Figure 1; Cuttitta 2010, 30-39 with 
regards to the case of Italian cooperation with North African countries); moreover, 
negotiations for formal readmission agreements (at both bilateral and European level) 
have been concluded or initiated also very recently (as discussed under section 6.2.3 
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below with regards to the latest EURA negotiations). In fact, cooperation on 
readmission may start informally and be formalised through an agreement only at a later 
stage; or a formal agreement may then evolve into an informal arrangement or 
operational protocol, usually in order to make its implementation more effective. 
For this reason, with regards in particular to bilateral cooperation on readmission, 
it is not easy to temporally locate the process of informalisation. In his works, Cassarino 
shows that the number of informal agreements linked to readmission concluded by EU 
Member States has increased substantially over the last decade, raising from 52 in 2007 
to 98 in February 2015, according to the most recent figures (Cassarino 2015, 77). 
However, in an interview I had with Cassarino himself, he admitted that quantifying 
informal agreements is problematic and figures may be insufficiently reliable, due to 
difficulties in tracing and accessing these kinds of instruments (which often remain 
hidden). 
Bearing in mind this caveat concerning the separation between formalisation and 
informalisation and their temporal location, it seems nonetheless possible to identify a 
process of multi-level informalisation of readmission, which developed during the last 
decades both at the bilateral and European level. Formalisation and informalisation may 
be considered as two prevailing trends in two different phases, but their prevalence is 
not intended in absolute terms. 
At the bilateral level, in the last decades (i.e. since the late 1990s-early 2000s) 
countries on the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean have increasingly 
grounded their cooperation policies in the area of readmission on a broad array of 
informal instruments - such as MoUs, exchanges of letters, ‘oral processes’, operational 
protocols and other kinds of (written or unwritten) agreements or arrangements between 
governments, ministries or other officials (Cassarino 2010b, 8-14)
8
. As further 
discussed under section 6.3 below, these instruments have been increasingly used to 
regulate (or re-regulate) and operationalise bilateral cooperation in the field of 
                                                 
8
 As discussed above in section 5.1, this growth in informal arrangements linked to readmission 
concerned in particular cooperation between EU Member States and Mediterranean and African 
countries; conversely, in the same period, with countries in Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans there 
has been an increase in formal readmission agreements, both at the bilateral and European level 
(Cassarino 2010b, 10-11; 2007, 187-188). 
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readmission, without excluding the simultaneous existence also of formal readmission 
agreements. 
At the European level, despite the attempts (starting in the early 2000s) to 
implement a common readmission policy through the negotiation of EU readmission 
agreements, the difficulties in carrying out successful negotiations, the limited results 
achieved in the Mediterranean area, the insufficient effectiveness and scarce relevance 
of concluded EURAs (all discussed in Chapter 3 above) pushed the EU to gradually 
downscale the role of EURAs, make a wider use of informal instruments of cooperation 
and focus more on the operational elements of readmission, as analysed in details in the 
next section. 
 
6.2. Informalisation of cooperation on readmission at the European level 
This section discusses informalisation of cooperation on readmission at the 
European level. Section 6.2.1 shows how MPs are part of a broader trend, which 
privileges the use of policy instruments, informal deals and concrete practices rather 
than formal legal instruments to establish cooperation on migration in general, and on 
readmission in particular. The EU-Turkey Action Plan for cooperation on migration 
management and the subsequent EU-Turkey Agreement are analysed as a peculiar 
example of this trend (section 6.2.1.1). With regards to the implementation of European 
instruments of informal cooperation, section 6.2.2 analyses how the fact that they are 
implemented in practice by Member States and through bilateral cooperation may affect 
their effectiveness. Finally, section 6.2.3 reflects on informalisation as a non-linear 
‘reversible’ process, which may originate dynamics of ‘re-formalisation’. 
 
6.2.1. Policy instruments, informal deals and concrete practices vs legal 
instruments 
As discussed in Chapter 4, following the launch of the GAMM in 2005, 
readmission was firmly included into a more comprehensive policy framework for 
migration cooperation with third countries. In particular, in 2007 Mobility Partnerships 
were introduced with the main purpose to obtain more operational cooperation on 
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readmission on the part of third countries and push the latter to negotiate and conclude 
European readmission agreements, by using as an incentive the promise of increased 
mobility and legal migration opportunities for the citizens of partner countries. The fact 
that in the aftermath of the 2011 Arab Spring, the EU resorted to MPs as an instrument 
to establish cooperation on migration (including on readmission) with North African 
countries rather than simply pushing forward with EURAs may be seen as a first sign of 
an emerging informalisation trend at the European level. 
This trend has gradually become more clear and explicit, until the Commission 
issued in September 2015 its landmark communication on an EU Action Plan on 
Return, which – as described in Chapter 3 – marked a radical change in the 
Commission’s approach to return and readmission. Starting from that moment, the EU 
has increasingly prioritised the effectiveness of readmission, while neglecting whether 
this outcome is obtained through formal agreements, informal arrangements, political 
deals or concrete cooperation practices carried out at the bilateral level. The relevance 
of successfully implementing returns has been largely prioritised over the existence of 
proper legal instruments regulating readmission procedures and including, at least on 
paper, adequate human rights safeguards. 
This shift towards the prioritisation, informalisation and operationalisation of 
readmission was explained by the EU officials I interviewed partly as a consequence of 
the political change brought about by the new Commission (in office since November 
2014) and partly as a response to the 2015-2016 so-called ‘European refugee crisis’ (see 
the last paragraphs of section 3.4.4). 
In an interviewed I had with Jean-Pierre Cassarino in July 2016, the scholar 
elaborated further on the reasons for (and factors that determined) the success of 
informalisation at the EU level; he identified three complementary elements. The first 
one is the renewed willingness, both on the part of the EU institutions and Member 
States, to join efforts in order to ensure the effectiveness of returns of irregular migrants 
and rejected asylum seekers, against the backdrop of a ‘migration crisis’. A second 
relevant factor he mentioned is the role played by the existing bilateral cooperation 
arrangements of Member States, which represented a proof and an example of how 
informal cooperation on readmission can work in practice. A third factor concerns the 
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inter-institutional conflict between the Council and the European Parliament over the 
ordinary legislative procedure (which provides for a co-decision role of the Parliament) 
extended by the Lisbon Treaty to the policy area of migration and asylum. Cassarino 
considers that fostering the use of political dialogues and other policy or quasi-legal 
instruments represented a way for the Council to solve this conflict by de facto 
excluding the Parliament from participating in the adoption of such informal 
instruments of cooperation. 
As noted already in Chapter 3, there is a sharp contrast in particular between the 
2011 Commission Evaluation of EURAs and the 2015 EU Action Plan on Return, with 
regards to different elements, including the use of informal instruments of cooperation 
on readmission. Indeed, the 2011 evaluation emphasised the need for Member States to 
properly and consistently apply EURAs for all their returns and explicitly condemned 
the use of pre-existing bilateral informal arrangements (European Commission 2011a, 
4). On the contrary, the 2015 Action Plan on Return and the EU documents which 
followed (analysed below in this section) are now promoting a similar logic of 
informality at the European level, favouring the use of informal readmission 
arrangements and political deals, including at the bilateral level, with the purpose to 
substantially increase ‘return rates’ across the EU9 (Carrera 2016, 45). This new 
approach has been consistently confirmed (in more or less explicit terms) by all the EU 
officials I interviewed. 
It is now interesting to describe more in detail the development of this approach in 
the period 2015-2016, by analysing the content of the main documents issued by the EU 
institutions on the EU return and readmission policy. Prior to the Commission Action 
Plan on Return, it was the European Council held on 25-26 June 2015 to lay down the 
bases for a renewed EU approach to readmission. Building upon the letter sent by 
Commissioner Avramopulous to the Council weeks before (Council of the EU 2015a), 
the European leaders emphasised that the effective implementation of returns is crucial 
to discourage irregular migration and affirmed that ‘all tools shall be mobilised to 
promote readmission of irregular migrants’. Among the other measures, they agreed that 
                                                 
9
 On the problematic issue of measuring the effectiveness of the EU readmission policy in terms of return 
rates, see sections 1.2 and 3.4.2 above. 
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‘high-level dialogues with the main countries of origin of irregular migrants should be 
launched by the High Representative as soon as possible, in close cooperation with the 
Member States’ (European Council 2015a, para 5)10. 
The Commission upheld the European Council’s proposals and elaborated them 
further in its September 2015 Action Plan on Return. The Commission confirmed that 
increasing return rates, in particular to African countries, is an EU priority and to this 
purpose it is essential to boost cooperation on readmission with third countries 
(European Commission 2015b, 10). First of all, in order to ensure the effective 
implementation of readmission commitments (especially those undertaken by African 
countries under Article 13 of the Cotonou Agreement with regards to own nationals
11
), 
the Commission committed to organise ‘regular bilateral12 meetings on readmission 
with key countries of origin in Sub-Saharan Africa’, also in cooperation with the EEAS, 
Member States and Frontex (European Commission 2015b, 11)
13
. The explicit aim of 
these meetings is to enhance practical cooperation, for instance by establishing well-
functioning communication channels between national authorities (in Member States 
and in third countries) and working arrangements for the timely identification of 
returnees and issuing of travel documents. The primary focus is, thus, on improving 
operational mechanisms of cooperation, rather than concluding formal readmission 
agreements
14
. 
                                                 
10
 In addition, the European Council required the Commission to ensure that readmission commitments 
are implemented effectively, ongoing EURA negotiations are concluded and new ones are launched. For 
this purpose, the European Council recommended that EU assistance and policies (especially in the areas 
of trade and development) are used to create incentives, in line with the more-for-more principle 
(European Council 2015a, para 5). 
11
 Under Article 13 of the Partnership Agreement between the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) 
countries and the EU and its Member States signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000 (Cotonou Agreement), 
the parties commit to accept the readmission of any of their nationals who are illegally present in the 
territory of the other party, at the other party’s request and without further formalities. 
12
 In this context, ‘bilateral’ does not mean between two countries, but between the EU and its Member 
States, on the one hand, and the third country concerned on the other hand. 
13
 As mentioned under section 3.4.2, in this Communication the Commission proposed to focus the EU 
readmission policy on countries of origins (especially in Sub-Saharan Africa) rather than on countries of 
transit. The idea is that this would facilitate a better cooperation also on the part of transit countries (in 
North Africa), which would be less concerned about the readmission of non-nationals. 
14
 The Commission identified also a number of priority countries with which such meetings are to be 
organised: starting from Nigeria and Senegal, the list includes also Mali, Ethiopia, Congo, Guinea, Ivory 
Coast and Gambia (European Commission 2015b, 11). 
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Secondly, as requested by the European Council of June 2015, the Action Plan 
foresees that the High Representative for Foreign Affairs launches ‘high-level political 
dialogues on readmission’ with relevant countries of origin and transit. High-level 
dialogues are intended either to improve the implementation of already existing 
readmission commitments, or to establish cooperation instruments with countries where 
these are still lacking
15
. In addition to this new dedicated forum of political dialogue, 
the Commission recalled that the EU will continue to use Mobility Partnerships and 
other GAMM instruments and fora to enhance cooperation on readmission (European 
Commission 2015b, 12)
16
. Therefore, without neglecting the importance of concluding 
ongoing EURA negotiations and possibly opening new ones with relevant countries of 
origin, the EU Action Plan on Return put a strong emphasis on two elements: the 
improvement of operational cooperation on a practical (even bilateral) level and the use 
of political dialogue and other policy instruments to obtain more from third countries. 
The Council Conclusions on the Future of the Return Policy adopted in October 
2015 welcomed the Commission Action Plan, embraced fully the measures it proposed 
and provided further details on their operationalisation. Under paragraph 11, the 
Council reaffirmed that ‘the EU and its Member States will strive to ensure the effective 
implementation of all readmission commitments, whether undertaken through formal 
readmission agreements, the Cotonou Agreement or other arrangements’, including in 
this wording also informal instruments. 
With regards to the bilateral meetings on readmission proposed by the 
Commission, the Council recommended their ‘swift launch’ and reaffirmed that they 
should focus on enhancing ‘practical cooperation with all relevant countries of origin 
                                                 
15
 In fact, the list of possible priority countries for high-level dialogues includes a differentiated set of 
countries: countries that have already signed a EURA (like Pakistan and Sri Lanka), countries that have 
ongoing negotiations (Morocco and Algeria) and countries that have never started (or had refused to start) 
readmission negotiations with the EU: Egypt, the Sub-Saharan African countries mentioned also in the 
previous list (Nigeria, Senegal, Mali, Ethiopia, Congo, Guinea, Ivory Coast and Gambia), and two Asian 
countries (Afghanistan and Bangladesh) (European Commission 2015b, 12). 
16
 The introduction of high-level political dialogues on readmission has been criticised by García 
Andrade et al. (2015, 29), who questioned the choice of creating a new forum of this kind, given that the 
issue of readmission could be dealt with either in the framework of Joint Readmission Committees under 
existing EURAs (for Pakistan and Sri Lanka) or, in their absence, under other existing fora for bilateral 
dialogue between the EU and third countries. 
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and transit’ and should build ‘on the experience of EU Member States having a record 
of successful return operations to these third countries’. Therefore, the example of 
Member States’ bilateral readmission practices and arrangements should play a relevant 
role in the establishment of EU-level operational cooperation on readmission. 
In addition, depending on the progress achieved with these bilateral dialogues 
until June 2016, the Council invited the Commission to propose negotiating mandates 
for EURAs ‘with relevant countries of origin where it is necessary to formalise the 
practical cooperation arrangements’. This recommendation highlights that operational 
cooperation has become a priority for the EU, whereas formal readmission agreements 
represent an option, which may be pursued ‘if necessary’ only at a second stage, in 
order to formalise pre-established informal cooperation (Council of the EU 2015b, para 
11). 
The EU’s preference for informal working arrangements on readmission 
developed in the framework of political dialogues with African countries emerged also 
in the EU-Africa Valletta Summit held on 11-12 November 2015. In the Valletta 
Summit Action Plan, indeed, the EU Member States agreed to ‘develop practical 
cooperation arrangements and bilateral dialogues on implementation of returns with 
regard, in particular, to identification and issuance of travel documents’ (Council of the 
EU 2015c, 16). The same approach to readmission is restated in the Council 
Conclusions on External Aspects of Migration of 23 May 2016 (Council of the EU 
2016c, para 8). 
But the most clear and explicit acknowledgment of a shift towards informal 
cooperation on readmission at the European level is included in the Council 
Conclusions on the Expulsion of Illegally Staying Third-country Nationals of 11 May 
2016. Here, the Council affirmed that, 
 
in addition to readmission agreements, legally non-binding working arrangements 
on identification, return and readmission could be established with third countries 
at EU level, pertaining in particular to own nationals and including the holding of 
regular, informal meetings at expert level to review implementation and address 
possible obstacles. The Council should be involved in the negotiating process, as 
appropriate. Such legally non-binding arrangements should be fully compatible 
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with existing bilateral readmission agreements of the Member States, and may in 
cases contribute to creating the conditions for the negotiation and conclusion of 
future readmission agreements as cooperation develops (Council of the EU 2016b, 
4). 
 
In this provision the change in the EU approach to readmission is perfectly 
summarised. Cooperation on readmission with third countries does not need to be based 
on EURAs, but may be established through ‘legally non-binding working arrangements’ 
and ‘regular informal meetings at expert level’. The main focus is on readmission of 
own nationals by countries of origin, rather than on readmission of non-nationals by 
transit countries in the EU’s neighbourhood. Unlike EURAs, these EU informal 
arrangements are ‘fully compatible’ with Member States’ bilateral readmission 
agreements and practices; in fact, they actually draw on Member States’ experience and 
their implementation usually relies on Member States’ existing practices. Finally, the 
use of these informal instruments of cooperation may also lead to the adoption of formal 
EURAs. 
In its Communication on Establishing a New Partnership Framework with Third 
Countries of 7 June 2016, the Commission confirmed the approach promoted by the 
Council. The Commission described plans to develop ‘a new Partnership Framework’, 
i.e. ‘a new comprehensive cooperation with third countries on migration’ based on so-
called ‘compacts’ or ‘comprehensive partnerships’, which would put together the full 
range of EU policies and external relations instruments with the purpose to stimulate 
third countries’ enhanced cooperation in the management of migration (European 
Commission 2016f, 5-6). The EU aims to use in particular its development and trade 
policies as a leverage to obtain ‘specific and measurable increases in the number and 
rate of return and readmissions’; indeed, ‘the essential part of any compact will be joint 
efforts to make returns and readmission work’ (European Commission 2016f, 7). 
In order to achieve this goal, the Commission stressed the need to prioritise and 
secure coordinated and coherent action in the field of readmission on the part of the EU 
and Member States and clearly reaffirmed that ‘the paramount priority is to achieve fast 
and operational returns, and not necessarily formal readmission agreements’ (European 
Commission 2016f, 7). This statement resounds the words pronounced by a DG HOME 
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official I interviewed in March 2016 (three months before), who said that the new 
Commission approach did not have as a priority that of signing formal readmission 
agreements, but rather making readmission work in practice. Apparently, in the view of 
both the Council and the Commission
17
, improving operational cooperation in close 
relation with Member States comes first, while the eventual formalisation of such 
cooperation has become an optional element. 
A further confirmation of this new approach comes from the European Council of 
28-29 June 2016, which endorsed the Commission proposal for a new Partnership 
Framework and committed to its swift implementation, starting with a limited number 
of priority countries
18
. Paragraph 2 of the Council Conclusions is worth quoting in full: 
 
Building on the Commission communication, the EU will put into place and 
swiftly implement this Framework based on effective incentives and adequate 
conditionality, starting with a limited number of priority countries of origin and 
transit, with the following objectives: 
- to pursue specific and measurable results in terms of fast and operational returns 
of irregular migrants, including by applying temporary arrangements, pending the 
conclusion of full-fledged readmission agreements; 
- to create and apply the necessary leverage, by using all relevant EU policies, 
instruments and tools, including development and trade; 
- to also mobilise elements falling within Member States’ competence and to seek 
synergies with Member States in relations with the specific countries. 
Cooperation on readmission and return will be a key test of the partnership 
between the EU and these partners (European Council 2016d, para 2) [emphasis 
added]. 
 
Finally, the European Council Conclusions on Migration of 20 October 2016 
acknowledged the outcomes achieved in the implementation of the Partnership 
                                                 
17
 Cassarino stressed in our interview how, in an institutional perspective, the position of the JHA 
Council has become the prevalent one and how the Commission has aligned its own views to those of the 
Council (sometimes to the point of neglecting the fundamental principles of the Treaties and the respect 
for human rights). In fact, the analysis carried out in this section demonstrates that the core elements of 
the new EU approach to readmission may be equally found in documents produced by the Council and 
the Commission, proving a rare unity of vision between the two institutions. 
18
 From June to October 2016 most of the EU efforts in the implementation of the new Partnership 
Framework focused on five priority countries: Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Mali and Ethiopia. The progress 
made with each of them is described in the First Progress Report on the Partnership Framework issued by 
the Commission on 18 October 2016 (European Commission 2016k; see in particular Annex 3). 
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Framework with the first priority countries (Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Mali and Ethiopia) 
and confirmed the EU’s willingness to continue to pursue this new approach to 
migration cooperation, since ‘more efforts are needed to stem the flows of irregular 
migrants, in particular from Africa, and to improve return rates’ (European Council 
2016e, para 4). 
To sum up, instruments of informalisation of cooperation on readmission at the 
European level include (but are not limited to): 1) Mobility Partnerships, aimed at 
improving cooperation on readmission by offering incentives in the areas of legal 
migration and mobility; 2) high-level political dialogues on migration, aimed at 
prioritising return and readmission in the EU relations with specific third countries of 
origin and transit; and 3) informal quasi-legal agreements linked to readmission. The 
latter are usually referred to by the EU institutions as ‘legally non-binding’ agreements 
or arrangements, as for instance in the above-mentioned Council Conclusions on the 
expulsion of illegally staying third country nationals of May 2016 (Council of the EU 
2016b, 4). However, I prefer to call them more generally ‘quasi-legal’ instruments, 
because in some cases they may be considered to have legally binding nature even if 
they are not formal international law agreements (as in the case of the EU-Turkey 
Agreement discussed below). Having analysed in details Mobility Partnerships in 
Chapter 4 above, it is worth providing a few examples also of the second and third types 
of informal instruments. 
Considering that they have been introduced only in the last two years, high-level 
political dialogues and informal readmission deals have developed rather rapidly and 
their use is deemed to grow exponentially in the coming years. Their very denomination 
and form, the actors involved in their negotiation and conclusion, the avoidance of any 
parliamentary scrutiny and the modality of their publication bear witness to the 
informality of these kinds of European instruments of cooperation on readmission. 
As regards the second category, the Communication establishing a new 
Partnership Framework included in annex an impressive list of High-Level Dialogues 
on Migration held in the period comprised between July/September 2015 and May 2016 
 230 
with 16 countries in Africa, Asia and the Mediterranean area
19
. Most of these dialogues 
were carried out by the High Representative and the Commission, whilst some of them 
by the foreign ministers of some Member States on behalf of the EU (European 
Commission 2016f, Annex 2). 
One of the first outcomes of a High-Level Dialogue was the Joint Declaration on 
Ghana-EU Cooperation on Migration, signed on 16 April 2016
20
. This document 
resembles in many respects the text of joint declarations establishing Mobility 
Partnerships, being similarly built around the four GAMM pillars; however its content 
is more general and less structured and it lacks any reference to concrete measures and 
projects. With regards to readmission, paragraph 11 of the Joint Declaration states: 
 
In this context and in line with the Valletta Declaration and Action Plan, both 
parties agreed on the need to significantly increase in the short-term the speed and 
efficiency of procedures for returning and receiving irregular migrants and the 
timely issuance of travel documents required for return. The parties agreed to 
deepen the discussions at the technical level. Ghanaian authorities committed to 
organise pilot identification missions in EU Member States [not later than June 
2016] (EEAS 2016a, para 11). 
 
Two additional examples of EU informal instruments of cooperation on 
readmission can be found among quasi-legal agreements (the third category of informal 
instruments mentioned above). The first one is the EU-Turkey Statement, also called 
‘EU-Turkey Agreement’, signed on 18 March 201621. This is an extremely interesting 
case of informal cooperation between the EU and a third country (Turkey) in the area of 
migration and asylum, interconnected in a peculiar way also with the formal EURA 
with Turkey and to bilateral cooperation on readmission between Greece and Turkey. 
The EU-Turkey Agreement will be analysed in detail in the next sub-section 6.2.1.1. 
The second example is the ‘Joint Way Forward on Migration Issues between 
                                                 
19
 Ethiopia, Eritrea, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Algeria, 
Morocco, Tunisia, Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan. 
20
 The text of the EU-Ghana Joint Declaration is available at the following link: 
https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/5249_en. See Table 2, section 4.1 above. 
21
 The text of the EU-Turkey Agreement is available in the form of a European Council press release at 
the following link: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18-eu-turkey-
statement/. It will be analysed in the next sub-section. 
 231 
Afghanistan and the EU’, also called ‘EU-Afghanistan Joint Way Forward (or JWF) 
Agreement’ signed on 2 October 201622. In the joint press release that introduced it, the 
deal is presented as the outcome of a six-month long negotiation in the framework of a 
Senior Officials’ Dialogue on Migration23. The document is described as ‘a joint 
political commitment to effectively tackle the challenges linked to irregular migration’ 
(EEAS 2016b). However, since Afghan nationals represented in 2015 the second largest 
group of asylum seekers in the EU after Syrians with 196,170 applications (EASO 
2016a, 10), the EU-Afghanistan deal is mainly focused on the readmission (and 
reintegration) of rejected asylum seekers to Afghanistan. 
The legal nature of this arrangement is clarified in its introduction, in a way that 
aims to clearly distinguish it from a formal EURA, notwithstanding the fact that its 
purpose, and partly also its content, are similar to those of a formal readmission 
agreement: 
 
The JWF is not intended to create legal rights or obligations under international 
law. It paves the way for a structural dialogue and cooperation on migration issues 
[…]. It comes in support of the EU Member States bilateral relations with 
Afghanistan and cannot be interpreted as superseding the existing or preventing the 
conclusion of future bilateral agreements between the EU Member States and 
Afghanistan (EEAS 2016c, Introduction)
24
. 
 
As part of the deal, Afghanistan commits to readmit any Afghan citizen who has 
not been recognised international protection in the EU and who refuses to voluntarily 
return to Afghanistan. Interestingly, the text establishes ‘a limitation to the number of 
non-voluntary returnees to 50 persons per flight in the first six months following the 
signature of the declaration’; however, there seems to be no limit to the total number of 
                                                 
22
 The text of the EU-Afghanistan deal is available at the following link: 
https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/11107/joint-way-forward-on-migration-
issues-between-afghanistan-and-the-eu_en. 
23
 Indeed, both the May 2016 Council Conclusions on External Aspects of Migration and the June 2016 
Commission Communication on establishing a new Partnership Framework identified Afghanistan as a 
priority country in Asia, towards which the EU committed to ensure a more effective cooperation on 
readmission (Council of the EU 2016c, para 8; European Commission 2016f, para 16). 
24
 In describing the relations (of compatibility) between this text and Member States’ bilateral 
readmission agreements with Afghanistan, this paragraph recalls the words of the Council Conclusions on 
the expulsion of illegally staying third country nationals quoted above (Council of the EU 2016b, 4). 
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daily deportation flights that can be carried out by EU Member States individually or 
jointly under the coordination of Frontex. Expecting a large number of deportations, 
‘both sides will explore the possibility to build a dedicated terminal for return in Kabul 
airport’ (EEAS 2016c, Part II, para 3). 
One of the most worrying aspects of the agreement in terms of human rights 
protection is that it opens up to the possibility of deporting unaccompanied children, 
single women, elderly and seriously sick people. Even though it specifies that ‘special 
measures will ensure that such vulnerable groups receive adequate protection, assistance 
and care throughout the whole process’ and clarifies that unaccompanied children will 
not be returned ‘without successful tracing of family members or without adequate 
reception and care-taking arrangements having been put in place in Afghanistan’ (EEAS 
2016c, Part I, paras 4-5), according to NGOs these provisions are questionable because 
the practice of deporting vulnerable people to Afghanistan had so far been rarely used 
among Member States. 
In addition, this informal agreement is particularly controversial for two reasons. 
Firstly, it was signed in the run-up to the Brussels Donor conference on Afghanistan, 
which took place on 4-5 October 2016
25
. This is a clear evidence of the EU’s attempt to 
make humanitarian and development aid conditional to a third country’s cooperation on 
migration management, and especially on return and readmission. This practice is 
actually part of a broader European strategy, based on the previous experience of the 
EU-Turkey Agreement of March 2016, which is grounded exactly on the same quid pro 
quo (see next section). 
Following the EU-Turkey Agreement, several EU leaders have strongly 
encouraged the replication of the same model with other relevant countries of transit or 
origin, in particular in Africa
26
. In the context of the new Partnership Framework (for 
which the EU-Turkey Agreement is credited as an inspiration), the EU itself committed 
to conclude before the end of 2016 informal migration deals with Ethiopia, Mali, Niger, 
                                                 
25
 Information on the Brussels Donor Conference on Afghanistan is available at the following link: 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2016/10/05/. 
26
 For instance, Austria has suggested the negotiation of an agreement of this kind with Egypt (EU 
Observer, 20 September 2016) and the German chancellor has directly engaged in migration talks with 
several African countries - Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Ethiopia and Chad (EurActiv, 7 October 2016). 
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Nigeria and Senegal focused on the provision of aid in return for increased cooperation 
on the readmission of irregular migrants and rejected asylum seekers (EU Observer, 13 
October 2016; EurActiv 21 October 2016). The long-standing conditionality principle 
seems, thus, to have further evolved into a logic of trading humanitarian and 
development aid to countries that are in vital need of it, in exchange for their 
cooperation in stemming migration flows. 
The second most controversial element of this informal agreement is the critical 
security situation in Afghanistan, which is consistently reported as having deteriorated 
further in the last two years. This is the conclusion not only of several NGOs’ accounts, 
but also of two recent Country of Origin Information (COI) reports by the EASO 
focused, respectively, on the recruitment by armed groups (EASO, 2016b) and on the 
general security situation across the country (EASO, 2016c). Moreover, concerns were 
expressed even by the Commission and the EEAS in a restricted non-paper ‘on 
enhancing cooperation on migration, mobility and readmission with Afghanistan’ 
produced in March 2016 and transmitted to the Council’s Permanent Representatives 
Committee in preparation to the EU-Afghanistan agreement. In this document the EU 
institutions noted that: 
 
the main push factors [of Afghan migration to Europe] are: a deteriorating security 
situation with record levels of terrorist attacks and civilian casualties (over 11,000 
civilian casualties recorded in 2015), compounded by a deteriorating economic 
situation. Both are likely to grow stronger (Council of the EU 2016a, 3). 
 
Therefore, NGOs have strongly criticised the EU and its Member States because, 
despite being well-aware of the situation in Afghanistan, they are ready to forcibly 
repatriate rejected asylum seekers to a country in conflict (Amnesty International 
2016f). In this respect the Joint Way Forward Agreement appears to be even more 
dangerous for migrants and asylum seekers than the EU-Turkey Agreement. 
 
  
 234 
6.2.1.1. The EU-Turkey cooperation on migration management in the context of 
the ‘refugee crisis’ 
This section analyses the recent intensification of migration cooperation between 
the EU and Turkey, which occurred between 2015 and 2016, as one of the most 
interesting cases of informalisation of cooperation on readmission at the European level. 
Since the summer of 2015 the EU has struggled to cope with the so-called ‘refugee 
crisis’, a mass influx of mainly (but not exclusively) Syrian, Iraqi, and Afghan asylum 
seekers along the Eastern Mediterranean and Western Balkan routes into Europe
27
. 
Besides representing a serious humanitarian crisis affecting hundreds of thousands of 
human beings, this migration flow has challenged the fragile geopolitical balance of the 
Western Balkan region, exacerbated tensions among Member States and raised concerns 
about the future of the borderless Schengen area. 
EU Member States have shown limited capacity to agree on a common strategy to 
deal with the ‘crisis’; one of the few issues European leaders seemed to agree upon was 
the need to obtain from Turkey a stronger commitment to reduce the flow of migrants 
and asylum seekers crossing the Aegean sea to the Greek islands. Therefore, the EU 
institutions and Member States took a series of decisive steps to improve migration 
cooperation with Turkey; this includes in particular the adoption of an EU-Turkey 
Action Plan in October/November 2015 and the EU-Turkey Agreement of March 2016. 
 
The EU-Turkey Action Plan 
During the informal European Council meeting of 23 September 2015, European 
leaders decided to ‘reinforce the dialogue with Turkey at all levels […] in order to 
strengthen our cooperation on stemming and managing the migratory flows’ (European 
Council 2015b). Starting from that moment, an intense negotiation was launched 
between European and Turkish diplomacies, counting several high-level meetings. On 5 
                                                 
27
 Arrivals along the Eastern Mediterranean route amounted to more than 850,000 in 2015; 90% of them 
originated from the world’s top ten refugee-producing countries (more than 50% came from Syria, 
approximately 25% from Afghanistan and 15% from Iraq). Source: UNHCR Refugees/Migrants 
Emergency Response: Mediterranean, http://data.unhcr.org/mediterranean/country.php?id=83 (accessed 
on 10 November 2016). 
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October 2015 Turkish President Erdoğan was invited to Brussels to discuss the issue 
with the representatives of the European institutions; the outcome was a first draft 
Action Plan ‘stepping up EU-Turkey cooperation on support of refugees and migration 
management in view of the situation in Syria and Iraq’ (European Commission 2015c). 
A slightly modified joint version of the Action Plan was agreed ad referenda on 15 
October 2015 (European Commission 2015d) and was finally activated at the 
extraordinary meeting of the EU heads of State or government and Turkey, which took 
place on 29 November 2015 (European Council 2015c). 
On the basis of the EU-Turkey Action Plan and EU-Turkey Statement of 29 
November, the EU committed to provide humanitarian and financial assistance 
amounting to 3 billion euro under the ‘Refugee Facility for Turkey’ (European 
Commission 2015e) in order to support Syrians under temporary protection in Turkey 
and help host communities, thus reducing the push factors of Syrians’ onward 
movements to Europe. In return, Turkey committed to strengthen its efforts to both 
prevent irregular migration towards the EU and take back irregular migrants and 
rejected asylum seekers who entered the EU coming from Turkey. However, probably 
learning from its past failures, the EU did not only offer financial assistance to Turkey, 
but it also committed to accelerate the visa liberalisation process with a view to 
achieving the lifting of visa requirements for Turkish nationals by October 2016. In 
addition, the Commission engaged to reactivate the process for Turkey’s accession to 
the EU. 
The content and structure of the Action Plan are revealing of the European 
approach to the refugee crisis: cooperation with Turkey is primarily aimed at reducing 
the number of asylum seekers and migrants reaching the EU. In the first section of the 
Action Plan (dealing with Syrians in Turkey) the ‘crisis’ is depicted as a refugee issue, 
while in the second section (dealing with irregular migrants trying to enter the EU from 
Turkey) the same crisis is described as an irregular migration problem (Farcy 2015). 
The Action Plan overlooks the figures showing that a large majority of those ‘irregular 
migrants’ mentioned under Part II are actually asylum seekers. The overlapping of two 
distinct legal categories appears to serve the purpose of promoting migration control 
measures, which would affect not only migrants who are not in need of protection, but 
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also (and according to figures, mainly) asylum seekers and refugees who are in need of 
protection. 
Both the Action Plan and the EU-Turkey Statement make reference both to the 
EU-Turkey readmission agreement and to ‘established bilateral readmission provisions’ 
(European Council 2015c, para 7) as essential tools to ensure the deportation of 
migrants who are not in need of protection. When mentioning bilateral readmission 
arrangements, these documents refer (implicitly) in particular to cooperation between 
Greece and Turkey, which, despite the existing 2001 readmission protocol, was 
considered to be insufficiently effective, due to the limited number of returns actually 
carried out (see section 5.4 above). For this reason the Action Plan includes a 
commitment on the part of Turkey to ‘step up cooperation [with Greece] and accelerate 
procedures in order to smoothly readmit irregular migrants who are not in need of 
international protection and were intercepted coming from the Turkish territory’ 
(European Commission 2015d, Part II - Turkey, para 3). 
With regards to the EU-Turkey readmission agreement, as mentioned under 
section 3.5.2, when it entered into force in October 2014 it applied only to Turkish 
nationals (and stateless persons and nationals of third countries with which Turkey had 
already concluded bilateral RAs); the obligation to readmit all third country nationals 
was meant to become applicable only three years later, starting from October 2017. The 
EU-Turkey Statement brought this deadline forward to June 2016 (European Council 
2015c, para 5). Evidently, the EU and its Member States were interested in having at 
their disposal an additional instrument (besides bilateral cooperation between Greece 
and Turkey, which already applied both to nationals and non-nationals) that could 
facilitate the removal of irregular migrants who had entered the EU coming from 
Turkey and were considered as not being in need of international protection. The EU-
Turkey Action Plan and Statement exemplify how a policy instrument covering inter 
alia cooperation on readmission can be used with the aim to rapidly upgrade and 
operationalise the provisions of a legal instrument, the EURA with Turkey. Hence, 
starting from 1 June 2016 the EU-Turkey readmission agreement should have become 
 237 
fully applicable
28
. However, it seems that the actual implementation of this part of the 
EURA is still hampered by a certain reluctance on the Turkish side to take the necessary 
formal steps; indeed, as stated by the Commission in its Third Progress Report on the 
implementation of the EU-Turkey Agreement issued in September 2016, ‘regarding the 
EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement, no progress has been recorded in the 
implementation of the third-country nationals provisions. The Turkish Council of 
Ministers has not yet taken the decisions authorising the application of these provisions’ 
(European Commission 2016h, 6). 
It is worth noting that the combined implementation of the EU-Turkey Action 
Plan and the EU-Turkey readmission agreement may result in an increased risk of 
human rights violations. As a matter of fact, in the period during and following the 
negotiation of the Action Plan, NGOs reported an increase in arbitrary arrests and 
detention of asylum seekers in Turkey, push-backs at sea and episodes of refoulement of 
Syrians at the Turkish-Syrian border (Amnesty International 2015b; HRW 2015b). In 
addition, there may be a risk of ‘readmission chains’, eventually amounting to ‘chain 
refoulement’29; this risk emerges explicitly from the Action Plan, where the EU 
committed to support cooperation between Member States and Turkey in organising 
joint return operations towards countries of origin and to support cooperation with the 
countries of the ‘Silk Route’s Partnership for Migration’30 on combating irregular 
migration (European Commission 2015d, Part II - EU, paras 3-4). 
 
The EU-Turkey Agreement 
However, in the months following its activation, the EU-Turkey Action Plan did 
not seem to produce any significant outcome in terms of flow reduction; rather, the 
living conditions of asylum seekers and refugees in Greece and along the Western 
                                                 
28
 This was announced by the Commission in its daily press release of 1 June 2016: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEX-16-2021_en.htm. Accessed on 10 November 2016. 
29
 Readmission chains occur when rejected asylum seekers are deported from State to State based on 
readmission agreements back towards their country of origin (or another transit country); this may 
amount to ‘chain refoulement’ if there is no assessment of possible risks of persecution or torture (see 
above section 3.4.4). 
30
 These countries are: Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Bangladesh; most of them are considered to 
be refugee-producing countries. 
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Balkan route kept deteriorating, while escalating tensions between Balkan countries and 
between EU Member States led to the building of new fences at the EU external borders 
and to the temporary reintroduction of internal border controls within the Schengen 
area. 
This stagnant situation was suddenly turned over in March 2016 by a proposal for 
a new deal between the EU and Turkey presented at the international summit of the EU 
heads of State or government and Turkey held on 7 March 2016. On that occasion, the 
new plan (promoted by Germany and the Netherlands in concert with Turkey) was 
enunciated in its six fundamental principles (European Council 2016a, para 1); details 
and operational issues of the plan were agreed ten days later at the European Council 
meeting of 17-18 March 2016. The second day (18 March 2016) was dedicated to 
another meeting between the EU leaders and Turkey, during which a more elaborated 
version of the so-called ‘EU-Turkey Agreement’ was approved, in the form of a joint 
statement
31
 (European Council 2016c). 
In this document, the content of the new EU-Turkey deal is introduced by a very 
straightforward declaration: ‘in order to break the business model of the smugglers and 
to offer migrants an alternative to putting their lives at risk, the EU and Turkey today 
decided to end the irregular migration from Turkey to the EU’ [emphasis added]. The 
EU-Turkey Agreement does not substitute but rather complement the previous EU-
Turkey Action Plan; its main features, as introduced by the 7 March statement and 
detailed in the 18 March statement, may be summarised as follows. 
The Agreement is grounded on the parallel functioning of two mechanisms: 1) ‘all 
new irregular migrants’ – an expression that includes persons not applying for asylum 
as well as asylum seekers whose application is deemed unfounded or inadmissible 
based on the Asylum Procedures Directive (APD) – crossing from Turkey to the Greek 
islands starting from 20 March 2016 will be returned to Turkey; 2) for every Syrian 
returned to Turkey from the Greek islands, another Syrian will be resettled directly to 
the EU from Turkey (based on a so-called ‘one-for-one’ principle), giving priority to 
those who have not previously entered or tried to enter the EU irregularly. Resettlement 
                                                 
31
 The EU-Turkey Agreement of 18 March 2016 is officially called ‘EU-Turkey Statement’; this is of 
course different from the above-mentioned EU-Turkey Statement of 29 November 2015. 
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under this new mechanism will, however, be carried out within the Member States’ pre-
existing commitments, which for the year 2016 amount to a total of 72,000 places for 
resettlement available across the EU
32
 (European Council 2016c, paras 1-2). The text of 
the Agreement further specifies that, once irregular crossings between Turkey and the 
EU are ending or have been substantially reduced, a Voluntary Humanitarian 
Admission Scheme will be activated to substitute the ‘one-for-one’ resettlement 
mechanism (European Council 2016c, para 4). 
In return for Turkey’s commitment to take back ‘all new irregular migrants’ and 
to take any necessary measures to prevent the opening of new sea or land routes for 
irregular migration (European Council 2016c, para 3), the EU committed to: i) advance 
further the fulfilment of the Visa Liberalisation Roadmap from October 2016 (as 
established by the EU-Turkey Statement of 29 November 2015) to the end of June 
2016, provided that all benchmarks have been met
33
; ii) speed up the disbursement of 
the initially allocated three billion euro under the Facility for Refugees in Turkey and, 
once these resources are almost exhausted, mobilise additional funding for up to three 
billion euro until the end of 2018; iii) revitalise Turkey’s accession process, as 
established also in the EU-Turkey Statement of 29 November 2015 (European Council 
2016c, paras 5-8). 
The EU-Turkey Agreement builds upon the EU-Turkey Action Plan, but it also 
introduces two unprecedented (and highly controversial) principles in EU-Turkey 
cooperation in the area of migration and asylum. The first one is the extension of 
Turkey’s readmission obligations to all migrants, including not only irregular migrants 
and rejected asylum seekers (i.e. asylum seekers whose application is considered 
                                                 
32
 Also the European Council Conclusions of 17-18 March reiterated that ‘the EU-Turkey Statement does 
not establish any new commitments on Member States as far as relocation and resettlement are 
concerned’ (European Council 2016b, para 3). 
33
 In reality, at the moment of writing, visa liberalisation benchmarks have not been fully achieved yet 
(European Commission 2016h, 10). Both the June 2016 and the October 2016 deadlines have been 
missed, even though in May 2016 the Commission issued a legislative proposal to transfer Turkey to the 
list of visa-free countries (amending Regulation 539/2001), despite acknowledging that not all 
requirements had been fulfilled (European Commission 2016e). The Commission proposal is currently 
being discussed by the Council and the EP. Allegedly, at the present moment Turkey aims to obtain visa 
liberalisation by the end of 2016-beginning of 2017, even if not all benchmarks will be met (EurActiv, 22 
September 2016). 
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unfounded in the merits) who are normally subject to voluntary or forced removal, but 
also asylum seekers (Syrian refugees included) to whom readmission agreements 
usually do not apply. The second new element consists of a mechanism where the 
resettlement of a Syrian refugee from Turkey to the EU is offered in exchange for the 
readmission of another Syrian refugee from the Greek islands to Turkey, thus making 
resettlement conditional to readmission
34
. 
With regards to the first element, it should be noted that the deportation of an 
asylum seeker to a third country without violating EU and international law may only 
be possible if the third country concerned, in our case Turkey, can be considered a ‘safe 
third country’35 (STC) or a ‘first country of asylum’36 (FCA) for a particular applicant, 
based on the definitions set out respectively under Articles 38(1) and 35 of the Asylum 
Procedures Directive. In both cases the asylum application would be deemed 
inadmissible based on Article 33(2) of the Procedures Directive and the asylum seeker 
could be returned to Turkey because he/she either already benefits from sufficient 
protection in Turkey (Turkey is a FCA) or he/she may request and receive protection in 
accordance with the 1951 Geneva Convention (Turkey is a STC)
37
. 
                                                 
34
 However, these two elements are not completely new. Indeed, the extension of readmission obligations 
to all migrants including asylum seekers (based on the application of the STC concept) and the principle 
of resettlement for readmission represent the fundamental pillars also of the so-called ‘Samsom Plan’. 
This proposal (whose name comes from the Dutch politician who made it public in January 2016) was 
elaborated and promoted by a think tank called European Stability Initiative (ESI) and was supported by 
the Netherlands (during their semester of Presidency of the Council) and Germany. For a critical analysis 
of the Samsom Plan, see the relevant sections in: Peers and Roman 2016; Roman et al. 2016. 
35
 Art. 38(1) APD sets out a series of legal requirements that need to be met in order for a third country to 
be considered ‘safe’ (a STC) for an asylum seeker: a) life and liberty shall not be threatened on account of 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; b) there shall be 
no risk of serious harm (consisting of: death penalty; torture or unhuman or degrading treatment; or a 
serious threat to the applicant’s life due to indiscriminate violence in situations of conflict, as defined by 
art. 15 of the Qualification Directive); c) the principle of non-refoulement shall be respected; and d) the 
possibility shall exist for the applicant to claim refugee status and, if found to be a refugee, to receive 
protection in accordance with the Geneva Convention. 
36
 Art. 35 APD establishes that a third country can be considered to be a FCA for a particular applicant in 
two cases: a) if the applicant has been recognised as a refugee in that country and can still avail himself or 
herself of that protection; or b) if the applicant otherwise enjoys sufficient protection in that country, 
including benefiting from the principle of non-refoulement. Article 35 further specifies that in applying 
this concept Member States may take into account Article 38(1), i.e. the legal requirements used to 
establish whether a country is a STC. 
37
 The application of the concepts of STC and FCA to Turkey is not discussed in the EU-Turkey 
Statement of 18 March 2016, but it is mentioned in the concomitant European Council Conclusions 
(European Council 2016b, para 3). The latter refer to the Commission Communication ‘Next operational 
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Therefore, this new deal marks a radical change: while until that moment 
cooperation with Turkey on migration control and readmission was mainly focused on 
‘irregular migrants who are not in need of international protection’ (this is the 
terminology used by the EU-Turkey Action Plan), with the EU-Turkey Agreement the 
focus of cooperation on stemming migration flows has explicitly shifted to asylum 
seekers and the scope of readmission has become larger, to include irregular migrants, 
asylum seekers and refugees alike. 
The Agreement is undoubtedly the product of a strong political will on the part of 
the EU to find a radical and effective solution to the ‘refugee crisis’; however the 
solution proposed is controversial both in terms of its compliance with international and 
EU law, and in terms of its actual implementation. A number of problematic issues have 
been highlighted by the UNHCR (2016a; 2016b; 2016c), the Commissioner for Human 
Rights of the Council of Europe (2016a) and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council 
of Europe (2016a; 2016b); strong criticism was raised also by NGOs like Amnesty 
International (2016a), the European Council for Refugees and Exiles (2016a; 2016b) 
and Human Rights Watch et al. (2016). Several aspects of the Agreement were fiercely 
debated by scholars, many of whom were critical on its legal basis and its compliance 
with EU and international law (Carrera and Guild 2016; Thym 2016; Hathaway 2016a; 
2016b; Hailbronner 2016; Peers 2016a; 2016b; Pascouau 2016; Emmanouilidis 2016; 
Collet 2016; Labayle and De Bruycker 2016; den Heijer and Spijkerboer 2016; Corten 
and Dony 2016; Favilli 2016). 
In this section I will not discuss the most controversial substantive elements of the 
Agreement, concerning in particular the respect of the right to seek asylum, the 
prohibition of collective expulsions, the principle of non-refoulement and the right to an 
effective remedy, as established on paper and implemented in practice; these will be 
analysed under section 7.3 below. Here I will focus on a specific feature of the 
Agreement, relating to its form rather than to its content, which is of particular interest 
to this work – i.e. its legal nature. 
                                                                                                                                               
steps in EU-Turkey cooperation in the field of migration’ of 16 March 2016 for a more detailed analysis 
of how the asylum application of a person coming from Turkey to Greece can be declared inadmissible in 
accordance with EU and international law (European Commission 2016b, 3-4). 
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The question is whether the so-called ‘EU-Turkey Agreement’ is a legally binding 
international agreement or a non-binding political declaration. The text of the 
Agreement makes no reference to the issue, differently, for instance, from the text of all 
Mobility Partnerships and of the EU-Afghanistan Joint Way Forward Agreement, both 
clarifying explicitly the nature of the instruments, which are ‘not intended to create legal 
rights or obligations under international law’. 
The procedure established by Article 218 TFEU for the negotiation and 
conclusion of international agreements between the EU and third countries (which is 
followed, for instance, to conclude formal EURAs) has not been respected. The Treaties 
establish that, for agreements in the area of migration and asylum (a field to which the 
ordinary legislative procedure applies), the Council shall adopt the decision concluding 
the agreement only after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament (Art. 218(6) 
TFEU); moreover, the European Parliament shall be immediately and fully informed at 
all stages of the procedure (Art. 218(10) TFEU). In the case of the EU-Turkey 
Agreement, the EP has been neither informed during the negotiation process, nor asked 
to give its consent before the European Council agreed with Turkey on the text of the 
agreement and made it public in the form of a statement through a press release on 18 
March 2016. 
Considering that the formal procedure for international agreements has not been 
followed and that the Agreement has the form of a joint statement (and is actually 
denominated ‘EU-Turkey Statement’), one may conclude that it is a non-binding 
political declaration. However, den Heijer and Spijkerboer (2016) argued that the 
particular form or terminology of a text cannot be the decisive criteria allowing for the 
Council or the Commission to neglect the constitutional safeguards of Art. 218 TFEU. 
Based on the case law of the International Court of Justice, the authors argued that the 
question of whether a text is an international agreement does not depend on its form, but 
on whether the parties intended to bind themselves. 
Similarly, based on the case law of the Court of Justice of the EU, Corten and 
Dony (2016) argued that it is not the form of a text to determine whether it is an 
international agreement; on the contrary, it is based on its purpose and content that one 
can establish whether the text contains commitments of a voluntary or legally binding 
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nature for the parties. The authors come to the conclusion that the EU-Turkey Statement 
contains legally binding commitments and thus is an international agreement (whose 
validity and legal effects may however be questioned). 
Therefore, two more elements should be taken into consideration. Firstly, the 
purpose and content of the text, the terminology used and the context in which it was 
drawn up support the view that the parties intended to bind themselves, thus intended 
the text as a binding agreement. Secondly, the EU-Turkey Agreement certainly had 
legal effects: its implementation required legislative changes at the national level both in 
Turkey and Greece
38
, and at the European level (e.g. amendments to the EU-Turkey 
readmission agreement
39
 and to the Council Decision 2015/1601 of 22 September 2015 
establishing an emergency relocation mechanism
40
). These legislative changes, which 
were necessary in order to implement the EU-Turkey deal, have been promptly adopted 
(or launched) between March and April 2016, proving that all the parties involved 
actually intended the agreement as legally binding and aimed to put it in practice as 
rapidly as possible. 
Therefore, a number of elements (its denomination and form as well as the 
procedure followed and the actors involved in its negotiation and conclusion) suggest 
the EU-Turkey Agreement is an example of ‘informal international lawmaking’ as 
defined in section 6.1. However, the intention of the parties to bind themselves and the 
legal effects it produced suggest that this ‘statement’ is not a mere political declaration 
                                                 
38
 On 1 April 2016 the Greek Parliament adopted under urgent procedure an important reform to its 
national asylum law (Law 4375/2016, entered into force on 3 April 2016) which introduced a 
considerable number of changes to the institutional framework, first reception procedures, asylum 
procedure and accelerated border procedure, application of the FCA concept, etc. For an analysis of the 
main changes introduced by the new law, see: AIDA 2016a. 
39
 The EURA with Turkey had to be amended in order to advance the deadline for extending its 
application also to non-nationals from October 2017 to June 2016. See: Council Decision (EU) 2016/551 
of 23 March 2016 establishing the position to be taken on behalf of the EU within the JRC on a Decision 
of the JRC on implementing arrangements for the application of Articles 4 and 6 of the Readmission 
Agreement between the EU and Turkey from 1 June 2016. 
40
 On 21 March 2016 the Commission adopted a legislative proposal for the amendment of the September 
2015 Council Decision that established an EU emergency relocation mechanism (European Commission 
2016c). The purpose of the amendment was to make the 54,000 unused places originally earmarked for 
relocation from Hungary, available for the resettlement of Syrians from Turkey. The Commission 
proposal was adopted by the Council in September 2016 (see: Council Decision (EU) 2016/1754 of 29 
September 2016 amending Decision (EU) 2015/1601 establishing provisional measures in the area of 
international protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece). 
 244 
lacking legally binding nature; on the contrary, it plays the functions of a legally 
binding international agreement, even though of an informal kind
41
. Indeed, as I argued 
above under section 6.1 drawing upon the work of Pauwelyn, Wessel and Wouters 
(2012), an informal agreement may take the form of a statement or a press release, and 
yet it may be construed and intended by the parties as legally binding, or it may have 
legal and normative effects
42
. 
Hence, it seems that disregarding the procedure established by the Treaties and 
the institutional role of the European Parliament was an intentional strategy pursued by 
the Council and EU Member States with the support of the Commission and motivated 
by the alleged need to rapidly adopt controversial but urgent measures and avoid 
possible obstacles emerging from a democratic scrutiny of the text by the EP or from an 
opinion of the CJEU on the compatibility of the Agreement with the Treaties
43
. An 
analysis of the most problematic elements relating to the content of the EU-Turkey 
Agreement (which considers also the most recent developments at a judicial level) is 
carried out in Chapter 7, section 7.3. 
 
6.2.2. The implementation of European instruments of informal cooperation at 
the bilateral level: impact on their effectiveness 
Notwithstanding its increasing diffusion, the informalisation of migration 
cooperation at the European level is characterised by a relevant limitation that concerns 
the relationship with Member States with regards to the actual implementation of 
European instruments of informal cooperation. Indeed, Mobility Partnerships, political 
dialogues and informal agreements usually provide only for a general framework for 
                                                 
41
 For this reason, throughout this work I prefer to use the term ‘EU-Turkey Agreement’ instead of ‘EU-
Turkey Statement’. 
42
 The legal service of the EP does not agree with this conclusion and has argued that the EU-Turkey 
Statement is not a legally binding agreement but a mere catalogue of measures to be adopted on their own 
legal basis. On the contrary, several Members of the European Parliament are extremely critical towards 
the Council and the Commission for neglecting the role of the EP, which they claim had to be involved 
(in compliance with art. 218 TFEU) in the negotiation and conclusion of what they consider to be a 
binding agreement with Turkey (EU Observer, 10 May 2016). 
43
 This latter possibility is also foreseen as an optional step in the framework of the art. 218 procedure 
(art. 218(11) TFEU). 
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cooperation with a given third country; these instruments then need to be implemented 
by individual Member States through bilateral initiatives, concrete practices and 
operational arrangements with the third country concerned. 
In the framework of the EU return and readmission policy, thus, European 
informal cooperation instruments play a relevant but partial function: they facilitate, 
encourage and support (both politically and financially) cooperation on migration 
management and on readmission, but the operationalisation of such cooperation is 
ultimately a responsibility of the Member States. For this reason, the effectiveness of 
European informal instruments of cooperation actually depends on how these 
instruments are implemented in practice at a bilateral level. 
The EU institutions’ efforts to establish cooperation with a given third country 
may be frustrated if Member States do not follow up with bilateral initiatives and 
operational arrangements which translate general commitments into practice. This is 
especially true in the case of informal European instruments that are not legally binding, 
such as Mobility Partnerships or, for instance, the Joint Declaration on Ghana-EU 
Cooperation on Migration and the EU-Afghanistan Joint Way Forward Agreement 
mentioned above. In all these cases, lacking the willingness and actual engagement on 
the part of Member States to operationalise the provisions included in these instruments, 
the latter risk to be completely ineffective. 
The example of MPs is telling. As described in Chapter 4, the specific objectives 
of each MP (as listed in the main text of the Joint Declaration) are implemented through 
an evolving list of concrete initiatives and projects proposed either by Member States or 
by EU institutions and agencies, and usually included in the Annex to the MP (or 
scoreboard in the case of the MP with Tunisia). In particular, since Member States 
retain the exclusive competence to determine volumes of admission of migrant workers 
in their territory (Art. 79(5) TFEU), in the framework of a MP it is their sole 
responsibility to propose concrete initiatives in the area of legal migration, namely to 
offer labour migration opportunities, introduce circular migration schemes, etc. But so 
far this has happened only in a very limited way and the Commission does not have the 
competence and power to substitute Member States or to force them in the opposite 
direction. 
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As argued also in section 4.4.1 above, the lack of political willingness on the part 
of Member States to actually implement the objectives included under the MPs’ first 
pillar and to offer concrete opportunities for migrant workers to enter the EU frustrates 
the Commission’s efforts to present a balanced and comprehensive cooperation 
instrument to third countries, given the fact that one of the MPs’ fundamental 
components (the one third countries are most interested in) is lacking. This deficiency 
impacts, of course, on the overall effectiveness of MPs as a policy instrument aimed at 
strengthening cooperation on migration control and readmission, because the lack of 
Member States’ initiatives in the area of legal migration and mobility translates into the 
lack of a crucial incentive for third countries to cooperate in the area of readmission. 
However, the predominance of the bilateral dimension in the implementation of 
cooperation on readmission is not a peculiar feature of informalisation: rather, it 
characterises both informal instruments and formal European readmission agreements. 
Indeed, EURAs are also implemented by Member States at a bilateral level (Cassarino 
2010c, 17-18); their effectiveness, thus, depends on whether and how Member States 
put them in practice. As discussed under section 3.4.1 above, when Member States need 
to readmit a third country national to a given country, they tend to apply pre-existing 
(often informal) bilateral practices, even when an EURA is in place
44
. This may not 
affect the effectiveness of readmission per se, as long as readmission is actually carried 
out; but if EURAs prove useless compared to bilateral arrangements, this may 
jeopardise the effectiveness of EURAs as an instrument aimed at pursuing a harmonised 
readmission policy at EU level. This is one of the reasons that led the EU to learn from 
the Member States’ experience of informal cooperation with third countries and 
gradually shift its common readmission policy towards informalisation. 
Furthermore, the Commission seems to have recently acknowledged the crucial 
role of Member States in ensuring the effectiveness of European instruments of 
cooperation on readmission: in the communications issued in the last two years, besides 
fostering the expansion of informal modalities of cooperation on readmission, the 
Commission emphasised the need to strengthen cooperation with Member States. 
                                                 
44
 This practice has been explicitly criticised by the Commission in its 2011 EURAs’ evaluation 
(European Commission 2011a, 4). 
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Actually, the EU’s support for a combination of informalisation and cooperation with 
Member States in the area of readmission emerges not only from the Commission 
communications but also from the Council conclusions analysed under section 6.2.1 
above
45
. In these documents the EU institutions have consistently emphasised the 
importance of reinforcing operational cooperation at the bilateral level and have 
committed to support the launch of new (or the improvement of existing) working 
arrangements, ad hoc procedures and communication channels between national 
authorities in Member States and third countries, with the purpose to increase the 
effectiveness of cooperation on readmission at the EU level. 
Apparently, at the present moment EU institutions are pursuing a strategy where 
informal cooperation with third countries is negotiated, established and operationalised 
in close collaboration with the Member States’ authorities46. From an EU perspective, 
this is doubly beneficial. First of all, the expertise and prior relations of some Member 
States with certain third countries may be extremely helpful in the launch and successful 
progress of political dialogues and informal agreements at the EU level. Secondly, an 
active involvement of Member States’ authorities in the launch of informal cooperation 
with a given country may be useful to ensure those Member States’ collaboration also in 
the implementation phase, and ultimately contribute to the effectiveness of European 
instruments of informal cooperation. 
For instance, in the case of the EU-Turkey Agreement, the German and Dutch 
governments played a crucial role in negotiating a new European plan for migration 
cooperation with Turkey (building upon the so called ‘Samsom Plan’, as mentioned in 
section 6.2.1.1) and in promoting it at the EU level. Most importantly, the role played 
by Greece has been, and still is, of uttermost importance for the EU-Turkey Agreement 
to work properly and to produce effective results. Indeed, the implementation of the 
most crucial (for the EU) elements of the agreement is entirely within the competence 
                                                 
45
 I.e. in the EU Action Plan on Return (European Commission 2015b), the Council conclusions on the 
future of the return policy (Council of the EU 2015b), the Valletta Summit Action Plan (Council of the 
EU 2015c) and the Communication on establishing a new Partnership Framework with third countries 
(European Commission 2016f). 
46
 For instance, the German chancellor has recently engaged in migration dialogues with several African 
countries (Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Ethiopia and Chad) as part of the EU plan to establish a new Partnership 
Framework with a number of priority countries in Africa (EurActiv, 7 October 2016). 
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and responsibility of Greece; moreover, the smooth functioning of the readmission of all 
new arrivals depends on the degree of operational cooperation at the bilateral level 
between Greek and Turkish authorities. 
The demanding tasks attributed to Greece by the EU and the other Member States 
in the framework of the EU-Turkey Agreement is worth attention. First of all, as 
mentioned above under section 6.2.1.1 (see footnote 38), Greece had to amend its 
national asylum law in order to make it apt to implement the agreement at best, 
including several changes with regards to first reception, accelerated procedures, 
application of the STC and FCA concepts, appeal procedures, and its institutional 
framework. Secondly, the implementation of the agreement has posed several 
procedural and operational challenges. 
Starting from 20 March 2016, Greek authorities have to register the asylum 
applications of every person who arrives on the Greek islands and they have to rapidly 
determine, in the first place, whether applications are admissible or not (ensuring at the 
same time full compliance with EU and international law). This is already a serious 
effort for Greece, considering that it has to deal also with a huge backlog of asylum 
applications (dating back to the years before the 2013 reform of its national asylum 
system). In addition, when the EU-Turkey Agreement was adopted there were 
approximately 50,000 unregistered asylum seekers and refugees in the country, who 
were prevented from continuing their onward journey along the Western Balkan route, 
following the EU leaders’ decision to ‘close’ the Greek-Macedonian border. 
Moreover, Greece has to ensure the application of Article 46 of the Asylum 
Procedures Directive
47
; thus, authorities have to manage the presumably high number of 
appeals that may follow first instance inadmissibility decisions and they have to decide 
upon them in accordance with EU law. However, authorities must also ensure that 
asylum seekers do not leave the country during the whole procedure; the solution 
adopted by Greece has been the automatic and arbitrary detention of all new arrivals in 
                                                 
47
 Art. 46 APD establishes that if an asylum application is found inadmissible, the applicant has the right 
to an effective remedy before a court or tribunal (art. 46(1)) and has the right to remain in the territory of 
the Member State pending the outcome of the appeal; the suspensive effect is automatic if the 
inadmissibility of the application is grounded on the STC concept (arts. 46(5)-(6)). 
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so-called ‘hotspots’ on the Greek islands48. This practice poses several problems, both 
in procedural and substantial terms
49
. 
Finally, it is worth recalling that, more in general, the Greek asylum system is 
extremely weak. As established by both the European Court of Human Rights and the 
Court of Justice of the EU in two landmark judgements
50
, it is affected by serious 
systemic deficiencies that limit the possibility for asylum seekers to exercise their right 
to seek asylum, have their application duly examined, receive adequate reception, and 
be treated in a humane manner. With the EU-Turkey Agreement, the EU expects from 
this very system an additional effort to implement a plan that, from a procedural and 
practical point of view, is very complex. 
As concerns the implementation of the agreement, in practice it began on 4 April 
2016, with the readmission of about 200 migrants (who had not applied for asylum) 
from the Greek islands to Turkey and the simultaneous resettlement of about 40 Syrians 
from Turkey to Germany and Finland (European Commission 2016d). In the following 
months operations progressed rather slowly, in particular with regards to readmission 
from Greece to Turkey, as admitted also by the Commission in its third progress report 
on the implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement (European Commission 2016h, 2). 
According to the most recent figures provided by the Commission, as of 17 November 
2016, only 721 migrants have been readmitted from Greece to Turkey and 2,351 
Syrians have been resettled from Turkey to EU Member States
51
. 
On the other hand, the EU-Turkey Agreement seems to have produced, to some 
                                                 
48
 Hotspots were established in September 2015 in Greece (and Italy) as part of the EU mandatory 
mechanism for the relocation of Syrians and Eritreans across the EU. They were originally meant to be 
open centres for the reception, identification and registration of asylum seekers, but in practice they soon 
turned into detention centres for all new arrivals. In the case of Greece, the EU-Turkey Agreement 
marked the divide between open centres and closed detention facilities. 
49
 As reported by NGOs, the legal basis of detention is unclear; there is no evaluation of the risk of 
absconding and of the vulnerability of specific categories of people; there is no validation of detention by 
a judicial authority; no information is provided to detainees on the reasons and duration of their detention; 
and conditions of detention are extremely critical (Amnesty International 2016c; HRW 2016a; 2016d). 
50
 ECtHR, M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, Application No. 30696/09, Judgement of the Grand Chamber, 
21.01.2011; CJEU, N.S. and M.E. and others, Joined cases C-411/10 and C-493/10, Judgment of the 
Court (Grand Chamber), 21.12.2011. 
51
 Figures available at the following link: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-
do/policies/european-agenda-migration/press-material/docs/state_of_play_-_eu-turkey_en.pdf (accessed 
on 21 November 2016). These figures are regularly updated by the Commission. 
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extent, the expected results, since starting from April 2016 there has been a sharp 
decrease in the number of arrivals to the Greek islands: while in January-February 2016 
there were around 2,000 arrivals per day, in September-October 2016 daily arrivals 
were around 100
52
. The Commission has heralded this outcome as a factual proof of the 
effectiveness of the agreement: ‘the substantial fall in both crossings and fatalities since 
the entry into force of the Statement is testament to its effective delivery’ (European 
Commission 2016h, 2). 
However, due to the fact that arrivals to the Greek islands have reduced but have 
not stopped, whilst deportations from Greece to Turkey have proceeded at a slow pace, 
the situation on the Greek islands has been deteriorating, causing an escalation of 
tensions and violence in the hotspots. The already fragile Greek asylum system is 
suffering from increasing pressure at all levels, from first reception to appeal 
procedures; recently, this situation has started to cause concern among Member States 
and EU institutions, with raising fears that the agreement may soon collapse (EurActiv, 
2 November 2016). 
The short analysis of this case study shows that the endurance and effectiveness of 
the EU-Turkey Agreement depend entirely on the capacity of Greece to keep 
implementing it (despite the huge challenges it poses to its asylum system), as well as 
on an improvement in bilateral cooperation on readmission between Greek and Turkish 
authorities. In conclusion, this proves how the effectiveness of a European instrument of 
informal cooperation depends on how it is implemented by Member States at the 
bilateral level. 
 
  
                                                 
52
 In January and February 2016 arrivals on the Greek islands were 67,500 and 57,000 respectively; in 
March 2016 (when the EU-Turkey Agreement was discussed and adopted) they were 27,000; in April 
2016 (when the implementation of the agreement actually began) they fall to 3,650 and in May 2016 to 
1,260. From May to July 2016 arrivals were on average 1,500 per month, while from August to October 
2016 they were approximately 3,000 per month. Source: UNHCR Refugees/Migrants Emergency 
Response: Mediterranean, http://data.unhcr.org/mediterranean/country.php?id=83 (accessed on 21 
November 2016). 
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6.2.3. The reversibility of informalisation: possible ‘re-formalisation’ dynamics 
resulting from informalisation 
Section 6.2 has so far analysed the increasingly widespread use of informal 
instruments of cooperation on readmission at the European level; in this sub-section I 
argue that this recent informalisation trend should not be regarded as a linear 
irreversible process and the occurrence of dynamics of ‘re-formalisation’ should not be 
completely excluded. 
Even though in recent years there has been an evident gradual shift towards 
informalisation, this does not mean that the EU institutions have renounced the idea of 
negotiating formal instruments of cooperation on readmission with third countries. 
Indeed, EURAs have not disappeared from the Commission’s and the Council’s official 
documents; on the contrary, the need to finalise pending readmission negotiations has 
been repeatedly affirmed and the opening of new negotiations has also been suggested. 
For instance, the launch of EURA negotiations with the main countries of origin 
of irregular migrants in Sub-Saharan Africa is presented as the first of three ways to 
enhance cooperation on return by Commissioner Avramopoulos, in its letter to the 
Council of June 2015 (Council of the EU 2015a, 5). This proposal is upheld in the EU 
Action Plan on Return of September 2015, where, besides launching two new informal 
modalities of cooperation with third countries
53
, the Commission recommends the 
conclusion of ongoing negotiations with North African countries and the opening of 
negotiations for new EURAs with key countries of origin in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(European Commission 2015b, 10-12). Also the European Council Conclusions of June 
2015 make reference to the need for the Commission to accelerate and conclude 
ongoing negotiations and launch new ones (European Council 2015a, para 5(b)). 
Against this background, the Council Conclusions on the future of the return 
policy of October 2015 mark an interesting development. In this document readmission 
agreements are for the first time presented as an instrument ‘to formalise the practical 
                                                 
53
 As mentioned above in section 6.2.1, the EU Action Plan on Return put a strong emphasis on two 
informal ways of establishing or improving cooperation with third countries: bilateral readmission 
meetings with Sub-Saharan countries of origin aimed at improving operational cooperation; and high-
level political dialogues on readmission with relevant countries of origin and transit. 
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cooperation arrangements’ established through informal bilateral dialogues (Council of 
the EU 2015b, para 11). More explicitly, the Council Conclusions on the expulsion of 
illegally staying third country nationals of May 2016 recommend the establishment of 
‘legally non-binding working arrangements on identification, return and readmission’ 
and note that these instruments ‘may in cases contribute to creating the conditions for 
the negotiation and conclusion of future readmission agreements as cooperation 
develops’ (Council of the EU 2016b, 4). Furthermore, the Commission Communication 
establishing a new Partnership Framework with third countries refers to formal 
readmission agreements only to stress that they are no more a priority in the EU return 
and readmission policy, as ‘the paramount priority [of cooperation on readmission] is to 
achieve fast and operational returns’ (European Commission 2016f, 7). 
This short account shows that in the most recent EU documents formal 
readmission agreements are still an option, but they are presented along with informal 
instruments of cooperation on readmission and, compared to the latter, they are not 
considered a priority anymore. Instead, EURAs represent an eventual possibility, which 
may be pursued in order to formalise a previously established informal modality of 
cooperation, if this formalisation is deemed useful to further improve cooperation with a 
given country. The two most recent negotiations for new EURAs, both launched by the 
Commission in 2016, represent clear examples of this trend. 
The first one is the opening of negotiations for an EURA with Tunisia, for which 
the Commission received mandate in December 2014 and which formally began on 12 
October 2016. The conclusion of a readmission agreement was one of the initiatives 
explicitly included in the Mobility Partnership signed with Tunisia in March 2014 (see 
Chapter 4, section 4.5.2). Therefore, the launch of readmission negotiations with 
Tunisia may be seen as a case of ‘re-formalisation’ linked to prior informalisation, as 
the opening of negotiations for a EURA with Tunisia is a direct consequence of the 
previous adoption of an informal instrument of cooperation (the MP), which laid the 
bases and created favourable conditions for initiating discussions on a formal 
readmission agreement. 
The second example is the opening of negotiations for an EURA with Nigeria, for 
which the Commission received mandate in September 2016 and which were launched 
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on 26 October 2016. Also in this case, the negotiation of a formal readmission 
agreement originates from a context of informal cooperation. In March 2015 the EU and 
Nigeria signed a Common Agenda for Migration and Mobility (CAMM), another policy 
instrument of the GAMM, introduced in 2011 as an alternative to MP, requiring reduced 
commitments from the parties
54
 (García Andrade et al. 2015, 34-35). This instrument 
provided a solid framework for cooperation between Nigeria and the EU in the four 
thematic areas of the GAMM, including in the field of readmission. In this area, the 
CAMM focused on strengthening operational cooperation (i.e. swift identification of 
own nationals, issuance of travel documents, efficiency of return procedures), while also 
mentioning the possibility to conclude formal readmission agreements (CAMM with 
Nigeria, para 4). 
The CAMM was accompanied by the establishment of a High Level Dialogue 
with Nigeria, which has intensified in particular in the first half of 2016 (European 
Commission 2016f, Annex 2). The new Partnership Framework introduced by the 
Commission in June 2016 (with Nigeria being selected as one of the first priority 
countries) has significantly reinforced cooperation between the EU and the third 
country. As reported in the First Progress Report on the Partnership Framework of 18 
October 2016, since the launch of this new cooperation framework, ‘negotiations for an 
EU-Nigeria readmission agreement have been accelerated, with the formal adoption of 
the mandate for negotiations by the Council in September 2016 and the opening of 
negotiations planned for 25 October’ – only one month after. According to the report, 
‘Nigeria is particularly interested in simplifying cooperation on readmission by 
concluding an EU-wide agreement’ (European Commission 2016k, 7). 
The launch of negotiations for a EURA with Nigeria can, thus, be considered as a 
further instance of ‘re-formalisation’ deriving from informal cooperation. The latter was 
developed thanks to a number of informal instruments: the CAMM, the High Level 
                                                 
54
 CAMMs are offered in alternative to MPs when the EU and a third country wish to establish an 
advanced cooperation on migration but one of the parties is not willing to undertake the full set of 
obligations and commitments associated with MPs, namely the signature of an EURA in exchange for a 
VFA (European Commission 2011e, 11). The CAMM with Nigeria is the only CAMM adopted so far. It 
is very similar to existing MPs in terms of structure, content and purpose; however, it makes few 
references to concrete cooperation projects and focus more on research, data collection, exchange of 
information and good practices, etc. (García Andrade et al. 2015, 34-35). 
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Dialogue on readmission and the new Partnership Framework. 
To conclude, both the EURA with Tunisia and the EURA with Nigeria are 
examples of a possible re-formalisation trend, which is interestingly linked to a previous 
informalisation process. In these cases, informal cooperation seems to play a relevant 
function in preparing the conditions for the introduction of formal agreements: 
interestingly re-formalisation appears to be generated by informalisation. Therefore, it 
seems possible to argue that in the area of cooperation on readmission at the European 
level, informalisation and re-formalisation dynamics may coexist and influence one 
another, being the two processes fluid and intertwined. 
 
6.3. Informalisation of cooperation on readmission at the bilateral level 
After an in-depth analysis of the informalisation of cooperation on readmission at 
the European level, this section analyses informalisation at the bilateral level. The 
importance of analysing this aspect is due to two main reasons. Firstly, bilateral 
cooperation on readmission (both formal and informal) is still predominant (Cassarino 
2010c, 22), despite the gradual consolidation of a common return and readmission 
policy and the multiplication of European instruments of cooperation, if only because of 
its role in the implementation of the latter (as discussed in section 6.2.2 above). 
Secondly, as mentioned above in section 6.1, informalisation started at the bilateral 
level, with what Cassarino called the ‘emergence of informal patterns of bilateral 
cooperation on readmission’ (2007, 185); the Member States’ experience of informal 
cooperation with third countries was then taken as an example and expanded at the 
European level. 
This section discusses the peculiar features of informal instruments of bilateral 
cooperation and the reasons why States make an extensive use of these instruments as 
an alternative to, or in addition to already established, formal readmission agreements, 
focusing on the Mediterranean area. Also based on the empirical evidence provided by 
the three case studies analysed in Chapter 5, three common fundamental features are 
identified and discussed: (a) their flexibility, immediate operability and rapidity in the 
adoption; (b) their lack of transparency and accountability; (c) the role non-state actors 
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and international organisations may play. 
 
6.3.1. The increasing use of informal bilateral agreements linked to 
readmission 
As anticipated above in section 6.1 and section 5.1, over the last decade 
cooperation on readmission between EU Member States and third countries in the 
Mediterranean area has made large use of informal tools, such as MoUs, exchanges of 
letters, administrative arrangements, operational protocols, etc., as an alternative to 
formal readmission agreements, or in order to complement and operationalise them. 
Cassarino (2010b; 2010c) calls these instruments ‘non-standard agreements linked to 
readmission’ distinguishing them from ‘standard readmission agreements’. Based on 
empirical information on known bilateral readmission agreements between EU Member 
States and third countries, the scholar argues that since the late 1990s-early 2000s 
France, Greece, Italy and Spain have been at the forefront of a new wave of informal 
agreements linked to readmission with third countries on the southern shore of the 
Mediterranean and in Africa (Cassarino 2010b, 9-14; 2007, 186-188). 
For reasons of geographical proximity and migration salience, these 
Mediterranean EU Member States have tried to establish cooperation on migration 
management, border control and readmission mainly with third countries in the 
Southern and Eastern Mediterranean. However, differently from countries in Eastern 
Europe and the Western Balkans, Mediterranean and African third countries have 
shown a certain reluctance towards the conclusion and/or actual implementation of 
formal readmission agreements, due to a number of reasons (discussed below in this 
section) among which the lack of incentives comparable to those offered by the EU to 
its Eastern neighbours (prospective EU accession, visa facilitation and liberalisation, 
etc.). Therefore, faced with these difficulties, some Member States have started to 
devise a broader framework for bilateral cooperation based on a variety of informal 
agreements rather than on formal RAs, ‘arguing that these new forms of “compromise” 
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foster cooperation on readmission’ (Cassarino 2007, 179-180)55. 
There are several reasons why States may prefer to ground bilateral cooperation 
on readmission on informal instruments rather than, or in addition to, formal 
readmission agreements. Many of these reasons are closely related to the fundamental 
features of informal agreements, which will be further analysed in the next sub-section. 
First of all, compared to formal RAs, informal arrangements are more flexible and may 
be easily adapted to changing circumstances, reducing the risk of defection and 
allowing for a more effective and long-lasting cooperation. Due to the uncertainties 
surrounding the concrete implementation of a cooperation agreement over time and 
given the highly sensitive nature of migration matters, both EU Member States and third 
countries may want to include in their bilateral cooperation on readmission the proper 
amount of flexibility. According to Cassarino (2010b, 8-9), this is the main rationale for 
the adoption of non-standard agreements. 
Secondly, compared to formal RAs, informal arrangements are less visible to the 
public. This is a crucial element in particular for North African countries, whose 
governments often refuse or resist the conclusion of formal readmission agreements 
because they fear the potentially negative impact such instruments may have on their 
domestic economy, social stability and political support to the government
56
. The 
economies of certain third countries still depend to a large extent on remittances; 
moreover, cooperation on readmission is politically unpopular among the citizens of 
these countries (including their diasporas in Europe), who clearly oppose any 
commitment taken on by their national government to accept the forced return of their 
fellow citizens. In addition, the signature of formal readmission agreements may affect 
negatively these countries’ external relations with their African neighbours. For this set 
of motives, Southern Mediterranean countries have traditionally proved more keen to 
cooperate on migration management and readmission with their European counterparts 
                                                 
55
 In fact, data collected by Cassarino demonstrate that the growth of informal agreements linked to 
readmission is concentrated in the Mediterranean area, whereas the increase of formal readmission 
agreements recorded approximately in the same period concerns countries like Germany, Denmark and 
Switzerland, which have negotiated formal readmission agreements mainly with countries in Eastern 
Europe and the Western Balkans (Cassarino 2010b, 9-14). 
56
 This is true both for bilateral readmission agreements and EURAs, as discussed above in Chapter 3; it 
applies for instance to the case of the EURA with Morocco (see section 3.5.1). 
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on the basis of informal quasi-legal instruments, operational protocols and 
administrative arrangements, rather than formal RAs. 
A third element supporting the use of informal cooperation is the unbalanced 
costs/benefits ratio that formal RAs impose on third countries compared to EU Member 
States. Indeed, besides financial, institutional and organisational costs (partly covered 
by their European counterpart), as mentioned above, North African countries are asked 
to bear the social and political costs of an agreement that is unpopular at both domestic 
and neighbourhood level, without receiving adequate incentives or compensations in 
return (Cassarino 2010b, 6). Indeed, incentives offered by European States may not 
always induce third countries to conclude formal RAs, or even if they do, they may not 
be able to ensure the implementation of the agreements over time. Even though bilateral 
RAs set out reciprocal obligations for the parties, in practice such obligations are 
unequal and tend to penalise third countries. In order for the full implementation of a 
readmission agreement to be ensured, both parties would need to perceive a balance 
between its costs and benefits (Cassarino 2007, 181-184). 
For this reason, readmission is often embedded into a broader cooperation 
framework, including other strategic, and perhaps more crucial, policy areas (e.g. 
energy security, fight against international terrorism, trade concessions, police 
cooperation, development aid) or involving ‘high politics’ issues (e.g. reconciliation 
processes, strategic alliances, search for international legitimacy). As affirmed by 
Cassarino, ‘it is this whole bilateral cooperative framework which secures a minimum 
operability in the cooperation on readmission more than the “reciprocal” and binding 
obligations contained in a standard readmission agreement’ (2010b, 7). In fact, the 
benefits coming to third countries from informal bilateral cooperation in other relevant 
policy areas may compensate for the unbalanced costs of a formal readmission 
agreement
57
. 
The case of cooperation between Italy and North African countries analysed by 
                                                 
57
 According to Cassarino, the more two States interact and negotiate within a broad cooperation 
framework, the more they know their counterpart’s priorities and capacities, and the more they will be 
ready to jointly adapt their cooperation in response to changing circumstances and to the changing 
balance of costs and benefits; this dynamic favours informal flexible modalities of cooperation over 
formal legal instruments (2007, 185). 
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Cuttitta (2008; 2010) is illustrative of this phenomenon. In order to convince Morocco, 
Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Algeria to cooperate on readmission, either on the basis or in 
the absence of a formal bilateral RA, Italy has offered those countries a variety of 
incentives including legal migration opportunities in the form of annual entry quotas, 
conditional development aid, financial and technical assistance, trade partnerships and 
international political support
58
. Cuttitta argues that in most cases North African 
countries have been able to gain relevant and highly visible financial, technical and 
political benefits in exchange for their cooperation on readmission; this is most evident 
in the case of Libya (see also Paoletti 2010; 2011a
59
). Such benefits were perceived by 
those countries as sufficient to counterbalance the costs of cooperating in the area of 
migration management and readmission and to present to their national constituencies 
cooperation with Italy as overall beneficial for the country. 
If on the one hand this outcome was undoubtedly welcome by Italy, on the other 
hand Cuttitta highlights that ‘in most cases it would be difficult to tell who has gained 
more at the bargaining table’ (2008, 13). On the same note, Cassarino (2005) and 
Paoletti (2011b) emphasise more generally the ability of Southern Mediterranean 
countries to capitalise on the interconnectedness characterising such a broad cooperation 
framework with European countries, using their cooperation on migration management, 
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 In analysing Italian migration policies and relations with third countries in North Africa, Paoletti 
(2011a, 74-77) emphasises in particular the combination of readmission agreements and annual entry 
quotas as a powerful negotiation tool in the hands of Italy. Throughout the years 2000s, Italy has made 
large use of its annual entry quota system to either reward or punish Southern Mediterranean countries for 
their conduct in the areas of migration control and cooperation on readmission, by increasing or cutting 
down their reserved shares of migrant workers. Indeed, by giving these countries the opportunity to 
increase their annual share of migrant workers admitted to Italy, Italy has been able to exert pressure on 
them and obtain their commitment to collaborate in controlling migration flows and accepting the 
readmission of irregular migrants (see also Favilli 2005, 157). 
59
 Paoletti (2010) argues that in the case of Italian-Libyan cooperation on readmission, and more 
precisely with regards to repatriations carried out through charter flights between October 2004 and 
March 2006, Italy bore the highest financial and reputational costs, with limited benefits in terms of 
effective reduction of migration flows. Conversely, Libya obtained important benefits in terms of 
international credibility and regime legitimacy, as well as financial and material resources received from 
Italy. In negotiating cooperation on readmission in this particular case, Libya has been the strongest 
player (the one that had to be induced to cooperate) while Italy had ‘little choice but to cooperate with 
Libya’ and was ready ‘to talk at any cost’. Paoletti concludes that ‘the Italian-Libyan non-standard 
agreements linked to readmission can be defined as relations among unequals, with Italy being in the 
weaker position’ (2010, 74), thus configuring an overturning in north-south power relations as they are 
traditionally conceived. 
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border control and readmission as a bargaining chip to exert more leverage on EU 
Member States and obtain important benefits in other policy areas (foreign policy, trade, 
development aid), in line with their interests and priorities. 
Finally, in relation to this last element, Cassarino identifies as a further relevant 
factor leading to the growth of informal cooperation on readmission also the 
empowerment of Mediterranean third countries, resulting from their proactive 
involvement in joint border control at the EU southern borders, which produced a 
change in power relations between countries on the two sides of the Mediterranean. 
Indeed, the bilateral police cooperation initiatives developed since the early 2000s 
allowed certain North African countries to gain international credibility and regime 
legitimacy; as a consequence, they acquired a strategic position in migration talks with 
the EU and its Member States (Cassarino 2010b, 16; 2007, 191-192). Having become 
stronger interlocutors, Mediterranean third countries can now act as ‘equal players’, 
expressing their own views and making pressures on EU Member States to address or 
reconfigure cooperation in a way that they consider to be more advantageous for them. 
Therefore, these new power relations resulting from the empowerment of third 
countries have contributed to downgrade formal readmission agreements while 
increasing the relevance of informal instruments of cooperation (Cassarino 2010b, 16-
18). As summarised by Cassarino, ‘the objective remains unchanged, but in relations 
with Southern Mediterranean countries, the emphasis has been placed more on 
pragmatic steps than on the conclusion of formal agreements’ (Cassarino 2007, 192). 
 
6.3.2. The main features of informal bilateral agreements linked to 
readmission 
As mentioned in the previous section, the main characteristics of informal 
agreements linked to readmission represent also some of the most relevant reasons why 
Mediterranean countries have engaged in informal cooperation. According to Cassarino 
(2007, 190), indeed, these features ‘are sufficient to explain the gradual proliferation of 
informal patterns of cooperation on readmission in the Mediterranean region and 
beyond’ and they are key to understand why some Mediterranean third countries 
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accepted to cooperate on readmission with some Member States on an informal basis, 
while remaining reluctant towards the signature of formal RAs. 
However, it should be noted that these very features are not uncontroversial: what 
makes informal arrangements strong in terms of effectiveness of cooperation, may at the 
same time represent a weakness in terms of respect for democratic decision-making and 
human rights. Some of the most controversial aspects of these instruments were 
analysed under Chapter 5 and are discussed in this section, whereas a detailed 
examination of how informal bilateral instruments of cooperation may impact on the 
human rights of migrants and asylum seekers follows in Chapter 7. 
Building upon the works of Cassarino (2007; 2010b), Lipson (1991) and 
Pauwelyn, Wessel and Wouters (2012a) (see section 6.1 above), I have identified the 
following three main characteristics of informal readmission agreements: a) their 
flexibility, immediate operability and rapidity in the adoption; b) their lack of visibility, 
transparency and accountability; c) the role non-state actors and international 
organisations may play in their negotiation and implementation. 
 
The flexibility and immediate operability of informal readmission agreements 
As mentioned in section 6.3.1, informal arrangements linked to readmission such 
as MoUs, exchanges of letters, administrative arrangements, oral processes and 
operational protocols are highly flexible in their content and structure, and may be 
easily adapted to changing contingencies. 
The negotiation and adoption of these instruments may be quite rapid: these are 
usually conducted at the executive or ministerial level and may involve different actors, 
including heads of government, interior ministers or other officials (like heads of 
police), but the national parliaments of the countries concerned are generally excluded 
from the entire process. Since these arrangements are not considered international law 
agreements, they do not need to be authorised or ratified; hence, they usually avoid 
parliamentary scrutiny and lengthy ratification procedures. Moreover, informal 
arrangements are immediately applicable, as there are no time gaps between their 
signature and their entry into force; this ensures the instant operability of these 
instruments – an element that is deemed of crucial importance by both parties. 
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The fact that these instruments may be rapidly and easily adopted is also a 
guarantee of their adaptability to changing circumstances. Indeed, the terms of an 
informal agreement may be easily renegotiated by the parties in order to respond to new 
contingencies; such renegotiation would occur at the executive or administrative level, 
avoiding any formality and excluding any parliamentary debate. Since the parties’ 
interests and priorities may change over time, the possibility to adapt their bilateral 
cooperation arrangements accordingly, represents an added value and contributes to 
limit defections. 
Arguably, this is also the most relevant difference compared to formal 
readmission agreements. Being international treaties, the latter are rather rigid in their 
content, structure and adoption procedure. Their conclusion usually requires a lengthy 
negotiation process, because the parties are keen to define in details the commitments 
they undertake (which are legally binding and publicly visible). Moreover, once 
concluded, formal agreements need to be ratified by the national parliaments of both 
countries concerned and published in official journals before they can enter into force 
and become operational; this process tends to be rather slow. The features of flexibility 
and operability, thus, seem to be the main rationale for the adoption of informal 
arrangements in the area of readmission. 
 
The lack of transparency and accountability 
As mentioned above in section 6.3.1, informal instruments of bilateral cooperation 
on readmission tend to be less visible to the public compared to formal RAs. Indeed, 
instruments like MoUs, exchanges of letters, oral agreements, administrative 
arrangements and operational protocols are generally not published in the official 
journals of the countries concerned. Sometimes they are not even recorded in official 
documents, nor made public in any alternative way, e.g. through a press release, media 
coverage, publication on institutional web sites or a government communication to the 
parliament. Informal agreements may actually remain (temporarily or permanently) 
hidden or secret. Their limited visibility may make it difficult to detect and uncover 
them; however, in some cases informal arrangements linked to readmission may be 
traced in that they are part of a broader framework of bilateral cooperation on migration 
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and other issues (Cassarino 2007, 185-186). 
This is for instance the case of Italy and Libya, which have cooperated on the 
readmission or rejection of third country nationals from Italy (or from territorial and 
international waters) to Libya in different periods starting from 2004, most probably on 
the basis of several (written and oral) informal deals and operational protocols, which 
have not been made public. However, the existence of such informal arrangements on 
readmission may be inferred from the fact that Italy and Libya have been cooperating 
intensely on the joint management of migration since 1998, in particular through a 
series of agreements, operational protocols and MoUs in the area of police cooperation, 
which have been made public or whose existence has been admitted by the Italian 
government (but content not disclosed). Actually, cooperation between Italy and Libya 
has not been limited to migration, but has included a number of issues (colonial-era 
compensations, energy, trade relations, fight against international terrorism), 
culminating in the Treaty of Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation signed in August 
2008; it is within this broad cooperation framework that informal agreements on 
readmission should be framed (Favilli 2005, 161-165; Cuttitta 2010, 34-36; Paoletti 
2010; 2011a; see above section 5.2). 
Besides their limited publicity and visibility, informal readmission agreements 
suffer also from a lack of democratic oversight and accountability, due to the fact that 
they are not subject to the regular procedure required for the conclusion of international 
agreements. For instance, in Italy Article 11(4) of Legislative Decree 286/1998 
establishes that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Interior have the 
power to conclude cooperation arrangements (‘intese di collaborazione’) with third 
countries aimed at accelerating and improving the procedures for the readmission of 
irregular migrants, and at fighting irregular migration; the conclusion of this kind of 
informal agreements does not require the prior authorisation of the Italian Parliament
60
. 
                                                 
60
 The provision establishing that these cooperation arrangements can be concluded without the 
authorisation of the Parliament is based on the idea that the nature of these agreements is not political but 
merely technical (see art. 80 of the Italian Constitution). Favilli (2005) questions this interpretation: she 
argues that international agreements in the field of migration do have a political nature and therefore their 
conclusion should be always authorised by the Parliament (of the same opinion is: Pastore 1998, 974). 
Moreover, Favilli (2005) argues that the adoption of any kind of agreements in this area, including 
informal and ‘technical’ ones, should foresee the participation of the Parliament, based on art. 10(2) of the 
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Actually, not only informal readmission arrangements are usually neither 
authorised ex ante nor ratified ex post by national parliaments, but in most cases they 
are not even discussed at parliamentary level. In some cases, a parliamentary inquiry 
may be raised towards the government or its ministers to obtain information on the 
content of an informal agreement, but this usually happens only after the agreement has 
already been concluded and its existence has been uncovered
61
. 
With regards to the Italian-Libyan case study, Favilli (2005) is especially critical 
towards two practices carried out by the Italian government: that of keeping cooperation 
agreements in the area of readmission secret, and that of excluding the Italian 
Parliament from their adoption process. According to the scholar, both practices violate 
Article 10(2) of the Italian Constitution, which establishes that the legal status of 
foreigners (including their removal in case of irregular entry or stay) should be 
regulated exclusively by law; this constitutional provision requires full transparency 
over norms in the area of migration, precisely in order to avoid that this delicate matter 
is subject to the discretionary power of the executive. Favilli argues that this provision 
rules out both the possibility to conclude secret agreements in the field of migration and 
the possibility to exclude the Parliament from their adoption. 
The low level of transparency and public accountability of informal readmission 
agreements raises serious concerns over the extent to which their implementation can 
actually be monitored; it seems extremely difficult to ensure and enforce their full 
compliance with EU and international law, with regards in particular to the fundamental 
rights of migrants and asylum seekers who are to be readmitted (Cassarino 2007, 193). 
As long as removals are carried out on the basis of informal deals concluded at the 
executive level without any parliamentary scrutiny and whose content (or even 
existence) are kept secret, the risk of human rights violations will be extremely high. 
 
  
                                                                                                                                               
Italian Constitution (which establishes that the legal status of migrants should be regulated by law). 
61
 This has occurred on various occasions in Italy since the years 2000s, with regards to the informal 
cooperation agreements signed by the Italian executive with countries in North Africa, and in particular 
with Libya (Favilli 2005; Paoletti 2010; Cassarino 2007, 193-194). 
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The role of non-state actors and international organisations 
In Chapters 3 and 4 the role of non-state actors and international organisations has 
been analysed with regards to the negotiation and implementation of European 
readmission agreements (section 3.4.3) and Mobility Partnerships (section 4.4.3). Most 
of what has been said concerning these two European-level instruments of cooperation 
on readmission holds true at the bilateral level. Actually, the increasing participation of 
non-state actors and international organisations in the implementation of external 
migration policies (and consequently also in the related decision-making processes and 
fora) is a phenomenon that has begun at the national/bilateral level and has rapidly 
developed to cover also European-level initiatives. 
Since the years 2000s, private actors and international organisations have been 
increasingly involved in the implementation of Member States’ policies in the area of 
migration and asylum, both inside and outside their national territory. More precisely, 
EU Member States have outsourced to private actors relevant tasks in the fields of 
migration control, border surveillance, migration detention and forced return. Moreover, 
international organisations such as the IOM and UNHCR have become global leaders in 
implementing, on behalf of European countries, Assisted Voluntary Return and 
Reintegration programmes targeting irregular migrants and rejected asylum seekers, as 
well as capacity-building initiatives in the area of migration management and asylum 
addressed to authorities in third countries
62
. 
States have, thus, gradually delegated private actors and international 
organisations to carry out typical State duties, in order to maximise the effectiveness, 
flexibility and operability of a wide range of cooperation initiatives in the area of 
migration management, including return and readmission, while minimising their costs 
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 For instance, upon initiative of the Italian government, in August 2005 Libya signed a cooperation 
agreement with the IOM. Following the signature of this agreement, the IOM opened an office in Tripoli 
and carried out a number of projects in collaboration with the Libyan government, funded by Italy and the 
EU (under the Aeneas Programme first and the Thematic Programme later on). The most relevant project 
was called TRIM (‘Transit and Irregular Migration Management’) and it was implemented between 2006 
and 2009. The main activities of the project included capacity-building addressed to Libyan officials and 
assistance to migrants in Libya who wished to return to their countries of origin through a programme of 
Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration. The TRIM project focused in particular on AVR to Niger 
and Chad and was carried out with the supervision of the UNHCR (Paoletti 2011a, 160-162; Cuttitta 
2008, 5-6). 
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and visibility. In addition, the more non-state actors and international organisations have 
become responsible for the operationalisation of Member States’ migration policies, the 
more they have acquired the power to influence (and to some extent participate in) 
decision-making in this field (Cassarino 2010b, 26-28). 
With particular regard to cooperation on readmission, informal instruments like 
MoUs, administrative arrangements, oral deals and operational protocols represent an 
optimal framework for the increased role of non-state actors and international 
organisations. The main features of these instruments – i.e. flexibility, limited visibility 
and prioritisation of the operability of cooperation over its formalisation – match 
perfectly with the involvement of international organisations and private actors in the 
implementation of cooperation on readmission and offer favourable conditions for a 
further expansion of their role. 
 
6.4. How do the features of informal cooperation at bilateral level apply to 
the European level? 
This section analyses if and how the features of informal bilateral arrangements 
linked to readmission characterise also the recent instances of informal cooperation on 
readmission developed at the European level, and described above in section 6.2.1, 
focusing on the examples of high-level dialogues on migration, Mobility Partnerships 
and other kinds of joint political declarations, the EU-Turkey Agreement and the EU-
Afghanistan Joint Way Forward Agreement. 
High-level dialogues on migration and readmission may facilitate negotiations 
with third countries, especially those unwilling to conclude a formal and publicly visible 
EURA. As mentioned above, third countries’ authorities are often reluctant to openly 
cooperate with the EU on the readmission of their own nationals (especially on the basis 
of a EURA), as this decision would be highly unpopular among their domestic 
populations and diasporas in Europe. Therefore, they tend to prefer grounding 
cooperation with the EU on a political legally non-binding declaration, or even a 
restricted document, in order to keep the issue out of public scrutiny and domestic 
debate (Carrera 2016, 45-46). 
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The inclusion of an informal arrangement on readmission (preferably oriented to 
the procedural and operational aspects of readmission) within a broader political 
dialogue on migration allows not only to reduce its visibility, but also to increase its 
operability and flexibility. Being the result of a political deal and lacking the constraints 
of a legally binding instrument, such informal arrangement is immediately applicable 
and may be easily adapted over time to changing circumstances and interests, simply 
through a new high-level meeting between the parties. The combination of these 
features goes to the advantage of both the EU and its Member States and the third 
countries concerned; for this reason, since the Action Plan on Return of September 2015 
the EU has been trying to proactively promote this new modality of cooperation with 
third countries and implement it in close collaboration with (and following the example 
of) Member States – e.g. through the new Partnership Framework (see above section 
6.2.1). 
However, Carrera (2016, 46-47) correctly notes that the informality of certain 
readmission agreements is not a guarantee of their effectiveness; on the contrary, their 
legally non-binding nature may even exacerbate practical implementation challenges. In 
fact, in the case of informal agreements it may be problematic to ensure that the parties 
are compliant with the terms of the agreement and that readmission is carried out in 
practice; actual cooperation is contingent in particular on the state of diplomatic 
relations between the EU (or its Member States) and the third country concerned
63
. 
However, it is also true that if one or both parties find that an informal deal does 
not work as it was expected to do, its flexible nature and the lack of legal constraints 
may allow for its relatively rapid renegotiation (and for the consequent immediate 
application of the newly renegotiated deal). This occurred, for instance, with the EU-
Turkey Action Plan agreed in October 2015 and activated the following month, which 
was ‘substituted’ in March 2016 by the EU-Turkey Agreement, because the former had 
                                                 
63
 The EU-Turkey Agreement is illustrative of this dynamic. In the last months, both the EU and Turkey 
have demonstrated to be well-aware of the fact that the long-lasting effectiveness (or the survival) of their 
cooperation on migration management and readmission depend on their broader relations. Against this 
background, Turkey has repeatedly threatened the EU of breaking the pact due to the allegedly ‘cold’ 
European reactions to the Turkish failed coup of July 2016, whilst the EU has been extremely cautious in 
condemning the Turkish government harsh reaction to the coup. 
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not produced the expected results in terms of reduction of the migrant and refugee flow 
into Europe. 
The EU-Turkey Agreement is a perfect example of how an informal agreement 
linked to readmission may be rapidly adopted and may become immediately 
operational. Ten days elapsed between the announcement of its basic principles on 7 
March 2016 (European Council 2016a) and the adoption of the agreement on 18 March 
2016 (European Council 2016c); moreover, the text of 18 March established that the 
agreement shall start being applied from the 20
th
 of March, only two days after. The 
recent EU-Afghanistan Joint Way Forward Agreement is another informal deal linked 
to readmission that is meant to become immediately operational; its text says explicitly 
that ‘cooperation will begin on the day this declaration is signed’ and envisages it will 
last for ‘an initial period of two years’. 
Along with flexibility, operability and limited visibility, European instruments of 
informal cooperation share with the national ones also a lack of transparency and 
accountability. Carrera questions in particular their compatibility with the rule of law 
and the principle of legal certainty, with reference both to Mobility Partnerships 
(Carrera and Hernández i Sagrera 2011, 106-107; see also final paragraph of section 
4.4.4) and to ‘informal patterns of cooperation and non-legally binding instruments 
including a readmission angle’ (Carrera 2016, 47). 
Similarly to bilateral informal agreements, also European policy instruments and 
informal arrangements linked to readmission escape the democratic decision-making 
procedures envisaged by the Treaties, which require the prior authorisation of the 
European Parliament to the conclusion of international agreements in the area of 
migration, as well as the full participation of the Parliament in their negotiation process 
(Art. 218 TFEU). Since policy instruments like MPs, political declarations like the 
‘Joint Declaration on Ghana-EU Cooperation on Migration’, and informal agreements 
like the ‘EU-Turkey Statement’ and the ‘Joint Way Forward on migration issues 
between Afghanistan and the EU’ are not considered international agreements, they do 
not fall within the scope of Art. 218 TFEU. 
However, as analysed above in section 6.2.1.1, the legal nature of the EU-Turkey 
Agreement has been the object of an institutional controversy, with several Members of 
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the European Parliament claiming that the EU-Turkey Statement was meant by the 
parties as a binding agreement and therefore the EP had to be involved in its negotiation 
and conclusion, in accordance with Art. 218 TFEU procedure. NGOs raised the same 
claim also with regards to the subsequent EU-Afghanistan Joint Way Forward 
Agreement: 
 
This deal is essentially a readmission agreement, but by refusing to classify it as 
such, the Council and the European External Action Service (EEAS) are seeking to 
by-pass the normal procedure of adopting a formal agreement. Such an agreement 
would require the consent of the European Parliament which has the power to 
reject readmission agreements. This same method was used with the EU-Turkey 
deal (Amnesty International 2016f). 
 
In addition to this democratic deficit, informal European policy or quasi-legal 
instruments of cooperation on readmission may also avoid the judicial oversight of 
national, European and international courts. In fact, it is unclear the extent to which 
these instruments, or the initiatives and actions stemming from them, may be subject to 
the jurisdiction of national courts, the CJEU or the ECtHR (Carrera and Hernández i 
Sagrera 2011, 106-107). 
As concerns the role of non-state actors and international organisations, with 
regards to Mobility Partnerships, international organisations have been playing a major 
role at different levels, i.e. from the elaboration of the very concept of MP to the 
drafting, negotiation and concrete implementation of each MP; also private actors have 
been delegated tasks concerning the implementation of MP initiatives, generally in 
cooperation with international organisations (see section 4.4.3 above). These actors are 
carving out a role for themselves also in the context of other informal instruments and 
fora of cooperation on migration (and on readmission), both at the operational level (in 
the implementation phase) and in terms of consultancy and information provision (in 
the preliminary phase of elaboration or during the negotiations of these instruments). 
An interesting case concerns the role played by the European Stability Initiative 
(ESI) in the adoption of the EU-Turkey Agreement. The ESI is a private think tank; in 
October 2015 it elaborated a policy proposal to counter the ‘Syrian refugee crisis’ called 
‘the Merkel Plan’ (ESI 2015a) and during the following months it promoted this plan 
 269 
across Europe (and in particular with the German and Dutch government). After the 
proposal obtained the endorsement of the Dutch government and became famous as the 
‘Samsom Plan’ or ‘Samsom-Merkel Plan’ (ESI 2016), its fundamental principles were 
incorporated in what has become known as the EU-Turkey Agreement. Cassarino 
(2010b, 26) criticises the role of private think tanks, which may be ‘subcontracted to 
deliver a technical expertise legitimising a “form” of top-down knowledge about 
international migration and, above all, uncritically consolidating States’ hierarchy of 
priorities’; the scholar argues that ‘the emergence of a private technical expertise has 
contributed to the production of a dominant scheme of interpretation about the current 
challenges linked to the movement of people by serving policy-makers’ priorities 
without questioning their orientations’. 
To conclude, the main features of bilateral informal agreements linked to 
readmission can be definitely observed also at the European level, where the recent 
development of new modalities of informal cooperation in the area of return and 
readmission has incorporated exactly the same fundamental principles and priorities 
first introduced by Member States in their relations (and practices) towards third 
countries. This proves that the informalisation of cooperation on readmission analysed 
in this study is actually a multilevel process. It remains now to be analysed how the very 
features of this process impact on the fundamental rights of migrants and asylum 
seekers. 
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CHAPTER 7 
MULTI-LEVEL INFORMALISATION OF COOPERATION ON 
READMISSION AND ITS HUMAN RIGHTS IMPLICATIONS 
 
 
7.1. The asylum-related human rights of (to be) readmitted migrants. The 
nature, content and limits of migrants’ human rights 
Having established that there has been a shift towards informalisation in 
cooperation on readmission in the Mediterranean area both at the European and bilateral 
level, and having identified the main features of European and bilateral instruments of 
informal cooperation, this chapter aims to analyse how the use of these informal 
instruments impacts on the protection of the human rights of migrants and asylum 
seekers who are subjected to readmission procedures. 
As mentioned above in Chapter 1, in order to limit the scope of my analysis I 
decided to focus only on the fundamental rights of migrants who are to be readmitted 
and are therefore directly affected by the operationalisation of instruments of 
cooperation on readmission. Moreover, I chose to consider the legal entitlements of (to 
be) readmitted migrants as potential asylum seekers; hence, I have further circumscribed 
my analysis to the ‘asylum-related’ human rights of these migrants, namely: 1) the 
principle of non-refoulement; 2) the right to seek asylum; 3) the prohibition of collective 
expulsion; and 4) the right to an effective remedy. In this chapter I investigate how the 
scope of these rights may be limited by informal modalities of cooperation on 
readmission either at the bilateral or European level. 
This section 7.1 introduces the four above-mentioned rights as they have been 
elaborated within the European legal framework, focusing on their nature, content and 
limits; it also reflects on the relationship between policies of cooperation on 
readmission and the protection of asylum-related human rights (especially the principle 
of non-refoulement); finally it discusses more generally the problems and limits of 
migrants’ human rights, drawing upon the works of prominent critical scholars. Section 
7.2 investigates how informal practices of cooperation on readmission carried out at the 
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bilateral level may infringe upon the above-mentioned four asylum-related rights; in 
order to do so, it makes reference to the three case studies of bilateral cooperation on 
readmission analysed above in Chapter 5 (i.e. Italy-Libya, Spain-Morocco and Greece-
Turkey). Section 7.3 is dedicated to the human rights implications of informal 
cooperation on readmission at the European level; it focuses on the case study of the 
EU-Turkey Agreement of 18 March 2016 analysing how it impacts on the four above-
mentioned asylum-related human rights. It emerges that the practical implementation of 
both bilateral and European informal agreements linked to readmission may hamper 
access to protection for migrants and asylum seekers who are subject to removal
1
. 
Parallel to a process of informalisation of cooperation on readmission, it is thus possible 
to identify a process of restriction of the fundamental rights of migrants and asylum 
seekers. 
 
7.1.1. The four asylum-related human rights 
7.1.1.1. The principle of non-refoulement 
The principle of non-refoulement is a fundamental principle of international 
refugee law. Its main embodiment is in Article 33(1) of the 1951 UN Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951 Refugee Convention or 1951 Geneva 
Convention), which establishes that a refugee or asylum seeker
2
 cannot be expelled or 
returned – refoulé(e) – ‘in any manner whatsoever’ to a country where his or her life or 
freedom would be in danger, due to a risk of persecution based on one of the five 
                                                 
1
 Here, the term ‘access to protection’ should be intended in a broad sense, as covering the principle of 
non-refoulement, the prohibition of collective expulsion and the right to access asylum procedures and 
effective remedies. 
2
 Art. 33(1) of the 1951 Refugee Convention refers to ‘a refugee’, but in fact the prohibition of 
refoulement is considered to apply irrespective of whether the person concerned has been formally 
recognised as a refugee; beneficiaries of the non-refoulement principle thus include asylum seekers whose 
status has not been determined yet (ExCom UNHCR 1977; Chimni 2005, 449). In this respect, the 
UNHCR argued in its 1997 Note on the Principle of Non-Refoulement that: ‘Every refugee is, initially, 
also an asylum applicant; therefore, to protect refugees, asylum applicants must be treated on the 
assumption that they may be refugees until their status has been determined. Without such a rule, the 
principle of non-refoulement would not provide effective protection for refugees, because applicants 
might be rejected at the frontier or otherwise returned to persecution on the grounds that their claim had 
not been established’ (UNHCR 1997, para C). 
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reasons identified by the same Convention under Article 1(A)(2) – i.e. his or her race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. In 
addition, international human rights law has recognised non-refoulement as a 
fundamental component of the absolute prohibition of torture and other cruel, unhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment (ExCom UNHCR 2001, para 16). This is 
explicitly affirmed in Article 3(1) of the 1984 Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), which establishes that 
‘no State Party shall expel, return (refouler) or extradite a person to another State where 
there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected 
to torture’. 
At the regional level, the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
does not include an explicit prohibition of refoulement, but the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) has interpreted the prohibition of torture enshrined in Article 3 
ECHR as including also a prohibition of refoulement. In its landmark Soering case
3
, the 
Court held that the expulsion (or extradition, as in the case in question) of a person may 
give rise to an issue under Article 3 ECHR, if there are substantial grounds for believing 
that the person concerned, if expelled, deported or extradite, would face a real risk of 
being subjected to torture or unhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the 
country of destination (Soering v. United Kingdom, para 91). 
In the framework of the European Union, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the EU (CFR) contains an explicit prohibition of refoulement: Article 19(2) CFR 
affirms that ‘no one may be removed, expelled or extradited to a State where there is a 
serious risk that he or she would be subjected to the death penalty, torture or other 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’. Therefore, in the European context the 
original scope of the non-refoulement principle has been gradually expanded to offer a 
wider protection compared to Article 33 of the Refugee Convention: European States 
cannot expel a person (any person, including refugees, asylum seekers and migrants in 
general) to a country where he or she would face not only a risk of being persecuted but 
also a risk of being subjected to death penalty, torture or unhuman or degrading 
                                                 
3
 ECtHR, Soering v. United Kingdom, Application No. 14038/88, Judgement of the Court (plenary), 
07.07.1989. 
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treatment. The respect for the principle of non-refoulement is reaffirmed also in 
secondary EU legislation, in particular under Article 21 of the Qualification Directive 
and Article 5 of the Returns Directive. 
In light of the fact that the principle of non-refoulement has found expression in 
various international instruments adopted at the universal and regional levels, as well as 
in the legislation and practice of several States, according to the UNHCR, it has come to 
be considered a norm of customary international law binding on all States, irrespective 
of whether they are party to the 1951 Refugee Convention (UNHCR 1997, para B; 
ExCom UNHCR 2001, para 16). Moreover, the UNHCR has interpreted the prohibition 
of refoulement as encompassing any measure attributable to a State – taking place both 
at the border and within the territory of a State (ExCom UNHCR 1977; see also: Chimni 
2005, 450) – which could have the effect of returning a person to a country where his or 
her life or freedom would be in danger
4. ‘This includes rejection at the frontier, 
interception and indirect refoulement
5
, whether of an individual seeking asylum or in 
situations of mass influx’ (ExCom UNHCR 2001, para 16). 
In the context of the 1951 Geneva Convention the prohibition of refoulement is 
not absolute; Article 33(2) provides, instead, for two exceptions to its application. The 
principle may not be claimed by a refugee or asylum seeker when: 1) there are 
reasonable grounds for considering him or her as a danger to the security of the country 
in which he or she is present; or 2) he or she, having been convicted by a final judgment 
of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country. 
However, in light of the serious consequences deriving from the removal of a person to 
a country where his or her life is in danger, the UNHCR and most commentators have 
                                                 
4
 In its Note on the Principle of Non-Refoulement the UNHCR affirmed that: ‘Measures of refoulement 
are various and include expulsion/deportation orders against refugees, return of refugees to countries of 
origin or unsafe third countries, electrified fences to prevent entry, non-admission of stowaway asylum-
seekers and push-offs of boat arrivals or interdictions on the high seas. Whenever refugees - or asylum-
seekers who may be refugees - are subjected, either directly or indirectly, to such measures of return, be it 
in the form of rejection, expulsion or otherwise, to territories where their life or freedom are threatened, 
the principle of non-refoulement has been violated. Furthermore, having regard to the nature and purpose 
of the principle, it also applies to extradition.’ (UNHCR 1997, para D). 
5
 ‘Indirect refoulement’ occurs when a person is expelled or removed to a country from where he or she 
risks to be subsequently deported to another country (either his/her country of origin or another country) 
where he or she would be at risk of persecution or torture. It is also referred to as ‘chain refoulement’. 
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suggested that these exceptions are to be narrowly interpreted. This understanding is 
further supported by the fact that international human rights law (see Art. 3 CAT) and 
most regional refugee and human rights instruments (see Art. 2(3) of the 1969 OAU 
Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa) provide for 
an absolute prohibition of refoulement and do not contemplate exceptions of any sort 
(UNHCR 1997, para F; Chimni 2005, 450-451). 
In the European context as well, the ECtHR has interpreted Article 3 ECHR as 
absolutely prohibiting any return of an individual to a country where there are 
substantial grounds for believing that he or she would face a real risk of treatment 
contrary to that provision. The Court has held that Article 3 ECHR enshrines one of the 
most fundamental values of a democratic society and in absolute terms prohibits torture 
or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (Salah Sheekh v. the Netherlands, 
para 135
6
). Article 3 makes no provision for exceptions and ensures absolute protection 
against the treatment prohibited; therefore, there can be no derogation from the non-
refoulement principle, irrespective of the victim’s conduct, however undesirable or 
dangerous (Saadi v. Italy, paras 137-138
7
). Nevertheless, the very same exceptions to 
the prohibition of refoulement originally introduced by the Refugee Convention, are 
reaffirmed in the EU legal framework under Article 21(2) of the Qualification Directive, 
despite the non-derogable nature recognised to the non-refoulement principle under the 
ECHR. 
 
7.1.1.2. The right to seek asylum 
The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) explicitly recognises 
‘the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution’ (Art. 14(1) 
UDHR)
8
; however, the UDHR is not per se a legally binding document. Neither the 
right to seek asylum, considered as a right to access asylum procedures, nor the right to 
                                                 
6
 ECtHR, Salah Sheekh v. the Netherlands, Application No. 1948/04, Judgment of the Court, 11.01.2007. 
7
 ECtHR, Saadi v. Italy, Application No. 37201/06, Judgment of the Grand Chamber, 28.02.2008. 
8
 The UDHR also states that ‘everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return 
to his country’ (Art. 13(2) UDHR), thus providing a first influential recognition of the ‘right to migrate’ 
and the ‘right to return’. 
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be granted asylum have been explicitly included in any international refugee law and 
human rights law instrument of universal scope; notably, the right to asylum is not 
explicitly recognised by the most relevant international refugee law instrument, i.e. the 
1951 Refugee Convention. Nonetheless, it is enshrined in two human rights instruments 
of regional scope; Article 22(7) of the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights 
provides for ‘the right to seek and be granted asylum in a foreign territory’ and Article 
12(3) of the 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights establishes that ‘every 
individual shall have the right, when persecuted, to seek and obtain asylum in other 
countries’. In contrast, in Europe the ECHR does not explicitly recognise the right to 
asylum in any form, neither as a right to seek nor as a right to be granted asylum. 
With regards to the 1951 Refugee Convention, however, it has been argued that a 
requirement to guarantee access to asylum procedures may be derived from the 
principle of non-refoulement. According to Kälin, Caroni and Heim, the non-
refoulement principle ‘provides a basis for procedural rights to refugee status 
determination insofar as it obliges States to determine whether a person they want to 
send back to the country of origin is a refugee’ (2011, 1395). According to Giuffré, 
‘depriving asylum seekers of an individual examination of their personal condition 
would expose them to the risk of refoulement, thereby undermining the object and 
purpose of the Convention’ (2013a, 105). The prohibition of refoulement would thus 
entail a right for the asylum seeker to enter the territory of a State (and a ‘duty of 
admission’ for the State in question), because he or she cannot be refoulé(e) to the 
country he or she came from, a right to apply for asylum, and a right to stay until his or 
her application has been examined; in fact, the examination of the asylum claim 
represents the sole way for a State to ascertain whether that person is in need of 
protection or can be expelled without breaching the non-refoulement principle 
(Gammeltoft-Hansen and Hathaway 2015, 238-239; Hathaway 2005, 300-301). Under 
the 1951 Geneva Convention, however, the precise scope and content of this right to 
access asylum procedures remain unclear, meaning that Article 33 compensates only to 
a limited extent for the lack of an actual provision on the right to asylum in the text of 
the Refugee Convention (Kälin, Caroni and Heim 2011, 1395). 
As concerns the ECHR, it has been argued that the European Convention does not 
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include a provision on the right to seek asylum because at the time of its drafting it was 
thought that the 1951 Refugee Convention would have fully covered the area of refugee 
rights (Cogolati, Verlinden and Schmitt 2015, 23). Nevertheless, the ECtHR case law 
has tried to compensate for this deficiency by deriving a right to seek asylum from the 
non-refoulement principle. Indeed, the Court has required in a number of cases (inter 
alia, M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, Abdolkhani and Karimnia v. Turkey
9
, Amuur v. 
France
10
, Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy) that States ensure access to fair and effective 
asylum procedures before removing a person to a third country, thus recognising the 
existence of an implicit right to entry, to apply for asylum and to be granted a fair 
asylum procedure, related to the prohibition of refoulement deriving from Article 3 
ECHR
11
 (Giuffré 2013a, 106). 
In contrast, within the EU legal framework, the right to asylum is expressly 
established by Article 18 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which reads: 
 
The right to asylum shall be guaranteed with due respect for the rules of the 
Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 and the Protocol of 31 January 1967 relating 
to the status of refugees and in accordance with the Treaty on European Union and 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
 
It should be noted that, compared to the above-mentioned formulations of the 
right to asylum, Article 18 CFR is rather vague and unclear. As observed by Gil-Bazo 
(2008), first of all, this provision lacks an explicit subject, as it does not specify who is 
entitled to the right to asylum
12
; it makes reference to the 1951 Refugee Convention and 
its 1967 Protocol as the standard to comply with, although these instruments do not 
mention the right to asylum among the rights to which refugees are entitled. Through an 
                                                 
9
 ECtHR, Abdolkhani and Karimnia v. Turkey, Application No. 30471/08, Judgment of the Court, 
22.09.2009. 
10
 ECtHR, Amuur v. France, Application No. 19776/92, Judgment of the Court, 25.06.1996. 
11
 For a review of the jurisprudence of the ECtHR concerning the right to access asylum procedures, see: 
Giuffré 2012. 
12
 The ‘right to asylum’ may be a right of the States to grant asylum if they so wish in the exercise of 
their sovereign power (in accordance with the original international law concept of asylum) or a right of 
individuals to obtain asylum, if they meet the criteria established by the applicable law and international 
conventions (as recognised under regional human rights conventions in America and Africa) (Gil-Bazo 
2008, 37-40). 
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analysis of the travaux préparatoires and in light of the object, purpose and general 
context of the Charter, Gil-Bazo comes to the conclusion that the drafters intended to 
establish the right to asylum as a subjective right of individuals, and not as a right of 
States. However, according to the scholar, the subject-less wording of the provision – a 
compromise solution between divergent positions among the drafters, advocating either 
for the explicit recognition of a right to asylum for everyone, or for the exclusion of EU 
nationals – represents an unfortunate choice. In fact, the power of Article 18 CFR as the 
first explicit recognition in a supranational European instrument of the right to asylum 
would be diminished by the lack of visibility of those that is seeks to protect; in 
contrast, both the American and African human rights conventions explicitly recognise 
‘every person’ or ‘every individual’ as the beneficiary of the right to asylum (Gil-Bazo 
2008, 37-45). 
Secondly, the formulation of Article 18 CFR is unclear also with regards to the 
precise content of the ‘right to asylum’, as it does not specify whether it is a right to 
seek asylum (as enshrined in the UDHR and derived from the non-refoulement principle 
in the context of the Refugee Convention and the ECHR), or whether it also guarantees 
a right to be granted asylum (in line with the African and American regional human 
rights conventions). Based on an analysis of both the travaux préparatoires and the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States, Gil-Bazo (2008, 45-48) comes 
to the conclusion that the right to asylum as established by Article 18 CFR has gone 
beyond the right to seek asylum, and is conceived as a subjective right of individuals to 
be granted asylum, when they meet the relevant criteria established by law, i.e. by EU 
law
13
. 
Therefore, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU importantly provides for 
a wider protection regime compared to the European Convention of Human Rights. 
However, in the framework of this work and in the context of cooperation on 
                                                 
13
 Indeed, the travaux préparatoires show that the drafters considered and rejected a formulation 
restricting the scope of the provision to a ‘right to seek asylum’ and opted for the more encompassing 
wording ‘right to asylum’, proving that it was not their intention to limit the scope of the provision to a 
purely procedural right to apply for asylum. As concerns common constitutional traditions, it seems that 
the right to asylum enshrined in the constitutions of several Member States is conceived not only as a 
right to apply for asylum but as a subjective right to be granted asylum for individuals who meet the 
criteria established by national law (Gil-Bazo 2008, 46-47). 
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readmission, my attention is mainly focused on the right of every person to seek asylum 
(as it relates to the non-refoulement principle) and the parallel duty of States to 
guarantee that everyone can access fair asylum procedures. 
 
7.1.1.3. The prohibition of collective expulsions 
The prohibition of collective expulsion of aliens has been first recognised under 
Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 to the ECHR, which was adopted by the Council of Europe 
in 1963. Subsequently, a provision prohibiting collective expulsions has been included 
also in other regional human rights instruments, e.g. under Article 22(9) of the 
American Convention and Article 12(5) of the African Charter. In the EU legal 
framework, the prohibition of collective expulsions is also enshrined in Article 19(1) of 
the CFR. 
The formulation of the prohibition of collective expulsion of aliens in the ECHR 
does not contain any further specifications
14
; therefore, the content and scope of this 
provision have been defined by the ECtHR case law. The ECtHR’s well-established 
definition of ‘collective expulsion’ is ‘any measure of the competent authorities 
compelling aliens as a group to leave the country, except where such a measure is taken 
after and on the basis of a reasonable and objective examination of the particular cases 
of each individual alien of the group’ (ECtHR 2016a, para 3). With regards to the 
personal scope of the provision, its wording does not specify who are the ‘aliens’ it 
refers to; it thus applies to any foreigners, irrespective of their legal situation
15
 and 
irrespective of whether they were residing in the territory of the State or were 
                                                 
14
 Art. 4 of Prot. No. 4 ECHR reads: ‘Collective expulsion of aliens is prohibited’. A similar wording is 
used in the CFR of the EU and in the American Convention on Human Rights. Conversely, Art. 12(5) of 
the African Charter states: ‘The mass expulsion of non-nationals shall be prohibited. Mass expulsion shall 
be that which is aimed at national, racial, ethnic or religious groups’. This formulation links collective 
expulsion to discrimination/persecution for reasons of nationality, race, ethnicity or religion; it thus limits 
the scope of the prohibition, by applying it only to the expulsion of groups of aliens that can be identified 
as such (i.e. as a group) based on national, racial, ethnic or religious grounds. Under the ECHR the group 
of aliens is not qualified in any way; apparently, it may simply consist of two or more individual aliens. 
15
 ‘The aliens to whom the Article refers are not only those lawfully residing within the territory, but “all 
those who have no actual right to nationality in a State, whether they are merely passing through a 
country or reside or are domiciled in it, whether they are refugees or entered the country on their own 
initiative, or whether they are stateless or possess another nationality”’ (Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, 
para 174, with reference to the travaux préparatoires of Prot. No. 4 ECHR). 
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intercepted while trying to crossing its borders (or even intercepted on the high seas by 
ships flying the flag of the respondent State, as in the Hirsi case) (ECtHR 2016a, paras 
6-7). 
The core purpose of Art. 4 Prot. No. 4 ECHR is to prevent States from being able 
to remove certain aliens without examining their personal circumstances and, 
consequently, without enabling them to put forward their arguments against the measure 
taken by the relevant authority (Hirsi Jamaa, para 177; Sharifi and Others v. Italy and 
Greece, para 210
16
). In order to determine whether there has been a sufficiently 
individualised examination, it is necessary to consider the circumstances of the case and 
to verify whether the removal decisions have taken into consideration the specific 
situation of the individuals concerned (Hirsi Jamaa, para 183; Khlaifia and Others v. 
Italy, para 238
17
). 
The Court has established that the fact that a number of aliens receive similar 
decisions does not in itself lead to the conclusion that there is a collective expulsion, if 
each person concerned has been given the opportunity to put arguments against his or 
her expulsion to the competent authorities on an individual basis (Andric v. Sweden
18
; 
Sultani v. France, para 81
19
). In addition, the Court has observed that there is no 
violation of Art. 4 Prot. No. 4 if the lack of an expulsion decision made on an individual 
basis is the consequence of an applicant’s own culpable conduct (Berisha and Haljiti v. 
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
20
 and Dritsas v. Italy
21
; see ECtHR 2016b, 
6). 
Furthermore, the Court held that Art. 4 Prot. No. 4 is not violated when the 
persons concerned have had an individual examination of their personal circumstances 
and particular facts of their case, even if they have been taken together to police 
                                                 
16
 ECtHR, Sharifi and Others v. Italy and Greece, Application No. 16643/09, Judgment of the Court, 
21.10.1014. 
17
 ECtHR, Khlaifia and Others v. Italy, Application No. 16483/12, Judgment of the Grand Chamber, 
15.12.2016. 
18
 ECtHR, Andric v. Sweden, Application No. 45917/99, Decision, 23.02.1999. 
19
 ECtHR, Sultani v. France, Application No. 45223/05, Judgement of the Court, 20.09.2007. 
20
 ECtHR, Berisha and Haljiti v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Application No. 18670/03, 
Decision, 16.06.2005. 
21
 ECtHR, Dritsas v. Italy, Application No. 2344/02, Decision, 01.02.2011. 
 281 
headquarters, some have been deported in groups, or the deportation orders and the 
corresponding letters have been phrased in similar terms without specifically referring 
to the earlier stages of the asylum procedure (M.A. v. Cyprus, para 254
22
). The Court has 
recently specified that Art. 4 Prot. No. 4 does not guarantee the right to an individual 
interview in all circumstances; the requirements of this provision may be satisfied 
where each alien has a genuine and effective possibility of submitting arguments against 
his or her expulsion, and where those arguments are examined in an appropriate manner 
by the authorities of the respondent State (Khlaifia and Others, para 248)
23
. 
Finally, in the Hirsi case the Court examined for the first time whether the 
prohibition of collective expulsions applies when the removal of aliens is carried out by 
a State party outside from its national territory, namely on the high sea. As set out in 
Article 1 ECHR, the State parties shall secure ‘to everyone within their jurisdiction’ the 
rights and freedoms established by the Convention. The Court observed that neither the 
text nor the travaux préparatoires of the ECHR preclude the extraterritorial application 
of Art. 4 of Prot. No. 4 (Hirsi Jamaa and Others, paras 173-174). It held that, even 
though the notion of expulsion, like that of jurisdiction, is principally territorial, if a 
State has exceptionally exercised its jurisdiction outside its national territory, it can be 
accepted that such exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction has taken the form of 
collective expulsion. The Court also reiterated that the special nature of the maritime 
environment does not make it an area outside the law, where individuals are covered by 
no legal system capable of affording them the enjoyment of the rights and guarantees 
protected by the Convention (Hirsi Jamaa and Others, para 178). Therefore, the Grand 
Chamber concluded that ‘the removal of aliens carried out in the context of 
                                                 
22
 ECtHR, M.A. v. Cyprus, Application No. 41872/10, Judgement of the Court, 23.07.2013. 
23
 In Khlaifia, the Grand Chamber – reversing the previous judgment of the Chamber – concluded that 
the virtually simultaneous removal of the three applicants did not amount to a collective expulsion within 
the meaning of Art. 4 Prot. No. 4 ECHR, but may rather be explained as the outcome of a series of 
individual refusal-of-entry orders. The Court affirmed that even though such orders were drafted in 
comparable terms, only differing as to the personal data of each migrant, and even though a large number 
of Tunisian migrants were actually expelled at the same time, these two facts cannot in themselves be 
decisive. On the contrary, The Court held that having been identified on two occasions, and their 
nationality having been established, the applicants had a genuine and effective possibility of raising 
arguments against their expulsion and to have them examined by the competent authorities (Khlaifia and 
Others, paras 249-254). 
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interceptions on the high seas by the authorities of a State in the exercise of their 
sovereign authority, the effect of which is to prevent migrants from reaching the borders 
of the State or even to push them back to another State, constitutes an exercise of 
jurisdiction […] which engages the responsibility of the State in question under Article 
4 of Protocol No. 4’ (Hirsi Jamaa and Others, para 180)24. 
 
7.1.1.4. The right to an effective remedy 
The right to an effective domestic remedy for human rights violations was first 
recognised by the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights; Article 8 UDHR reads: 
‘Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for 
acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law’. At a 
regional level, this right is affirmed in the European Convention on Human Rights 
(Article 13) and in the American Convention on Human Rights (Article 25); conversely, 
the African Charter does not contain a specific provision on the right to an effective 
remedy, but the latter has been developed through ‘a somewhat rudimentary 
jurisprudence and practice’ by the African Commission (Musila 2006). The issue of 
effective remedies appears to be crucial in international human rights law: indeed, the 
rights enshrined in universal and regional human rights conventions would have a 
merely theoretical meaning without the provision of mechanisms to put them in 
practice, including effective remedies to redress possible violations. 
Article 13 ECHR states: ‘Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this 
Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority 
notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official 
capacity’. According to the ECtHR case law, this provision requires the availability at 
national level of a remedy to enforce the substance of the Convention rights. The 
domestic remedy must be such as to allow the competent national authorities both to 
                                                 
24
 The jurisprudential development of the prohibition of collective expulsion, and in particular the case 
law on its extraterritorial application, are crucial for the analysis of the impact of informal bilateral 
practices of cooperation on readmission carried out in section 7.2.3 below. 
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deal with the substance of an ‘arguable complaint’ under the Convention25, and to grant 
appropriate relief. The Court has held that the remedy must be ‘effective’ in practice as 
well as in law; a remedy would only be effective if it is available and sufficient; it must 
be sufficiently certain not only in theory but also in practice, and it must be rapid
26
. 
However, the effectiveness of a remedy does not depend on the certainty of a favourable 
outcome for the applicant (Kudła v. Poland, para 15727; M.S.S., paras 288-292; Hirsi 
Jamaa and Others, para 197). Different requirements of effectiveness have been set out 
by the Court, depending on the nature of the applicant’s complaint, i.e. which right 
violation is alleged. Hence, the content of Article 13 and the scope of the obligations it 
imposes upon States may vary based on the violation complained and the nature of the 
right at stake, as discussed below. 
The ECHR formulation of the right to an effective remedy differs from the one of 
Article 8 UDHR and Article 25(1) of the American Convention with regards to the 
national authority competent to receive complaints of alleged violations: whilst the 
UDHR and the American Convention expressly require that the effective remedy is 
provided for by a judicial authority (a court or tribunal)
28
, the ECHR makes general 
reference to ‘a national authority’, and the ECtHR confirmed that this does not need to 
be a judicial authority. The same difference can be noted in respect to the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the EU; here, the right to an effective remedy is affirmed in the 
first paragraph of Article 47, which reads: ‘Everyone whose rights and freedoms 
guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated has the right to an effective remedy 
before a tribunal in compliance with the conditions laid down in this Article’ [emphasis 
                                                 
25
 The Court established that the claim of a rights violation must be an arguable one, but it did not 
provide for a general definition of ‘arguability’; the question of whether the claim is arguable needs to be 
determined in the light of the particular facts and the nature of the legal issue raised (Council of Europe 
2013, 12). 
26
 In addition, when assessing effectiveness, account must be taken not only of formal remedies available, 
but also of the general legal and political context in which they operate as well as the personal 
circumstances of the applicant (Council of Europe 2013, 12). 
27
 ECtHR, Kudła v. Poland, Application No. 30210/96, Judgment of the Court, 26.10.2000. 
28
 Art. 25(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights affirms: ‘Everyone has the right to simple 
and prompt recourse, or any other effective recourse, to a competent court or tribunal for protection 
against acts that violate his fundamental rights recognised by the constitution or laws of the state 
concerned or by this Convention, even though such violation may have been committed by persons acting 
in the course of their official duties’ [emphasis added]. 
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added]
29
. Thus, the ECHR is the only international human rights instrument not to 
require that rights violations are redressed exclusively by a judicial authority; however, 
the ECtHR case law has introduced additional safeguards by establishing that if the 
national authority is not a judicial one, its powers and the guarantees which it affords 
are relevant in determining whether the remedy before it is effective (Kudła, para 157). 
Within the framework of this study, Article 13 ECHR is relevant in that it is 
applied to cases of removal of aliens resulting from the application of readmission 
agreements and informal practices. Typically, in such cases Article 13 is considered in 
conjunction with Article 3 ECHR (right to an effective remedy against the violation of 
the principle of non-refoulement) and/or in conjunction with Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 
ECHR (right to an effective remedy against the violation of the prohibition of collective 
expulsion). For such instances, the Court has elaborated a specific notion of ‘effective 
remedy’ and specific requirements of effectiveness30. 
The main feature of an effective remedy within the meaning of Article 13 taken 
together with Article 3 and with Article 4 of Protocol No. 4, is that it must have a 
suspensive effect
31
 (Jabari v. Turkey, para 50
32
; Čonka v. Belgium, paras 79-8333; 
M.S.S., para 293; Hirsi Jamaa and Others, paras 198-199). In light of the importance 
that the Court attaches to Article 3 ECHR
34
 and the irreversible nature of the damage 
                                                 
29
 The most relevant innovation of Art. 47 CFR is that it brings together the right to an effective remedy 
(first paragraph) with the right to a fair trial (second and third paragraphs), which in all other human 
rights instruments are dealt with in separate articles. In particular, in the ECHR they are covered by 
Article 13 and Article 6, respectively. However, Art. 6 ECHR guarantees the right to a fair hearing only 
in the determination of civil rights or obligations, or any criminal charge; this has precluded the 
application of Art. 6 ECHR to immigration and asylum cases (see Maaouia v. France). Article 47 CFR, 
instead, makes no such distinction; as a result, in the EU legal framework, the right to a fair trial and all 
the procedural safeguards it includes (fair and public hearing; reasonable time; independent and impartial 
tribunal established by law; defense rights; legal aid) apply to any recourse against violations of EU law-
protected rights, including in immigration and asylum cases. 
30
 Within the EU legal framework, a person who is subject to a removal procedure must be guaranteed an 
effective remedy to appeal against or ask the review of his or her return decision, in compliance with 
Article 13 of the Returns Directive. 
31
 In contrast, a remedy with suspensive effect is not normally required when another right of the 
Convention is invoked in combination with Article 13. 
32
 ECtHR, Jabari v. Turkey, Application No. 40035/98, Judgment of the Court, 11.07.2000. 
33
 ECtHR, Čonka v. Belgium, Application No. 51564/99, Judgment of the Court, 05.02.2012. 
34
 The Court recalls that Article 3 enshrines one of the most fundamental values of a democratic society 
and prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (Jabari, para 
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that may result if the risk of torture or ill-treatment materialises, the Court has 
established that the notion of an effective remedy under Art. 13 in combination with 
Art. 3 ECHR requires the possibility of suspending the implementation of the measure 
impugned (Jabari, para 50; Shamayev and Others v. Georgia and Russia, para 460
35
). 
Moreover, in the Court’s view the notion of effective remedy under Art. 13 in 
combination with Art. 4 Prot. No. 4 ECHR also requires that the remedy prevents the 
execution of measures that are contrary to the Convention and whose effects are 
potentially irreversible (Čonka, para 79). 
Based on the same grounds, the Court has held that when Article 13 is considered 
in combination with Article 3 or Article 4 of Protocol 4, the effectiveness of a remedy 
also requires: a close scrutiny by a national authority (Shamayev and Others, para 448); 
an independent and rigorous scrutiny of any claim that there exist substantial grounds 
for fearing a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 (Jabari, para 50); and a 
particularly prompt response (Bati and Others v. Turkey, para 136
36
). In addition, the 
Court has underlined the importance of guaranteeing to anyone subject to a removal 
measure, the consequences of which are potentially irreversible, the right to obtain 
sufficient information to enable them to have effective access to the procedures to be 
followed (Hirsi Jamaa and Others, para 204; M.S.S., para 304). 
Finally, in the Hirsi case, the Grand Chamber observed that the absence of any 
domestic procedure to enable potential asylum seekers to lodge their complaints under 
Article 3 and Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 with a competent authority, and to obtain a 
thorough and rigorous assessment of their requests before the enforcement of the 
removal, may also amount to a violation of Article 13 of the Convention (Hirsi Jamaa 
and Others, para 205). In Sharifi, the Court found that, in some circumstances, there is a 
clear link between the enforcement of collective expulsions and the fact that the persons 
concerned were effectively prevented from applying for asylum or from having access 
to any other domestic procedure which met the requirements of Article 13 (Sharifi and 
                                                                                                                                               
39). 
35
 ECtHR, Shamayev and Others v. Georgia and Russia, Application No. 36378/02, 12.04.2005. 
36
 ECtHR, Bati and Others v. Turkey, Applications Nos. 33097/96 and 57834/00, Judgment of the Court, 
03.06.2004. 
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Others, para 242). 
To some up, based on the ECtHR case law, in order to meet the effectiveness 
requirements of Article 13 ECHR taken in conjunction with Article 3 and Article 4 of 
Protocol No. 4, a remedy must be available in law and in practice; it must be accessible 
to all possible claimants, who should receive sufficient information to this respect; it 
must consist of an independent and rigorous scrutiny by a competent national authority; 
it must be prompt; and it must have a suspensive effect. 
 
7.1.2. Problematizing migrants’ human rights 
The next sections 7.2 and 7.3 analyse bilateral and European informal readmission 
policies and practices from a human rights perspective, by using the four asylum-related 
human rights introduced in the previous section as a benchmark to assess the impact of 
such policies and practices on the protection of the fundamental rights of migrants and 
asylum seekers. However, it is worth noting that migrants’ human rights (as well as 
human rights in general, according to critical views) should not be taken as a given or 
considered as absolute. In fact, they are characterised by a number of limitations that are 
inherent to their nature; in addition, their enforceability and justiciability may be 
problematic and, as a result, their actual effectiveness may end up being very limited. 
The purpose of this sub-section is, thus, to provide elements for a 
problematization of migrants’ human rights, which considers not only the content of the 
four asylum-related human rights, but also the nature of the corresponding obligations 
of the EU and its Member States (Spijkerboer 2007; 2013). The reflection that follows 
points out, in particular, the problems and limits concerning the protection of the human 
rights of migrants in the European context, drawing upon Dembour’s critical analysis of 
the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (2015). This reflection aims to 
warn the reader not to rely blindly on human rights as something absolute and neutral, 
and invites, on the contrary, to question their nature and function (Dembour 2006; 
Dembour and Kelly 2011; Perugini and Gordon 2015). 
This section does not aspire in any way to offer an exhaustive overview of the 
vast and diversified critical scholarship on human rights (Dembour 2006; 2010); on the 
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contrary, it simply aims to recall the existence of inherent limits in human rights and to 
provide some elements allowing for a problematization of the issue and for a more 
conscious use of human rights, starting from the present analysis. It is not among the 
purposes of this work neither to dismiss the role of human rights in the context of 
migration and asylum, nor to diminish their relevance (e.g. when it comes to claim 
improvements in the legal and practical situation of migrants and asylum seekers). This 
study clearly recognises also the crucial role the ECtHR has played in the past and may 
play in the future (e.g. in cases like Hirsi Jamaa and Others vs Italy and N.D. and N.T. 
vs Spain), as proved by the evidence presented in Chapter 5. Despite this, the analysis 
carried out in this final chapter has largely benefited from a comparison with alternative 
views on human rights, whose convincing arguments have definitely enriched my own 
stance. 
My reflection moves from a consideration of the relationship between policies of 
cooperation on readmission and the protection of asylum-related human rights, 
especially the principle of non-refoulement and the related right to seek asylum. As 
argued by Hathaway (2005), Gammeltoft-Hansen (2011; 2012; 2014; 2015 with 
Hathaway) and Feith Tan (2015), developed Western States have on the one hand 
formally accepted the prohibition of refoulement (and affirmed their commitment to 
refugee law), but on the other hand they have strenuously tried to avoid the obligations 
that come from it – namely, the duty to admit the asylum seekers who manage to get to 
their jurisdiction and the duty to guarantee their access to asylum procedures and their 
stay in the country until their asylum claim has been examined. 
Since the 1980s, European and other Western countries (e.g. the United States and 
Australia) have adopted so-called ‘non-entrée policies’ with the purpose to avoid that 
asylum seekers arrive to their territory or enter their jurisdiction
37
. Scholars have 
identified three types of ‘traditional non-entrée policies’, which have been pursued 
unilaterally by Western States and have included both territorial and extraterritorial 
                                                 
37
 The term ‘non-entrée’ has been first coined by James Hathaway in 1992 to describe the ‘array of 
legalised policies adopted by states to stymie access by refugees to their territories’ (Hathaway 1992, 40; 
as cited in Hathaway 2005, 291, footnote no. 70). 
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measures
38. These policies ‘promised to insulate developed countries from de facto 
compliance with the duty of non-refoulement even as they left the duty itself intact’ 
(Gammeltoft-Hansen and Hathaway 2015, 242); however, over the last two decades, 
these traditional non-entrée practices have proved vulnerable to both practical and legal 
challenges (Gammeltoft-Hansen and Hathaway 2015, 246-248). 
As a consequence, States have resorted to an array of new ‘cooperation-based 
non-entrée policies’. Differently from the previous set of measures, these new kind of 
migration control policies are not unilateral but are based on international cooperation, 
and are carried out in the territory and/or under the jurisdiction of a third country
39
. In 
this way, European and Western States have sought to avoid legal liability for any 
unlawful act related to refugee deterrence (and implying a breach of international 
refugee law), by relying on the fact that these non-entrée policies are implemented 
under the sovereign authority of third countries, although on behalf of Western States 
(Gammeltoft-Hansen and Hathaway 2015, 248-256; Gammeltoft-Hansen 2012; Feith 
Tan 2015). Gammeltoft-Hansen and Hathaway have described seven main forms of 
cooperation-based non-entrée policies
40
. Based on this analysis, one can conclude that 
both formal and informal modalities of cooperation on readmission are being used, 
together with other cooperation-based migration control policies, not only by EU 
Member States but by developed countries worldwide, in order to prevent asylum 
                                                 
38
 These are: 1) the introduction of visa controls and carrier sanctions, aimed at preventing persons 
fleeing refugee-producing countries from reaching Western States, mainly by air; 2) the establishment of 
so-called ‘international areas’ in airports and harbours and the ‘excision’ of part of the national territory 
(coastlines and islands) for purposes of protection responsibilities, so that the arrival of refugees to such 
territories or areas would not imply the entry into the State’s jurisdiction for asylum purposes; 3) the 
interdiction of migrant boats on the high seas (Gammeltoft-Hansen and Hathaway 2015, 244-245; 
Hathaway 2005, 291-300). 
39
 Feith Tan (2015, 9-10) identifies three main features of this politics: cooperative non-entrée is 
extraterritorial in nature (from the viewpoint of Western countries) because it takes place either on the 
high seas or within the territory and jurisdiction of the cooperating State; it includes both bilateral and 
multilateral measures; and it encompasses both formal and informal readmission (or broader migration 
cooperation) agreements. 
40
 These are: 1) diplomatic relations; 2) direct financial incentives to carry out migration control tasks; 3) 
direct provision of equipment and training to the authorities of the cooperating country; 4) deployment of 
immigration officials in the cooperating country to collaborate with its national authorities; 5) joint border 
patrolling operations; 6) exercise of a direct migration control role from within the territory of the 
cooperating country; 7) ‘outsourcing’ to international agencies (e.g. Frontex) the task to intercept 
migrants and asylum seekers while they are still under the jurisdiction of the countries of origin or transit 
(Gammeltoft-Hansen and Hathaway 2015, 250-256). 
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seekers from entering their territory and accessing asylum procedures there
41
. The 
recourse to cooperation-based non-entrée policies actually characterises both the three 
case studies of bilateral cooperation described above in Chapter 5, and the most recent 
European migration cooperation policies, especially the EU-Turkey Agreement of 18 
March 2016. 
One of the most grievous consequences of non-entrée policies is the death of 
thousands of migrants and asylum seekers, who die in the attempt to reach the territory 
of developed countries. Focusing on the Mediterranean context, Spijkerboer (2007) 
argues that increasing ‘border deaths’ are the foreseeable consequence of the 
strengthening of border control policies (designed by the EU and its Member States 
over the past decades and implemented in cooperation with third countries) which have 
made a safe and legal entry into the EU impossible. More precisely, the scholar asserts 
that the increase in border deaths is related to a fundamental shift in European border 
policies from border control to border management (Spijkerboer 2013, 215-218). 
Taking the issue a step further, Spijkerboer investigates whether the EU Member 
States can be considered legally liable for migrant deaths at sea, even when such loss of 
life occur indirectly (i.e. without the direct and active involvement of State agents) and 
outside the territory and jurisdiction of European States. The author identifies two 
different approaches, which lead to two opposite answers. A ‘conventional approach’ 
would deny State responsibility for migrant deaths occurring outside the State’s territory 
and without involving State agents, because in such case the State is not in control of 
the situation in any way. By contrast, based on a ‘functional approach’ (embraced by the 
scholar), EU Member States should be considered responsible for migrant deaths 
regardless of whether the latter occur within or beyond territorial waters and State’s 
jurisdiction, because in both cases people drown as a consequence of the way in which 
border policies are carried out (Spijkerboer 2013, 226). 
This reasoning leads to question also whether border deaths may amount to a 
violation of the right to life enshrined in Article 2 ECHR. Again, under a conventional 
                                                 
41
 In light of the fact that, as well-known, the developed world currently protects only a small part of 
world’s refugees (around 20%), it seems that non-entrée policies have been highly effective in achieving 
their purpose. 
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approach one would argue that the link between European border policies and migrant 
deaths is too remote to conclude that there has been a violation of Art. 2 ECHR on the 
part of EU Member States. However, based on the ECtHR case law on the positive 
obligations of States under Art. 2 ECHR to safeguard the lives of persons who are 
within their jurisdiction, Spijkerboer argues that border deaths may at least give rise to 
three positive obligations on European States
42
 (2013, 227-235). 
The scholar concludes that it is possible to assert that the EU and its Member 
States do have a positive obligation to minimise the number of border deaths occurring 
as a consequence of their border policies (Spijkerboer 2013, 238; 2007, 138). Such an 
argument is grounded on the recognition that human rights law needs to somehow adapt 
its own concepts to policy changes, when such changes in State policies are aimed at 
sidestepping human rights norms – as pictured by Gammeltoft-Hansen and Adler-
Nissen in their ‘Introduction to Sovereignty Games’ (2008, 1-17). Hence, considering 
that the externalisation of border control policies has produced the effect of 
‘externalising’ also possible human rights violations, moving them away from the reach 
of the European legal and judicial systems, Spijkerboer suggests that also human rights 
law should adapt its fundamental principles (e.g. its notion of jurisdiction) to this shift 
(2013, 238-240). 
While Spijkerboer still seems to attach a potentially relevant role to human rights 
as a source of protection for migrants and an instrument that, if properly used, is capable 
of improving their status, Dembour is more sceptical (or rather ‘nihilist’, as she defined 
herself) towards any concept of human rights that is not empirically grounded (2006, 1-
18). With particular regard to the human rights of migrants, in an edited volume with 
Kelly (2011), she questions whether human rights are for migrants at all. Her critical 
stance on migrants’ human rights is grounded on the recognition of the gaps still 
existing between the promise of human rights for all, irrespective of one’s nationality 
and membership of a specific political community, and the reality of exclusion, 
discrimination and human rights violations routinely faced by many migrants. The 
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 These are: 1) the obligation to investigate into the number of migrant deaths at sea and collect relevant 
data; 2) the obligation to assess European border control policies in light of these data; 3) the obligation to 
establish the identity of the victims (Spijkerboer 2013, 234-235). 
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contributions gathered in this volume explore the reasons why migrants are often 
excluded from the scope of human rights, but also question whether one should actually 
resort to human rights in order to improve the situation of migrants (Dembour and Kelly 
2011, 1-22). 
According to some scholars, in fact, the difficulties migrants encounter in 
accessing human rights are not the result of faulty implementation, but are inherent to 
the very concept and nature of human rights. In the view of these critical scholars, far 
from being a language of protest and an instrument of emancipation and equality, 
human rights are a form of regulation (Douzinas 2000). They have been appropriated by 
States and have become a resource for the powerful rather than for the powerless; in 
fact, instead of limiting State power, human rights may actually strengthen it and 
legitimise dynamics of domination and exclusion (Perugini and Gordon 2015). 
According to this line of thought, human rights originate from the very same logic that 
creates the conditions for migrants’ vulnerability and exclusion; therefore, human rights 
seem to be part of the problem, rather than the solution to the marginalisation and 
inequality faced by many migrants.  
In her monograph ‘When Humans Become Migrants’, Dembour (2015) focuses 
specifically on the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, which exemplifies 
perfectly how generous human rights principles may be interpreted by courts in a way 
that serves to exclude many migrants from full protection. The author analyses how it 
has always been (and still continues to be) extremely difficult for migrants to have 
violations of Convention-protected human rights recognised by the ECtHR, whereas 
another regional human rights court, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, seems 
to be more inclined to favour the recognition of migrants’ rights. Dembour defines as 
‘Strasbourg reversal’ the paradox whereby the ECtHR typically starts its reasoning in 
migrant cases by reiterating the principle that States have the prerogative to control the 
entry and residence of foreigners in their territory, instead of beginning its reasoning 
from the relevant provision of the Convention, as one would expect
43
 (Dembour 2015, 
                                                 
43
 This expression is meant to ‘stress the incongruous nature of a human rights reasoning which starts 
with a prerogative which neither serves to affirm human rights nor is inscribed in the text which the 
adjudicating court’s task is to interpret and apply’ (Dembour 2015, 4). As explained by Dembour, the 
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1-6). 
The effect of the ‘Strasbourg reversal’, observes Dembour, is that the ECtHR 
‘consider[s] the migrant applicant first of all as an “alien” who is subject to the control 
of the State, rather than just as a human being’ (2015, 5). Hence, according to the 
scholar, the European Court has a bias towards the State, meaning that in migration 
cases the ECtHR tends to favour the State over the migrant applicant. As specified by 
Dembour, this does not mean that States always win before the ECtHR, but that the 
European system is characterised by an overall positive attitude towards the State (2015, 
8-9). Although in crucial cases like Saadi v. Italy, M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, or 
Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy the Court has resolutely affirmed migrants’ rights, there 
are many more cases where the Court’s judgments have done nothing for (or have even 
been detrimental to) the development of migrants’ human rights. 
It seems useful to keep in mind Dembour’s critical view on the ECtHR case law 
in migration and asylum cases, as well as the reflections of other critical scholars, when 
analysing the human rights impact of bilateral and European informal patterns of 
cooperation on readmission in the sections that follow. 
 
7.2. How does bilateral informal cooperation on readmission affect asylum-
related human rights? 
Informal practices of bilateral cooperation on readmission can be very 
controversial from a human rights perspective, as it clearly emerged already from the 
analysis of the three case studies of bilateral cooperation on migration control and 
readmission carried out in Chapter 5. This section investigates more specifically how 
informal bilateral readmission arrangements and practices may infringe upon the four 
asylum-related human rights described in section 7.1.1 above – i.e. the prohibition of 
refoulement, the right to seek asylum, the prohibition of collective expulsion and the 
right to an effective remedy – to each of whom a sub-section is dedicated. With this 
purpose, I make reference to some specific practices (already introduced in Chapter 5) 
                                                                                                                                               
Court presents the ‘state control prerogative’ as a well-established principle in international law; however 
Schotel (2012) has argued that such principle actually lacks legal foundation and that the Court is legally 
wrong to rely on it. 
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which are illustrative of the human rights issues that may arise from bilateral informal 
cooperation on readmission, with regards precisely to the four asylum-related rights 
relevant to this work. 
As concerns the Italian-Libyan case study, I focus on two practices: the return 
flights to Libya organised and financed by Italy, and carried out between October 2004 
and March 2006; and the push-back operations implemented by Italian authorities, with 
the cooperation of Libyan authorities, between May and November 2009 (see section 
5.2). With regards to the Spanish-Moroccan case, the practice I focus my attention on is 
that of devoluciones en caliente, which may be considered as a form of ‘legalised’ push-
backs carried out by Spanish authorities in cooperation with Moroccan authorities at the 
borders separating the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla from Morocco (see section 
5.3). As concerns the Greek-Turkish case study, I make reference to the alleged push-
back practices implemented by Greek authorities in the Aegean Sea, which have been 
widely documented by several independent sources, but always denied by the Greek 
government (see section 5.4). The following sub-sections investigate how each of these 
informal readmission practices has restricted, or actually violated, each of the four 
above-mentioned asylum-related human rights (and in some cases still continues to do 
so), determining a situation where the migrants and asylum seekers concerned are not 
granted sufficient protection. 
 
7.2.1. The principle of non-refoulement 
Between October 2004 and March 2006 Italy organised and financed the removal 
via charter flights of more than 3,000 migrants (mainly, but not exclusively, of Egyptian 
nationality
44
) recently arrived from Libya. After being readmitted from Italy to Libya, 
most of them were immediately repatriated to their country of origin, always via charter 
flights organised and financed by Italy (Paoletti 2011a, 143-148; HRW 2006, 106-113). 
With regards to this practice, the UNHCR (2005), Amnesty International (2005), the 
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 According to the Italian government, the return flights to Libya involved a majority of Egyptians (a 
part of whom declared to be Palestinian) and some Moroccan and Bangladeshi nationals (CPT 2006a, 
paras 64-65). The 84 applicants in the Hussun case appeared to be for the most part Palestinians, but there 
were also some Iraqi, Algerian, Jordanian and Moroccan nationals and one Tunisian (Hussun and Others, 
para 10). 
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European Parliament (2005a), the Committee for the Prevention of Torture of the 
Council of Europe (2006a) and Human Rights Watch (2006) have all expressed serious 
concerns about a possible violation of the principle of non-refoulement. Allegedly, the 
Italian authorities failed to take all the necessary measures to ensure that it was not 
sending back anyone (directly or indirectly) to a country where they would risk to suffer 
from ill-treatment or persecution. 
The situation of migrants and refugees in Libya was and still is extremely 
problematic. Libya has not ratified the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol; 
despite having ratified the OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee 
Problems in Africa, which provides for a legal basis for refugee protection and an 
obligation to cooperate with the UNHCR, Libya has not established neither a legal 
framework on asylum nor a national asylum procedure; in addition it does not allow the 
UNHCR to properly operate its protection mandate in the country. Therefore, Libya 
cannot be considered a safe country of asylum, refugees and asylum seekers can be 
returned to. Moreover, in Libya migrants and asylum seekers are arbitrary arrested, 
detained in deplorable conditions and often subjected to violence and ill-treatment by 
Libyan authorities. Sub-Saharan asylum seekers are routinely expelled in large groups 
to their countries of origin (i.e. often to refugee-producing countries like Eritrea, 
Somalia, Liberia, etc.), with no consideration being given to their individual situation 
and protection needs, sometimes even if their refugee status has been recognised by the 
UNHCR (Amnesty International 2005; HRW 2006; European Parliament 2005a). 
Therefore, summary returns to Libya as the ones carried out by Italy in the years 
2004-2006 entailed a serious risk of violating the prohibition of refoulement, both 
directly, due to the unhuman and degrading treatment returnees could suffer in Libya, 
and indirectly, due to the risk of being deported to a country where their life or freedom 
would be threatened (UNHCR 2005). In its report on the visit conducted in Italy in 
November 2004, the Committee for the Prevention of Torture of the Council of Europe 
(CPT) observed that no specific evaluation was carried out by Italian authorities on an 
individual basis to ensure that among the then 1,243 persons readmitted to Libya there 
was nobody who could possibly run the risk of being persecuted or tortured, either in 
Libya or in another State where the Libyan authorities could be led to send them, which 
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would have prohibited their expulsion from Italy (CPT 2006a, para 64). 
Between May and November 2009 the Italian authorities carried out nine push-
back operations in the Channel of Sicily resulting in the readmission of more than 800 
migrants and asylum seekers to Libya. Such operations consisted of intercepting 
migrant boats in international waters, taking migrants on board of the Italian vessels, 
and either returning them directly to Libya or handing them over to Libyan patrol boats 
on the high seas. While no official data was made available by Italian authorities on the 
nationalities of the persons forcibly returned to Libya, the UNHCR collected relevant 
information proving that push-back operations mainly concerned people originating 
from Somalia and Eritrea
45
. The Italian government admitted that neither an 
identification process nor an interview were carried out on board the Italian vessels 
during push-back operations; thus, no specific inquiry or individual assessment was 
made in order to determine possible protection needs of the persons concerned before 
they were returned to Libya or handed over to Libyan authorities (UNHCR 2011, paras 
2.1.2-2.1.6; CPT 2010a, paras 10-14). 
The Italian government affirmed that during push-back operations no migrant has 
ever expressed the intention to apply for asylum and that, consequently, there was no 
need to identify them and establish their nationality (CPT 2010a, paras 14 and 31). 
Conversely, some of the persons directly involved in these push-backs, interviewed by 
the UNHCR, affirmed the opposite. In any event, as pointed out by the European 
Committee for the Prevention of Torture in response to the remarks of the Italian 
government, ‘the absence of an explicit request for asylum does not necessarily absolve 
the Italian authorities of their non-refoulement obligations under Article 3 ECHR’ (CPT 
2010a, para 32). In fact, as observed by Tondini (2010, 24), Italian authorities could not 
be unaware of the consequences for migrants deriving from their handover to Libyan 
officials. 
Having considered the modalities in which these push-back operations were 
                                                 
45
 In 2007 and 2008 Eritrean and Somali nationals were among the main groups of persons seeking 
asylum in Italy. The recognition rate for these nationalities is very high: in 2008 in Italy 90% of Eritrean 
asylum seekers and 96% of Somali asylum seekers were recognised international protection (either 
refugee status or subsidiary protection). Also at the EU level in 2008 recognition rates for both 
nationalities were among the highest (HRW 2011, footnote 13). 
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conducted, the overall situation of migrants, asylum seekers and UNHCR refugees in 
Libya as described above
46
, and the Libyan common practice of arbitrary collective 
expulsions towards unsafe countries of origin (inter alia Eritrea and Somalia), Human 
Rights Watch (2009), the Committee for the Prevention of Torture of the Council of 
Europe (2010a) and the UNHCR (2011) argued that, by returning persons to Libya 
without assessing their protection needs, the Italian authorities have not sufficiently 
taken into account the existence of a potential risk of refoulement, in the form of both 
severe ill-treatment in Libya and onward expulsion to their countries of origin (indirect 
or chain refoulement). 
In contrast to the Italian practice of return flights, where the alleged violation of 
the non-refoulement principle found no judicial confirmation before the ECtHR
47
, with 
regards to these push-back operations, in its landmark judgement on the Hirsi case, the 
Grand Chamber found that there has been a double violation of Article 3 of the 
ECHR
48
. The Court held that, in forcibly returning the applicants to Libya without 
examining their case, Italy exposed them both to the risk of unhuman and degrading 
treatment in Libya (direct refoulement) and to the risk of arbitrary repatriation to 
Somalia or Eritrea, where they could be subjected to such treatment (indirect 
refoulement) (Hirsi Jamaa and Others, paras 137-138 and 158). 
Since the events in question occurred outside the Italian territory (and territorial 
waters), i.e. on the high seas, the Court had to preliminary examine whether the relevant 
provisions of the Convention (and in particular the principle of non-refoulement) 
applied extraterritorially. This is only possible if the applicants are within the 
jurisdiction of the State (Art. 1 ECHR); the ECtHR case law has established that this is 
the case when a State exercises an ‘effective control’ over individuals or areas abroad. 
                                                 
46
 Based on first-hand information, particular concern was expressed for: the conditions of detention in 
Libyan reception and detention centres; the lack of a national asylum system and a legal framework on 
refugee protection; the difficulties encountered by asylum seekers in accessing the UNHCR refugee 
determination procedure; the failure by Libyan authorities to recognise any form of protection to persons 
who are recognised as refugees under the UNHCR mandate; the collective expulsions routinely carried 
out by Libyan authorities (HRW, 47-91; UNHCR 2011, paras 3.2-3.7; CPT 2010a, paras 41-46) 
47
 See: ECtHR, Hussun and Others v. Italy, Applications No. 10171/05, 10601/05, 11593/05 and 
17165/05, Judgment of the Court (Struck out of the List), 19.01.2010. 
48
 The application was filed by a group of 24 Somali and Eritrean migrants who were readmitted to Libya 
during the first push-back operation carried out on 6 May 2016. 
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Since the events took place entirely on board of Italian vessels, the crews of which 
consisted exclusively of Italian officials, the Court held that in the period between 
boarding the Italian ships and being handed over to the Libyan authorities, the 
applicants were under the continuous and exclusive de jure and de facto control of the 
Italian authorities (Hirsi Jamaa and Others, para 81); therefore, the events in question 
fell within the Italian jurisdiction, and Italy had the duty to secure the respect of the 
rights and freedoms protected by the ECHR also in the circumstances of these push-
back operations carried out in international waters. 
When considering whether Italy had violated the prohibition of refoulement by 
pushing the applicants back to Libya, the Court made reference to various reports on the 
situation of migrants and asylum seekers in the country, and embraced the reasoning of 
the CPT (2010a) and Tondini (2010) mentioned above. Indeed, the Court found that, 
since the situation of migrants and asylum seekers in Libya was well-known and easy to 
verify on the basis of multiple sources, the Italian authorities knew or should have 
known that in Libya the applicants would be exposed to treatment contrary to the 
Convention and would not be offered any kind of protection (Hirsi Jamaa and Others, 
para 131). It also affirmed that the fact that the applicants had failed to expressly request 
asylum did not exempt Italy from fulfilling its obligations under Article 3 ECHR (Hirsi 
Jamaa and Others, para 133). The Court, thus, concluded that by transferring the 
applicants to Libya, Italian authorities, in full knowledge of the facts, exposed them to 
unhuman and degrading treatment (Hirsi Jamaa and Others, para 137). 
When examining whether Italy had violated the prohibition of refoulement also 
indirectly, the Court first considered the situation in Somalia and Eritrea, coming to the 
conclusion that it continued to pose widespread serious problems of insecurity, and that, 
for this reason, the applicants could arguably claim that their repatriation would breach 
Article 3 ECHR (Hirsi Jamaa and Others, paras 149-152). Following the same line of 
reasoning applied to direct refoulement, the Court established that the Italian authorities 
knew or should have known that there were insufficient guarantees protecting the 
applicants from the risk of being arbitrarily returned to their countries of origin, with 
particular regard to the lack of any asylum procedure and the impossibility of making 
the Libyan authorities recognise the refugee status granted by the UNHCR (Hirsi Jamaa 
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and Others, para 156). 
Since the early 2000s in the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla the Spanish authorities 
have repeatedly performed a push-back practice known as devoluciones en caliente, 
consisting of the immediate expulsion to Morocco, through the direct handing over to 
Moroccan officials, of migrants and asylum seekers (mainly of Sub-Saharan origin) 
intercepted while trying to cross the border into the Spanish territory. This practice has 
intensified in the last three years, parallel to an increase in migrants’ attempts to enter 
into the Spanish enclaves in large groups, mostly by climbing over the multiple barbed-
wire fences surrounding the entire land border of the enclaves or, in the case of Ceuta, 
also by reaching its shores from the sea (by boat or swimming). 
Based on reports of several NGOs and the Council of Europe Commissioner for 
Human Rights, the modalities by which these push-backs are carried out resemble in 
many ways those of Italian push-backs: allegedly, also in the case of devoluciones en 
caliente the Spanish authorities hand over migrants to Moroccan authorities 
immediately after their interception (in Melilla generally using the doors within the 
triple border fence), without identifying them or establishing their nationality, without 
conducting any interview or individual assessment of their possible protection needs, 
and preventing their access to the asylum procedure
49
. Inter alia, it has been claimed 
that these summary returns violate the non-refoulement principle, because they would 
put migrants and asylum seekers at risk of being subjected to violence and abuse by 
Moroccan authorities, potentially amounting to unhuman or degrading treatment (HRW 
2014a, 42-44; Amnesty International 2015a, 30-36; Council of Europe Commissioner 
for Human Rights 2015b, para 20; 2016b). 
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 The main difference between Spanish and Italian push-backs is that the former are not carried out in 
international waters, but from within the Spanish territory or at the Spanish border. However, the Spanish 
government has tried on several occasions to redefine on a case-by-case basis where the territory of the 
State begins, in an attempt to avoid its international obligations. For instance, the Spanish government has 
repeatedly asserted that the area between the triple fence in Melilla’s border is not Spanish territory, 
despite an affirmation by a Spanish court that the areas comprised between the three layers of fences are 
indeed Spanish territory (Amnesty International 2015a, 31). States’ attempt to establish ‘international 
zones’ and designate part of the national territory as being outside the national territory with the hope of 
thereby avoiding protection responsibilities towards persons present therein, is one of the ‘non-entrée 
policies’ described by Hathaway (2005, 298). However, regardless of whether these push-backs occur 
within or outside Spanish territory, Spain is to be considered responsible as long as it exerts an effective 
control over individuals or areas through the actions of its State agents, as established by the ECtHR case 
law and reaffirmed in Hirsi (para 81). 
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The question is whether the situation of migrants and asylum seekers in Morocco 
provides sufficient reasons for claiming a violation of the non-refoulement principle on 
the part of Spain: would the persons summarily returned to Morocco be at risk of ill-
treatment in Morocco, as in the case of Italian push-backs to Libya? National and 
international NGOs have provided relevant and consistent first-hand evidence in this 
respect, reporting in particular: the violence suffered by migrants at the hands of 
Moroccan police and security forces (e.g. raids in migrants’ informal settlements, 
excessive use of force at the borders with Spain, etc.); episodes of arbitrary arrest and 
detention; episodes of collective expulsions to the desert border with Algeria; gaps in 
the implementation of the legal framework on refugee protection and difficulties in the 
establishment of a national asylum system (MSF 2013; HRW 2014a; AI 2015a, 26-36 
and 44-48; Migreurop et al. 2015). 
Unfortunately, the decision of the ECtHR on the admissibility of the joined cases 
N.D. v. Spain and N.T. v. Spain issued on 7 July 2015 precludes any significant 
pronouncement of the Court on this question. Indeed, whilst the Court considered 
admissible the part of the application concerning the alleged violation of Article 4 of 
Protocol No. 4 ECHR and Article 13 ECHR (in conjunction with Art. 4 Prot. No. 4), it 
declared the applicants’ complaints under Article 3 ECHR inadmissible, as being 
manifestly ill-founded. 
The two applicants
50
 claimed that the Spanish authorities had summarily removed 
them to Morocco, despite the existence of a serious risk they would be ill-treated upon 
their handing over to Moroccan officials. According to the applicants, the practice of ill-
treatments by Moroccan authorities is described in the reports of several national and 
international NGOs, and is known or should be known by Spanish authorities in the 
context of their tight cooperation with Morocco in the area of migration (N.D. and N.T. 
v. Spain, para 11). However, the Court observed that in the present case the applicants, 
who were actually removed to Morocco, were not subjected to (and did not complain 
about) any treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR upon their expulsion to that country. 
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 The two applicants N.D. and N.T. are, respectively, a Malian and an Ivorian nationals. They were part 
of a group of at least 65 Sub-Saharan migrants, who, on 13 August 2014, were summarily returned to 
Morocco by Spanish Guardia Civil officials immediately after having put down their feet on the Spanish 
territory, having succeeded in climbing over the triple fence at Melilla’s border. 
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Therefore, the Court held that, without prejudice to the general situation of risk of ill-
treatment for migrants in Morocco evoked by the applicants, in the specific 
circumstances of the case there were no elements that could possibly reveal a violation 
of Article 3 ECHR by the Spanish authorities. For this reason the Court rejected this 
part of the application as manifestly ill-founded (N.D. and N.T. v. Spain, para 15)
51
. 
With regards to push-backs carried out by Greece in the Aegean Sea, any 
consideration as to possible human rights violations can only be based on NGOs’ 
reports; so far, no application has been submitted to the ECtHR against Greece claiming 
the violation of Convention-protected rights deriving from a push-back episode in the 
Aegean Sea. In addition, as mentioned above in section 5.4, the Greek government has 
always denied the existence of such push-back practices and defended the conduct of its 
Coast Guard officials. Nevertheless, the copious and consistent evidence, based on first-
hand testimonies, gathered by several national and international NGOs during the last 
decade seems to incontestably prove that these informal push-back practices do take 
place (Pro Asyl 2007; 2013; HRW 2008; Amnesty International 2013; 2015a). 
Irrespective of the different modalities and forms Greek push-backs may take (see 
section 5.4 above), migrants and asylum seekers are allegedly sent back to Turkey (or 
Turkish territorial waters) outside of any formal procedure. As in the case of Italian and 
Spanish push-backs, the persons involved are neither identified nor interviewed, and no 
individual assessment of their protection needs and personal situation is carried out; 
reportedly, even explicit requests of protection are not given adequate consideration 
(Pro Asyl 2013, 18-19). NGOs have argued that this practice may result, inter alia, in 
the violation of the non-refoulement principle, both directly and indirectly. Upon their 
return to Turkey, indeed, migrants and asylum seekers may face the risk of being 
arrested and detained in degrading detention conditions
52
; and some of them may also 
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 In the similar pending case of Doumbe Nnabuchi v. Spain (submitted in April 2015 and communicated 
to the Spanish government in December 2015) the applicant did not claim a violation of the principle of 
non-refoulement linked to his summary removal to Morocco, but he claimed inter alia a violation of 
Article 3 ECHR on account of the fact that he was subjected to a disproportionate use of violence by 
Spanish officials when he was crossing Melilla’s border fences, which the applicant maintains amounted 
to unhuman and degrading treatment. 
52
 Turkey has a record of treating asylum seekers harshly in detention: episodes of unhuman and 
degrading treatment have been reported by NGOs (Amnesty International 2009; 2015b) and condemned 
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face the risk of being deported to their country of origin without a proper assessment of 
their protection needs (Pro Asyl 2013, 19). 
Numerous reports describe the problems faced, and human rights violations 
suffered, by migrants, asylum seekers and refugees in Turkey, which in some 
circumstances may amount to treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR – and which, more 
generally, make Turkey an unsafe country for asylum seekers (Roman et al. 2016, 12-
20). The situation of asylum seekers and refugees in Turkey has got even worse in the 
last years, due to the exacerbation of the conflict in Syria, the resulting increase in the 
number of refugees, and the strengthening of cooperation on migration control with the 
EU (HRW 2015b; 2016c; Amnesty International 2009; 2015b; 2016b; 2016e; see above 
section 6.2.1.1). 
As concerns the risk of direct refoulement, besides the issue of detention 
conditions which may amount to unhuman and degrading treatment, asylum seekers and 
refugees face also a number of legal and practical barriers that hamper access to and 
enjoyment of protection in Turkey. The country has ratified the 1951 Geneva 
Convention and its 1967 Protocol, but maintains a geographical limitation, whereby it 
does not recognise refugee status to asylum seekers who come from outside Europe
53
. 
This results in restricted rights and limited access to health care, education and 
employment for a large majority of asylum seekers and refugees in Turkey. In addition, 
even though in 2013 Turkey adopted a new organic legislation on international 
protection
54
, its implementation has progressed very slowly; thus Turkey is still far from 
having a well-functioning national asylum system, able to guarantee access to fair and 
effective asylum procedures. 
With regards to the risk of indirect refoulement, it should be observed that Turkey 
has engaged in the deportation of migrants and asylum seekers to their countries of 
origin since the 1990s; this is particularly worrying because, as already noted in section 
                                                                                                                                               
by the ECtHR (see, inter alia: Abdolkhani and Karimnia v. Turkey and S.A. v. Turkey). 
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 Syrians, for instance, have been granted a form of ‘temporary protection’, but, like all other non-
European asylum seekers (e.g. Afghans and Iraqis), they have no right to refugee protection in its full 
sense, as enshrined in the 1951 Refugee Convention. 
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 Law No. 6458 of 4 April 2013, ‘Law on Foreigners and International Protection’, Official Gazette No. 
28615 of 11 April 2013. 
 302 
5.4, a large part of migrants to Turkey come from ‘refugee-producing countries’. 
Reportedly, Turkey has regularly expelled (and continues to expel) Iranian, Iraqi and 
Afghan asylum seekers without a proper assessment of possible risks of persecution, 
torture or ill-treatment in their countries of origin. Most recently, NGOs have repeatedly 
denounced episodes of summary removal, push-backs at the border and physical 
violence addressing Syrian refugees (HRW 2015b; 2016c; Amnesty International 
2015b; 2016b). 
From this account it clearly emerges that Greek push-back practices may expose 
the returnees to both the risk of being subjected to ill-treatment in Turkey and to the risk 
of being deported to their countries of origin without a proper assessment of their 
protection needs. 
 
7.2.2. The right to seek asylum 
With regards to the Italian practice of so-called ‘return flights’ to Libya carried 
out in the years 2004-2006, the UNHCR (2005), Amnesty International (2005), the 
European Parliament (2005a) and Human Rights Watch (2006) have expressed serious 
concerns about a possible violation of the right to seek asylum. As reported by the 
UNHCR (2005) and HRW (2006, 107), Italian officials used to sort out migrants by 
nationality upon their arrival in Lampedusa: Eritrean, Ethiopian and Somalian nationals 
were admitted to the asylum procedure, while migrants coming from other countries 
were to be sent back to Libya via charter flights (most of them being Egyptian 
nationals). However, this division was apparently done using ‘rushed methods’ 
(UNHCR 2005); ‘according to the International Federation for Human Rights, the 
identification of nationality seemed to have been determined primarily by the intuition 
and snap judgments of two Arabic interpreters’55 (HRW 2006, 107). As a consequence, 
individuals who might have had a valid protection claim may have been prevented from 
accessing the asylum procedure and from having their claim adequately examined. As 
mentioned above in section 7.1.1.2, the right to asylum is a subjective right of 
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 As explained by Italian authorities in their reply to a letter by the Council of Europe Committee for the 
Prevention of Torture, the main task of Arabic interpreters is to determine whether migrants who declare 
to be Palestinians are in fact Egyptians (CPT 2006a, para 65). 
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individuals; everyone has the right to seek protection from persecution, irrespective of 
his or her nationality or country of origin
56
. 
By deporting migrants, sorted out by nationality, to Libya without offering them 
the possibility to apply for asylum and without an individual assessment of their 
possible protection needs, Italy has allegedly failed to guarantee their right to seek 
asylum. However, it cannot be argued that this has occurred in all cases. In its decision 
on the Hussun case, the ECtHR observed that, with regards to the group of 14 applicants 
who were actually expelled to Libya, each of them had received an individual expulsion 
order, issued by a judge (Giudice di Pace) following a hearing held in the presence of a 
lawyer and an interpreter (Hussun and Others, para 45). Apparently, in the 
circumstances of the case and with regards to that group of individuals, Italian 
authorities applied the return procedure provided for by national law, including, at least 
formally, all due procedural guarantees. 
The same cannot be held with regards to the Italian push-back operations carried 
out in 2009. In fact, as mentioned in section 7.2.1, Italian authorities have officially 
acknowledged that they did not proceed with the formal identification of migrants who 
were intercepted at sea during push-back operations; they did not inform them about 
their real destination; and they did not conduct any individual interview nor specific 
inquiry to determine possible protection needs of intercepted migrants (UNHCR 2011, 
para 2.1.4; CPT 2010a, para 13; Hirsi Jamaa and Others, para 11). 
As reported by the Committee for the Prevention of Torture of the Council of 
Europe (2010a, para 14), the Italian government affirmed that during push-back 
operations no migrant has ever expressed the intention to apply for asylum and that, 
consequently, there was no need to identify them and establish their nationality. Even if 
this statement were to correspond to reality – which is doubtful, based on information 
gathered by the UNHCR from a number of pushed-back migrants (2011, para 2.1.6) – 
the absence of an explicit request for asylum does not in itself absolve Italy from its 
obligations (CPT 2010a, para 32; Hirsi Jamaa and Others, paras 133 and 157), 
including the duty of admission and the duty to guarantee access to an effective asylum 
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 Article 3 of the 1951 Geneva Convention establishes that the State parties ‘shall apply the provisions 
of this Convention to refugees without discrimination as to race, religion or country of origin’. 
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procedure, which derive from the principle of non-refoulement (see above section 
7.1.1.2). 
Furthermore, it should be noted that even if a person were to request protection 
while aboard an Italian vessel, this would have hardly had any consequence. In fact, as 
reported by the CPT, the Italian Coast Guard and military personnel on board the 
vessels admitted that there was no procedure in place capable of referring that person to 
a protection mechanism. Officials aboard the ships were neither responsible, nor trained, 
nor instructed for the identification and screening of migrants, the provision of 
information on how to apply for asylum, and the processing of asylum requests. In 
addition, intercepted migrants did not have access to linguistic or legal assistance on 
board the intercepting vessels, in order to express their needs (CPT 2010a, para 14). 
Therefore, Italian push-back operations did not only result in a direct and indirect 
violation of the non-refoulement principle (as established by the ECtHR in Hirsi), but 
they also deprived intercepted migrants and asylum seekers from their right to seek 
protection and to access asylum procedures, which derives from the prohibition of 
refoulement (and which is also explicitly protected by Article 18 CFR). 
As noted in the previous section, both Spanish push-backs in Ceuta and Melilla 
and Greek push-backs in the Aegean Sea appear to be very similar to Italian push-backs, 
with regards to the modalities of their implementation. As reported by NGOs, Spanish 
authorities would hand over migrants directly to Moroccan officials immediately after 
having caught them in the border area of the enclaves, whereas in the case of Greek 
push-backs, migrants and asylum seekers would not be handed over to Turkish 
authorities, but would be simply returned or forced to return to Turkey (or Turkish 
territorial waters). In both cases, these summary removals would occur outside of any 
formal readmission procedure: based on reports of NGOs and the Council of Europe 
Commissioner for Human Rights, migrants and asylum seekers are neither identified 
nor interviewed, their nationality is not determined, and no individual assessment of 
their protection needs and personal situation is carried out, neither by Spanish nor by 
Greek authorities (Amnesty International 2013; 2015a; HRW 2008; 2014a; Migreurop 
et al. 2015; Pro Asyl 2007; 2013; Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights 
2015b). 
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Of particular relevance to this section is the fact that, in both contexts, intercepted 
migrants would be prevented from accessing asylum procedures. Reportedly, even in 
cases when migrants have explicitly declared their protection needs and expressed to the 
authorities their intention to apply for asylum, their claims have been ignored (Pro Asyl 
2013, 18). Therefore, based on information provided by NGOs and the Commissioner 
for Human Rights, it would seem that in the context of these informal push-back 
practices both Spain and Greece have not abided by their obligations to guarantee the 
right to seek asylum. 
This is especially worrying in the Greek-Turkish context, in light of the fact that a 
large majority of those who cross the Aegean Sea come from ‘refugee-producing 
countries’. In recent years most of them have arrived in particular from Syria, 
Afghanistan and Iraq (see section 6.2.1.1 above); these currently represent the top three 
main countries of nationality of asylum seekers in the EU; the same nationalities 
(together with the Eritreans) present the highest recognition rates across the EU, both at 
first and at higher instances (EASO 2016a, 9-11 and 19-27). Therefore, considering the 
significant presence of asylum seekers on the Eastern Mediterranean route, it seems 
crucial that Greece abstain from practices that may limit the right of every person to 
seek protection from war, persecution or ill-treatment. 
In the Spanish-Moroccan context, as mentioned in section 5.3, push-backs target 
specifically Sub-Saharan migrants, while other nationalities (especially Syrians) are 
usually allowed to access the asylum procedure (once they manage to enter the 
enclaves). In fact, since 2014 an increasing number of Syrians have entered irregularly 
the Spanish enclaves (Melilla in particular) mainly passing through the official border 
crossing points with fraudulent documents, posing as Moroccan nationals (Frontex 
2016, 21; Migreurop et al. 2015, 16). But this option is not available to all: its cost is 
high (between 500 and 2,000 euro according to Amnesty International) and in any case 
it does not work for Sub-Saharan Africans, whose physical appearance usually differs 
from that of most Moroccans; for this reason Sub-Saharan migrants and asylum seekers 
have always tried to enter the Spanish enclaves mainly by climbing over the fences 
(Amnesty International 2015a, 24-25). 
Following the increase in arrivals of Syrian refugees, since the end of 2014 the 
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Spanish government has opened an asylum office at Melilla’s main border check point 
and established an accelerated procedure, which allows for the swift transfer of asylum 
seekers to the Spanish mainland, before a decision on their asylum application is made. 
However, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights observed that this 
procedure applies only to persons who claim asylum at this facility, namely almost 
exclusively to Syrian nationals; Sub-Saharan migrants, instead, are unable to access the 
asylum office at the border check point and are left with the option of climbing the 
fence (2015b, paras 18 and 30). 
However, as mentioned above in relation to the Italian practice of return flights, 
States have to guarantee to everyone the right to seek asylum, irrespective of his or her 
country of origin; therefore, Spain has an obligation not to discriminate asylum seekers 
based on their nationality and to allow access to the asylum procedure both to Syrian 
and to Sub-Saharan nationals. As underlined by the Commissioner for Human Rights in 
its third party intervention submitted to the ECtHR in the case N.D. and N.T. v. Spain, 
‘migrants climbing the fence may also have valid protection claims and […] they should 
not be obliged to take serious risks, including climbing over the six-metre high triple 
fence, to be able to have access to the asylum procedure’ (2015b, para 32)57. The 
Commissioner thus concluded that Spain should strengthen the asylum system in 
Melilla ‘to allow all persons in need of protection, irrespective of where they come 
from, to access the territory safely and to submit asylum claims’ (2015b, para 32). 
 
7.2.3. The prohibition of collective expulsions 
With regards to the Italian practice of return flights to Libya, the European 
Parliament (2005a), the Council of Europe Committee for the Prevention of Torture 
(2006a), Amnesty International (2005) and Human Rights Watch (2006) have expressed 
serious concerns about a possible violation of the prohibition of collective expulsions. 
According to HRW, while the Italian government claimed that all migrants had the 
opportunity to seek asylum while in Lampedusa, in fact ‘at times the authorities 
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 The Commissioner recalled also that the ‘UNHCR has underlined that since 2013, a growing number 
of the migrants arriving in Melilla were likely to have protection needs as they came from war-torn 
countries’ (2015b, para 15). 
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collectively expelled large groups without providing them an asylum review’ (2006, 
106). Likewise, Amnesty International asserted that ‘the authorities appear to be rushing 
to deport people from Lampedusa, and are doing so without proper scrutiny of the 
individual cases’ (2005, 3). Both the European Parliament and the CPT argued that the 
practice of return flights may actually amount to collective expulsion: although migrants 
were generally identified and their nationality established, no specific evaluation was 
made of the personal circumstances of each individual concerned in order to exclude 
any possible risk of refoulement in his or her particular case (EP 2005a, paras 1-2; CPT 
2006a, paras 64 and 69). 
As already described in previous sections, in the context of the 2009 push-back 
operations, Italian authorities failed to carry out any formal identification and 
nationality determination procedure, any individual interview or any other specific 
examination of the personal circumstances of each migrant intercepted at sea and 
brought aboard Italian vessels. For these reasons, according to Human Rights Watch 
(2009), the Council of Europe Committee for the Prevention of Torture (2010a) and the 
UNCHR (2011), Italian push-backs amounted to a collective expulsion of aliens. These 
allegations were confirmed by the ECtHR in its judgement on the Hirsi case, where it 
found that Italy had violated the prohibition of collective expulsion as set out by Article 
4 of Protocol No. 4 ECHR. 
More specifically – after having determined that the prohibition of collective 
expulsion applied also ‘extra-territorially’, i.e. to removals towards a third country 
carried out outside national territory
58
 – the Court held that the transfer of the applicants 
to Libya was performed without any examination of each applicant’s individual 
situation. Applicants were not subjected to any identification procedure by the Italian 
authorities, which restricted themselves to embarking all the intercepted migrants onto 
military ships and disembarking them on Libyan soil; moreover, the personnel aboard 
the military ships were not trained to conduct individual interviews and were not 
assisted by interpreters or legal advisers. Based on these considerations, the Court ruled 
out the existence of sufficient guarantees ensuring that the individual circumstances of 
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 See section 7.1.1.3 above. 
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each migrant concerned were the subject of a detailed examination, and it concluded 
that the removal of the applicants was of a collective nature (Hirsi Jamaa and Others, 
paras 185-186). 
With regards to Spanish and Greek push-back practices, based on the reports of 
several NGOs (Amnesty International 2013; 2015a; HRW 2008; 2014a; Migreurop et 
al. 2015; Pro Asyl 2007; 2013) and the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council 
of Europe (2015b), it seems plausible to argue that these summary removals are carried 
out with the same modalities of Italian push-backs. In particular, Spanish authorities in 
Ceuta and Melilla, as well as Greek authorities in the Aegean Sea, appear to routinely 
send back groups of migrants to Morocco and Turkey, respectively, without conducting 
any prior identification, any individual interview and any examination of the personal 
circumstances of each migrant in a group. 
Therefore, one may conclude that such push-back practices could actually amount 
to collective expulsions (as defined by the ECtHR), similarly to the 2009 Italian push-
back operations, which have already been condemned by the Court in the Hirsi case. It 
remains to be seen whether in the two cases pending before the Court concerning the 
Spanish practice of devoluciones en caliente (namely, N.D. and N.T. v. Spain and 
Doumbe Nnabuchi v. Spain) the ECtHR will confirm its reasoning in the Hirsi case, and 
condemn Spain for violating Article 4 of Protocol No. 4. 
 
7.2.4. The right to an effective remedy 
The Italian practice of push-backs at sea has been criticised also because it failed 
to provide intercepted migrants with the possibility to challenge the legality of their 
removal to Libya before a competent domestic authority
59
. In the Hirsi case, the 
applicants complained that, due to the fact that push-back operations were carried out 
outside of any legal framework and were not in accordance with the law, they were not 
afforded an effective remedy under Italian law to lodge their complaints under Article 3 
ECHR and Article 4 of Protocol No. 4, as required by Article 13 ECHR. Considering 
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 As concerns the Italian practice of return flights, the issue of effective remedy has not been specifically 
raised by international bodies (CPT, UNHCR, EP) and NGOs (HRW, AI), which have nonetheless 
criticised the practice in other respects (see previous sections). 
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the modalities in which such push-backs were conducted, the ECtHR agreed with the 
applicants
60
. The Court emphasised in particular the fact that the Italian military 
personnel provided no information to the applicants as to their real destination (they 
actually led the applicants to believe they were being taken to Italy) and the procedure 
to be followed to avoid being returned to Libya. In this respect, the Court reiterated the 
importance of guaranteeing anyone subject to a removal measure the right to obtain 
sufficient information to enable them to gain effective access to the relevant procedures 
and to substantiate their complaints (Hirsi Jamaa and Others, paras 203-204). 
The Court thus concluded that the applicants were deprived of any remedy which 
would have enabled them to lodge their complaints with a competent authority and to 
obtain a thorough and rigorous assessment of their requests before the removal measure 
was enforced (Hirsi Jamaa and Others, para 205). It further observed that the domestic 
remedy the applicants could have availed themselves of, according to the Italian 
government
61
, even if it were accessible in practice, in fact could not be considered 
‘effective’, as it did not satisfy the requirements of Article 13 taken together with 
Article 3 and Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 – namely the criterion of suspensive effect, 
which requires that the execution of the impugned measure is stayed until the competent 
authority has examined the applicant’s complaints62 (Hirsi Jamaa and Others, para 
206). 
Likewise, with regards to Spanish push-backs in Ceuta and Melilla, the Council of 
Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, in his third party intervention in the N.D. and 
N.T. case, argued that ‘the practice of immediate expulsions to Morocco deprives 
migrants of any possibility to challenge the legality of the expulsion decision, or to 
complain about ill-treatment possibly inflicted during the expulsion, before a competent 
authority’ (Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights 2015b, para 35). The 
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 The Court reiterated that the applicants had no access to a procedure to identify them and to assess 
their personal circumstances before they were returned to Libya; in addition neither interpreters nor legal 
advisers were present aboard the Italian vessels (Hirsi Jamaa and Others, para 202). 
61
 The Italian government argued that the applicants could have applied to the Italian courts upon their 
arrival in Libya bringing criminal proceedings against the Italian military personnel, in order to obtain 
recognition (and possibly compensation) for the alleged violations of the Convention (Hirsi Jamaa and 
Others, para 192). 
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 See above section 7.1.1.4. 
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persons subjected to a summary removal through the border fences of the enclaves do 
not receive any written, individualised and reasoned decision to appeal against; in 
addition, they are not provided with any information on how to challenge their forced 
return, how to avoid being deported, or how to complain for possible ill-treatments 
received at the hands of the authorities
63
. 
Based on NGOs’ reports, the same may be argued also for Greek push-backs in 
the Aegean Sea, which are carried out with very similar modalities. Indeed, migrants 
and asylum seekers, whose boats and dinghies are intercepted by Greek authorities, are 
returned or forced to return to Turkey without any opportunity to challenge their 
expulsion or to complain about possible ill-treatments before a competent authority. 
Considering that these push-backs are an informal practice carried out outside of any 
legal framework and, what is more, that the Greek government has always denied their 
existence, it seems logical that, in the context of such a complete lack of transparency, 
Greek authorities preclude also the access to an effective remedy to the persons who are 
subjected to this practice. 
 
7.3. How does European informal cooperation on migration and readmission 
affect asylum-related human rights? The case of the EU-Turkey Agreement 
The analysis of European instruments of informal cooperation on readmission 
carried out in Chapter 6 has already revealed the existence of some controversial 
elements from a human rights perspective. For instance, the EU-Afghanistan Joint Way 
Forward Agreement seems to consciously neglect the deterioration of the security 
situation in Afghanistan, as it provides for the readmission of rejected asylum seekers, 
explicitly including also vulnerable persons (e.g. unaccompanied minors, single women, 
elderly and seriously sick people). For the same reason, also the EU-Turkey Action Plan 
adopted in November 2015 seems to overlook the risk of chain refoulement for certain 
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 Furthermore, as noted by the Commissioner, migrants’ access to a domestic remedy is further 
hampered by the fact that Moroccan officials often transfer them to other regions of the country (e.g. to 
Fez in the cases of both N.D. and N.T. and Doumbe Nnabuchi). This would make it difficult for NGOs to 
keep contacts with returnees, a circumstance which would reduce the possibilities of bringing complaints 
of human rights violations before the Spanish courts (Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights 
2015b, para 35). 
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rejected asylum seekers (e.g. Afghan nationals), who may be deported to unsafe 
countries upon their removal to Turkey. 
As discussed above in section 6.2.1, these informal deals are part of a broader 
European strategy, which consists of making humanitarian and development aid, as well 
as trade agreements, investments and other concessions, conditional to a third country’s 
effective cooperation on return and readmission. This approach to migration 
cooperation with third countries has found its most comprehensive elaboration in the so-
called ‘new Partnership Framework’ and is currently being implemented (with mixed 
results) in relation to five African countries (Ethiopia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and 
Senegal). However, the most controversial materialisation of this new approach is 
probably embodied by the EU-Turkey Agreement of 18 March 2016, as mentioned 
above in section 6.2.1.1
64
. 
Moving from these considerations, this section investigates specifically how 
informal cooperation on readmission at the European level may infringe upon the four 
asylum-related human rights described in section 7.1.1 – i.e. the principle of non-
refoulement, the prohibition of collective expulsion, the right to seek asylum, and the 
right to an effective remedy – taking as a case study the EU-Turkey Agreement of 
March 2016. The following sub-sections are dedicated to the above-mentioned rights, 
and considers both how they are established in the text of the Agreement and how they 
are implemented in practice. 
 
7.3.1. The principle of non-refoulement and the prohibition of collective 
expulsions 
The EU-Turkey Agreement has been immediately criticised by international 
organisations (Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe 2016a; 
UNHCR 2016b; PACE 2016a), NGOs (Amnesty International 2016a; ECRE 2016b; 
HRW et al. 2016) and scholars (Carrera and Guild 2016; Peers 2016a) for entailing a 
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 Section 6.2.1.1. focuses on the content, fundamental principles and legal nature of the EU-Turkey 
Agreement; this section continues the investigation started above, by focusing more specifically on the 
most controversial elements of the agreement from a human rights perspective. 
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serious risk of collective expulsion and violation of the principle of non-refoulement. 
The wording of the text of 7 March (the first version of the agreement) was indeed 
rather vague, as it merely mentioned the return of ‘all new irregular migrants crossing 
from Turkey into the Greek islands with the costs covered by the EU’. For this reason, 
in its Communication on Next Operational Steps in EU-Turkey Cooperation in the Field 
of Migration of 16 March 2016, the Commission expressed explicit reassurances that 
every case will be treated individually and that the legal and procedural requirements set 
out by the Asylum Procedures Directive will be respected: ‘there is no question of 
applying a “blanket” return policy’ (European Commission 2016b, 3). 
These reassurances were included in the text of 18 March (the final version of the 
agreement), which contains an explicit commitment to respect both prohibitions: it 
affirms that the implementation of the agreement ‘will take place in full accordance 
with EU and international law, thus excluding any kind of collective expulsion. All 
migrants will be protected in accordance with the relevant international standards and in 
respect of the principle of non-refoulement’ (European Council 2016c, para 1). In order 
to abide by the prohibition of collective expulsion and refoulement, before returning a 
group of persons to Turkey, the EU (or more specifically Greece) has to conduct a 
reasonable and objective examination of the particular case of each individual of the 
group, and has to verify, always on a case-by-case basis, that nobody face any risk of 
persecution, torture or ill-treatment upon his or her removal to Turkey. 
However, it is important to verify whether the commitments the EU has taken on 
paper have so far been respected in practice. If on the one hand there have been no 
reports of apparent episodes of collective expulsion so far, on the other hand returnees 
seem to be at risk of direct refoulement, due to the degrading detention conditions they 
are reportedly subjected to upon their deportation to Turkey, which may amount to ill-
treatment under Article 3 ECHR. NGOs have documented that in Turkish detention 
centres where returnees from Greece are detained, living and hygienic conditions are 
very poor; returnees face difficulties in accessing the asylum procedure and are denied 
access to information and to legal assistance, as lawyers and NGOs are not allowed to 
enter the centres (HRW 2016b; Mülteci-Der 2016; Mülteci-Der and Pro Asyl 2016; 
Amnesty International 2016e). These elements add to the already difficult situation that 
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migrants and asylum seekers in general live in Turkey (described in the final part of 
section 7.2.1 above). Moreover, returnees are also at risk of indirect refoulement, i.e. 
onward deportation towards their country of origin, where they may be subjected to 
treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR (as extensively discussed in section 7.2.1 
above)
65
. 
 
7.3.2. The right to seek asylum 
Arguably, the EU-Turkey Agreement may affect the right to seek asylum in 
different ways. In this respect, it seems useful to consider in particular the implications 
of the so-called ‘one-for-one’ principle (whereby for every Syrian readmitted from 
Greece to Turkey, another Syrian will be resettled from Turkey to an EU Member State) 
and the applicability of the concepts of safe third country (STC) and safe country of 
origin (SCO) to Turkey
66
. Criticism on these aspects of the EU-Turkey Agreement has 
been raised by both international organisations (UNHCR 2016c) and NGOs (Amnesty 
International 2016a; ECRE 2016a; 2016b; HRW et al. 2016), as well as by the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (2016a) and several scholars (Peers 
2016b; Collet 2016; Pascouau 2016; Emmanouilidis 2016; Labayle and De Bruycker 
2016; Favilli 2016). 
Firstly, as mentioned above in section 6.2.1.1, the one-for-one principle foresees 
that in this new form of ‘conditional resettlement’ priority is given to Syrians who have 
not previously entered or tried to enter the EU irregularly. This mechanism appears to 
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 It is worth noting that the implementation of the EU-Turkey Agreement may lead to a violation of Art. 
3 ECHR on the part of Greece also in a third way, namely due to the degrading conditions of detention to 
which migrants and asylum seekers are reportedly subjected in the ‘hotspots’ on the Greek islands. As 
mentioned above in section 6.2.2, hotspots were created in September 2015 as open centres for the 
reception, identification and registration of asylum seekers, but with the EU-Turkey Agreement they were 
turned into closed detention facilities. Starting from 20 March 2016, everyone who arrives in Greece 
(including children, sole women, disabled people, etc.) is detained in these hotspots until Greek 
authorities have examined their case and determined whether they can have their asylum request 
processed in Greece and be transferred to the mainland, or whether they should be send back to Turkey. 
NGOs have denounced this practice of arbitrary deprivation of liberty, and have documented very critical 
detention conditions (e.g. overcrowding, lack of indoor sleeping places, low-quality and insufficient food, 
poor hygienic conditions, lacking healthcare, promiscuity, situation of insecurity, violence among 
detainees, etc.) (HRW 2016a; 2016d; Amnesty International 2016c; PACE 2016a, paras 4-12). 
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 See section 6.2.1.1 for a definition of the concepts of STC and FCA and a description of the ‘one-for-
one’ mechanism. 
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be controversial first of all from an ethical point of view, as it essentially punishes a 
Syrian refugee because he has tried to seek safety in Europe, while rewarding another 
Syrian refugee because he has not made the attempt; a despicable distinction is thus 
established between ‘good refugee’ and ‘bad refugee’. Moreover, this mechanism 
clearly contrasts with one of the fundamental principles of international refugee law: 
Article 31(1) of the 1951 Refugee Convention establishes that a refugee cannot be 
punished for illegal entry or presence in the country where he or she seeks refuge
67
; the 
right of an individual to seek protection cannot, in fact, be subordinated to the (legal or 
illegal) way he or she enters a country. Therefore, the right to seek asylum of Syrians 
may end up being restricted by the application of the one-for-one principle. 
Secondly, in so far as the one-for-one mechanism applies to Syrians only, it 
represents a clear violation of the prohibition of discrimination based on the country of 
origin, as enshrined in Article 3 of the 1951 Refugee Convention
68
. Indeed, non-Syrian 
asylum seekers who are readmitted to Turkey in application of the first pillar of the EU-
Turkey Agreement (‘all new irregular migrants […] will be returned to Turkey’) are 
forced to remain in Turkey, because the possibility of resettlement to Europe via the 
one-for-one mechanism is only foreseen for Syrian nationals. 
This issue may have serious implications, if one considers that in 2016 the 
migration flow along the Eastern Mediterranean route consisted of, approximately, more 
than 50% Syrians, 26% Afghans and 17% Iraqis
69
 – which represent the three main 
countries of nationality of asylum seekers in the EU, and are also among the 
nationalities with the highest recognition rates across the EU (EASO 2016a). Therefore, 
among the non-Syrian asylum seekers who would be returned to Turkey under the EU-
Turkey Agreement there may be many persons with a valid protection claim, who 
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on account of their illegal entry or presence, on refugees who, coming directly from a territory where their 
life or freedom was threatened in the sense of Article 1, enter or are present in their territory without 
authorization, provided they present themselves without delay to the authorities and show good cause for 
their illegal entry or presence’. 
68
 Art. 3 of the 1951 Refugee Convention states: ‘The Contracting States shall apply the provisions of this 
Convention to refugees without discrimination as to race, religion or country of origin’. 
69
 Source: UNHCR Refugees/Migrants Emergency Response: Mediterranean, 
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would be in many cases recognised either refugee status or subsidiary protection in the 
EU (if they managed to apply for asylum there). Conversely, in Turkey they have no 
right to apply neither for the refugee status (due to Turkey’s geographical limitation to 
the 1951 Refugee Convention) nor for temporary protection (which applies to Syrians 
only)
70
. In addition, as described above under section 7.2.1, asylum seekers in Turkey 
generally face a number of substantial problems, including: inadequate asylum 
procedures, lack of reception facilities, insufficient protection standards, limited access 
to residence rights, healthcare, education and employment. Given this situation, the EU-
Turkey Agreement may determine a large disparity between Syrian and non-Syrian 
asylum seekers, which may lead to a serious restriction of the latter’s right to seek and 
to enjoy asylum. 
Thirdly, the right to seek asylum of every person who enter Greece coming from 
Turkey may risk to be limited by the application of the concepts of safe third country 
(STC) and first country of asylum (FCA) to Turkey. As mentioned above in section 
6.2.1.1, the Asylum Procedures Directive (APD) establishes that an asylum application 
may be deemed inadmissible if a third country can be considered as a STC or as a FCA 
for the applicant concerned (Art. 33(2) APD) and it sets out the criteria for a third 
country to be considered a STC (Art. 38(1) APD) or a FCA (Art. 35 APD)
71
. Member 
States authorities may apply the STC concept only to a third country where an asylum 
seeker: 1) would face no risk of persecution; 2) no risk of serious harm (consisting of 
death penalty; torture or inhuman or degrading treatment; or a serious and individual 
threat due to indiscriminate violence in a situation of conflict
72
); 3) no risk of 
refoulement; and 4) where he or she would have the possibility to request refugee status, 
and if found to be a refugee, to receive protection in accordance with the 1951 Geneva 
Convention. The relevant question here is whether Turkey can be considered a STC, as 
defined by Art. 38(1) APD. 
The risk of serious harm in Turkey is increased by at least two factors: firstly, as 
mentioned above in section 7.2.1, asylum seekers may suffer from unhuman and 
                                                 
70
 See section 7.2.1 above. 
71
 See footnotes 35 and 36, under section 6.2.1.1. 
72
 The definition of ‘serious harm’ is set out by Art. 15 of the Qualification Directive. 
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degrading treatment inside Turkish immigration detention centres (Abdolkhani and 
Karimnia v. Turkey; S.A. v. Turkey); secondly, the intensification of the conflict 
between the Turkish government and the Kurdish rebels in the south-east of the country 
represents a serious threat for the life of many asylum seekers and refugees who live in 
that area. As concerns the risk of refoulement, even though Turkey is formally 
committed to abide by the principle (being part of several international human right 
conventions protecting it and having incorporated the principle into its national law
73
), 
serious episodes of violent push-backs at the border and summary removals of asylum 
seekers (especially Syrians) have been repeatedly reported by NGOs (HRW 2015b; 
2016c; Amnesty International 2015b; 2016b). 
Finally, as mentioned above in section 7.2.1, Turkey has ratified the 1951 Refugee 
Convention and its 1967 Protocol, but it maintains a geographical limitation for non-
European asylum seekers, based on which it does not recognise refugee status, as 
defined by the Geneva Convention, to asylum seekers who come from outside Europe 
(i.e. from States that are not members of the Council of Europe). Non-European asylum 
seekers may only apply for a so-called ‘conditional refugee’ status or for subsidiary 
protection, as defined in the 2013 Turkish Law on Foreigners and International 
Protection; Syrian nationals, instead, may apply for a special regime of ‘temporary 
protection’, established by a government regulation in October 201474 (AIDA 2015). 
The sum of these elements lead us to conclude that in most cases Turkey would 
not satisfy the requirements set by the Asylum Procedures Directive to be considered as 
a safe third country (Roman et al. 2016). This is especially true with regards to the last 
requirement (letter (e) of Art. 38(1) APD), since Turkish legal framework on asylum 
currently makes it impossible for a non-European asylum seeker to ‘request refugee 
status’, to be recognised as a refugee, and to ‘receive protection in accordance with the 
Geneva Convention’ (Peers and Roman 2016)75. 
                                                 
73
 Art. 4, Law on Foreigners and International Protection; Art. 6, Temporary Protection Regulation. 
74
 Council of Ministers of the Republic of Turkey, Temporary Protection Regulation of 22 October 2014. 
For further information on the content and rights attached to these different forms of protection (including 
temporary protection for Syrians), see the AIDA Country Report on Turkey as updated in December 2015 
(AIDA 2015). 
75
 On this issue there is disagreement among legal scholars. The requirement at letter (e) of Art. 38(1) 
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As concerns the concept of first country of asylum, Article 35 APD establishes 
that this may only be applied to a third country where an asylum seeker: 1) has been 
recognised as a refugee and can still avail himself or herself of that protection; or 2) 
otherwise enjoys sufficient protection in that country, including benefiting from the 
principle of non-refoulement. Could thus Turkey be considered as a FCA, based on this 
definition? With regards to the first criterion, based on the same reasoning applied 
before, Turkey could not be considered as a FCA for non-European asylum seekers, as 
the latter cannot be recognised as refugees in that country, due to the geographical 
limitation to the 1951 Refugee Convention. Conversely, with regards to the second 
criterion, Turkey could be considered as a FCA because, as mentioned above, it does 
foresee alternative forms of protection for non-European asylum seekers (i.e. 
‘conditional refugee’ status, subsidiary protection, and temporary protection for 
Syrians). 
Nonetheless, it needs to be determined (always through an individual assessment 
of each applicant’s case) whether the protection granted by Turkey qualifies as 
‘sufficient’. Article 35 APD does not provide a definition of ‘sufficient protection’; it 
simply requires that the person concerned benefits from the principle of non-
refoulement (which, as mentioned above, is not always respected by Turkey). In 
addition, Art. 35 APD states that ‘in applying the concept of FCA to the particular 
circumstances of an applicant, Member States may take into account Article 38(1)’. The 
latter would provide for more stringent requirements, however, being a ‘may clause’, 
Member States are not obliged to apply the STC criteria to determine whether a country 
may be considered as a FCA
76
. 
                                                                                                                                               
APD, in fact, has not been univocally interpreted. According to Steve Peers (whose interpretation I share) 
this provision requires that the third country concerned has ratified and fully applies the 1951 Geneva 
Convention, otherwise it seems logically impossible that in that country a person can request refugee 
status, be recognised as a refugee and receive protection in accordance with the Geneva Convention. 
Conversely, according to Daniel Thym, this provision does not require that the third country concerned 
has ratified the 1951 Refugee Convention without any geographic limitation and fully applies it; it is 
sufficient that the third country offers a level of protection which is equivalent to the protection provided 
for by the Refugee Convention (Peers and Roman 2016; Thym 2016). On the same issue, see also the 
debate between Hathaway and Hailbronner on Verfassungblog (Hathaway 2016a; 2016b; Hailbronner 
2016). On its part, the European Commission has explicitly embraced and promoted Thym’s 
interpretation of this crucial requirement (European Commission 2016a, 18). 
76
 According to the UNHCR, even though the APD does not define ‘sufficient protection’, it 
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Therefore, based on Art. 35 APD, national authorities of Member States (i.e. in 
this case Greek authorities) could apply the concept of FCA to Turkey, and thus declare 
an asylum application inadmissible, after having examined on an individual basis 
whether the asylum seeker concerned would enjoy sufficient protection in Turkey and 
would not be at risk of refoulment. However, it should be emphasised that a faulty, 
careless or hasty application of the concepts of STC and FCA in daily practice may 
actually limit, when not violate, the right of many asylum seekers and war refugees to 
seek and enjoy protection. 
With regards to the practical implementation of the EU-Turkey Agreement, NGOs 
have reported several irregularities in the way asylum and return procedures have been 
carried out by Greek authorities. In particular, based on the returnees’ testimonies, 
NGOs have complained that since the implementation of the Agreement has begun, not 
everyone has been granted the possibility to apply for asylum before being readmitted to 
Turkey. They have reported a confused situation on the Greek islands, rushed 
procedures and no access to information, which in some cases have prevented asylum 
seekers to register their asylum claim in Greece (Amnesty International 2016c; HRW 
2016b; Mülteci-Der 2016). These allegations confirm that the practical implementation 
of the EU-Turkey Agreement entails the real risk of restricting the right to seek asylum, 
also due to procedural and operational faults. 
 
7.3.3. The right to an effective remedy 
Article 38(2) of the Asylum Procedures Directive provides for the procedural 
guarantees to be ensured when national authorities apply the concept of safe third 
country and declare an asylum application inadmissible. First of all, the safety of a third 
country must be always assessed on a case-by-case basis, in order to verify whether the 
                                                                                                                                               
follows from the text, context, object and purpose of Article 35 that ‘sufficient protection’ goes beyond 
protection from refoulement. The UNHCR suggests that, for protection to be ‘sufficient’, in the third 
country concerned there should be: no risk of persecution or serious harm; no risk of onward refoulement; 
compliance in law and practice with international standards, including adequate living standards, work 
rights, health care and education; access to a right of legal stay; assistance to persons with specific needs; 
and timely access to a durable solution. However, given the lack of a definition of ‘sufficient protection’ 
in the APD, the UNHCR encourages national (Greek) courts to make a reference for a preliminary ruling 
to the CJEU on the interpretation of Art. 35(b) APD (UNHCR 2016c, 3-4). 
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notion is applicable to the particular circumstances of the individual applicant 
concerned. Moreover, the applicant must be guaranteed the right to challenge the 
application of the STC concept to his or her case, on the grounds that that country may 
not be safe in his or her particular circumstances. Article 35 APD provides for the same 
safeguards in the application of the concept of first country of asylum. 
As set out by the Procedures Directive, applicants shall be given the opportunity 
to consult in an effective manner a legal adviser or other counsellor at all stages of the 
procedure (Article 22(1) APD), including at first instance (Article 31(1) APD) or in 
border procedures, when deciding on the admissibility of an asylum application (Article 
43(1) APD). Legal advisers and counsellors must have access to the applicant for the 
purpose of consultation, including in closed areas such as detention facilities (Article 
23(2) APD). On appeal, Member States must ensure free legal assistance and 
representation on the request of the applicant (Article 20(1) APD). 
In addition, Article 46 APD establishes that, if an asylum application is found 
inadmissible pursuant to Article 33(2) APD, the applicant has the right to an effective 
remedy before a national court or tribunal (Article 46(1)(a)(ii) APD). If the decision on 
the inadmissibility of the application is based on the FCA concept, the court has the 
power to rule whether or not the applicant may remain on the territory of the Member 
State pending the outcome of the remedy, either upon the applicant’s request or acting 
ex officio (Article 46(6)(b) APD); conversely, if the decision on the inadmissibility of 
the application is based on the STC concept, the suspensive effect is automatic (Article 
46(5) APD)
77
. 
Given the procedural safeguards provided for (on paper) by the Asylum 
Procedures Directive, the question is whether the accelerated procedures implied by the 
EU-Turkey Agreement – and promptly put in place by Greece – actually allow for a 
case-by-case examination of the personal circumstances of each asylum seeker (with all 
procedural safeguards being guaranteed), and whether they ensure the possibility for an 
                                                 
77
 However, it should be recalled that, based on Articles 3 and 13 ECHR, as interpreted by the ECtHR, 
the remedy against an inadmissibility decision must have automatic suspensive effect in law and in 
practice, if the applicant has an arguable claim of a risk of ill-treatment upon return or of a risk of onward 
deportation towards a country where he or she may be at risk of such treatment (see section 7.1.1.4 
above). 
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applicant to appeal against an inadmissibility decision, by challenging the application of 
the STC or FCA concepts to his or her particular case. On the one hand, NGOs have 
reported cases where Greek authorities have allegedly failed to properly assess on an 
individual basis the personal circumstances of each applicant before readmitting him or 
her to Turkey, or where they have failed to provide access to information and legal 
assistance to asylum seekers in hotspots (PACE 2016a, para 25; HRW 2016b). 
However, on the other hand, Greek Appeal Committees – the national authority 
responsible for examining recourses against the negative first instance decisions of the 
Greek Asylum Service – have played a significant role in re-examining the cases of 
Syrian asylum seekers who have challenged their return to Turkey under the EU-Turkey 
Agreement. 
Starting from a landmark ruling issued on 17 May 2016, the Greek Appeal 
Committees have begun to uphold the appeals of Syrian asylum seekers against the 
inadmissibility decision on their asylum application, based on the consideration that 
Turkey did not comply with some of the APD requirements to be considered a safe third 
country. More precisely, the Committees have found that Turkey did not comply with 
the non-refoulement principle and/or that the protection provided to Syrians in Turkey 
was substantially different and not in accordance with the 1951 Refugee Convention
78
 
(EDAL 2016; ECRE 2016c; Pro Asyl 2016). 
The European Commission reported in its June 2016 Second Progress Report on 
the implementation of the EU-Turkey Agreement that, until that moment, the first 
instance inadmissibility decisions concerning the asylum applications of Syrian 
nationals had been overturned by the Appeal Committees in a large majority of cases – 
i.e. in 68 cases out of 70 (European Commission 2016g, 4). The two cases in which the 
Appeal Committees found, instead, that Turkey could be considered a STC for the 
applicants, concerned two Syrian adult men who had been living in Turkey for several 
years. In both cases the Committees argued that there was a sufficient connection 
between the applicants and the third country, on the basis of which it would be 
                                                 
78
 The Committees mentioned the fact that temporary protection is not defined as a form of international 
protection and that it does not provide for a residence permit in Turkey to conclude that the core elements 
of protection as enshrined in the 1951 Refugee Convention are not satisfied (EDAL 2016). 
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reasonable for that person to go to that country (i.e. Turkey), as required by Article 
38(2) APD (EDAL 2016). 
In one of these two cases, however, the applicant’s legal representatives applied at 
the ECtHR for interim suspensive measures (under Rule 39 of the Court) in order to 
stop the applicant’s deportation to Turkey79. This was one of the first cases related to 
the EU-Turkey Agreement to be brought before the ECtHR. Another application was 
submitted to the Court in April 2016 by three Afghan nationals who had arrived in 
Chios on 20 March 2016 – the day the EU-Turkey Agreement became operational – and 
were detained in a hotspot on the island; the applicants complain about their conditions 
of detention (alleged violation of Article 3 ECHR), the arbitrariness of their detention 
(alleged violation of Article 5(1) ECHR) and the lack of information on the reasons for 
their detention (alleged violation of Article 5(2) ECHR)
80
. 
In all these cases, including those brought before the Greek Appeal Committees 
and those brought before the ECtHR, the applicants were granted the right to an 
effective remedy. However, following the numerous Appeal Committees’ decisions 
rebutting the STC presumption regarding Turkey, in June 2016 Greece amended its 
asylum law in order to modify the composition of the Appeal Committees
81
. The change 
consisted of increasing the number of state-appointed officials in these three-member 
Committees (two judges of the Administrative Courts instead of one), while reducing 
the number of asylum and human rights experts (one UNHCR representative instead of 
one UNHCR representative and one human rights expert from a list compiled by the 
National Commission on Human Rights) (AIDA 2016b). The purpose of this law 
amendment was clearly that of changing the orientation of the Appeal Committees 
towards a less strict interpretation of the APD requirements for a third country to be 
considered ‘safe’. The National Commission of Human Rights questioned the 
constitutionality of the new composition of the Committees and the compliance of the 
                                                 
79
 The applicant complained that if returned to Turkey his life would be in danger because in Turkey he 
was sought by ISIS, which wanted him to go back to Syria to work for oil production in an ISIS-
controlled area; in addition he would be at particular risk also because of his homosexuality (ECRE 
2016c). 
80
 ECtHR, Raoufi and Others v. Greece, Application No. 22696/16, Communicated Case, 26.05.2016. 
81
 Law No. 4399/2016 of 22 June 2016, Journal of the Government of the Hellenic Republic, Sheet No. 
117. 
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new law with the right to an effective remedy (AIDA 2016b). 
The EU-Turkey Agreement was brought to the attention also of the Court of 
Justice of the EU. Between March and May 2016, three similar applications for 
annulment were lodged with the General Court of the CJEU (under Article 263 TFEU) 
requesting the annulment of the EU-Turkey Agreement
82
 (Council of the EU 2016d). 
The applications were directed against the European Council and were brought on 
behalf of two Pakistani and one Afghan nationals. The applicants claim that the so-
called ‘EU-Turkey Statement’ is an agreement that produces legal effects adversely 
affecting their rights and interests. In particular, they claim that the Agreement exposed 
them to the risk of refoulement to Turkey or ‘chain refoulement’ to Pakistan or 
Afghanistan, thereby obliging them to apply for asylum in Greece against their will. In 
support of their request for annulment, the applicants raised a number of arguments, 
including both procedural issues relating to the adoption of the EU-Turkey Agreement 
and more substantial issues relating to its compatibility with international and European 
human rights standards (Council of the EU 2016d, para 4). 
Finally, in December 2016 the NGO Access Info Europe decided to lodge a 
complaint against the European Commission before the General Court of the CJEU, in 
order to obtain the Commission’s legal analysis of the EU-Turkey Agreement. The 
lawsuit was launched after the Commission denied two access to information requests 
submitted by the NGO in March 2016, asking for ‘copies of the Commission’s own 
evaluation of the legality of what was agreed with Turkey’. The Commission justified 
its denial making reference to issues such as: protection of legal advice, protection of 
decision making and protection of international relations (Access Info Europe 2016a; 
2016b). 
The cases pending before the two European Courts prove the existence of 
different venues, at different levels, for individuals whose rights have been limited or 
violated by the EU-Turkey Agreement to challenge the legality of this instrument and 
seek redress. It will be interesting to follow the developments of this case law, in order 
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 CJEU, N.F. v. European Council, Case T-192/16; N.G. v. European Council, Case T-193/16; 
N.M. v. European Council, Case T-257/16; cases notified to the European Council on 31.05.2016 and 
02.06.2016. 
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to verify whether it will uphold, limit the scope or completely dismiss the EU-Turkey 
Agreement. 
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CONCLUSION 
INFORMALISATION OF COOPERATION ON READMISSION AND 
RESTRICTION OF MIGRANTS’ HUMAN RIGHTS: TWO PARALLEL 
PROCESSES 
 
 
In this work I analysed the external migration policy of the EU and its Member 
States in the Mediterranean area, focusing on policies, instruments and practices of 
cooperation on readmission. Firstly, I examined the development and main features of 
cooperation on readmission at the European level, focusing on its two main instruments 
– i.e. European readmission agreements and Mobility Partnerships (Chapters 2-4). 
Secondly, I investigated cooperation on readmission at the bilateral level, focusing on 
three case studies in the framework of Euro-Mediterranean relations – i.e. migration 
cooperation between Italy and Libya, Spain and Morocco, Greece and Turkey (Chapter 
5). In both analyses I paid a specific attention to the use of both formal and informal 
instruments of cooperation on readmission. In Chapter 6 I defined the concept of multi-
level informalisation of cooperation on readmission and explored this process and its 
main characteristics, focusing in particular on the recent shift at the EU level towards 
broader and more informal frameworks of cooperation, based on policy instruments and 
informal agreements. Finally, in Chapter 7 I considered how bilateral and European 
informal cooperation on readmission may impact on the asylum-related human rights of 
migrants, limiting their possibility to access protection. 
My analysis into this topic moved from two research questions and six hypothesis 
to be investigated (and proved) throughout this study (see Chapter 1, section 1.2). The 
research questions were the following: 1) has there been a shift towards 
‘informalisation’ in cooperation on readmission in the Mediterranean area, both at 
European and bilateral level?; 2) if so, what are the features of this ‘informalisation’ 
process and its implications on migrants’ human rights? 
With regards to the first research question, on the one hand, the investigation into 
how bilateral cooperation on readmission has evolved in the three case studies analysed 
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in Chapter 5 demonstrated that informal instruments and practices have been 
increasingly preferred to formal bilateral readmission agreements. On the other hand, 
the analysis carried out in Chapters 3, 4 and 6 showed that, along with formal European 
readmission agreements, the EU has also increasingly resorted to informal policy or 
quasi-legal instruments of cooperation (e.g. Mobility Partnerships, high-level dialogues, 
migration compacts, the EU-Turkey Agreement, the EU-Afghanistan Joint Way 
Forward Agreement, etc.), thus proving that the informalisation of cooperation on 
readmission has occurred also at the EU level, and that it is a multi-level process. This 
demonstrates my first and second hypotheses, and allows to respond affirmatively to the 
first research question. 
However, two more issues were to be explored in the framework of this first 
research question. The analysis of the role played by Member States in the 
implementation of European formal and informal instruments of cooperation on 
readmission – conducted in sections 3.4.1, 4.4.1 and 6.2.2 with regards, respectively, to 
EURAs, MPs and other informal instruments – showed that the effectiveness of the 
latter (and especially of informal instruments) actually depends on how they are put in 
practice by Member States at the bilateral level; this confirms my third hypothesis. 
Moreover, under section 6.2.3 I examined two examples of a possible re-formalisation 
trend at the European level: the recent launch of negotiations for EURAs with Tunisia 
and Nigeria demonstrates, indeed, that informalisation is not a linear irreversible 
process; rather, in the framework of informal cooperation on readmission, instances of 
re-formalisation may emerge. This proves also my fourth hypothesis. 
With regards to the second research question, the analysis carried out in sections 
6.3 and 6.4 identified and described the main features of informal cooperation on 
readmission
1
, showing that these are actually the same at the bilateral and European 
levels, and thus confirming my fifth hypothesis. Finally, the investigation conducted in 
Chapter 7 revealed the implications of informal cooperation on readmission on the 
protection of the asylum-related human rights of migrants. Drawing upon the three case 
                                                 
1
 These are: the flexibility and immediate operability of informal readmission agreements; their lack of 
transparency and accountability; the role played by non-state actors and international organisations in 
their adoption and implementation. 
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studies of bilateral cooperation (described in Chapter 5) and the case study of the EU-
Turkey Agreement (introduced in Chapter 6, section 6.2.1.1), it emerged that both at the 
bilateral level (section 7.2) and at the European level (section 7.3) the principle of non-
refoulement, the right to seek asylum, the prohibition of collective expulsions and the 
right to an effective remedy have been (or are at risk of being) restricted or violated by 
the recourse to informal readmission instruments and practices. This proves also my 
sixth hypothesis and provides a thorough and comprehensive answer to my second 
research question. 
The increasingly widespread use of informal instruments of cooperation on 
readmission also at the European level is apparently aimed at fastening and easing the 
enforcement of returns from the Member States to third countries, thus improving the 
‘effectiveness’ of the EU return and readmission policy – which, as mentioned above, is 
measured in exclusively quantitative terms. However, as noted by Carrera (2016, 52), 
this logic, i.e. ‘the EU’s current obsession with return rates’, blurs one of the main 
reasons why people cannot be returned, namely the legal status of migrants and asylum 
seekers as holders of fundamental rights and procedural guarantees envisaged in 
international and EU law. 
The recent EU policy shift towards informal readmission arrangements and quasi-
legal or policy instruments serves the purpose of moving cooperation on readmission 
outside of existing formal agreements, which are subject to public scrutiny and 
democratic and judicial accountability. Indeed, the limited transparency, accountability 
and legal certainty of informal cooperation instruments raise serious concerns regarding 
the extent to which readmission procedures can be monitored to ensure their full 
compliance with international and EU law. For this exact reason, already in 2005 
Amnesty International had called on the Council of the EU ‘to refrain from developing 
flexible mechanisms of cooperation on illegal immigration which would include neither 
appropriate legal safeguards, nor proper parliamentary scrutiny’ (2005, 4). 
The recourse to informal instruments and practices of cooperation on migration 
control and readmission in the Mediterranean area has been typically justified by 
European States by the existence of a perceived ‘migration crisis’, ‘humanitarian crisis’, 
or ‘emergency’. This happened, for instance, in the context of Italian-Libyan 
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cooperation to justify the 2009 push-backs at sea, while it is still happening in the 
context of Spanish-Moroccan cooperation, to legitimise the devoluciones en caliente 
which routinely take place in Ceuta and Melilla. More recently, also the EU-Turkey 
Action Plan and the subsequent EU-Turkey Agreement have been grounded on the 
need, from a European perspective, to stem the flow of migrants and asylum seekers 
heading towards Europe in the context of the so-called ‘refugee crisis’. 
In all these cases, the readmission not only of irregular migrants, but also of 
potential asylum seekers and refugees (often carried out in the form of collective 
summary removals) has been (or is still) implemented regardless of whether the transit 
country where migrants were (or are) to be readmitted had (or has) the capacity de iure 
and de facto to fully respect the fundamental human rights of returnees. However, as 
reaffirmed by the ECtHR in the Hirsi case, States cannot evade their responsibility 
under the ECHR (and other human rights conventions) on the basis of obligations or 
commitments arising from other agreements they may have entered into at a later stage 
(Hirsi Jamaa and Others, para 129). 
Notwithstanding the above-mentioned problems and risks, in particular with 
regard to the respect for the rule of law and the protection of migrants’ human rights, 
the EU has decisively turned to informal venues and informal instruments of 
cooperation on readmission. For instance, the new EU approach to migration 
cooperation with African countries based on the concept of ‘Partnership Framework’, is 
clearly informed by a logic of informalisation. The new Partnership Framework, indeed, 
aims to make use of policy tools and external relations instruments (e.g. high-level 
dialogues) as well as quasi-legal arrangements (e.g. informal readmission agreements, 
like the one recently proposed to Mali) in order to improve cooperation on migration 
management on the part of the third countries concerned and, more specifically, to 
increase the number and rate of returns and readmissions. 
A further signal of this informalisation trend is represented by the fact that the 
EU-Turkey Agreement of March 2016 is increasingly referred to by European leaders as 
a model that could be replicated with countries in North Africa, in order to stem the 
mixed migration flow across the Central Mediterranean route. Proposals have emerged 
for negotiating a similar kind of deal for example with Libya or Tunisia, despite the 
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obvious difficulties and challenges that this would entail. Regardless of the actual 
chances that this proposal may be put in practice, what matters here is the impact that 
such a solution could have in terms of restricting, if not violating, the asylum-related 
human rights of a large number of migrants and asylum seekers, some of whom may 
have valid protection claims, including those who come from refugee-producing 
countries or regions in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Horn of Africa. 
The analysis carried out in Chapter 7 demonstrates that the use of informal 
instruments and practices of cooperation on readmission (and the EU-Turkey 
Agreement is one of these instruments) entails the risk of serious human rights 
violations. For this reason, it is particularly worrying that the EU and its Member States 
are supporting the proliferation of informal instruments of cooperation on readmission, 
prioritising the effectiveness of returns whilst disregarding the obligation to ensure 
migrants the actual enjoyment of their rights. To conclude, the process of multi-level 
informalisation of cooperation on readmission goes hand in hand with the restriction of 
the fundamental rights of migrants, in particular those human rights and procedural 
guarantees related to their legal status as potential asylum seekers. Therefore, the EU 
and its Member States should avoid resorting to informal cooperation in the area of 
migration management and readmission, as long as its human rights implications for 
migrants and asylum seekers outweigh its advantages for States. 
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ANNEXES 
Annex 1: List of Interviews 
 
Int. 
No. 
Interviewee Date Place 
1 Migration scholar and expert on Italian-Libyan 
cooperation on migration management 
 
08.10.2015 Amsterdam 
2 Official at the Dutch Ministry of Security and Justice 
(and former official at the European Commission DG 
Home) 
 
10.02.2016 The Hague 
3 Human rights and migration lawyer from Turkey 
 
19.02.2016 Amsterdam 
4 Official at the European Commission DG Home (Dir. 
A – International Coordination) 
 
10.03.2016 Brussels 
5 Official at the European Commission DG Home 
(Dir. C – Irregular migration and return policy) 
 
11.03.2016 Brussels 
6 Official at the European Commission DG Home (Dir. 
A – International Coordination) 
 
11.03.2016 Brussels 
7 Jean-Pierre Cassarino – migration scholar and expert 
on cooperation on readmission and Euro-
Mediterranean relations 
 
21.07.2016 Skype 
interview 
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